Summary:
Abdel Halim Khaddam played a pivotal role in strengthening the Syrian-Iranian alliance, which began in early 1979. This alliance was formed after the fall of the Iranian Shah’s rule, the victory of the Iranian revolution in February 1979, and Egypt’s exit from the battle against Israel through the signing of a peace agreement on March 26, 1979. As Foreign Minister, Abdel Halim Khaddam made significant efforts to maintain this alliance and overcome any obstacles that could create disagreements between the two countries. He utilized his diplomacy to ease tensions between Iran and the Arabian Gulf, which had been strained due to the Iraq-Iran war and its impact on the alliance. Syria’s relationship with the Arab Gulf states remained intact, even in the face of potential attacks, as they recognized the importance of maintaining the alliance. The Syrian-Iranian alliance’s goal of sowing discord and disagreements between the two allies served the interests of Israel, which sought to end the alliance.
Introduction:
The study of political figures holds significant importance within the realm of modern and contemporary studies, as it sheds light on how individuals shape and transform their surroundings based on their ideas and aspirations. Such studies provide a comprehensive understanding of the political developments occurring at various levels—internally, regionally, and internationally.
Hence, the research study titled “The Role of Abdel Halim Khaddam towards the Syrian-Iranian Alliance (1979-1982)” aimed to examine Abdel Halim Khaddam’s contributions to the Syrian-Iranian alliance. The study sought to explore the key actions through which Khaddam effectively strengthened the relationship between the two countries and sustained their alliance.
The research covered two main aspects. Firstly, it delved into the Syrian-Iranian alliance and Abdel Halim Khaddam’s pivotal role within it during the period of 1979 to 1988. This encompassed an examination of the alliance’s origins and the factors that contributed to its formation. Secondly, the study focused on Khaddam’s diplomatic endeavors to mitigate conflicts between Iran and the Arab Gulf states from 1979 to 1988.
First, the inception of the Syrian-Iranian alliance and Abdel Halim Khaddam’s stance on it from 1979 to 1982:
Significant changes and transformations have occurred in the Arab region, directly impacting Syria’s relations with other countries. Following the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli agreement in September 1978, President Hafez Al-Assad’s hope for Egypt’s reengagement diminished. Egypt’s decision to comply with Israeli wishes, convinced at the last moment that Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem would only hold symbolic value, raised concerns. Nevertheless, the Egypt-Israel agreement can be attributed to Egypt’s commitment to permanently renounce conflict with Israel for future generations.
Consequently, Hafez al-Assad sensed a conspiracy against him due to his rejection of the Camp David Agreement. This rejection was accompanied by a wave of armed violence within the territories, along with a media campaign targeting him personally and his regional role. Al-Assad believed it was imperative to address the matter through two crucial tracks in Syrian foreign policy: giving full weight to the Soviet Union after perceiving American policy bias towards Israel, and supporting the Islamic Revolution in Iran, which unfolded in February 1979. This revolution emerged as a game-changer, tilting the balance of power in Syria’s favor and breaking its isolation.
Links between Damascus and the leadership of the Islamic Revolution had been established several years prior to its triumph in Tehran. Relations commenced through connections with Imam Musa al-Sadr, who frequently visited Damascus in the 1970s and became a personal friend of President Hafez al-Assad. While the initial foundation of relations between Syria and the leaders of the Islamic Revolution stemmed from the Iranian opposition to the Shah regime, Syria fostered good relations with certain factions. Musa al-Sadr played a pivotal role in these relations through the movement for the liberation of Iran.
Damascus provided support to the Iranian opposition, offering refuge to Ayatollah Khomeini and granting Syrian passports to certain Iranian leaders. Ayatollah Khomeini sought sanctuary in Syria after being expelled from Iraq in 1978, where he stayed for several months before moving to Paris. From Paris, he led the revolution that eventually led to his triumphant return to Tehran on February 11, 1979, following the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the sudden downfall of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.
The Syrian government warmly welcomed this transformation and viewed it as a victory for their own interests. They expressed their willingness to cooperate and coordinate with the new leadership in Iran. As soon as Mr. Ruhollah Khomeini announced the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad considered it necessary to align with this endorsement in line with his higher interests. He made determined efforts to convince Arab leaders that Khomeini’s Iran was distinct from the previous regime led by the Shah.
It appears that President Hafez al-Assad’s support for the Islamic Revolution stemmed from his need for a strong ally comparable in size to Egypt, which had abandoned Syria, leaving it to face Israel alone. Consequently, he found this new ally in Iran.
Syria began supporting the establishment of the Islamic Revolution in Iran based on the principle of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” Iran had voiced its opposition against Israel and the United States, referring to the latter as the “Great Satan.” Syria aimed to capitalize on this shared hostility and sought to obtain support from Iran at various levels.
Therefore, Syria initiated the process of forming an alliance with the Islamic Republic of Iran to gain a strategic depth that would enable it to enhance its defense capabilities against Israel. Additionally, Syria considered it in the interest of the Arab nations to extend support to Iran following the end of the Shah regime, which had been an ally of Israel and later positioned itself against the United States. Syria sought to align itself with Iran after the Shah’s downfall.
