Arafat’s First Written Letter to Assad… The Syrian President Warns Him: “I Am Not President Sarkis or King Hussein” (4 of 5)

Khaddam Contradicts the PLO Chairman, Saying Israel Wants to “Turn the Palestinian Resistance from a Problem for Israel into a Problem for Syria”

Previous installments covered the beginning of U.S. envoy Philip Habib’s mediation to secure the departure of Yasser Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and his forces from Beirut amid Israeli bombardment and Lebanese divisions over the situation. They also covered the escalating campaigns between Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and Abu Ammar, who had begun accepting the principle of leaving Lebanon under pressure, as well as details of a letter from Bashir Gemayel, Syria’s staunchest adversary, to Assad to reassure Damascus as he pursued the presidency, and details of Habib’s plan to remove Abu Ammar and his fighters.

In this installment, we present Arafat’s first letter to Assad, who agreed to receive Palestinian fighters in Syria after having previously refused to do so when they left Beirut to “save it from destruction” caused by Israeli bombardment and siege. The letter also contained a clear warning to Arafat. What was this warning? And what were the details of U.S. envoy Philip Habib’s plan?

On August 7, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat sent his first letter to Assad following a series of media and military campaigns between the two. The letter read:

“Mr. President Hafez al-Assad,

As Your Excellency knows, pursuant to the Jeddah decisions, intensive talks were held between us and the Lebanese government concerning the departure of the Palestinian forces stationed in Beirut. During these talks, as well as following a meeting between my brothers in the Palestinian leadership and Your Excellency, we were informed that Syria had agreed to receive 1,200 fighters, in addition to the leadership and their offices.

In light of these dangerous circumstances, we respectfully ask Your Excellency, should a final agreement be reached with the Lebanese authorities, to cooperate with our brothers in Syria in this regard in a manner that would enable us to resolve the problem of distributing our forces whose departure from Beirut has been agreed upon. We hope that sister Syria will accommodate those who cannot go to another country, even temporarily, until arrangements can be made for them.

We are confident that the national bonds between the Palestinian revolution and sister Syria will enable us to confront this circumstance with a united position and shared responsibility.

I would like to thank Your Excellency for this fraternal stance, which we have always known from Brother President Hafez al-Assad and sister Syria since the launch of our revolution.”

Khaddam wrote in his papers: “This telegram is the first contact Arafat has made with President Assad or with any Syrian party. In addition, he attempted to link responsibility for the departure to the meeting of the ministerial committee in Jeddah.”

When the telegram was discussed by the leadership, Assad decided to task Khaddam with conveying the leadership’s response to representatives of the Palestinian resistance factions in Damascus. Khaddam conveyed it to the representatives on August 9, 1982. It read:

“Regarding Brother Abu Ammar’s letter:

1 — This is the first letter addressed to the leadership in Syria since the beginning of the events, that is, since the beginning of the [Israeli] aggression.

2 — What it says about Syria having agreed to accept 1,200 fighters is incorrect. We refused to accept any fighters in all the discussions held with us, on the basis that the fighters should remain where they are, confronting the enemy, as stated in the Syrian declaration.

3 — We were not officially informed of the negotiations or contacts that Abu Ammar was conducting.

As for the substance of the matter, the leadership discussed it on the basis of the following considerations:

1 — The objectives of the Israeli-American aggression against Lebanon, particularly with regard to Lebanon, the Palestinian revolution, and Syria. Among these objectives are:

a. The elimination and domestication of the revolution and its transformation into an institution whose mission would be to liquidate the Palestinian cause and provide cover for the deviations prevailing in the Arab world.

b. Turning the Palestinian resistance from a problem for Israel into a problem for Syria by transferring the situation existing in Lebanon to Syria and creating conflicts on Syrian territory between Syria and the Palestinian revolution. This is particularly significant given that some Palestinian voices were questioning Syria’s position while Syria was fighting and had suffered heavy human losses, amounting to thousands of Syrian fighters wounded or killed, as well as enormous material losses amounting to billions of the money earned from the bread of the Syrian citizen. At the same time, we did not hear these voices utter a single word about the Arab states that had provided not a drop of support. Some of them went beyond silence and were complicit with the Israeli enemy.

2 — The need to preserve the Palestinian revolution and ensure its continuity as one of the fundamental factors in maintaining the Arab-Israeli conflict. This stems from Syria’s responsibility toward the Palestinian cause, the national and Arab nationalist struggle of the Palestinian Arab people, and the importance of their continuing this struggle.”

