DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS: Abd al-Halim Khaddam, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Syrian Arab Republic .
Sameeh Tawfeek Abou Fares, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Syrian Officials
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State ‘and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Richard Murphy, u. S. Ambassador to Syria
Joseph j, Sisco, Under Secretary. of State for Political Affairs
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Near- Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Harold H. Saunders, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian. Affairs
Robert B. Oakley, NSC Staff
Amb. Robert Anderson, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Press Relations
Peter W. Rodman, NSC staff
Robert H. Pelletreau, Jr., Deputy chief of Mission, Damascus’
Isa K. Sabbagh, Special Assistant to Amb .Akins. Jidda (Interpreter)
DATE Saturday, March 15, ·1975
PLACE: Guest House. Damascus Syria.
[The conversation began in the dining room over lunch.}
Kissinger: When you go to Cuba, will you defend me.
Khaddam: It is not necessary to defend you; it is easy to speak well of you.
Kissinger: What is this meeting?
Khaddam: A meeting of nonaligned nations to prepare for a Summit later.
Kissinger: I will be corning. We’ll leave NATO and join the nonaligned. I want to join the largest alliance.
khaddam: And Ismail Fahmy will join NATO.
Kissinger: How is Cuba nonaligned?
Khaddam: They’re against imperialism.
Kissinger: But how is that nonaligned?
Khaddam: The nature of non-alignment is changing.
Kissinger: I told Gromyko there was a leadership crisis in the-Soviet Union.
He’ said, never. I said I read a lot of attacks in the Soviet press about someone travelling around the Middle East giving away sleeping pills, since attacks on the United States are prohibited by the principles
of coexistence, the articles must have been against him. [Laughter] I had to have it translated twice before he understood.
Khaddam.: That’s a record.
Kissinger: He needs it translated three times to understand the jokes?
Khaddam: No, it’s good he heard your statement twice, are you seeing him soon?
Kissinger: A date is not set. I told him to wait for me in’ Phnom Penh. {Laughter]
Khaddam.: The trouble with Sihanouk is he’s wavering between the Soviets and the Americans
Kissinger: And the Chinese and Khmer Rouge. He’s more afraid of the Khmer Rouge than Lon Nol is.
Khaddam: The Chinese have lots of influence with your Congress.
Kissinger: Are you sure you know which side the Chinese prefer to win? It’s like the alliance between the Iraqis and Kurds. [Laughter]
Khaddam: The Chinese prefer that both sides stay together.
Kissinger: I think there will be a negotiated solution fairly soon.
Khaddam: The Security Council has taken some good theoretical resolutions on Cyprus.
Kissinger: I think there is a good possibility now of settling the problem. It depends on which government will be the caretaker government in Turkey until the election. If it’s either Ecevit or Demirel, both are strong enough to settle this . If they have another interim government like the caretaker Prime Minister I talked to earlier this week, then we will have to wait for the election.
Khaddam: I think before the election it will be impossible, because the issue is the key to the election.
Kissinger: No, I think if Ecevit becomes Prime Minister before the election he’ll settle it before the election .So he can run on the platform that he achieved a political as well as a military· success. I could be wrong. That’s my estimate. Is that right, Joe?
Sisco: Yes.
Kissinger: That’s why he is Under Secretary!
Khaddam: I am sure your opinion is based on studies by Mr. Sisco.
Kissinger: Yes, he and I were in all the meetings there. We work very closely together. I think Ecevit will run on a platform. claiming victory. He was a student of mine.
Khaddam: I met him, He is very intelligent.
Kissinger: when he was my student he was a poet and professor.
Khaddam: Poets. when they enter into politics, tend to harden a bit. Their psychological makeup makes it harder to adapt.
Kissinger: They’re like women in politics. They’re more blood-thirsty than men.
Khaddam: That’s why the Conservatives chose a woman.
Kissinger: Mrs. Thatcher. Mrs. Gandhi. Mrs. Meir7 Mrs. Bandaranaike. She was very tough on her opponents.
Khaddam: And Elizabeth of Argentina.
Kissinger: You’ll stop there on the way?
Khaddam: In 1980 there will be the Summit Conference of the nonaligned in Cuba.
Kissinger: By that time we’ll be there.
Khaddam: By that time your relations will have taken a different turn.
Kissinger: Did you see my speech a few weeks ago! About Latin America. I mentioned Cuba.
Khaddam.: Did you see the book by Mr. Joubert?
Kissinger: I’ve heard of it. He mentions me. I’m an obsession with Mr. Joubert.
Khaddam: It would be beneficial to read it.
Kissinger: He’s very intelligent.
Khaddam: And ambitious.
Kissinger: But I don’t think he can go anywhere in French politics. He’s a temporary phenomenon. I don’t think he’s strong enough to last for a long time in opposition.
Khaddam: He doesn’t have any particular color or view, that is why he won’t last.
