Abdel Halim Khaddam: Iran has brought ISIS to Syria. Bashar al-Assad is an unbalanced person.

In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Abdel Halim Khaddam expressed his belief that unifying and supporting the opposition will lead to the downfall of the Damascus regime. He made these remarks during his stay in Paris, where he encountered two members of Al-Ahmari near the renowned landmark, the Arc de Triomphe. Khaddam, an 82-year-old former Syrian vice president, recalled his early involvement in the Baath Party, the loss of the Golan Heights, and the true nature of what is referred to as “resistance.”

Having held significant positions such as vice president, foreign affairs minister, member of the Baath Party leadership, governor of Quneitra, and governor of Hama, Khaddam is a prominent figure in Syria who has played a crucial role over several decades. His wealth of experience has endowed him with patience and composure, evident in his precise recounting of details. However, Khaddam expressed deep sorrow over the current suffering of the Syrian people, asserting that any reconciliation between the Gulf countries and Iran would be negated by Tehran once the Syrian crisis concludes.

During his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Khaddam highlighted how Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad acquiesced to American demands, including the closure of Palestinian organization offices, securing the border with Iraq, and withdrawing from Lebanon.

The following are the key highlights of the interview:

Will Syrians vote for Bashar al-Assad again in the next elections?

• It’s all just stacks of paper. The papers that go into the ballot boxes hold no value, and those who choose Bashar or any other candidate will do so out of coercion or fear.

These elections are not genuine, and everyone is aware of it. However, Bashar al-Assad insists on holding them as a way to defy the world.

• Who is responsible for the ongoing destruction in Syria?

• Two primary factors are responsible: Russia, Iran, and the regime on one hand, and the Arab community on the other. There is a significant distinction between those who directly commit or participate in the killings and those who had the power to stop or mitigate the bloodshed but failed to do so. This is evident in the actions of the League of Arab States when it took six months after the uprising to send Nabil al-Araby to meet with Bashar al-Assad. Honestly, the current situation in Syria reminds me of the early days of the Palestinian catastrophe. Furthermore, it’s essential to note that there were no extremists in Syria initially. The Syrian people are not naturally inclined towards extremism. However, the oppression they faced and the sense of abandonment by the international community pushed many Syrians towards extremist ideologies. This is a manifestation of a loss of balance in their actions.

• It is true that extremism didn’t suddenly emerge in Syria. The Free Army was initially fighting separately from terrorist groups. What transpired next?

• As I mentioned before, extremism arose due to the mounting pressure on the Syrian people and the lack of international action in their support. This compelled various factions to engage in conflict. Undoubtedly, there are those who try to exploit this uncontrolled enthusiasm.

• Are you referring to groups like ISIS and Al-Nusra, for instance?

• Yes, including other armed groups. However, Al-Nusra Front is distinct from ISIS in that a majority of its militants are Syrians. I can confidently say that once Bashar al-Assad departs, they will readily surrender their weapons.
• • When discussing “ISIS” and “Al-Nusra,” who brought “ISIS” to Syria?
  • It was Iran that brought “ISIS” to Syria. There is no doubt about that, and I am well aware of the situation.

  Iran plays a significant role in the conflict in Syria. Shiite Islamic organizations, the Revolutionary Guard, and Hezbollah are all fighting alongside the Assad regime. The downfall of the regime will be a severe blow to the entire Iranian establishment.

  You may ask why. The answer is that if Bashar’s regime falls, Iran’s influence in Iraq will diminish. If it doesn’t disappear completely, Hezbollah’s role in Lebanon will weaken as well. Consequently, the presence of Iranian militias and weaponry will be reduced. Believe me, you will witness a decline in Iran’s regional influence. This is why you see Iranians supplying weapons, protection, and fighters to the Assad regime.

  I don’t want to overstate it, but I can confidently say that ISIS is directly orchestrated by Iran.