In light of this, Foreign Minister Abdel Halim embraced the success of the revolution in Iran with great enthusiasm and deep optimism. Amidst Arab divisions and Israeli attacks, he emphasized that Syria’s support for the Iranian revolution was not a tactical or temporary stance. It was a consistent and principled position. He affirmed Syria’s unwavering commitment to stand alongside the Iranian revolution in its just struggle against aggression. He highlighted that the Islamic Revolution’s solidarity with Arab issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict and its decision to sever diplomatic ties with Israel laid a solid foundation for establishing a close alliance between Iran and Syria, which formed the cornerstone of Arab-Iranian relations. Unsurprisingly, Syria’s swift support for the Islamic Revolution raised concerns in Israel and prompted quick actions to address the situation. On March 26, 1979, Israel signed a peace treaty with Egypt, marking the end of the conflict between the two countries and initiating a new phase in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, significantly altering the balance of power.
Against this backdrop, Abdel Halim Khaddam publicly expressed his views at the Fez Conference held in Morocco on May 18, 1979. He denounced the Sadat-Begin Treaty as a significant step towards war, a conspiracy against Arab rights and interests, and a compromise on the cause of Palestine. He believed that the treaty had isolated Egypt and brought it under the umbrella of Israel. Khaddam emphasized that the Iranian revolution’s victory was evident, as it had secured the eastern gateway of the Arab nation. He noted that many had embraced its principles, and the confrontation with Israel would extend beyond the Arab world to any place where it is faced.
Furthermore, President Hafez Al-Assad aimed to convince the Arab nations to view Iran as an influential force equivalent to Egypt, following Egypt’s withdrawal from the Arab-Israeli conflict. He emphasized this point by stating that Iran, as a Muslim and neighboring country, had undergone a revolution. It championed the cause of supporting the Arabs in their struggle against Israeli aggression and working towards the restoration of Palestinian rights. Undoubtedly, Israel had isolated Egypt from the Arab sphere, but it had lost Iran, which had aligned itself with Syria. Consequently, Syria’s endeavors to unite with Iraq and establish closer ties with Iran raised concerns in Israel. The Israeli leadership closely monitored Syrian maneuvers aimed at constructing an eastern front to compensate for Egypt’s absence. Israel’s counterstrategy focused on preventing the formation of an Eastern Front led by Syria through any available means, striving to maintain a distance between Iraq and Syria and hinder Arab unity between the two countries. Israel perceived Iraq’s rising regional influence as a threat.
On the other hand, Syria made efforts to mediate and alleviate tensions between Iran and Iraq, seeking to foster Arab solidarity with Iran. However, the stances of Damascus and Baghdad towards the Iranian revolution were inconsistent. Syria viewed Khomeini differently from the Shah, especially regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict and his opposition to Israel. Conversely, Iraq believed that Khomeini posed no lesser danger than the Shah, demanding that he cease interfering in Iraq’s internal affairs and withdraw from Arabistan, the islands of Lower Tunb, Greater Tunb, and Abu Musa, while recognizing Iraq’s sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab.
Consequently, the Syrian government encountered difficulties in achieving an Iraqi-Iranian rapprochement, which coincided with an escalation of tension between Iraq and Syria, particularly after Saddam Hussein assumed power in Iraq on July 16, 1979. This escalation heightened concerns in Damascus, especially as Egypt aligned itself with the pro-Western camp. Syria feared that other Arab parties, including Jordan, might follow suit, leading to increased isolation and a weakened position vis-à-vis Israel. Therefore, Syria deemed it necessary to strengthen its relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran in order to overcome its isolation.
Consequently, Abdel Halim Khaddam embarked on a significant diplomatic mission to Iran, aiming to enhance relations between the two nations. He arrived in Tehran on August 15, 1979, where he received a warm welcome from Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi and several Iranian officials. The discussions centered around Syria’s aspiration to establish strategic ties with the new Iranian government. Khaddam emphasized that the Iranian revolution had altered the balance of power, favoring the Arab nation, with the primary focus on the Palestine issue. He further emphasized that Egypt’s departure from the Arab camp and the triumph of the Iranian revolution would contribute positively to restoring balance in the region vis-à-vis Israel.
On the same day, Khaddam held a meeting with Iranian Prime Minister Mehdi Bazarkan, accompanied by Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi and Deputy Prime Minister Sadiq Al-Tabtabaei. Bazarkan shed light on the revolution’s objectives and the widespread consensus supporting it, assuring Khaddam that the Islamic revolution in Iran would foster strong relations with Syria as a brotherly nation. On behalf of the Syrian leadership, Khaddam extended congratulations to Iranian officials on the revolution’s success, expressing great hopes for its impact in propelling Iran into a new phase of Arab-Iranian cooperation integration.
The following day, Khaddam visited the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he met with Ibrahim Yazdi and several ministry personnel. He conveyed the satisfaction of the Syrian people and leadership with the triumph of the Islamic revolution in Iran, recognizing it as a profound change in regional dynamics. Ibrahim Yazdi affirmed that collaboration between the Islamic Revolution and Syria would yield fruitful outcomes for both nations and the region. Consequently, Khaddam’s discussions with Iranian officials led to increased political and economic cooperation between the two countries, fostering ongoing consultations across various fields and coordinated efforts and positions on pertinent issues.
Thus, it can be asserted that Abdel Halim Khaddam aimed to enhance the alliance and cooperation between Syria and Iran through his diplomatic efforts, aligning with the interests of both nations. His primary objectives encompassed establishing connections and strengthening relations with Iran in economic, political, and military spheres.
Consequently, Abdel Halim Khaddam successfully demonstrated Syria’s recognition of the new regime. During Friday prayers at Tehran University on Jerusalem Day, Iranians witnessed his speech addressing Syria’s stance on the Palestinian cause, particularly Jerusalem. He paid tribute to Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic revolution in Iran.
