Change has become a national necessity in Syria, and Bashar has failed in managing the state and addressing the economic situation.
Currently, there is no indication of peace, neither from the Israelis nor from other Arab parties, including Syria.
Azmi Bishara acted as an intermediary between the Israelis and Damascus, working in conjunction with Israeli intelligence services. He served the interests of Israel, particularly regarding the Lebanese “Shebaa” farms, and it should be officially announced that he had dealings with the Syrian government.
The situation in Syria is progressing in a manner that makes change inevitable.
In the near future, the formation of an opposition front will be announced with the aim of saving Syria from Bashar al-Assad’s regime.
The Israeli elections will likely result in a government that leads to a stalemate, maintaining the current status quo.
Farooq al-Shara’s analysis of words and events is superficial, which has contributed to the setbacks experienced in Syria since 1992.
Rabin left a written letter with President Clinton, confirming that he was prepared to withdraw beyond the borders of June 4, 1967.
If I had received a final travel order from President Bashar, I would not have left Syria.
The actions of the People’s Assembly reflect Bashar’s incompetence and the poor advice he has received. Despite that, he has actually benefitted me greatly.
I have not applied for asylum, and I will not seek asylum in any country. I am currently residing in my house in France, which I purchased in 1987. If I had intended to exploit politics for personal gain, I could have amassed a significant amount of money. However, no amount of wealth can compare to the value of a single hair or a grain of soil in the land of Syria.
One of the historical mistakes made by the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization was the promotion of the slogan of an independent national decision. Abu Ammar and the Fatah leadership hold historical responsibility for this.
If we were to take everything Bashar al-Assad says seriously, it would present a problem. “Preparing Bashar for the presidency was one of the major mistakes made by President Hafez al-Assad. He committed a grave error by transferring the presidency to his son after his death.”
I strongly reject the involvement of sectarian factors in political conflicts within the country.
Al-Sanara: Mr. Abdel Halim Khaddam, in multiple press interviews with you over the past months, you have mentioned President Bashar Al-Assad’s direct responsibility for the assassination of President Hariri. What evidence do you have?
Khaddam: I was interrogated by the International Commission of Inquiry, and I provided them with my information. Due to the confidential nature of the investigation, it became impossible to discuss the specific content of this information, as it became the property of the investigation. However, if we refer back to my initial interview on the Arab satellite channel, I discussed several facts that led me to reach this conviction, along with other facts and the overall atmosphere surrounding President Hariri’s relationship with Dr. Bashar Al-Assad.
Al-Sanara: So, you don’t have any direct evidence that Bashar gave the order?
Khaddam: Of course, we were not present in a meeting where the decision was made. Such a decision is made by an individual and handed over to his security institution, which in this case is the Military Intelligence Service. However, based on the results, evidence, and what Bashar Al-Assad has personally told me and the party leadership, there is no doubt about his innocence.
Al-Sanara: If you could provide us with more details about the conversations with Bashar and the party leadership regarding Hariri and the overall atmosphere?
Khaddam: In one session, Bashar stated that there was a conspiracy against the country orchestrated by Hariri, the French, and the Americans. He said, “When I made the decision to extend Lahoud’s term, I was convinced that I was 50% right and 50% wrong, but now I am completely certain that the decision was the right one.” He repeated that there was a conspiracy involving Hariri, the Americans, and the French. According to Bashar, Hariri was working against Syria, considered an enemy, and gathering his sect around him. This is a serious matter and goes against Syria. When someone is labeled a conspirator and an enemy, what is their punishment? Death is the penalty, especially when people die and killing is seen as part of their culture.
Al-Sanara: Is the main reason for the direct disagreement between you and Bashar related to your attitude towards Hariri?
Khaddam: No, that’s not the reason. The issue of Hariri is separate. The main disagreement lies in the area of economic, political, and educational reforms, encompassing reform in all aspects of life. Syria is facing a challenging economic situation with millions of unemployed people and widespread poverty.
Al-Sanara: You were in power alongside the late President Hafez Al-Assad for 30-40 years. Did you and President Hafez Al-Assad discuss these reforms?
Khaddam: Firstly, my field of work was foreign policy. Secondly, within the party’s leadership and conferences, I have consistently emphasized the need for reform and Syria’s requirement for it, as Syria cannot meet the demands of the current stage and has fallen behind. The issue dates back to the days of President Hafez. He had his vision of governance and how to manage it, while I had a different vision. However, these discussions remained within the framework of party institutions.