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Palestinian fighters carry pictures of PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat as they leave Beirut on August 27, 1982.

3 — Ensuring that relations between Syria and the Palestinian revolution remain fraternal and based on clear principles, including the fact that we are in the same trench and have one common cause. This requires us to have a unified strategy in confronting this enemy and the historic conflict in the region between us and the Zionist entity, American imperialism, and its allies. All of this requires avoiding steps or measures that could create an atmosphere weakening the national and existential bond between Syria and the Palestinian revolution.

Based on all these considerations, the leadership addressed the following questions to the leadership of the Palestinian revolution:

First:

a. How many fighters will be leaving Beirut?

b. How many of them have no destination to which they can go?

c. What are the nationalities of all these fighters?

Second: Given that the enemy is attempting to turn the consequences of the aggression into a problem for Syria and the Palestinian revolution, and given the historic importance of the current situation and its future repercussions for the conflict as a whole, as well as its importance and the need to preserve the Arab dimension of the conflict, what do our brothers think of having the organization, pursuant to Article 6 of the Charter of the League of Arab States, call for an immediate emergency meeting of Arab foreign ministers to discuss one issue: the departure from Beirut, and to adopt an Arab decision to organize this matter, with the aim of having everyone share in shouldering the national responsibility and acting out of a sense of Arab duty?

This is particularly important because, after Beirut, the issue will be raised in successive stages concerning the armed departure of the Palestinian revolution from Lebanon, followed by its political departure, and then the departure of the Palestinian population from Lebanon.

“The leadership awaits answers to these questions so that it can take the appropriate decision.”

Khaddam notes in his documents that “the following day, the Regional Command of the Baath Party [the ruling party in Syria] met and studied the situation from all its aspects, including the issue of the departure of Palestinian fighters from Lebanon. It was decided to inform the organization that Syria welcomed them regardless of their number, and that in Syria they would find, as they had in the past, refuge and support. After the leadership meeting ended, President Hafez summoned representatives of the organizations and informed them of the leadership’s decision. It was a pleasant surprise for them, and they thanked him, the leadership, and the Regional Command for this national and fraternal stance.”

During the discussion, President Assad raised the issue of security and discipline. He “stressed that there could be no leniency on these matters, and said: ‘It must be clear to Arafat: I am not President Sarkis, nor King Hussein,’” referring to the events of Black September in Jordan, which led to Arafat and his fighters leaving for Lebanon in 1970.

A Second Letter from Arafat

On August 11, Assad received the following telegram from Yasser Arafat:

“Brother President Hafez al-Assad,

Greetings of revolution and jihad.

I and my brothers have received your decision and that of the Regional Command regarding the transfer of all your fellow fighters in besieged Beirut who wish to go to Damascus. We have received it with great appreciation and relief, particularly given the special relationship between the Palestinian revolution and Syria, especially under these difficult and fateful circumstances in which we are confronting this Israeli aggression, backed with unlimited support from the United States, which provides it with the means for its power and the strength of its aggression, protects it, and shields it.

Our Arab nation is passing through an extremely delicate, dangerous, and complex period. Just as yesterday this advancing aggression targeted Palestine and the Golan, and today Lebanon, unless all our Arab forces unite, our will becomes one, and all our capabilities are brought together, the future of our Arab nation will remain exposed to violations, aggression, and plunder.”**

Arafat added:

“Mr. President, I am writing to you from steadfast, besieged Beirut, upon which shells are raining from the air, land, and sea, day and night. I appeal to you, Mr. President, to exert your efforts with your fellow Arab leaders to rally this nation in the face of the danger threatening it from every direction.”

Arafat concluded his letter:

“I thank you, on my own behalf, on behalf of my fellow fighters, on behalf of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and on behalf of the Palestinian people, for this kind gesture, which we have come to expect from you and from sister Syria. It is a revolution until victory.”

The two letters did not dispel the rivalry and mistrust between Assad and Arafat. The latter preferred to leave for Tunisia by sea rather than pass through Damascus with the approval of the Syrian president, who thereafter devoted considerable effort to hosting Arafat’s rivals and opponents within the PLO, opening Syria and its camps to them.

The Evacuation Plan… and the Syrian Commentary

On August 12, 1982, Khaddam received Brigadier General Sami al-Khatib, an envoy of Lebanese President Elias Sarkis, who briefed him on the results of the talks with U.S. envoy Philip Habib and the details of the agreement for Arafat’s departure, while also seeking Khaddam’s comments on each point.