Abdel Halim Khaddam achieved his desired outcomes during his visit to Tehran when he met Ayatollah Khomeini at his residence in Qom on August 18, 1979. Accompanied by Iranian Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi, they exchanged greetings, and Khaddam expressed Syria’s profound hopes for the Islamic Revolution’s success under Khomeini’s leadership. He conveyed President Hafez al-Assad’s greetings and assured Khomeini of Syria’s commitment to strengthen relations with Iran amid American and Israeli pressures.
In response, Ayatollah Khomeini emphasized that the Islamic Revolution had triumphed against tyranny and injustice, relying on the power of the people. He affirmed their support for the oppressed and deprived, standing with the Palestinian people against the global arrogance of power. He expressed confidence that Muslims would ultimately prevail over injustice, aggression, and oppression. At the conclusion of their discussions, Khaddam was asked to convey gratitude and greetings to President Hafez al-Assad, emphasizing Khomeini’s commitment to strong relations with Syria.
Following the conclusion of his talks, Abdel Halim Khaddam departed Tehran for Damascus. Upon his arrival, he briefed President Hafez al-Assad and the party leadership about the visit’s progress, assuring them that favorable conditions for cooperation with the new Iranian regime were present.
In light of this, it becomes evident that this alliance began to manifest its characteristics when Syria stood alongside its ally Iran during the American hostage crisis in Tehran in 1979, involving the United States of America. Damascus declared its support for Tehran’s actions and called on Arab countries to rally behind Iran. While attending the 10th Arab Summit Conference in Tunisia in late October 1979, Abdel Halim Khaddam expressed the Iranian revolution’s tangible assistance to the Palestinian cause, asserting that it is only natural for the Arabs to support Iran in its crisis with the United States of America. Consequently, the head of the Syrian Air Force, Mohammad Al-Kholi, visited Tehran on November 25, 1979, where he engaged in discussions with several advisers of Ayatollah Khomeini. The outcome of the meeting was the establishment of closer cooperation between the Syrian and Iranian intelligence services. Additionally, two teams of Syrian intelligence arrived in Iran to establish a permanent military base.
On February 1, 1980, President Hafez Al-Assad and Abdel Halim Khaddam paid a visit to Tehran with the objective of developing relations between the two nations, particularly in terms of regulating the new Iranian regime’s relationship with regional countries. The visit also aimed to support Iran in its struggle against the economic sanctions imposed by the United States of America and to help alleviate its isolation. President Assad emphasized Syria’s readiness to maintain its relations with Iran and find a resolution to the hostage crisis with the United States of America.
By April 1980, the United States chose a military option to rescue its hostages held in Tehran, conducting operations on Iranian territory on April 24, 1980. This operation resulted in losses on all sides. Syria condemned these actions and labeled the United States’ operation as piracy, targeting Iran and its people.
Following the unsuccessful attempt by the United States of America to free its hostages, Iranian Foreign Minister Sadiq Qutbzadeh conducted an official visit to Damascus on April 27, 1980. During his visit, he met with President Hafez al-Assad and Abdel Halim Khaddam, providing them with updates on the latest developments in the hostage liberation process. Qutbzadeh commended Syrian support for Iran and its positive stance. President Assad reaffirmed his support for the Islamic Republic of Iran in its opposition to the United States.
President Assad strongly condemned the military operations carried out by the United States, deeming them a clear violation of Iran’s safety, independence, and sovereignty. He emphasized that these operations posed a threat to peace and security in both countries.
Abdel Halim Khaddam held a press conference in Damascus on April 29, 1980, where he expressed solidarity with the Iranian Republic and denounced the American attack, emphasizing that it targeted both the Arabs and Iran.
In response to these events, Syria initiated a significant air transfer of Soviet-made weapons to Iran. Syrian cargo planes, specifically Antonov-12, transported weapons from Syrian stockpiles to Iranian airports. The weapons included 23 mm anti-aircraft guns, mortars, military ammunition, and other Syrian weapons sent to Iran. Moreover, Syria dispatched training units from its army to Iran to provide training and expertise on the use of Iranian and Soviet weapons.
On September 15, 1980, Iran became embroiled in a political crisis with Iraq due to various reasons, including President Saddam Hussein’s announcement on September 17, 1980, unilaterally canceling the Algiers Agreement. This cancellation ultimately led to the outbreak of war between the two countries on September 22, 1980. Iraqi aircraft initiated raids on Tehran airport and other airports across Iran, launching a comprehensive attack. Consequently, the war between the two nations commenced.
At the onset of the war, most Arab countries declared their support for Iraq. However, Syria refrained from taking any action against either Iraq or Iran. President Hafez al-Assad initiated communication with several Arab presidents with the aim of halting the conflict. He expressed his belief that the war against Iran was misguided and would exhaust both countries, diverting their attention from the primary conflict against Israel. Syria remained quiet in the initial weeks of the war as it sought to assess the resilience of its ally.
Upon confirming Iran’s determination and resilience, Syria concluded that it should extend support to Iran rather than abandon it. Syria deemed it necessary to embrace Iran as an ally, despite pressures from certain countries. As a result, Syria announced its solidarity with Iran in its war against Iraq and provided support through media, financial means, and military assistance. Syria believed that decisive measures were required to prevent Iraq from achieving victory over Tehran, which would directly threaten Syria.