Al-Sanara: So, there was a dialogue and mutual respect between you and President Hafez Al-Assad?
Khaddam: Exactly, that is correct.
Al-Sanara: Was the issue of preparing Bashar for the presidency the direct cause of the conflict between you later on?
Khaddam: Firstly, the preparation of Bashar for the presidency was one of the major mistakes made by President Hafez Al-Assad. We have a republican system, and political values in Syria do not allow for the inheritance of state positions. It was a grave mistake for the secretary-general of a party and the president of the republic to take measures to transfer the presidency to his son after his death.
Al-Sanara: Did you and the party leadership not voice any objections?
Khaddam: Initially, there is no party leadership in the sense of having decision-making power. The leadership acts as an interface, and the ultimate decision lies with the president.
Al-Sanara: It was and still is the case?
Khaddam: Yes, that’s correct. It was the case and continues to be so.
Al-Sanara: Were there no objections or confusion at all?
Khaddam: Of course, objections did arise. However, he managed the situation entirely. Within the security apparatus, the state, and the party leadership, everything was orchestrated to proceed accordingly.
Al-Sanara: Did you see yourself completing the path of President Hafez al-Assad as his deputy before he brought his son Bashar?
Khaddam: I don’t view things in that way. I never thought I was continuing a path that I had objected to for many years. I held different opinions regarding the importance of reform in Syria. The serious discussions began, especially after Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union and signs of collapse started appearing there. I focused on the realization that Syria would lose support and could only meet its domestic and international requirements through a concentrated effort on the domestic front. This effort would involve addressing internal issues, economic development, administrative growth, and political participation by involving the people in managing the country’s affairs and determining its destiny. The country was being governed solely by one person’s decision. Regardless of what happens to that person, he is susceptible to errors without being held accountable. In democratic systems, when political authority makes mistakes, the people hold it accountable through elections. That’s why I emphasized the need for structural change in the system to achieve a democratic situation where people can participate and hold those responsible accountable for their mistakes.
Al-Sanara: To what extent does the sectarian factor play a role in Syria’s political structure?
Khaddam: The sectarian factor has no role. I completely reject the involvement of sectarian factors in the country’s political conflicts. When President Hafez al-Assad was elected as President of the Republic in 1970, his election was based on genuine consensus, and people came to the polls willingly. When he traveled to the governorates, he received an unprecedented reception in the history of Syria because people had high hopes for the change that took place on October 16, 1970. They had great expectations that the president would liberate the country, promote openness, establish freedoms, and democracy, among other things. All Syrians are aware of President Hafez al-Assad’s sect, yet they still came to the polls. People’s positions are based on their vision of the country’s interests, whether in support or against certain policies.
Al-Sanara: I’m referring to the sectarian factor later on. President Assad came to power through a coup and was elected. People knew who he was, but inheritance was based on a sectarian basis.
Khaddam: Inheritance is based on a family basis, not a sectarian one. Hafez al-Assad didn’t pass on his position to his son based on sectarian grounds but rather on familial grounds.
Al-Sanara: In your opinion, is there potential for change in the near future?
Khaddam: In any case, I believe that change has become a national necessity in Syria. Bashar al-Assad has failed in managing the state and addressing the economic situation. People’s conditions have worsened, unemployment has risen, freedoms have been suppressed, and administrative corruption has increased. As a result, Bashar al-Assad’s failure over his five and a half years in power is evident. Therefore, it is natural to expect change.
Al-Sanara: Since you left power, I have met with various factions of the Syrian opposition, particularly those abroad. Some have approached cautiously, others with enthusiasm. How would you characterize these recent developments? Are they the foundation of an opposition front?
Khaddam: There will soon be a national opposition front in Syria. Currently, the matter is being studied and discussed among several figures and movements. We will establish a national front to address the crisis in Syria.
Al-Sanara: Have you recently met with any Arab leaders?
Khaddam: No, I haven’t met or contacted anyone.
Al-Sanara: What about Walid Jumblatt and his Progressive Socialist Party? They directly accuse President Bashar of assassinating Hariri, but there are also questions regarding the assassination of Kamal Jumblatt.
Khaddam: Walid has publicly accused Syria. However, my responsibility was primarily related to the Lebanese file on the political side. I had no involvement in the security matters that were being handled between the President, the official from the security service in Lebanon, and some security agencies. Therefore, I cannot definitively say yes or no.
