The London School of Economics and Political Science The origins of the post-Cold War order in the Middle East: France, Britain, the European Community and transatlantic relations, 1978-1982 Alexandre Dab A thesis submitted to the Department of International History of the London School of Economics and Political Science for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, 11 December 2020 1
Van der Klaauw was in Damascus during the 15th session of the Palestine National Council (PNC), which was taking place between 11 and 19 April. A British assessment of the PNC’s final declaration identified several elements of moderation. Tellingly, one of those was that while Arafat welcomed Brezhnev’s speech on the Middle East, he did so in very general terms, and did not endorse his call for an international conference65. As PLO Central Committee member Muhammad Abu Mayzar had told Patrick Wright, the British Ambassador to Syria, back in February, the Soviet plan did not fit with the current Palestinian strategy. The priority was to gather widespread international support for a new United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution, which would recognise the Palestinian right to self-determination, before agreeing to participate in any sort of negotiations66. In that respect, getting the Americans on board was key, and this was not something that the Soviets could deliver. The Europeans, on the contrary, were in a much better position. The Syrians were of great concern to the Europeans and the ‘moderate’ Arab states, both because it was the Arab country with the closest ties to Moscow, and because it had a significant influence over the PLO. The British, for example, took it upon themselves to maintain contact with Damascus ahead of van der Klaauw’s visit. Reporting to his Community partners on his meetings with President Hafez al-Assad and Foreign Minister Abdul Halim Khaddam, which took place in Damascus on 5 February, Gilmour struck an encouraging tone. He said that when it came to the search for Middle East peace the ‘Syrians had no faith in Israel and the United States, and therefore felt that if anyone could do it, it would have to be Europe.’ Interestingly, Gilmour also noted that neither Assad nor Khaddam had made any reference to the Soviet Union67. Admittedly, Brezhnev had not yet announced his Middle East initiative, but this was nonetheless very unusual. During the Thorn Mission, for example, Khaddam had made several reference to his country’s relationship with Moscow. He had explained that ‘Syria had had to build up her relationship with the Russians in the face of Israeli pressure, Egyptian treachery, Arab indifference and American hostility,’ and that if there was no other choice he would continue to develop this partnership68. The Soviets were indeed ‘physically and economically entrenched’ in the country, as Gilmour reported to Carrington. But, contrary to the Europeans who had the Americans’ ear, they were in no position to help promote Syria’s most pressing interests, namely rebuilding Arab unity and getting back the Golan Heights. According to Gilmour, these goals were more important to the Syrian regime than maintaining its relationship with Moscow, and he concluded from his visit that the Ten had a card to play in Damascus69. The Europeans, therefore, seemed to enjoy a privileged position in Damascus in so far as the Syrians realised that, on the off chance that progress towards peace might happen, the Community constituted their best bet. This was a striking example of how far EPC had come since the 1973 October War as it appeared that the Europeans were now competing with the Soviets for political influence in Syria. For a European role to be acceptable, however, the Ten needed to demonstrate clearly that their initiative was entirely detached from Camp David, and on that count Syria continued to harbour some doubts70. During his time in Damascus, Gilmour spent considerable energy trying to assuage his interlocutors’ suspicion. He went through the text of the Venice Declaration point by point with Khaddam, and painstakingly countered every criticism that came his way71. As Wright subsequently reported, Gilmour’s ‘vigorous’ defence of the European initiative’s independence from Washington had made ‘a considerable impact’ on the Syrian Foreign Minister. As he remarked, ‘[i]t is not often that one hears an admission by Khaddam that he might possibly have been mistaken.’ He also noted that while it was not the first time that the Syrians had welcome a European role, this time he had ‘detected a considerably warmer tone’ coming from Assad72.
Encouraged by the apparent evolution of the Syrian attitude, Gilmour was eager for van der Klaauw to build on the result of his visit. As he reported to his Community partners, Khaddam had been impressed by his explanation of the Venice principles. And he said that if the Syrian Foreign Minister heard something similar from the European delegation, he would reconsider his position on the European initiative73. During his visit to Damascus on 22-23 February, the Dutch Foreign Minister made it clear that the Ten’s efforts were independent from Camp David. And based on his meeting with Assad, he reported that the Syrians had gained confidence in the European initiative’s independence from Washington. Moreover, judging by the various reports of the van der Klaauw mission, it was Khaddam who most actively engaged with the Luxembourg report, and he seemed to have been reassured by what he had heard from the Dutch Foreign Minister74. Ultimately, the Ten’s head of mission concluded that his visit to Damascus ‘had gone rather better than he had expected at the beginning.’75 The evolution of the Syrian attitude towards the European initiative was a significant indication that the Community had gained in credibility. Now, one cannot say from the source base used here the extent to which the European initiative translated into greater Syrian moderation. But what is clear, is that the Community was now regarded as a serious player in Arab-Israeli diplomacy.
It is obviously impossible to say what the PLO and the Syrian reactions to the Soviet initiative would have been without the Community’s involvement. And, the objective here is certainly not to suggest that the Europeans single-handedly prevented a Soviet return at the centre of Middle Eastern diplomacy. Already before the Venice Declaration, the PLO and Syria acknowledged that eventually they would have to deal with the US, and had already distanced themselves from Moscow, and even more so after the invasion of Afghanistan. But, at that juncture, it was clear to them that if the road to peace went through Washington, the road to Washington went through Europe. In that sense, the Community played a significant part in keeping the Arabs looking West at a time when an unprecedented wave of anti-Americanism was sweeping through the Middle East. In doing so, at the very least, they helped navigate the intensification of the superpower confrontation by offering a Western pole of attraction at a time of multiple crises, a situation which had traditionally benefited the Soviet Union. In any case, this further confirms that the Community was playing a meaningful diplomatic role in the Middle East at the beginning of the 1980s, one that certainly deserves a place in the historiography