In light of this, Abdel Halim Khaddam condemned the Iraq-Iran war, stating that it was the wrong war against the wrong enemy at the wrong time. He emphasized that the Iraqi president initiated the war without consulting any Arab countries, proposing that matters could have been resolved through the International Court of Justice instead of hastily declaring war. Furthermore, Khaddam alleged that Iran’s intentions were to occupy Iraq and subsequently the Gulf states. He emphasized that the war being fought was solely Iraq’s war and not a war of the Arab nations, asserting that Iran was defending itself.
Consequently, Assad deemed it necessary to strengthen Syria’s defense capabilities in order to serve as a focal point in confronting Israel. Additionally, he emphasized the importance of supporting Syria’s ally, Tehran, in participating in this confrontation. Recognizing the need for assistance, Syria sought reliance on the Soviet Union, as the war would keep Iraq occupied and remove it from Arab strategies for an extended period.
In light of this, on October 3, 1980, President Hafez al-Assad summoned Abdel Halim Khaddam to discuss the possibility of concluding a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union as a response to the evolving situation. Abdel Halim Khaddam wholeheartedly supported the signing and conclusion of the treaty, emphasizing its necessity in strengthening defense and military capabilities, particularly considering the challenges in procuring weapons from the West. In terms of national armaments, Syria had no alternative but to rely on Soviet weapons. Consequently, the Soviet Union ensured assistance to Syria’s ally, Iran.
On October 8, 1980, Syria officially signed the Treaty of Friendship (64) with the Soviet Union. Despite this development, Syria continued to criticize Iraq’s engagement in the war with Iran, prompting the Iraqi government to sever its relations with Damascus on October 9, 1980. The severance was accompanied by accusations of treason and media manipulation, alleging that Syrian soldiers were fighting alongside Iranian forces. These accusations were aimed at mobilizing Iraqi public opinion against Syria, particularly following Iraq’s incursion into Iranian territory. President Hafez al-Assad, accompanied by Abdel Halim Khaddam, worked to contain the ongoing conflict between the two parties.
To that end, on October 17, 1980, they embarked on a tour to visit Arab countries, including the Arab Gulf states, North and South Yemen, Libya, and Algeria, holding discussions with their respective presidents. This initiative was based on Syria’s geopolitical role in the Arab world, emphasizing the need for integration among supporting countries and those confronting common challenges. Integration was rooted in Arab solidarity and the shared goal of safeguarding Arab national security in the face of Israel.
During these talks, Abdel Halim Khaddam reassured the heads of Arab states that further escalation of the war with Iran would have devastating consequences. It would invite the return of foreign fleets and major powers to the region, leading to divisions among Arabs and weakening their unity against Israel. Despite accusations against Syria for abandoning its principles, Abdel Halim Khaddam persisted in his discussions with Arab officials, striving to mitigate biases against Iran, which remained an ally to Syria.
After returning, Abdel Halim Khaddam convened a meeting with the heads of Syrian media institutions in Damascus on October 24, 1980, given the deteriorating military situation between Iraq and Iran. During the meeting, he briefed them on the political landscape and requested that they cease media campaigns against Iraq as per President Assad’s request. He also instructed them to report news of the war objectively, without any additions or distortions, emphasizing that the Iraqi leadership believed their army had entered Iranian territory following the collapse of the Iranian army after the revolution. Consequently, this leadership accused Syria of supporting Iran’s involvement in the war by sending Syrian fighters to join Iranian forces.
In addition to navigating the military situation, Syrian diplomacy sought to forge an alliance with Iran in response to the internal challenges faced by the Syrian regime, such as the ongoing bombings by the Muslim Brotherhood. The situation reached a critical point with the open rebellion in Hama in early February 1982, triggering a comprehensive sectarian conflict along Sunni lines. President Hafez al-Assad emphasized the necessity of maintaining a relationship with Iran to delegitimize the opposition.
Amidst the events in Hama, both countries expedited the signing of a long-term commercial and economic protocol on March 14, 1982. Abdel Halim Khaddam signed the agreement in Tehran. The protocol encompassed the annual export of 9 million tons of Iranian oil to Syria, including around 20,000 barrels provided free of charge, in exchange for Syrian phosphate exports to Iran. Additionally, it entailed the closure of Syria’s borders with Iraq and the shutdown of the crucial Iraqi-Syrian oil pipeline from Kirkuk to Banias, extending to Tripoli in northern Lebanon. These measures directly impacted the Iraqi economy, which heavily relied on the pipeline for its war efforts.
Considering the aforementioned developments, historical evidence confirms that the Syrian-Iranian alliance was not a temporary occurrence but rather a response to political dynamics in the region. Abdel Halim Khaddam played a pivotal role in architecting and nurturing this alliance, recognizing it as a fundamental pillar in countering the shared Arab enemy and countering Israel’s plan to sideline Egypt from the Arab-Israeli conflict, with the intention of replacing it with Tehran.
Secondly, let’s discuss Abdel-Halim Khaddam’s diplomatic efforts to mitigate the conflict between Iran and the Arab Gulf states from 1979 to 1988. The year 1979 witnessed a series of risks and crises throughout the Arabian Gulf region.
In early February of the same year, Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Tehran from Paris, receiving an enthusiastic public reception. During this occasion, he announced the downfall of the Shah regime and the establishment of the Islamic Revolution. This revolution not only brought about significant changes to the structure of Iran’s political system but also had far-reaching implications for its foreign policy, particularly within the regional context of the Arabian Gulf.