Al-Sanara: Alongside the internal situation, there are discussions regarding Syrian involvement in Iraq’s affairs, including support for resistance organizations and the surrender of former regime figures and Saddam’s sons. How extensive is this involvement?
Khaddam: There hasn’t been a consistent Syrian policy towards Iraq. The policy has changed multiple times. Initially, there was an alliance between the two regimes, even a few months after the fall of Saddam’s regime. However, this alliance ended, and the Syrian authorities expelled Saddam Hussein’s family and some of his relatives, including his two sons, from Syria. This move was intended to create an opportunity for dialogue with the Americans.
It appears that Bashar al-Assad’s political ambivalence has harmed Syria. I don’t have any information regarding Syrian assistance to Iraqi factions, but I cannot deny it either since I am not familiar with such matters. For a certain period, I was responsible for the Iraq file, particularly before 1998, but I later discontinued my involvement. Following the occupation and the war, I revisited the file from a specific perspective, which was how to preserve Iraq’s unity. I used to receive Iraqi delegations from various parties, sects, and political currents. The primary focus was on preserving national unity and the integrity of Iraq, avoiding sectarian conflicts (Sunni versus Shia) or national conflicts (between Arabs and Kurds), as they would only serve to destroy Iraq. Eventually, I relinquished the file, which was then personally handled by Dr. Bashar Al-Assad.
Al-Sanara: To what extent can the Syrian opposition benefit from the experience of the Iraqi opposition?
Khaddam: The two situations are distinct. Iraq’s circumstances differ from those of Syria. Consequently, the experience of the Iraqi opposition varies from that of the Syrian opposition. Each side has its own unique experiences.
Al-Sanara: I mean, the issue of relying on a foreign solution. Did you, as an opposition, consider not relying on foreign factors?
Khaddam: Certainly, any change brought about through foreign intervention will have consequences for the country. We do not seek or want to impose such a cost on Syria or future generations in Syria. However, this does not mean that we should refrain from utilizing the international and regional situations to the advantage of the opposition. There is a distinction between what occurred in Iraq and what could transpire in Syria.
Al-Sanara: How can the Syrian opposition use the international situation to its advantage, such as increasing international pressure on the regime and creating opportunities for the opposition?
Khaddam: No, certainly not. The international situation has its own dynamics in every region of the world. Each region can leverage the international situation to some extent. In this regard, we will utilize or benefit from the international situation for the betterment of Syria, but without any foreign intervention.
Al-Sanara: It has been recently reported that the Syrian regime has allowed American forces to enter Syrian territory and pursue the Iraqi resistance from there.
Khaddam: I have no information regarding that matter.
Al-Sanara: Regarding the Shebaa Farms case, as someone following this issue, do you believe it is Syrian or Lebanese territory based on your understanding as a politician and legal expert?
Khaddam: According to my understanding, it is Lebanese territory that was entered by Syrian forces in 1952. The Syrian government should present an official document to the United Nations affirming that these territories belong to Lebanon.
“This situation opens the door to the relationship with Hezbollah. When I was responsible for the Lebanese file, the resistance emerged during that period. The resistance later took the form of Hezbollah and had its consequences.
In your opinion, should Resolution 1559 be applied to Hezbollah as well?”
Khaddam: Firstly, it is crucial to achieve national reconciliation in Lebanon. This should be the foundation. Whatever serves national reconciliation and what the Lebanese people agree upon, I personally support. It is not merely a matter of analyzing and studying a text. The issue at hand concerns the destiny of a country. Lebanon is currently facing a profound crisis.
What matters most is overcoming this crisis and having the Lebanese people agree on the key matters that are in dispute, in order to safeguard national unity, stability, and the future of Lebanon. What the Lebanese people agree upon, I, as a Syrian and Arab citizen, stand by and support.
Al-Sanara: According to the information you have, what is the status of the Lebanese dialogue?
Khaddam: I do not have any information on that. The meetings are confidential, and I have not met any of the participants in the dialogue.
Al-Sanara: Syrian-Iranian relations and Hezbollah, to what extent do they serve Syria or continue to serve Syria?
Khaddam: First, we need to identify the interests of Syria and Iran. The question then arises: who does this relationship serve? Relations are established between countries, but the right relations are based on mutual benefits and mutual interests. At one point, there was an alliance between Syria and Iran during the Iraq-Iran war. The main focus of that alliance was the conflict between Baghdad and Damascus, as well as between Baghdad and Tehran. The war is over, and Iraq is now in a different situation.
