“Abdul Halim Khaddam,” a lawyer and a leader in the Arab Ba’ath Party, then the Deputy to the Syrian President, who resigned from his political and party positions after the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005 and the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon. Khaddam left Damascus for Paris, where he received news of the suicide or killing of the former Syrian intelligence chief in Lebanon, General Ghazi Kanaan, the Interior Minister, in his office. Just a few months later, he announced in a television interview his coup against the Syrian regime that he had engineered its foreign policy for nearly three decades and was the foremost figure responsible for the Lebanese dossier for over 20 years, transforming into an opposition figure.
“Al-Masry Al-Youm” met with the former Deputy President of Syria in Brussels in an attempt to shed light on some of the issues and stages that Syria and the region have gone through, as he still holds many of the secrets of contemporary political arena.
■ How did the transformation in Syrian-Egyptian relations manifest in the 1970s?
- Syrian-Egyptian relations are unique and deeply rooted in the region’s history. Both countries resisted and defeated the Crusader, Mongol, and Turkish campaigns, and they are the main states that stood against the Zionist project, bearing the burden of defending the Palestinian cause and achieving the first Arab unity in the region. Therefore, it was not easy to abandon these relations. After the “October War” and the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations, there was concern on the Syrian side, but it did not turn into disruptions in relations, and communications did not cease. After the Second Sinai Agreement in September 1975, the Syrian government took pivotal steps in its relations with Israel, and the tension in the relationship between the two countries increased and continued until the Riyadh Summit on Lebanon, where reconciliation was reached between the leaderships of Egypt and Syria. Relations remained within this framework until the late President Anwar Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem.
■ How did those relations evolve after the Camp David Agreement and until the death of President Hafez al-Assad in 2000?
- “Camp David” spoiled the relations with Egypt, and tension reached its peak. After President Hosni Mubarak assumed the presidency, tensions eased and gradually receded until the Riyadh summit in 1989, where a meeting was held between Presidents Mubarak and Assad, closing the previous phase and starting a new one, which revitalized the relations.
■ On what basis did Syrian diplomacy rely after Egypt’s sole signing of the peace agreement with Israel?
- Syrian diplomacy focused its efforts on isolating the policy of unilateralism in the Arab-Israeli conflict and mobilizing Arab public opinion. It succeeded in cooperation with Iraq, Algeria, Libya, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and South Yemen to issue a resolution at the Arab Summit that led to freezing Egypt’s membership in the Arab League.
■ How was Syria’s relationship with the Palestine Liberation Organization under the leadership of Yasser Arafat during that period?
- It’s better to frame the question as how Syria’s relationship was with Yasser Arafat rather than with the Palestine Liberation Organization, because the organization consisted of various factions and personalities, and a large segment of these factions differed constantly with the head of the organization, Yasser Arafat. His relationship with Syria was fluctuating. For example, we differed in our position on the deadly tensions in Lebanon between the Palestinians and a group of Lebanese due to his ambition for control. On the other hand, we agreed on resisting the approach of “Camp David.”
■ How did the Oslo Agreement affect Syria’s regional relations and its relationship with the Liberation Organization?
- The Oslo Agreement had no impact on Syria’s regional relations because none of the Arab states believed that Israel would relinquish Jerusalem and the West Bank. The agreement achieved political gains for Israel by obtaining recognition from the organization, while Arafat gained nominal authority while decisions remained in the hands of the Israelis. We were clear in explaining our position to Arafat, but we refrained from entering into a conflict over the agreement because we were aware it would lead to the opposite of his aspirations.
■ It is said that Damascus wanted to disarm Arafat’s resistance while the Egyptian and Saudi positions were against that?
- There’s no truth to the claim that the disagreement with Arafat was about the resistance’s weapons. Rather, it was about the presence of these weapons in Beirut, Tripoli, and most Lebanese regions. Our viewpoint was that these weapons should be located in the south to confront Israeli aggression. Moreover, we categorically rejected the dominance of factions over Lebanon, as it would lead to its fragmentation.