One of the primary objectives of the Iranian Islamic Revolution was to encourage neighboring countries to adopt the revolution’s principles, objectives, and approach. This principle, known as the “export of the revolution,” aimed to disseminate the model of a global Islamic state that rejected the recognition of geographical boundaries between Islamic nations. Instead, it emphasized the existence of ideological boundaries under which other countries were expected to submit to Iran’s authority.
Iran’s adoption of this policy is evident in Mr. Khomeini’s statements, in which he criticized the monarchies and called for the destruction of corrupt regimes and the overthrow of unfair rulers. He deemed it a duty assigned to all Muslims worldwide to support a victorious Islamic political revolution. Consequently, there was a call to export the Iranian Islamic revolution to countries in the Arabian Gulf, which posed a significant security challenge to these nations. They perceived the Iranian regime as aiming to overthrow existing ruling regimes and establish ones loyal to Iran.
Moreover, the political landscape of Iran, along with its changing perception of the Iranian revolution, had a profound impact on the Gulf states, particularly the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This was primarily due to Iran’s campaign against the Saudi regime, advocating for the removal of Saudi supervision over the holy sites and Ayatollah Khomeini’s call to place Mecca and Medina under joint Islamic sovereignty. The Islamic Revolution Organization in the Arabian Peninsula accused Saudi Arabia of atheism and anti-Islamic practices.
Furthermore, tensions have been escalating between the Arab Gulf states and Iran, sparked by statements made by Sadiq Al-Rouhani, a prominent figure of the Islamic Revolution, during a press conference held in Qom on June 15, 1979.
During the conference, Al-Rouhani declared that Bahrain would remain the fourteenth region of Iran under the old administrative division. Then, on July 17 of the same year, he further asserted that the Shah’s parliament, which had abandoned the claim to Bahrain in 1970, was illegitimate, and Iran would renew its claim to Bahrain.
These statements caused significant embarrassment for Mehdi Bazarkan’s government in its relations with the Arab Gulf countries, particularly Bahrain. The Bahraini government had concerns that Iran would revive its territorial claim. As a result, Iran dispatched Deputy Prime Minister Sadiq Al-Tabtabaei on an official visit to Damascus in early October 1979. His purpose was to discuss the dispute between Iran and neighboring Arab countries, including the Arab Gulf states. During his visit, he held meetings with President Hafez al-Assad, Abdel Halim Khaddam, and other senior Syrian officials. Al-Tabtabaei sought Syrian mediation to alleviate tensions between Iran and the Gulf states.In response to his request, President Hafez al-Assad addressed the matter.
Accordingly, in October 1979, accompanied by the Iranian Deputy Prime Minister, Abdel Halim Khaddam visited Bahrain. He held meetings with the Emir of Bahrain, Issa bin Salman, and other Bahraini officials, offering Syrian mediation to settle the differences between Iran and Bahrain. Khaddam’s objective was to clarify Iran’s position on Al-Rouhani’s statements regarding Bahrain. During the discussions, Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Sadiq Al-Tabtabaei, stated that Iran had no ambitions in Bahrain and sought to establish good relations with Manama.
As a result of Abdel Halim Khaddam’s mediation efforts to resolve the dispute between the two countries, their relationship improved. This progress led to Tehran’s agreement to appoint an ambassador to Manama, easing concerns in Bahrain.
Additionally, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia witnessed widespread demonstrations on November 27, 1979, in the Eastern Province, under the slogan of “Solidarity Day with the Iranian Revolution” and against the United States of America. Demonstrators criticized the policy of the ruling regime in Saudi Arabia. While Iranian officials welcomed these demonstrations, the authorities suppressed them severely, attributing them to the incitement of certain parties.
The Kingdom declared that the principles of the Iranian revolution posed a threat to the security of the Arabian Gulf and took a stand against it. Furthermore, they encouraged other Gulf states to oppose these principles.
By 1980, the position of the Gulf states had changed concerning the Islamic Revolution, largely due to Iranian threats that culminated in the Iraq-Iran War in September of the same year. Iran expanded its confrontation to the Gulf states and exploited the presence of Iranian communities in the region to destabilize internal security. These actions instilled fear in the Gulf states, as they perceived a risk to their systems due to the methods employed by Iran to export the revolution and bring down existing regimes while establishing loyal ones.
Consequently, the Gulf states sought to confront these threats through closer ties with Iraq, with Saudi Arabia taking the lead.
In light of the developments in the Iraq-Iran war, the Arab Gulf states reached an agreement to establish the Gulf Cooperation Council on February 4, 1981, as a regional structure aimed at maintaining their security against potential threats.
Considering this situation, the Iraq-Iran war became a focal point of disagreement between the Gulf states and Iran. The Syrian government also took a keen interest in this matter, with a desire to prevent the escalation of the war and provocation of the Gulf states, despite occasional related issues.
Therefore, Abdel Halim Khaddam’s efforts focused on two parallel lines. The first was to contain the dispute between Tehran and the Gulf states through dialogue, providing assurances and commitments that Syria would stand with the Gulf states in the event of any conflict with Iran or others. The second line of action involved urging the Iranian leadership to prioritize reassuring the Gulf states, assuring them that Iran would not take any actions that would raise concerns and have negative repercussions on the region.
Accordingly, Abdel Halim Khaddam conveyed the details of this policy to Iranian Foreign Minister Sadiq Qutbzadeh during his visit to Damascus on January 5, 1982. Khaddam emphasized the need and importance of calming the situation with the Gulf states and considering their circumstances and concerns. He highlighted that escalating tensions would only lead to increased cooperation between the Gulf states and Iraq, further expanding the war and potentially inviting external intervention to control the region and its resources. Khaddam also communicated the desire of the Arab Gulf states to establish good relations with Iran, based on what had been learned about them. At the end of the talks, the Iranian minister was requested to convey these demands to his leadership and continue Abdel Halim Khaddam’s efforts to resolve the differences between the Arab Gulf states and Iran.