Kissinger: Or the personality to sweep millions.’ I think. he got carried away and overestimated his political power.
Nor does he have the nerves for a confrontation. He should try negotiating thirty days with Syria. [Laughter]
Khaddam: With. us, actually you were just getting used to the airport road! The negotiations with Rabin and Sadat are those that predicted your future, unlike Joubert. Joubert does not know his future; Dr. Kissinger does. At least you establish a light at the end of the tunnel; if you stay long enough in the area you’ll end up as the head of a lunatic asylum. [Laughter] This is the difference. Dr. Kissinger is discerning enough to see the future — sometimes correctly, sometimes not. Mr. Joubert cannot. Perhaps you could employ him later in your retirement. [Laughter]
Kissinger: As an inmate or an assistant?
Kbaddam: He wouldn’t qualify as assistant. Laughter)
How, is President Nixon?
Kissinger: the last time I saw him he was better
,Khaddam.: The campaign against him is less now
Kissinger: His rehabilitation will begin soon.
Khaddam: There is, no ‘doubt he ‘suffered an injustice
Kissinger: I called on him. a few weeks ago in San.clemente.
Khaddam : The problem at the new papers is very big in United States
Kissinger: They insist on making the news not reporting it
Khaddam: Sometimes they help each other in creating news
Kissinger: At the news conferences they ask you questions designed to get you to give answers you don’t want to say, or what they know you can’t say. And so they make it a sensation either way, For example, last week they asked Your President would he make’ peace with Israel? They know very well that if he says yes, he’s in trouble with the Palestinians, and if he says no, it’s a sensation in America.
Khaddam.: But he answered.
Kissinger: He was very skillful.
Khaddam: The President said that of course we want peace. There is no sane person who doesn’t.
Kissinger: He handled it very skillfully. How long will your conference last in Cuba?
Khaddam: It depends on the violence of the campaign against imperialism. [Laughter] It could be a week. There will be 17 Foreign Ministers. If each Minister gives a speech of 15 minutes or half an hour we would need four days.
Kissinger: Ministers can’t speak for 15 minutes.
Khaddam: Especially now since Cuba has a very good climate.
Kissinger: But what is the main subject , imperialism?
Khaddam: There are several subjects.
Kissinger:· Western or Eastern imperialisme?
Khaddam: We’ll start with Western.
Kissinger: Because it’s safer.
Khaddam: Because we’re starting there.
Kissinger: There is less risk involved. Never attack someone who might retaliate
Khaddam: We’re not worrying about retaliation. Even though we’re small, we’ll lock horns with the biggest. I meant because we find ourselves physically in the West, we should start there. For example, now we are in Damascus; is it conceivable we’d’ talk about Jamaica? There are three topics: (I) the situation in the Middle East, (2) the question of energy and basic commodities.
Kissinger: May I make a suggestion? Don’t come out for prices which are lower than what is necessary for alternative sources. I know you will come out for lower prices Don’t go below $7.
Khaddam: No, 12$!
Kissinger: Below $6 ‘will be difficult for us.
Khaddam: It’s for America’s sake because there are American companies inspecting for oil here. we ‘will have a very good petroleum future. And we need help from the Arabs.
Kissinger: What’s the third problem?
Khaddam: To support national liberation movements against discrimination, things like that, We can be useful.
Kissinger: How long do you expect it to last? Seriously. Three or four days?
Khaddam: Three days. I’m careful to Come back. as quickly as possible.
Kissinger: I may come here again.
Khaddam: Yes, in case ‘you Come back.
Kissinger: I may do it. I’m thinking about it.
Khaddam: You realize, of course, we’ll aIways welcome you’ warmly
Kissinger: No, I know.
[The party ‘moves to’ the sitting room and’ continues the conversation .
Khaddam: What do you have in the way of new thoughts about Jordan?
Kissinger: They can’t negotiate about the West Bank?
Khaddam: No.
Kissinger: I’ll just call on King Hussein to keep him informed. I have no new thoughts. I understand Zayd Rifai is taking out Syrian citizen ship. He was so impressed by the military demonstration you showed him.
Khaddam: We are all one people. It was the Western world that split us up.
Kissinger: That you can’t blame me for. It was the British and French. When they were great powers. The post-World war I settlement was a disaster for everybody, for the Middle East, Europe. Never was a war fought for more stupid reasons and settled with more stupidity. In Europe, forget about the Middle East the settlement guaranteed German predominance. They surrounded a powerful state with scores of little states; that’s what powerful states like.
Khaddam: True. Wars always produce tragedies.
Kissinger: There are very few leaders who in the middle of conducting a war keep in mind that sooner or later they must make peace.
Khaddam: King Hussein has taken the final decision to carry out the resolutions of Rabat.
Kissinger: That is my impression, and we’re making no effort to change it. I’m. seeing him because he’s an old friend, and it would be impolite not to see him. when I am in the area.
Khaddam: Right.