There’s also no truth to the notion that the withdrawal of Arab and Saudi forces from Lebanon was due to a dispute with us over weapons. The withdrawal occurred due to the failure to implement Arab Summit resolutions following the escalation of the situation in Lebanon. As for Egypt, it didn’t have deterrent forces. President Sadat, who presided over the 1976 summit, did not list Egypt’s name when forming the Arab Deterrent Force. When Arafat asked him, he answered, “Hafez and I are one person, and the Egyptian and Syrian armies are one army. The presence of the Syrian army means the presence of Egypt.” Hence, there was no dispute between Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria on this matter.
■ Why has the Syrian-Israeli front remained calm since the disengagement, while the confrontation was confined to the fronts of Hezbollah and Hamas through logistical coordination with Damascus?
- Since signing the peace agreement with Israel, conventional warfare with it has become exceedingly complicated. There is no Arab state that can replace Egypt in this context; Egypt is a partner in confronting all external invasions of the region, starting from the Crusades and waves of Mongols and Tatars, to resisting the Zionist project in Palestine.
■ Your period of cooperation with President Bashar al-Assad was relatively short, and some speak of substantial disagreements. What were these disagreements about?
- Before Dr. Bashar al-Assad assumed power, he put forward ideas aimed at reforming the system comprehensively, in political, security, economic, cultural, and administrative aspects, in a way that would transition Syria to a phase where the people, institutions, and law would have roles and statuses. I made efforts to achieve the aspirations of the Syrians, but matters went in a different direction. However, I continued to try, and each time new factors emerged that pointed to the regime’s continuation in its individual nature, alongside the ongoing suffering of the people, both in their living conditions and their freedoms. This led to my conviction to resign and announce it, along with its reasons, at the first party conference in June 2005.
■ What prompted your transformation into the opposition ranks?
- Naturally, any party wanting to change a system in any country needs a project for change. The National Salvation Front in Syria has its project for change, and it’s not about changing individuals but about changing systems. I’m not the alternative; the alternative is democracy. This underscores the role of the people in the process of change.
■ What have you achieved so far in the opposition?
- The National Salvation Front’s project aims to change the system’s structure and move from an era of individual authority to a democratic phase that guarantees equal rights for citizens regardless of religion, sect, ethnicity, gender, or tribe. Additionally, it ensures public and individual freedoms and establishes a civil state, an institution-based state that respects the law and rotates power through free elections. It’s a state that eliminates injustice, achieves justice, eliminates corruption, upholds integrity, and adheres to the principle of equal opportunities.
Of course, the National Salvation Front and opposition factions have faced numerous obstacles, the most important of which is the deep-seated fear that has been implanted in the minds and hearts of Syrians for more than half a century, since the unity with Egypt. This was followed by the adoption of the security system, passing through all the stages that followed, including the separation stage and continuing after March 8, under the state of emergency and the use of severe repression. This is why it was a primary task for the main opposition to work on combating the culture of fear through the means available to it.
■ What is the mechanism for the right to change, and does the opposition possess this mechanism?
- The issue is not tied to a specific method of change. The primary goal is for the change to be peaceful, avoiding dragging the country into armed conflicts that could lead to the disintegration of national unity and tearing the country apart. We have seen the devastating effects of armed conflicts in Iraq, and therefore, the safest approach is to work on enhancing national unity, promoting a culture of freedom and democracy, eliminating the culture of fear, and creating an environment for national action that leads to achieving change.
■ Do you believe there are factions within the regime that the opposition can reach out to?
- There are no factions within the regime. The nature of the regime, since its inception, has created a state of fear at various levels, and over the years, the regime has cultivated groups with interests tied to it. Therefore, it’s not about factions but rather a significant number of individuals within the regime who are aware of the country’s situation and are open to change without direct involvement due to the constant surveillance.