At the request of President Hafez Al-Assad, Sadiq Qutbzadeh visited Saudi Arabia on January 10, 1982. He was warmly received by Saudi King Fahd bin Abdulaziz. Discussions were held between them regarding the outcomes of the Iranian Foreign Minister’s visit to Damascus. Khaddam presented all the topics discussed between the Syrian government and the Iranian Foreign Minister regarding the regional situation, the dangers it faced, and the ongoing conflicts that posed a threat to all Arab countries. Khaddam assured the Iranian minister that the Arab Gulf states recognized the new Iranian regime and were willing to cooperate with it, while urging Tehran to cease the propaganda against Bahrain and other regimes.
When communicating with Saudi officials, Abdel Halim Khaddam discussed the Iranian government’s intention to establish normal relations with the Arab Gulf states, expressing their concern about potential involvement of the Gulf states in the war. He informed them about the assurances given by the Iranian Foreign Minister to the Saudi king, which can be summarized as follows:
- Iran will refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of any country in the region. They have no ambitions in Bahrain or any neighboring countries and are willing to halt media campaigns against the Gulf states.
- He emphasized that the slogans chanted by pilgrims during the Hajj season would not infringe upon Saudi sovereignty or internal affairs. Instead, those slogans were directed against the United States and Israel, as an opportunity to unite Muslims from various nations and raise awareness that their primary adversaries were Israel and the United States of America.
- It was clarified that the official viewpoints of the Islamic Revolution were solely expressed by Ayatollah Khomeini or the Prime Minister. Any other statements were considered unofficial. Furthermore, Iran expressed its readiness to dispatch goodwill delegations to the Arab Gulf states and reciprocate by receiving similar missions in Tehran.
In response to these demands, Abdel Halim Khaddam conveyed to the Saudi king that, in exchange for these assurances, Iran expected the Gulf states not to support Iraq in the ongoing war.
On the other hand, the Saudi king’s response to Abdel Halim Khaddam was that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia supports these proposals to prevent differences and clashes and bring an end to tension in the region. He regarded them as beneficial for both countries and expressed gratitude for Khaddam’s efforts in this initiative. The king requested him to continue his endeavors to alleviate tensions between the two nations. Consequently, Abdel Halim Khaddam persisted in his efforts to enhance relations between Iran and the Arab Gulf states. He visited Kuwait on January 11, 1982, and met with Prince Jaber Al-Ahmed in the presence of Kuwait’s Foreign Minister, Sabah Al-Ahmed. He shared with them the discussions that had taken place between Damascus and Tehran, which he had previously presented to the Saudi king. He observed the growing fear and concern of Kuwait, along with other Gulf countries, regarding the policies of the new Iranian regime. Thus, he aimed to alleviate these apprehensions and address their concerns. Due to the situation in the Arabian Gulf and its potential consequences if the conflict escalated, the Emir of Kuwait welcomed Khaddam’s mediation in an attempt to strengthen Kuwait’s relationship with Tehran. It is undeniable that the Iraq-Iran war was taking place on the borders and at times in the waters of the Arab Gulf states. The Arab Gulf states perceived Iraq, in its war, as capable of deterring and eradicating the Islamic Revolution. Consequently, they provided financial and economic aid and facilities, including the use of ports for transportation of goods and equipment. Additionally, a pipeline was established to transport Iraqi oil to Yanbu port in Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, as the war between Iran and Iraq persisted, the latter initiated political and diplomatic moves towards Egypt to restore their relationship. On January 7, 1983, a meeting between the foreign ministers of Iraq and Egypt was held after a four-year hiatus. Egypt declared its solidarity with Iraq in its war against Iran, which heightened Syria’s concerns. In response, Syria announced its support for its ally Iran and decided to aid its war effort, considering it one of the pillars of competition against the Saudi-Iraqi-Egyptian coalition. During his visit to Tehran on March 11, 1983, Abdel Halim Khaddam stated that the main purpose of his visit was to work towards avoiding the expansion of the war between Iran and Iraq.
In conjunction with the above, on March 18, 1983, Abdel Halim Khaddam visited the Arab Gulf states with the aim of preventing the formation of an Arab bloc that would neutralize the Syrian-Iranian alliance. He had a meeting with Saudi King Fahd bin Abdulaziz, who offered mediation to restore relations between Syria and Iraq. However, Abdel Halim Khaddam rejected this mediation due to its potential impact on the progress of Syrian-Iranian relations. He also declined the generous offer of 2 billion dollars made by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which was contingent upon Syria opening the oil pipeline through its territory, as it would be seen as cooperation with Iraq, Iran’s adversary.
Undoubtedly, Abdel Halim Khaddam’s efforts to mediate and resolve the differences and tensions between the Arab Gulf states and Iran yielded results. Particularly, Saudi Arabia rejected Iraq’s demands for the Arab Gulf states to stand by them in the war, stating that Iraq did not consult them before deciding to declare war on Iran. This stance was confirmed by Saudi King Fahd bin Abdulaziz to the Syrian Minister of Information, Ahmed Iskandar. Saudi Arabia also denounced Iraq’s media campaign against Syria, acknowledging Syria’s substantial efforts to contain the war and end the fighting for the benefit of all parties involved. However, this period of relative stability did not last long.