According to Khaddam, al-Khatib said:

“I have written everything down on a sheet of paper, and I will read its contents to you: His Excellency President Sarkis has asked me to convey his greetings to you and to brief you on the stages we have reached in the negotiations with Mr. Philip Habib, aimed at saving Beirut.”

Khaddam asked him: “Do you think there is anything left of Beirut?”

Al-Khatib replied:

“Or, if you prefer, ask what is left of Beirut to save? There is no doubt that you know that the tragedy of Beirut is the terrorist tragedy. The current Israeli occupation and siege revolve entirely around the issue of the departure of the Palestinian resistance, its leadership and fighters, from Beirut and Lebanon. You know that, after this lengthy effort, we have arrived at the framework of a plan and program that may secure the approval of the parties concerned. Work is still continuing at this very moment to obtain final approval of it and thus move to the implementation stage.”

According to Khaddam’s documents, the plan was based on the following principles:

“First — The Palestinian resistance and its fighters in Beirut will leave Beirut and Lebanon peacefully for destinations prepared for them in advance, according to a specified program.

Second — Respect for the ceasefire will be maintained firmly and definitively.

Third — Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 516 concerning the international forces [to support the evacuation operation].

Fourth — All military forces present in Beirut—Lebanese, Syrian, and Israeli—will immediately comply [with the arrangements].

Fifth — The Palestinian fighters and their leaders will leave Beirut and Lebanon. The Lebanese government and the government of the United States will guarantee the safety of their departure and the safety of the Palestinian civilians who remain.

Sixth — Multinational Force: At the request of the Lebanese government, the multinational force will provide assistance to the Lebanese Army and security forces in carrying out their national responsibilities in securing the departure of the Palestinian fighters from Beirut.

Arrangements are currently being made to define the scope of this force’s operations and to work out the departure arrangements in the greatest detail, so that once a final agreement is reached between the Lebanese government and the other parties concerned, the timetable can be determined accordingly. The routes, how they are to be used, and the operational details will, of course, also be specified.

Mission of the multinational force: To secure the departure of the Palestinian fighters in accordance with an established program, within a maximum period of one month, subject to extension.

Seventh — The resistance will be responsible for organizing the assembly of those departing, from beginning to end.

Eighth — The Lebanese Armed Forces, numbering 3,500 personnel, will operate alongside the multinational force, bringing the total number of these forces to 5,000.”

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Israeli bombardment of areas in West Beirut during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, July 30, 1982.

Ninth — A Liaison Committee will be established for this force to ensure implementation of the agreed program, consisting of one Lebanese Army officer and one officer from each participating force.

The committee will be responsible for communication and coordination with the Palestinian resistance and Israel.

Tenth — The departure period will be 15 days.

Eleventh — Passage through Lebanon will take place during daylight hours, without stopping, to Syria. The Israeli army will temporarily clear the road when the convoys pass, and the other armed parties will do likewise.

Twelfth — Weapons: The Palestinian resistance will be permitted to take its individual weapons and ammunition with it. The heavy weapons currently held by the resistance will be left with the Lebanese Army until detailed information is provided concerning the locations and quantities of these weapons.

Thirteenth — The Lebanese Army may call upon the multinational force for assistance in securing this equipment.

Fourteenth — The Palestinians will provide the Lebanese Army with all information concerning mines and their locations.

Fifteenth — Palestinian leadership: The necessary arrangements will be made to ensure that the leadership leaves in appropriate numbers with each convoy throughout all stages of the departure. This refers to both the political and military leadership.

Sixteenth — Prisoners:

a. The Palestinians will hand over, through the Lebanese Army, to the Israelis all prisoners in their custody, regardless of their nationality, as well as the remains and information concerning prisoners who have died, in accordance with arrangements agreed upon with the International Committee of the Red Cross.”

Khaddam interrupted al-Khatib and asked: “There is a distinction here: prisoners or captives?”

Al-Khatib replied and continued: “It says ‘prisoners,’ and here is the plan in front of me.”

He continued:

“b. Regarding the Arab Deterrent Force in Lebanon: This is a separate matter from the Palestinian issue and will be discussed separately between the governments of Damascus and Beirut. President Sarkis, in agreement with you, can request the redeployment elsewhere in Lebanon of the Arab Deterrent Force currently stationed in Beirut, independently of the issue of the war.

