19. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Nixon1
The following is a report from Secretary Kissinger’s discussions this morning with President Asad of Syria:
“1. I have just completed a five hour discussion with President Asad of Syria. Given the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement, he now appears ready—in a very gingerly way—to try for a disengagement agreement of his own.
“2. During my first meeting with Asad a few weeks ago he insisted that a Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement had to be fully buttoned down before he was willing to commit himself to the Geneva Conference. Today he softened his position somewhat, emphasizing that he must know where he is going and have some indication of the possibilities for disengagement before he fully commits himself to negotiations.
“3. Asad gave me some concrete indications of the kind of disengagement agreement he would accept. Although they are no more than a starting point, I made it clear to him that the substantial pull back he has in mind will certainly be rejected by the Israelis. But he has now at least given us a concrete proposal which he said I could give the Israelis and indicated that he knew he would have ‛to make a further proposal’ if the Israelis reject this one.
“4. I shall make a brief airport stop in Israel on the way home to give them a report of the conversation with Asad. This is a good move, not only because Asad wanted me to do so, but also because as thin a reed as it is it helps relieve pressure on Sadat (who is presently under attack for having agreed to a disengagement scheme without waiting for the Syrians). The fact that the Syrian-Israeli disengagement talks can be said to have begun today will be helpful to Sadat and buy time for all concerned. With this Syrian-Israeli process started it also helps reduce the amount of trouble that the Soviets can cause.
“5. My plan is to describe briefly the Syrian proposal to the Israelis, ask them to study it and come up with concrete ideas of their own which perhaps Dayan can bring to us in ten days or two weeks in Washington. I want the U.S. role to be the same as that we played on the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement negotiation.”