The situation grew more precarious and critical in early 1984, mainly due to the escalating war between Iraq and Iran. Iranian offensive military operations against Iraq intensified, leading to the expulsion of Iraqi forces from most Iranian territories and enabling Iranian forces to penetrate some areas of Iraq. As a result, concerns mounted in Iraq and the Arab Gulf states. Simultaneously, they exerted increasing pressure on Syria to take a stand against Iran.
As a result of the worsening military situation in Iraq, Iraq resorted to targeting Iranian economic facilities, particularly oil, using French aircraft equipped with precision missiles. They conducted airstrikes on the Iranian island of Kharg and attacked tankers en route to Iranian oil refineries. This air blockade contributed to the depletion of Iran’s export and financial capabilities, which were already suffering from the economic blockade imposed by the West, as well as the burdens of the ongoing war with Iraq. In response, Iran resorted to intercepting ships bound for Saudi and Kuwaiti ports.
Consequently, the Arab Gulf states became a battleground, with two Kuwaiti tankers being bombed on May 13, 1984. Kuwait officially accused Iran of carrying out the attacks, while Iran threatened that it would not guarantee the safety of shipping routes in the Gulf if the security of its oil port on Kharg Island continued to be threatened.
In light of these developments, the foreign ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries convened an extraordinary meeting on May 17, 1984, in Riyadh. They issued a final statement condemning the Iranian attacks on shipping to and from the ports of the GCC member states, considering it an assault on all countries.
Considering the situation, King Fahd bin Abdulaziz dispatched his Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Al-Tuwaijri to deliver a message to the Syrian President, addressing the crisis in the Gulf and expressing concerns about the potential expansion of the war. The continuation of Iranian operations could prompt the involvement of military forces from major countries to protect their interests. This, in turn, could lead to these countries gaining control over the oil wells and declaring dominance over the region. Such a scenario would not be in the best interest of the Gulf states, Syria, or Iran. King Fahd requested President Hafez al-Assad’s intervention with Iran and conveyed that Saudi Arabia was prepared to cease its assistance to Iraq.
Due to the urgency and deterioration of the situation between Tehran and the Gulf states, Hafez al-Assad agreed to the Saudi king’s request to intervene and resolve the dispute between them and Iran. He instructed his deputy, Abdel Halim Khaddam, and his foreign minister, Farooq al-Shara, to travel to Tehran and clarify Saudi Arabia’s position regarding the Iranian attacks on ships and their impact on the region.
In response, Abdel Halim Khaddam and Farouq al-Shara journeyed to Tehran on May 24, 1984, and held a meeting with Iranian President Ali Khamenei. During the meeting, Abdel Halim Khaddam discussed the Saudi demands with the Iranian president, expressing concerns about the risks associated with the war’s escalation and the potential involvement of the Gulf countries’ allies, the United States and Israel. He emphasized the importance of halting the ongoing conflict to prevent further deterioration. In response, the Iranian president stated that Iran does not desire an expansion of the war. However, he pointed out that Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf countries are providing significant assistance to Iraq in terms of financial support, military facilities, and political backing, which necessitates their neutrality. He emphasized that their continued involvement would only prolong the war, which is not in their best interest or the interest of the entire region. Therefore, he requested Abdel Halim Khaddam to exert pressure on Syria to cease its support for Iraq, as this would help resolve the dispute between the Gulf Arab countries and Iran.
After concluding his discussions, Abdel Halim Khaddam returned to Damascus and briefed Assad on the key points discussed during his meeting with the Iranian president. As a result, he was requested to travel to Saudi Arabia and present Tehran’s offers to Syria, aiming to persuade them to reach a mutually satisfactory solution. Syria is apprehensive about the developments between Iran and the Gulf countries.
On May 26, 1984, Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam traveled to Jeddah and met with King Fahd. They discussed the significant findings from his mediation efforts with Tehran and addressed Iranian demands. Khaddam conveyed that the Iranians believed Saudi Arabia was providing facilities for Iraqi planes to land and launch attacks on Iranian tankers. They also claimed that AWACS aircraft were assisting Iraq in gathering intelligence, which aided Iraq’s military operations against Iran.
The Saudi king clarified that AWACS planes are designed to monitor low-flying aircraft and do not detect Iranian carriers. The assistance provided to Iraq is a response to the Iranian media campaign targeting the Arab Gulf states. Furthermore, Iranian policy seeks to alter the government systems in the Gulf countries. He emphasized that each country has the right to establish the system it deems suitable for its people’s interests. The Arab Gulf states fear the continuation of the war, as it may lead to foreign intervention in the Arabian Gulf to assist and protect Israel while asserting control over oil wells. Consequently, they urge Syria to relay these concerns to Iran.
After engaging in discussions with both countries, Abdel Halim Khaddam emphasized that the resolution to end the clashes relies on two issues: the Iraq-Iran war and the contentious dispute between the Gulf states and Iran. Calming the situation between Iran and the Gulf states is key to resolving these conflicts. This entails Iran refraining from interfering in Gulf affairs and Saudi Arabia discontinuing its support for Iraq. In return, the Iranians should cease striking Saudi ships. Despite presenting these solutions to both parties during his visits and travels, they proved ineffective in alleviating the tense situation.
On September 6, 1984, Iranian President Ali Khamenei visited Damascus, leading an eighty-member delegation. He met with President Hafez al-Assad and Abdel Halim Khaddam to assess the current situation in the Arabian Gulf region and explore ways to prevent the extension of the war between Iraq and Iran to other countries in the region.