The problem lies in the fact that Bashar al-Assad lacks a defined strategy that prioritizes Syrian interests. Without a strategy and clear interests, he becomes susceptible. However, this does not imply a complete rupture between Syria and Iran. Iran is a country in the region with a longstanding history among Arab nations. There should be friendly and cooperative relations, rather than hostile relations or relationships based on exploitation by either party.
In other words, it is not in Syria’s interest to be part of serving the strategy of any country in the region. Similarly, I am confident that Iran does not accept being part of a strategy aimed at serving another party.
Al-Sanara: Don’t you believe that the issue of “Hezbollah” and the emphasis on the situation in southern Lebanon are merely tools in Iran’s hands, used to manipulate the resolution of its nuclear file?
Khaddam: Well, sometimes numerous analyses are put forward, and I believe that Iran has a strategic vision that serves its interests. However, we must carefully consider whether these actions might lead to dragging the region into a war. This is a matter that requires thorough deliberation.
Hezbollah maintains its primary relationship with Iran, and its authority lies with the leader of the Islamic Revolution, Mr. Khamenei, and this is well known. But can we definitively say that Hezbollah is being used to escalate tensions in the region? No one can say for certain.
Al-Sanara: No one can deny that.
Khaddam: Indeed, no one can deny it, unless we assume that the Iranian leadership has reached a point of desperation.
Al-Sanara: Do you think they are being pushed into a corner?
Khaddam: I believe that there are astute leaders in Tehran who possess an understanding of what is feasible and what is not.
Al-Sanara: Including the president?
Khaddam: I prefer not to single out any specific individual, but I believe that there are conscious leaders in Iran who comprehend the possibilities and limitations.
Al-Sanara: You have closely followed the Palestinian issue. To what extent do you believe that the Syrian leadership has allowed the Palestinian leadership the freedom to exercise independent national decision-making?
Khaddam: Do you want me to offer words of flattery or honest words?
Al-Sanara: No, I want to speak candidly.
Khaddam: Honest words. One of the historical mistakes committed by the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization was the promotion of the slogan of an independent national decision. What does this slogan truly mean? It meant “liberating” Arab governments from their responsibility towards the Palestinian cause in exchange for a few million dollars from various countries. And what happened as a result? Some Arab countries adopted a different approach that was not in favor of the Palestinian cause. We pursued the path of an independent national decision and entered into the Oslo Agreement. But what was the outcome? Did it lead to a state? Is there true independence? Instead, we deviated from the Arab consensus. The PLO deviated from the Arab consensus under the Oslo Agreement. So, what is more effective for the Palestinian cause: having all Arab nations united in their support for the Palestinian people or burdening the PLO alone with this responsibility?
Al-Sanara: In your opinion, is the problem solely from the Palestinian side or are there other factors involved?
Khaddam: No, no. On the Palestinian side, specifically Abu Ammar (Yasser Arafat) and the leadership of Fatah, they bear a historical responsibility.
Al-Sanara: Were there any attempts by the Syrian regime to take control of the PLO in order to replace it?
Khaddam: Well, can you tell me what the PLO has achieved apart from symbolism, until Syria absorbed it? Can you explain why the Golan Heights were occupied? Why has the conflict between Syria and the Zionist movement persisted since the issuance of the “Balfour Declaration”? Who is it for? Can you argue that there was a revolution in Palestine without the participation of not only hundreds but thousands of Syrian volunteers and martyrs from various sects? How can you explain it? The Syrian people have always considered the Palestinian cause as not just the cause of an oppressed people, but as a national cause.
Al-Sanara: How did the relationship between the Syrian regime and the Palestinian organizations in Syria develop after Oslo?
Khaddam: All the existing factions were treated as brothers within the country. They enjoyed full freedoms, except when it came to security matters. Naturally, that was prohibited. One day, a Palestinian leader approached the Chief of Staff of the Syrian Army and asked him why they weren’t allowed to create some chaos together.
Al-Sanara: Who was this leader?
Khaddam: It doesn’t matter now. The Chief of Staff responded by saying, “We have witnessed what happened to you in Lebanon.” For us, security is a red line.
Al-Sanara: So, this pertains to causing chaos within Syria. What about operations from inside the Golan?