■ What remains of the Ba’ath Party, of which you were a leader and activist?
- In Syria, the Ba’ath Party has practically changed since the separation phase. At that time, it split into several parties, including the Nationalist Ba’ath Party and the Qatari Ba’ath (Qatari Organization). Additionally, a significant faction led by Akram Hourani separated and established the Arab Socialist Movement. At the same time, some core party members formed the Arab Socialist Movement.
After the events of November 16, 1970, the Sixth National Congress was held, adopting a theory based on Marxism and revolution. This led to a change in the party’s principles, shifting towards revolutionary means and the use of violence to maintain the regime, which contradicted the fundamental principles that the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party had been founded upon since April 1947.
The concentration of power within the Ba’athists led to the suppression of freedoms. The struggle for power within the party led to the authority becoming a tool for protecting the regime. The party’s power was used to cover its policies. The events of November 16, 1970 presented an opportunity to restore the party’s role through the restoration of its principles, achieving some progress, including recognizing existing parties. However, this phase ended by late 1973 when decision-making power became concentrated in the hands of the head of state.
■ What is your view on peace initiatives with Israel? What is your perspective on an acceptable and feasible political solution within the regional and international variables?
- Many peace initiatives have been proposed in the region, but I don’t see any of them as viable due to Israel’s political stance. Israel has rejected all proposed peace initiatives. The matter isn’t about a feasible or acceptable solution within regional and international variables, because such a solution would be influenced by other regional and international dynamics. History shows that there is no stagnation in situations. The Cold War era produced peace concepts, and the collapse of the Soviet Union generated different concepts. Therefore, a natural solution should be based on the principles of international legality that reject seizing land by force and emphasize ending the occupation. Adhering to international legitimacy alone ensures stability and security for everyone.
■ Do you believe that both the Syrian and Israeli sides are serious about reaching peace?
- First, we need to understand Israel’s strategic policy towards the peace process. Is Israel ready to accept the requirements of peace, especially the withdrawal from all occupied Palestinian, Syrian, and Lebanese territories, including Jerusalem? In my opinion, Israelis are adhering to expansionist policies and rejecting withdrawal. At the same time, the Syrian side cannot make the concessions demanded by Israel. Therefore, there doesn’t seem to be any indication that the peace process is forthcoming, at least given the current regional conditions.
■ Where do you think the region is headed, especially with Syria at its heart?
- The Middle East region has not experienced stability since ancient wars to this day, due to its strategic location and wealth, which gained more significance after the discovery of oil. In the region, there are three powers with major objectives at the expense of the peoples: the West led by the United States, Israel, and Iran. Each has its strategy and projects based on power dynamics.
The region faces two significant problems: the Arab-Israeli conflict and the competition between the West and Iran, with the nuclear issue as the focal point. The content is about containing and diminishing Iran.
■ What’s your perspective on Turkey’s stance towards the Arab world, from Erdogan’s stance in Davos to the Freedom Flotilla?
- Turkey’s stance on the Palestinian issue wasn’t surprising, as it crystallized when the Justice and Development Party came to power. This development is significant for the region and Turkey, considering our shared history spanning four centuries and the fact that we share borders for about 800 kilometers. I would like to mention a statement by Sultan Abdul Hamid when Herzl approached him, offering financial aid to the Ottoman Empire in exchange for allowing Jewish migration to Palestine. The Sultan replied, “If you accept that, it would be like someone taking a knife and tearing a piece of flesh from my body.”
■ Finally, what has Abdul Halim Khaddam, the opposition leader, gained after 5 years of defection, and when is the promised change expected?
- The matter isn’t about personal gain over 5 years. It’s about a national issue. Transitioning Syria from a state of inertia, lost initiative, and absence of freedoms to a phase of movement, progress, and initiative obliges every patriot in Syria to struggle for it. National struggle isn’t linked to achieving goals within a specific time frame, but rather to creating conditions to achieve those goals.