Tensions persist between Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain, intensifying due to the ongoing war and subsequent reactions. Iranian policy since the revolution has lacked substantial steps to actively calm the situation with the Gulf states. Certain Iranian politicians, particularly revolutionary leaders, have launched media campaigns against the regimes of these countries. Despite the Iranian government expressing its desire for reconciliation and calm, and intermittent periods of tranquility facilitated by Syrian efforts led by Abdel Halim Khaddam, an atmosphere of tension continues to prevail.
This was evident in the concerns expressed by the Saudi king to Abdel Halim Khaddam during their meeting in Taif on July 16, 1985. The Saudi king exhibited great apprehension regarding Iranian demands, specifically the request for Iranian pilgrims to be allowed to hold demonstrations during the Hajj season. He emphasized that the Kingdom receives pilgrims from 50 countries, and if each country were permitted to organize demonstrations, it would lead to security chaos. Consequently, he requested Abdel Halim Khaddam to relay President Assad’s consideration of the Iranian demands. Abdel Halim Khaddam assured the Saudi king that Syria would exert its utmost efforts to address these issues and seek peaceful solutions between the two parties.
In another development, on February 22, 1986, Abdel Halim Khaddam received the Saudi Foreign Minister, Saud Al-Faisal, in Damascus. During the meeting, Saud Al-Faisal informed him about the Iraqi president’s desire to strengthen relations with Damascus. The Kingdom saw this rapprochement as having positive repercussions on the course of the war. However, Abdel Halim Khaddam assured him that Iraq’s intentions were not sincere and that they aimed to break the Syrian-Iranian alliance and make Syria stand against Iran in the war.
Saud Al-Faisal and Abdel Halim Khaddam also discussed Saudi Arabia’s concerns about the Iranian threat, particularly after the Iranian attack on the city of Faw in February 1981 and their intention to occupy part of Iraq. They recognized that any military advancements would put oil resources from Kuwait to Amman at the mercy of foreign forces, under the pretext of maintaining security, which would pose risks to the Arab Gulf states. In response, Khaddam emphasized the need to address the situation without preconceived ideas and prevent it from worsening due to its significant repercussions that are not in the interest of all.
It is worth noting that Saudi Arabia aimed to improve Iraqi-Syrian relations to bring an end to the prolonged Iraq-Iran war and its direct effects on the region. Therefore, Abdel Halim Khaddam believed that strengthening the relationship with Iraq, an enemy of Syria’s strategic ally, would not be in Syria’s interest. Such a move would result in the loss of Iran as a partner with whom Syria shared the same policy objectives.
On April 4, 1986, one of the Saudi ships was struck by Iranian airplanes, leading to a tense situation between the two parties. In response, Saudi King Fahd bin Abdulaziz instructed Rafic Hariri to go to Damascus and present these events to President Assad, which took place on April 7, 1986. Upon Hariri’s arrival, he was received by Abdel Halim Khaddam, who discussed the incident of the Saudi ship with him. Khaddam expressed concerns about whether Iran intended to wage war against Saudi Arabia and provoke American intervention. He clarified that while Saudi Arabia did not seek war, it could not tolerate attacks on its ships. If a new attack occurred, the Saudi king would be compelled to order the Saudi air forces to strike Tehran. Therefore, they hoped that Damascus would relay this message to Tehran. Khaddam reassured Hariri that he would inform President Assad about the matter and take appropriate measures.
On May 14, 1986, Abdel Halim Khaddam traveled to Tehran where he met with Iranian President Ali Khamenei and held discussions with him and other Iranian officials. His objective was to convince them of the dangers posed by the attacks on Saudi ships. The atmosphere during the talks was highly tense as Khaddam emphasized the immediate cessation of such attacks, stressing that any attack on the Arab Gulf states was tantamount to an attack on Syria. He also emphasized that differences between the two parties, regardless of their nature, should be resolved through dialogue and understanding, not military means.
At the conclusion of the meeting, the Iranian President conveyed to the Vice President of the Syrian Republic that Iran was once again committed to avoiding an escalation of the war. Iran expressed its interest in establishing good neighborly relations and understanding with Saudi Arabia, as well as other Gulf countries. However, he pointed out that Saudi Arabia had recently displayed a hostile attitude towards Iran. While Iran supported Iraq in its war efforts, it would not allow ships to pass safely in the Arabian Gulf.
Thus, tensions between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, on the one hand, and Iran on the other hand, have escalated due to the issue of oil tankers and the repercussions of the war with Iraq, as well as the riots during the Hajj season in 1987. During the Hajj season, a group of Iranian pilgrims stormed the Holy Mosque, chanting slogans in support of Khomeini and causing clashes that resulted in several deaths among the pilgrims.
On November 11, 1987, the Arab Gulf states announced their full support for Iraq, further exacerbating the situation.
In response to these developments, Abdel Halim Khaddam, accompanied by Syrian Foreign Minister Farouq Al-Shara, embarked on a tour of the GCC countries on January 10, 1988. Their visit included Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Abu Dhabi, during which they delivered President Assad’s messages advocating for Syrian efforts to establish dialogue between Iran and the GCC countries. During his meetings with the rulers of these countries, Abdel Halim Khaddam expressed Syria’s optimism about improving relations between the Arab Gulf states and assured them of Syria’s commitment to making every possible effort to achieve this goal.
However, the Syrian government’s efforts were unsuccessful due to the deepening differences between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Consequently, Saudi Arabia severed diplomatic relations with Iran on May 26, 1988.