Kissinger; I think you’re a grea.t Foreign Minister to have good relations with both Jordan and the PLO..
Khaddam: It’s the direction of the President.
Kissinger: But it’s skillfully done. Seriously, I am not saying it as criticism.
Khaddam: Because we have no vested interests, we treat both sides equally. We don’t try to play one side against the other, and we’re very frank with both sides. When one side does something, we think is wrong, we tell them. And because we do this, both respond in kind to’ us.’ And of course, as you probably observed, it’s not easy to follow this kind of path. But as long as there is sincerity, dedication and warmth…. Take Lebanon, the situation between Lebanon and the resistance forces: we’ve been able to keep good. relations with both and to improve relations between both sides. In the future, if you have a quarrel with another Arab country” we can perhaps bring about a balance.
Kissinger: you’ll help us?
Khaddam: By letting things move in a positive direction. Because in fact we want American policy to develop in a better way, for our interests and the interests of the American people. But the time is long.
Kissinger: If the time is long, you’ll see our policy is also in the interest of Syria.
Khaddam: ‘When it comes to time, there is nothing to cause us to burn our nerves. We will be patient. When there is the element of time with no hope, that will lead to desperation. When there is time allied to hope there is patience.
Kissinger: Quite seriously, if you’re willing to give time Some hope, then I’m confident progress can be achieved. It is not in the American interest to have Syria in a state of desperation. And it is not American policy.
KhaddaIn: As you heard from the President, I would like to reiterate that irrespective of the results of Dr. Kissinger’s efforts we are very interested to have U. S. -Syrian relations strengthened and improving.
Kissinger: Even if we succeed!
Khaddam: If you succeed, it will.be a shot in the arm to U S. -Syrian relations.
Kissinger: Whatever happens on the present trip Mr. Foreign Minister, we want to bring positive results for Syria in the near future. So even aside from that , I appreciate what you said , but if we work together with Some confidence and some patience, I think we can bring Syria Some progress.
Khaddam: As you’re aware, the situation in the Middle East differs from the rest of the world. Surprises in this area are always big and likely to happen, and it is not easy to control things given the possibility of such surprises.
Kissinger: The question is whether you’ll surprise us or whether we’ll, both be surprised together.
Khaddam: we might both be surprised.
Kissinger: if that is true, we should probably on one of my trips discuss what it is tthat might surprise us. So we can perhaps act jointly to prevent it.
Khaddam: The situation is not in the control of anyone. Take Vietnam – we know the parties who are controlling the situation ,but not here. That’s why I asked you in the car how would you guarantee that what one side pledges won’t be violated.
Kissinger: The Arabs never break their word, so we have only the Israelis to worry about.
Khaddam: True. There are human circumstances which seem to be . dictating. There is no region in the world where events spring up like in the Middle East, Although the elements in Vietnam are known, although Dr. Kissinger signed with the Vietnamese, what happens there is known.
Kissinger: In Vietnam. we have a difficult domestic situation. , With the right set of circumstances, peace could be preserved. It’s quite predictable whatever happens in Vietnam~ whatever the circumstances are. That’s not the case in the Middle East.
Khaddam: That’s why I said that.
Kissinger: Yes, I agree with the Foreign Minister.
Khaddam: There are many currents in the Arab world. .President Sadat made a statement demanding the internationalization of Jerusalem. The result was that in Kuwait , with the national assembly of 50–they passed a resolution condemning every Arab leader who backed that. And the Kuwaiti Government took a resolution supporting ‘Syria”. President Assad’s call for a unified command. Because there is public opinion in Kuwait and 200 000 Palestinians in Kuwait.
Kissinger: They’ll all be in the streets greeting me when I come. It will be the biggest reception in the Middle East.
Khaddam: The Kuwaiti Government respects the feelings of the Palestinians and the Palestinians respect the feelings of the Kuwaiti Government” so there is no worry.
Kissinger: I thought there would be a 21-gun salute, all aimed at me [Laughter]
Khaddam: No. That was my way of supporting the contention that there are many factors that bear on this. Specifically, today there are 20 Arab governments, and every government feels that the measure of dedication and sincerity is whether they support the Palestinians. That is of very great importance.
Kissinger: I agree this is one of the problems.
Khaddam: Even in Turkey, even in Greece, they’re each their own country, and certain things have been happening.
Kissinger: I agree there is no one more interested in Arab unity than me. I could deal with one Arab leader instead of traveling around.
Khaddam.: That’s true. Arab unity will be coming about. “If that is true, that you would like Arab unity, then you should cease separate settlement
Kissinger: As I told you in the car, we’re not promoting anything.
Khaddam: Granted; that’s what we believe. But as you know,’ there are times when somebody does things not seeking the results that are brought forward. You possibly agree that when you’re dealing with a ” certain people, you have to know the factor that makes them tick. ‘For example, people in the Third world are different, in the. character of the people.
[The protocol officer arrives to indicate that President Assad is ready to’ receive the Secretary