From this perspective, there is a concern for saving Beirut. The Lebanese authorities believe that the time has come to put this plan into effect. On this basis, we hope His Excellency the President will cooperate with us by issuing the necessary instructions now regarding how it is to be implemented, bearing in mind that the rescue program has already been worked out between the resistance, the American envoy, and the Lebanese government.

The Lebanese authorities will attempt to ensure the redeployment of the Syrian deterrent forces to the greatest extent possible within the timeframe of this rescue program.

— Israeli withdrawal: The presidential palace will continue working to secure the Israeli withdrawal from the area around Beirut and subsequently from all of Lebanon, while insisting on implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 508 and 509.”

Khaddam asked: “You have no commitment whatsoever regarding an Israeli withdrawal?”

Al-Khatib replied: “We have no guarantee. We believe that everything we are working toward will help us remove the Israelis from Beirut, and then from Lebanon.”

Khaddam: “And the Americans—didn’t they tell you anything?”

Al-Khatib: “They told us nothing, but the American position is holding.”

Brigadier General al-Khatib continued:

“Part Four: The Lebanese sovereignty declaration. The complete removal of all weapons from Lebanese territory, but this is comprehensive and also extends to the families of the Palestinians.”

Khaddam: “We will not receive their families because that would constitute the displacement of the Palestinians, at least under the present circumstances. We will receive their leaders in Syria.”

Al-Khatib: “And the clause concerning the Syrian forces—”

Khaddam: “When you decide something… what is required now is a decision to implement it.”

Al-Khatib: “For two and a half months Sharon has been destroying Beirut, and no one has been able to do anything.”

Khaddam: “What is the position of the Phalange?”

Al-Khatib: “Sharon will come to them with Saad Haddad [commander of the South Lebanon Army].”

Khaddam: “So this means the Israelis will deploy in their areas.”

Al-Khatib: **“They have now reached Byblos. Today the air force has been bombing Beirut for eleven hours, with three warships and around fifteen artillery batteries. I’ll tell you what happened shortly, but there are some details concerning the French force—whether it should enter or not, or whether the Lebanese Army should enter first. The Israelis say no, the Lebanese Army should enter, and Sharon is still hanging on to this point. The rest is approximately 80 percent settled, especially after positive indications emerged from the Arab countries.

But I asked President Sarkis, and he said: ‘Confirm to Abu Jamal [Khaddam], regarding the issue of the Liberation Army in Beirut, whether anything has changed in the program.’”

Khaddam: “Nothing regarding the program?”

Al-Khatib:

**“Only this. He asked me to go as quickly as possible. What are we supposed to do? There is no communication.

At the beginning of the siege of Beirut, I went out and was surprised by an Israeli checkpoint. I was driving a Range Rover with a serviceman, a first lieutenant who is my brother-in-law—my sister’s husband—and Professor Abdul Karim. I was in the eastern sector [of Beirut].

An Israeli soldier asked me, ‘Welcome. Where are you coming from?’

I said, ‘From the Beirut area.’

He asked, ‘Where are you going?’

I said, ‘Who are you to stop me?’

It turned out he was a first lieutenant. I told him, ‘I have been sent by His Excellency the President on official business. His Excellency has assigned me an official mission.’

He said, ‘Any communication by the Lebanese government requires our permission, even if that communication is through Brigadier General Sami al-Khatib.’

I told him, ‘We are Arabs. This is unacceptable.’ I was speaking by telephone at the checkpoint and wanted to speak to His Excellency the President. Communications normally went through [Intelligence Director] Johnny Abdo. I spoke with him about the matter afterward, and I wanted to speak to him by telephone.

He said, ‘Forbidden.’

I told him, ‘I want to speak to the person in charge.’

He said, ‘I am the person in charge.’

At that point, an Israeli army colonel arrived and said, ‘What is the matter?’

I gave him my name.

He said, ‘You are Sami al-Khatib?’

I said, ‘Yes.’

He asked, ‘Commander of the Arab Deterrent Force?’

I said, ‘Yes, and I have been assigned a mission to Damascus.’

He spoke with Philip Habib, who then spoke with me. I told Habib what had happened to me, and he said: ‘If you wish, stay at home until we see what happens.’”

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PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat is seen in this archival photograph dated August 30, 1982, in Beirut, surrounded by tight security as he leaves the city for Tunisia.

Philip Habib then called me and said, “It’s over. Go ahead.” I spoke with our ambassador in Tel Aviv and asked him, “Should I leave now, or should I wait until the order reaches you?” He said, “Move immediately.” I got into the car and reached the checkpoint. The soldier said, “Didn’t we tell you it was forbidden?”