•  
  • Does Iran’s alliance with Assad stem from the historical relationship between the Assad family and Iran?
  • It’s almost accurate, but not entirely. I will elaborate on this point. Iran has extensively played the sectarian card. One peculiar example is their claim to protect and defend the tomb of Sayeda Zeinab in Syria. Does Sayeda Zeinab truly require Shiite terrorist factions to come to Syria and commit acts of violence in the name of protection and defense?
  • Under what circumstances would Iran abandon Assad? Reconciliation with the Gulf states, an international agreement, or something else?
  • Who suggested that Iran is actively seeking reconciliation with the Gulf states? They are merely pursuing temporary calm until the Syrian crisis concludes. Afterward, they will focus on other countries to ignite conflicts, particularly Bahrain, and support the Houthis in Yemen to provoke unrest along the Saudi border. In the coming years, the Arab region will witness an unparalleled sectarian conflict.
• • What makes you confident that Iran is not genuinely interested in reconciliation?
  • Let me recount a historical story. In June 1985, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Speaker of the Iranian Revolutionary Parliament, visited Syria. He was received at the airport and taken to meet former President Hafez al-Assad

  During this meeting, the Iranians made a request for weapons to support Saddam’s war. This request caught Hafez al-Assad by surprise. He tried to divert the conversation towards topics such as economics, politics, and geography, attempting to keep the Iranians away from discussing the weapons request. However, the Iranians responded in a strong tone, expressing their frustration and asking for a response to their request. President al-Assad informed the delegation that the decision would be conveyed by Abdel Halim, indicating that it was not his personal decision. After the Iranians left, President al-Assad remained with me, and we deliberated on the situation. We realized that providing them with weapons would create a crisis with Iraq, while refusing to do so could lead to other complications.

  The following day, we informed Rafsanjani that conflicts existed between Syria and Israel, Syria and Turkey, and Syria and Iraq. Therefore, taking the step of providing weapons directly was not feasible. However, we proposed a solution, suggesting that they explore obtaining weapons through Libya. Upon hearing this, Rafsanjani became visibly displeased and angry, stating that he had hoped for our direct support in their war against Iraq. He even went on to say, “If Iran wins, the entire region will become one territory and one state, stretching from Afghanistan to the Mediterranean.” He repeated this sentiment more than once. I was taken aback by this statement, as I had not anticipated hearing such words. Since then, our relationship with Iran did not deteriorate further, as Hafez al-Assad believed that maintaining a relationship with Iran served as support for Syria, both in relation to Israel and in the face of any conflicts with Arab countries.

  • What happened after that?
  • We held serious discussions with the leadership of the Baath Party regarding this matter. It became clear that Iran harbored ambitions. Therefore, I say to the Gulf states that reconciliation with Iran is futile

• Let’s return to the Syrian crisis. If you were in your previous position and faced with the current situation in Syria, what solutions would you have proposed to resolve the crisis?

• Honestly, after Hafez al-Assad’s departure, I no longer had the desire to actively engage in direct political action. However, I was concerned about how to safely disengage from party and political work, as sudden departures often result in elimination or imprisonment. I cannot answer your question directly because it was something I had foreseen, but it reminds me of an incident in 1998 when a disagreement arose between Hafez and me following the renewal of Emile Lahoud’s term.

Hafez al-Assad wanted to renew Lahoud’s term because he saw Lahoud as favorable to Bashar. There were those who convinced Hafez that by supporting Lahoud, he could exert control over Lebanon. When Lahoud’s term was renewed, I withdrew from involvement in the Lebanese affairs. Suddenly, Hafez completely handed over the Lebanese file to Bashar, and that’s when the problems started escalating. Bashar’s actions and impulsive behavior were the main reasons behind this.

I am not exaggerating when I say that Rafiq Hariri used to call me from time to time to express his complaints about Bashar’s actions and involvement in Lebanese affairs. Every time this happened, Hafez al-Assad would reprimand Bashar or hold discussions with Ghazi Kanaan.

• This short story raises the question that has been asked of you on multiple occasions: Who was responsible for the assassination of Hariri and the death of Ghazi Kanaan?

• Regarding Hariri, I have mentioned several times that Bashar Al-Assad believed that Rafiq was conspiring against Syria with the French and Americans. This was solely his perception. Personally, I had advised Rafic Hariri more than once to leave Lebanon and step aside. I recall a meeting in the leadership of the Baath Party prior to Hariri’s assassination. Suddenly, Bashar Al-Assad interrupted and said, “Let’s discuss politics.” He then further interjected by stating, “Rafic Hariri is mobilizing his sect against us and conspiring with the French and Americans.” I must admit that many leaders in the party were taken aback by this impulsive and baseless statement. The session concluded, and I called Bashar to express my concerns that such remarks could leak outside the party, as the presence of 20 leaders meant that at least ten of them could dismiss such claims. Two days later, Bashar approached Mohsen Dalloul, the former Lebanese Minister of Defense. I instructed him, “Go to Rafik Hariri and advise him to leave Lebanon due to the prevailing circumstances.”