Khaddam: No one ever prevented them from conducting operations from there. There were meetings in the presence of President Hafez Al-Assad, and I asked them and told them that the doors are open. Why did they conduct operations in Lebanon? In Lebanon, they engaged in operations against the Lebanese. Why was Hezbollah successful in liberating the south when their capabilities were only a fraction of what the Lebanese National Movement and the Palestinian factions combined had? They should ask themselves this question. Liberation did not inspire them.
Al-Sanara: Recently, Bashar Al-Assad stated that the victory of Hamas reduces pressure on Syria. How do you interpret this statement?
Khaddam: In any case, if we take everything Bashar al-Assad says seriously, it becomes problematic. I am unsure how to understand this particular statement. If he means that the pressure will shift from Syria to Hamas, then that is a misguided view.
Al-Sanara: In your opinion, who is responsible for this misguided perspective?
Khaddam: I don’t want to blame anyone. If I don’t have sufficient information, I refrain from making such statements.
Al-Sanara: You had concerns about Farooq al-Shara and his approach to negotiations with Israel, didn’t you?
Khaddam: He mistook words of courtesy for facts.
Al-Sanara: Can you provide an example?
Khaddam: In 2000, he met with Barak in the presence of Clinton. He came back to us and said, “Clinton is with us, Albright is with us. Barak wants peace, but he needs several months to arrange his situation.” This shows that his understanding of words or events was superficial. It played a significant role in the setbacks that occurred in Syria since 1992.
Al-Sanara: What was the outcome of those negotiations? Did Rabin leave any document or commitment?
Khaddam: Yes, Rabin left a commitment with President Clinton.
Al-Sanara: Was it in writing?
Khaddam: I am not certain, but I know that there is a written letter from the United States to President Hafez Al-Assad stating that Rabin is willing to withdraw beyond the borders of June 4, 1967. It discusses the subject of peace and peaceful relations.
Al-Sanara: During that period, what was the main point of disagreement? Was it about normalization or the specific details?
Khaddam: The main point of disagreement was the understanding of security arrangements. While there was agreement on the principles of security arrangements, such as a buffer zone on both sides of the border and international control, the issue of security became contentious. From the Israeli perspective, the arrangements involved a buffer zone in Syria, control centers in Jabal al-Sheikh and other locations in the Golan, the reduction of Syrian forces in southern Damascus, while the Israeli situation remained unchanged.
Al-Sanara: In your opinion, was it Barak’s position from the beginning that led to the failure of the negotiations?
Khaddam: Barak was the chief of staff and was following instructions.
Al-Sanara: When Barak became prime minister and had a meeting with Shara, did he maintain the same positions or did they change?
Khaddam: In the initial sessions, Barak spoke in general terms, but when he started to specify his positions, he reverted back to his previous stances, and that’s when the negotiations came to a halt.
Al-Sanara: Two issues that are often raised in Israel are the fate of pilot Ron Arad and the case of spy Eli Cohen.
Khaddam: Is the issue of peace in the region solely about a pilot and a spy? The cause of peace in the region is related to the occupation and the rights of the Palestinian people.
Al-Sanara: Why were these issues raised during the negotiations?
Khaddam: Western delegations visiting Damascus brought up these issues, such as the case of Arad and the killing of Sultan Yacoub. Our response was that we had no information. In reality, we had no information.
Al-Sanara: What about the case of Eli Cohen?
Khaddam: It was not brought up.
Al-Sanara: Not by Arab delegations from inside Israel?
Khaddam: According to my information, no one has raised it. Personally, I haven’t met with any Arab delegation from inside Israel.
Al-Sanara: Not even Dr. Azmi Bishara?
Khaddam: Not at all.
Al-Sanara: It was reported in the newspaper “Tagamoa” party, citing sources, that Abdel Halim Khaddam’s headquarters has become a destination for Israeli journalists and Mossad agents.
Khaddam: Well, let me clarify… My intention is to discuss what he desired. He acted as an intermediary between the Israelis and Damascus.
Al-Sanara: Who appointed him?
Khaddam: Israeli intelligence.
Al-Sanara: I mean, there was something mentioned about a message from Danny Yatom…
Servants: Mazabbat. He was a messenger. Azmi Bishara, this “Arab nationalist,” was a messenger. Many in Syria were suspicious of Azmi Bishara for transmitting information to Israel about the situation in Syria.
Al-Sanara: However, the regime is receiving him?
Khaddam: They entertain him because it’s such a poor system, and who didn’t laugh at it with just a few words?