I said, “Orders have been given allowing me through.”

He replied, “You are not allowed to pass through here.”

I went home and spoke with the president, who told me, “Take another route.” I said, “This is not fitting for us. Sharon has made himself the ruler and wants to destroy Beirut and the resistance so that he can make himself king of Israel.”

The bombardment was intense, and Philip Habib suspended his meetings and was no longer able to continue. At 4 p.m., I called the president and said to him, “I am going out with an Israeli liaison officer named Colonel Udi, and we will wait for Philip Habib at the checkpoint.” The liaison officer came, and I proceeded.

Khaddam: “All right. And what is the situation on the ground so far?”

Al-Khatib: “As for the situation, we can see civilian cars in Aley and Bhamdoun.”

Khaddam: “What about the ordinary citizen? What is his situation? What is he doing?”

Al-Khatib: “The ordinary citizen is helpless, and people are beginning to grow weary of this life.”

Khaddam: “What is the latest on the presidential elections?”

Al-Khatib: “They have set August 23 as the date for the session to elect the president, and a quorum will not be required.”

Khaddam: “If Bashir [Gemayel] becomes president, how will he lead? How will he govern under the occupation and afterward? Bashir used to tell people how elections could be held under the Syrian occupation. What will he say now about elections taking place under the yoke of the Israeli occupation?”

Gemayel did indeed become president on August 23, before being assassinated on September 14 of the same year. The presidency then passed to his brother, Amin Gemayel, on September 22.

Abu Badia [Al-Khatib]: “Is it conceivable that Beirut is being destroyed while Pierre Gemayel [leader of the Phalange Party and Bashir’s father] places the blame on the Palestinians? At the very least, he could regard them as partners in the calamity that has befallen Lebanon. The Palestinians are being bombarded and massacred, and he does not utter a word of condemnation of the occupation. How are they going to live in Lebanon? That is, if they do not end up as refugees throughout the Arab world. We have become convinced that the countdown to Israel’s existence has begun.”

Al-Khatib added: “Then they began dealing in drugs and hashish and stealing. They looted my headquarters and even stole a colonel’s shoes. They stormed the Free Zone and completely looted everything in it. They cleaned it out, then entered a supermarket in Baabda and took everything. Saad Haddad’s men were insulting Bashir. Then the Israelis entered Saad Haddad’s area. Now Bashir’s men have put up a sign in Kahaleh reading, ‘Last checkpoint of the Lebanese Forces.’ I saw the sign with my own eyes.”

Khaddam: “Perhaps on the assumption that the Israelis would withdraw ten kilometers from Beirut.”

Al-Khatib: “Of course. That is what they want to pursue Habib for—to have the Lebanese Army deploy alongside them and the multinational force outside Beirut, extending as far as forty kilometers, after which the Israeli army would begin shelling.”

Khaddam: “What will happen to the National Movement?”

Al-Khatib: “No one is saying anything about the National Movement.”

Khaddam: “Tomorrow General Hikmat [al-Shihabi, chief of staff of the Syrian Army] will brief me on the matter, and I will let you know at nine in the morning.”

Al-Khatib: “If only you knew what has become of the Lebanese: destruction, humiliation, and looting. They burned our houses, cars, and taxis. They promoted hashish and sold various goods, and Israeli soldiers began buying with shekels.

Captain Ajloun told me that Mohammed al-Tawil was supposed to come with me today as an escort. Mohammed al-Ali told me that they were in Byblos at three in the morning when a shell came in and struck Mohammed in the abdomen. He began screaming and wailing; shrapnel had struck him in the stomach and parts of his intestines were exposed, and they took him to the hospital.”

Khaddam: “Regarding the Battle of Bhamdoun and the battle involving those who moved from the Chouf toward Zahle, one of the Israeli commanders said: ‘We advanced with a tank brigade, and on the way one of the fighters fired an RPG at us. It hit nothing. Shortly afterward, we were surprised by a battalion, engaged it, and our advance was halted. Then we were surprised to find the Syrians firing at us from a distance of four meters. The Syrians, or the Syrian soldier, are excellent fighters and know how to use their weapons very well.’ He gave an account of how many officers and soldiers they had lost.”

Al-Khatib: “Now, Abu Jamal, you would no longer recognize the streets. Everything is destroyed. Beirut is no longer Beirut.”