Approximately a week later, an assassination attempt was made on Marwan Hamadeh. I visited him, as well as Walid Jumblatt, who is now considered a prominent figure in Lebanese politics and played a crucial role in nullifying the “March 17 Agreement” made by Amin Gemayel with Israel. What is noteworthy is that I personally advised Rafiq to leave Lebanon. His response was, “But Maher Al-Assad called me and expressed a desire to work together.” I firmly replied, “This is a disguise, believe me. Leave Lebanon. Your life is more important.” Sadly, a week later, he was murdered.

The phrase “sectarian bloc” used by Bashar reminds us of the situation of Alawites in Syria and their feelings of persecution. Does this lead Bashar and Alawites, for example, to adopt sectarian slogans or seek revenge?

Let’s delve into the early stages of this period

During the French presence, there were Alawites, Sunnis, and Christians who collaborated with the French, as well as a faction of Alawites aligned with the National Bloc. However, there was a sense of widespread marginalization initially. It’s important to note that a significant number of Alawites worked as laborers for others and experienced a deep sense of injustice. Following that, the “March 8 Movement” emerged in Syria, led by Baathist officers and Nasserists. Subsequently, the Baathists ousted the Nasserists from the military. Salah Jadid, an Alawite member of the influential “Agwatat” family, came to power, but he did not succumb to sectarianism. At this time, a leftist government was established in Syria, which triggered internal reactions. Anyone who became entangled with the Baath Party was unable to break free, as doing so would result in their demise.

The stages progressed until Hafez al-Assad assumed the position of Minister of Defense. Hafez began consolidating officers around him and diminished the prominence and influence of Salah Jadid. A meeting of the Baath Party leadership was convened, and a considerable number of members sided with Hafez al-Assad against Salah Jadid, including myself. A government led by Nour al-Din al-Atasi was formed. Subsequently, the “corrective movement” took place, which led to Assad assuming leadership. It was during this period that Assad employed sectarian tactics. He facilitated the entrance of Alawite individuals into military academies, resulting in 80 percent of annual military college graduates being Alawites. This was a deliberate strategy. While Sunni officers were appointed to certain military leadership positions to give the impression of inclusivity, they held no real influence or decision-making power. Ultimately, all decisions rested solely with Assad, who maintained control over every aspect. Every two years, approximately 4,000 officers graduated, with 80 percent of them being Alawites.

• According to nationalism and the Baath Party, what remains of the Baath Party? Does Khaddam still believe in the ideas of the Baath Party?

• I joined the party in 1947 when it held firm to its ideals of Arab nationalism and Arab unity, which resonated with a particular generation of Arabs. To be honest, the party had noble ideals until it came to power. That’s when the course changed. For instance, the party advocated for “the freedom of the individual” as a prerequisite for the rise of the nation. However, it later made decisions that infringed upon individual freedoms and independence. The Baath Party used to have broad national slogans that many believed in, but those ideals faded after it gained power. Over time, the party became more of a means to an end rather than an end in itself.

Consider that the party’s membership, which started at 4,000, grew to over a quarter of a million solely due to the fear of power and repression. So, I can confidently say that the original ideas of the Baath Party no longer exist. Instead, a large number of Syrians have joined the Baath Party simply to secure employment.

• Let’s return to the current crisis. Do you envision any scenario in which Tehran might abandon Bashar Al-Assad’s Syria?

• No, it’s not possible. For Iran, Syria is a matter of life or death.

• There is speculation about the potential establishment of a sectarian state in the Sahel. If that were to happen, what do you anticipate would occur to the Sunni population in the Sahel?

• That scenario is unlikely to unfold. In the Sahel, more than 40 percent of the population is Sunni. If the coastal region is lost, Syria would become a landlocked state without access to the sea. Therefore, I rule out the possibility of a separate state emerging within the country.