Al-Sanara: Azmi laughed at the Syrian regime.
Servants: Yes, Azmi laughs, Azmi Shater. Now he’s going to Lebanon, and in Lebanon’s environment, he gathers information.
Al-Sanara: This is a very serious statement. Are you saying that Azmi Bishara is an agent for Israel?
Khaddam: I’m saying that he serves Israel. What I mentioned about him is a fact. He is a concealed Knesset member and he serves Israel.
Al-Sanara: Did you meet with other Knesset members?
Khaddam: No.
Al-Sanara: There have been discussions in Syria regarding the excessive wealth and corruption associated with the Khaddam family. In the interview we published with you on 6/1/2006, you mentioned that you would call for an international commission of inquiry to investigate cases of widespread corruption in Syria. What is the current status of this case?
Khaddam: The last time I mentioned it, I called for the formation of an investigation committee led by Mr. Sameh Ashour, the President of the Egyptian Bar Association, along with the participation of the Secretary General of the Arab Lawyers Union, the President of the Court of Cassation in Egypt, and a representative from the United Nations Anti-Corruption Commission. I invited this committee to come to Syria and examine all our files since 1970, starting with me. I am willing to provide them with all the information I have.
I mentioned that Sameh Ashour and the Bar Association came to Damascus with the Lawyers’ Conference to support Bashar. They are his friends. I accepted two friends of Bashar and the president of the Court of Cassation in Egypt, who is supposed to be close to President Mubarak, which makes it a total of three individuals. I do not know any of them personally. I invited them to come and judge for themselves, to see who is involved in corruption, who covered it up, and under whose protection this corruption took place. I challenge them at any time if they have any file that directly or indirectly implicates someone related to me up to the 20th degree.
Al-Sanara: It is also said that you are one of the wealthy individuals in Damascus.
Khaddam: Let me clarify. I am neither rich nor poor. I come from a family that owns properties. Secondly, my children. The youngest of them entered the job market 20 years ago, and all three have worked outside of Syria. I challenge anyone to prove that any of my children have any affiliation with any government institution in Syria. They have worked hard and each of them has built their own home. They own a canned goods factory and a television production company. This is the fortune of $1.2 billion that people talk about.
Al-Sanara: How can you explain this to me in a way that convinces me as a citizen? I want to believe Abdel Halim Khaddam, who spent 30 years in power, witnessed everything he talks about, and remained silent. How can I believe you?
Khaddam: Why would I see things and remain silent about them? Who said I remained silent about them?
Al-Sanara: Your voice wasn’t heard?
Khaddam: Where is my voice now? Do you live on the moon and not on Earth?! As for the story, I used to speak up a lot. Every time a campaign was launched, the next day, the security services in Syria were filled with rumors against me or my children. However, I wasn’t silent. I continued to engage in dialogues and meetings until it became overwhelming. The last conversation took place during the farewell talk at the Qatar Conference.
Al-Sanara: After the Qatari conference and your departure from Damascus, did you arrange things with the understanding that you were leaving for good or just going on a tour?
Khaddam: No, definitively.
Al-Sanara: Did you meet Bashar Al-Assad before your departure?
Khaddam: Of course, I bid him farewell.
Al-Sanara: Did you inform him that your departure was final?
Khaddam: No, if I had told him that the departure was final, you wouldn’t have gone.
Al-Sanara: To what extent?
Khaddam: Quite so.
Al-Sanara: How did he react?
Khaddam: He left me, and our session lasted for about an hour and a half. We had a cordial conversation.
Al-Sanara: What was the final straw?
Khaddam: It was in the year 2000 when I gave up on the possibility of reform. My decision to resign was made in 2000, and I believed it was better to wait for the conference. If I had resigned outside the conference, it would have been interpreted differently, and I would have lost the opportunity to defend myself. But at the conference, in front of 1200 people, I spoke the truth in a speech that lasted an hour and a half, and I said everything.
Al-Sanara: Did you announce your resignation at the conference?
Khaddam: I began the speech by announcing my resignation. I explained why I resigned and addressed all the issues.
Al-Sanara: Let’s talk about your family disowning you, as well as the session of the People’s Assembly and your dismissal from the “Baath” party. How will all of this affect the future?
Khaddam: The session or spectacle of the People’s Assembly demonstrates Bashar’s stupidity and those who advised him to orchestrate it, because it ended up serving me a lot.
Al-Sanara: In what sense?