While it’s possible for one side to gain an advantage over the other in the current conflict, it is unlikely that an independent or separate state will be established. Let me reiterate our initial point: If Arab countries provide quality weapons to Syrians, not Ahmed Al-Jarba specifically, I assure you that Bashar and his regime will fall within a month.

• What is your issue with Ahmed Al-Jarba?

• Al-Jarba has no direct connection to Syrians. I mean, he doesn’t have a presence inside Syria, so he won’t be able to make a significant impact.

• Are you willing to play a role in the reunification of Syria? Or can you suggest individuals who are capable of resolving Syria’s current crisis?

• I have made efforts, and I continue to do so. I have contacts with many active Syrians. There is a solution, but let me go back to your previous question about Al-Jarba. Just imagine that I sent messages to dozens of faction leaders and influential Syrians, and almost all of them responded except for Ahmad Al-Jarba, who said, “It’s too late” when someone asked him. I don’t know what he means by “too late.” Can Jarba guarantee that he will go to Damascus tomorrow? Anyone who aspires to become a leader must be open to everyone and accept all opinions, unlike Jarba.

• What does it imply?

• What I mean is that there is an Arab country that established the “National Council” and brought together the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups solely to prove its own existence.

• Which country is it?

• Qatar came up with the idea of the Muslim Brotherhood, and several opposition members formed what was called the “National Council.” However, the “Council” failed. Anyone who genuinely wants to assist Syrians should organize a national conference for Syrians and select both an effective civilian and military leadership simultaneously. The one currently governing Syria is the “Free Army.” The revolutionaries and opposition forces require a centralized military and civilian command. Just imagine, for example, if the focus is on Homs and the Sahel, then the Assad regime will undoubtedly collapse.

• Why wasn’t the focus on Homs and the Sahel?

• Who said there was no focus on them? Let me provide you an example of the failure that occurred to the rebels in the Sahel. When they requested support, they were directed to the “coalition” that initially supported them until the rebels reached Kassab, covering a distance of 50 km. However, they ran out of ammunition, and only a few individuals remained to defend this front, leading to a halt in their support. The “coalition” took a peculiar stance on this matter. That’s why a comprehensive national conference needs to be held to prevent decision-making from becoming erratic.

• So, how can the rebels achieve victory?

• Victory can be achieved through unified support. Bashar Al-Assad is currently fighting with missiles, aircraft, and tanks. The opposition doesn’t demand planes or tanks but rather anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, as well as medium-range or short-range missiles.

• Let’s return to the Baath Party and the fall of the Golan. The Golan Heights fell, and the Baath Party hoped to reclaim it. Now, the entirety of Syria has fallen. How did this happen?

• What is transpiring in Syria at present takes us back to the time of the Golan’s fall and the Palestinian catastrophe. The crisis was rooted in slogans. The fall of the Golan was not solely the fault of the Baath Party or its leadership but rather a culmination of mistakes made in Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. In Syria, the Baath Party leadership presented grander slogans, but it lacked a solid infrastructure to support raising these banners.

• In addition to the irrationality in the party’s slogans, don’t you think that the party’s hands are stained with blood? Is there no connection between the behavior of its members and the raised slogans?

• We cannot assert that the party’s hands are stained with blood. However, we can acknowledge that some of its members deviated from the party’s goals after it came to power.

• Army sectarianism… Can’t a large portion of the problems in Syria be attributed to it?

• Almost every Alawi household in Syria has at least one officer or non-commissioned officer. This is the root of the problem; the army had become sectarian, although discussing sectarianism was strictly prohibited. This formed the basis of corruption, and those surrounding Hafez al-Assad engaged in corrupt practices.

• What remains of the resurrection; who represents it?
• – Nothing remains… There is nothing left.
• Why did Bashar Al-Assad abandon you, or why did you leave him?

• I made the decision to leave myself and attended a meeting of the party leadership for an hour and a half. I discussed with the leadership what steps should be taken in the future. By the way, I didn’t work closely with Bashar. The only foreign trip I took with him was to Tehran before the American army entered Iraq.

During that time, we visited Tehran and met with the Iranians. Unexpectedly, Bashar proposed to them that they train Shiite factions to fight against the Americans in Iraq in case they invaded. The Iranians hesitated, as they already had links and contacts with Iraqi factions. There was no need to establish combat units.

• How could Bashar make this proposal when the Syrian-Iraqi border was practically open for terrorists to enter Iraq and fight against the Americans?

The border wasn’t open in that manner, but there was indeed a degree of leniency in allowing those who wanted to go to Iraq. There’s even a peculiar story. At the beginning of the Iraqi crisis, there were around 1800 detainees of various nationalities in Syrian prisons. Under Bashar’s directive, the Syrian General Security released all of them and indirectly directed them towards Iraq, as shared by some officers closely associated with the security services.

• What was the American response to this action?

The Americans were furious. The American ambassador met with Bashar and made three demands. The first was to completely close and secure the border, followed by the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon and the closure of offices belonging to Palestinian organizations in Syria. Bashar Al-Assad fully complied with these three requests.

• When did this occur?

I don’t recall the exact timing, but it took place just a few months after the Americans entered Iraq.

• Did he fulfill all of their requests?

Yes, he fulfilled all of their requests without hesitation.

• What did the Iranians later propose to Bashar?

• The Iranians demonstrated cleverness in their utilization of armed groups in Iraq. They even employed factions loyal to Saddam Hussein to combat the Americans and subsequently redirected the conflict of those factions against one another.

• Regarding this matter, allow me to ask you a direct question: Who was responsible for the assassination of Ghazi Kanaan?

• There are two theories: suicide or assassination. During his final conversation with a Lebanese journalist, he uttered the words, “This will be the last time you hear from me.”

There is a significant detail: a suicide doesn’t typically die from gunshot wounds. Ghazi Kanaan had two bullets in his head. The notion of assassination was put forth by his own family. If it was indeed a killing, it was likely carried out by the security forces under the guidance of Bashar Al-Assad. Bashar Al-Assad had summoned Ghazi Kanaan on the morning of his assassination and sent him a message stating, “Please settle your affairs, or things will become complicated.” Ghazi Kanaan then left, took his gun, spoke to the Lebanese journalist, and subsequently lost his life. The reason, as it has been claimed, is that Ghazi Kanaan had made certain disclosures implicating Bashar’s regime in various security matters.

• Regarding the issue of assassinations in Lebanon… Some claim that you were involved in orchestrating them. What is your response to this accusation?

• I categorically deny this accusation and I am unwilling to assign direct blame to the Syrian regime without concrete evidence.

• What about the assassination of Rashid Karami?

• He was assassinated by Maronite militias.

• And what about the assassinations of Mufti Hassan Khalid and Kamal Jumblatt?

• Mufti Hassan Khalid’s assassination occurred due to his opposition to Syrian politics, but the identity of the perpetrators remains unclear. Kamal Jumblatt also had disagreements and conflicts with Hafez al-Assad. It is uncertain whether Syrian security was involved in their assassinations or not.

• When discussing assassinations, who made repeated attempts to assassinate the other: Saddam Hussein or Hafez al-Assad?

• Saddam Hussein made multiple attempts and plans to assassinate Hafez al-Assad. There were three attempts to assassinate me, the last of which was a shooting incident.

• What was the reason behind these attempts?

• The reason behind these attempts was the positions and speeches of the Syrian government in meetings of the League of Arab States. Saddam Hussein wanted his opinions to be the dominant and singular ones in all matters.

• Is there any evidence to support these claims?

• There is ample evidence, including the story involving Abdel Fattah Boumedien. During his visit to Iraq, he met Saddam Hussein and asked him, “Why did you plan to assassinate Khaddam four times?” Saddam Hussein replied, “You mean three times!” This incident highlights Saddam Hussein’s unstable mindset, as he could be calm and composed at times and completely lose his temper at others.

• What is the current status of the Murtada Association, which used to oversee the promotion of Alevi and Shiite culture in Syria?

• The association has ceased to exist. Its founder, Jamil Al-Assad, who is Hafez’s brother, was an opportunist who established the association solely for monetary gain. However, the association is now almost non-existent.

• Lastly, will the Syrian crisis last for ten years, as predicted by international intelligence agencies?

• If they intend for it to continue, the crisis will last for more than 20 years. However, if they so desire, Bashar Al-Assad’s reign can end within a month. There is no need for concern about armed groups, as they will cease to exist once Bashar falls.