Khaddam: I mean, they stopped those poor people from insulting me. Just a week ago, they were all competing to praise me. So, in just a week or two, one goes from being a great national leader to being considered a big traitor?
Al-Sanara: This is what we observe in Syria, with demonstrations filling the streets in an instant.
Khaddam: What do you expect from these demonstrations? They don’t mean anything.
Al-Sanara: In our previous interview, I mentioned the organization of demonstrations. How did you arrange that?
Khaddam: If you want to know, gather students, provide alcohol to the thugs, pay off workers, instigate the people, and you will have it.
Al-Sanara: Is everything ready, including slogans, etc.?
Khaddam: Everything… Everything is ready.
Al-Sanara: As Ghawar said, the funding is also available?
Khaddam: Funding is also available.
Al-Sanara: According to Dred Lahham, he holds you responsible. In an interview, he stated that if these remarks were made by a Syrian citizen, he would accept them, but coming from Abdel Halim Khaddam, it’s something he will never accept.
Khaddam: Why?
Al-Sanara: Because you were in power.
Khaddam: I mean, if I was in power and I left, realizing the mistakes and the direction the country is heading in, and I left to try to save this country, what does that mean?
Al-Sanara: How optimistic are you about the possibility of reform and change?
Khaddam: I am very optimistic. I believe in progress, and the situation in Syria is progressing in a way that makes change inevitable.
Al-Sanara: Even the parties participating in the National Front share this view with you?
Khaddam: What parties? They are all just names on paper.
Al-Sanara: But there are organized parties in Syria. Is their role over?
Khaddam: The process started in 1958 when the decision was made to dissolve the parties.
Al-Sanara: This is one of Abdel Nasser’s mistakes.
Khaddam: Indeed, one of the mistakes of unity was dismantling it, because unity can only be protected by political frameworks that have the ability to safeguard it. Unfortunately, these frameworks were weakened. Until the early seventies, there were serious political parties. However, these parties became closely tied to power, which eventually led to their fragmentation and division. The Communist Party split into four factions, the Arab Socialists into four or five parties, and the Unionists into three or four parties. These parties have stagnated, failing to develop or adapt themselves. Essentially, all the parties participating in the National Front, which are essentially regime-affiliated parties, froze in time since the early seventies.
Al-Sanara: What is the truth behind the rumors that you sought political asylum in Saudi Arabia?
Khaddam: It is absolutely false. I have no intention of seeking asylum from anyone because I will be returning to Damascus.
Al-Sanara: When will you be returning?
Khaddam: Soon.
Al-Sanara: Did you contact President Mubarak or did he contact you?
Khaddam: I did not contact Mubarak, nor did he contact me.
Al-Sanara: What is the nature of your relationship with the Hariri family, and does your presence in Saad Hariri’s residence imply a price for accusing the Syrian regime of assassinating his father?
Khaddam: Firstly, I am not in Saad Hariri’s palace. It is a house, not a palace. I have owned this house since 1987. I visit France once or twice a year, and my children also spend their holidays in this house.
Al-Sanara: Is your relationship with the Hariri family based on economic or political interests?
Khaddam: I am a politician, and it is incorrect for anyone to assume that I use politics for personal gain. If I wanted to do so, I could have amassed great wealth. However, all the wealth in the world is insignificant compared to the value of a single hair or a grain of dust in Syrian soil.
Al-Sanara: Have you been offered such a proposition?
Khaddam: No one would dare to present such a story on this matter.
Al-Sanara: What is the issue of nuclear waste?
Khaddam: There is no nuclear waste or any other waste. It was a case of expired chemicals that were brought into Syrian territory by an individual in agreement with a security officer to be buried. However, these materials were discovered.
The security officer, fearing interrogation, spread a rumor within Syria within 24 hours, falsely implicating Abdel Halim Khaddam’s sons in the matter. I approached President Hafez al-Assad and requested the formation of a committee.
The committee was indeed formed and went to Tartous port. After three days, it collected all the relevant files from the port and customs. The committee then reported to the president that Abdel Halim Khaddam’s sons had no involvement in the incident. One of the heads of the security branches provided the committee with a recording of an interview between the goods owner and my son, Jamal. The goods owner stated, “We have goods that we want to transport to Saudi Arabia. Since Jamal was working in Saudi Arabia at the time, we thought he could assist us there.” The goods owner described the nature of the goods to Jamal. However, Jamal responded by insulting him over the phone and holding the speaker to his face. I presented this recorded call to President Hafez al-Assad.
Al-Sanara: In your opinion, why are such issues being raised now?
Khaddam: This incident occurred in 1988. They are reopening old files. When the incident happened, the goods owner was interrogated and sentenced to 10 years in prison. He served his sentence and was released. So why was the file closed for all these years?
They know that there is nothing, and they know that my sons have no involvement. However, as part of a campaign of confusion and distortion, they have initiated this campaign and brought up old matters. These old matters have no connection to anything that could harm me or my children. If my words are not enough, the complete investigation files are available at the Italian port of Naples.
Al-Sanara: As a politician, a Syrian citizen, and an Arab, how do you view the issue of peace between Israel and Syria?
Khaddam: There are currently no indications of peace, neither from the Israelis nor from other Arab parties, including Syria.
Al-Sanara: Do you believe that Israel is not ready for peace or that Syria is not ready?
Khaddam: Both parties are not ready for peace.
Al-Sanara: Why is Israel not ready?
Khaddam: Well, first of all, the Israeli party is not ready due to its internal situation. The main reason is that Israel does not accept the implementation of United Nations resolutions. Ultimately, peace requires a reference point.
What is the internationally and Arab-agreed reference for peace with Israel? It is the Madrid reference based on United Nations resolutions. Israel rejects the Madrid reference. Therefore, whoever governs in Syria cannot abandon the Madrid reference. Hence, the situation in Israel is not ready, and the same goes for Syria and other Arab countries.
Al-Sanara: During your time with President Hafez al-Assad, what was your vision regarding accepting Israel within the borders of 1967 or the borders of the truce?
Khaddam: No, we envisioned accepting the 1967 borders and the withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967.
Al-Sanara: So, it would involve mutual recognition, normalization, and other aspects?
Khaddam: Absolutely, if a peace agreement were to be concluded, it would encompass several issues, including establishing peaceful relations.
Al-Sanara: When you say that Syria was ready while Israel was not, do you believe that during the period of Hafez al-Assad and Rabin, both leaders were prepared to reach a peace agreement?
Khaddam: I am referring to the Syrian side, and I affirm that Syria was ready to do so. Regarding the Israeli side, the impression was that Rabin was ready, but unfortunately, he was assassinated. Then Peres came, and the subsequent events unfolded. We are all aware of what transpired.
Al-Sanara: In summary, you believe that Hafez al-Assad and Rabin were prepared to achieve peace, and Rabin’s death put an end to those prospects.
Khaddam: The chances of reaching an agreement were more promising than the chances of failure.
Al-Sanara: How do you view the elections in Israel?
Khaddam: Israeli society is dynamic, undergoing numerous changes. I believe it will be challenging for the election outcome to generate a governing body capable of making significant decisions regarding the regional situation and the issue of peace.
Al-Sanara: Don’t you think that the elections might produce a peace-oriented government?
Khaddam: No, I don’t anticipate a government of war, but rather a government that maintains the status quo and keeps the situation unchanged.
Al-Sanara: Regarding your meetings with the opposition, particularly with the Muslim Brotherhood, how seriously do you consider them and do you believe they will lead to the desired outcome?
Khaddam: The agreement is indeed serious.
Al-Sanara: What have you agreed upon?
Khaddam: We have agreed to save Syria, establish a democratic system, and let the ballot boxes determine the ruling party based on the will of the people.
Al-Sanara: Will this be announced at an opposition conference?
Khaddam: Yes, it will be announced soon, although the exact date has not yet been determined.
Al-Sanara: Can we expect a conference for the Syrian opposition in the near future?
Khaddam: We can’t refer to it as a conference per se, but rather a form of gathering or meeting.
Al-Sanara: Will it bring together all opposition figures?
Khaddam: It will bring together individuals who share a common vision.
Al-Sanara: Apart from the Muslim Brotherhood, are there others included? You yourself are part of that group too, aren’t you?
Khaddam: Once they convene and announce the formation of the front, the names will be revealed, and you will witness that these names represent the diverse spectrum of Syrian society. The objective is to establish an entity that will save Syria. As for what we want to call it, that’s a secondary matter. It needs to develop a program, and we will work on that together, announce it, and unveil the names.
Al-Sanara: Your final message to the Syrian citizens…
Khaddam: My final message to the Syrian citizens is to remain patient and steadfast. Insha’Allah, the meeting will take place soon in Damascus.
