DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS: Abdul Halim Khaddam, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Syrian Arab Republic
Sameeh Tawfeek Abou Fares, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Isa K. Sabbagh, Special Assistant to Ambassador Akins, Jidda (Interpreter)
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
DATE & TIME: Saturday, March 15, 1975
12:02 – 12:35 p.m.
Place : In Secretary’s Car from Airport to Guest House; Guest House Damascus
Khaddam: Welcome back.
Kissinger: Thank you, It is good to see you, Whatever Our problems politically, it is always a good human thing ·to see our friends.
KhaddaIn: The sentiment is definitely reciprocated. We don’t see only great difficulties, because from what we hear, the United States has. decided to recognize the PLO.
Kissinger: I saw that in the newspaper.
Khaddam: President Sadat is saying that
Kissinger: Where?
Khaddarn.: In a press interview with a Lebanese paper
Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, with respect to the PLO, you will always know exactly what we are doing, and we would not do anything with another country that you wouldn’t know about beforehand. We know of your special interest in the Palestinian problem and your historical connection with Palestine.
Khaddam: And our future relations also
Kissinger: Exactly. so you can be sure we will make no understanding .. with President Sadat that we don’t discuss with you. I told President Assad last week exactly what our position is, and there is no change, and it’s exactly what I told President Assad. And I have always refused to establish contact with the PLO through Cairo, and when I do it, I’ll do it through Morocco, so the various factions in this area. are not affected.
Khaddam: Of course, it goes without saying that it would be a great pleasure to us to learn that there is such a contact.
Kissinger: But if there is such contact, first, it will not be made through Cairo, And second, we will let you know first. It will be through Morocco.
Khaddam: What is important is that step. be taken
Kissinger: But frankly, they are making it harder by constantly attacking me and making it look like what we do is under pressure
Khaddam: How is President Sadat’s health?
Kissinger: He seems fine.
Kpaddam: And Minister Fahmy?
Kissinger: He speaks of his Syrian colleague with great affection! He expects to see you on the 24th in Cairo.
Khaddam: Yes, there is a possibility.
Kissinger: [pointing to the peak of Mt. Hermon, More snow in the last week?
Khaddam: No, that’s the same. When are you going to sign the agreement between Egypt and Israel?
Kissinger: There is no agreement. Believe me, there is no agreement. I told my colleagues on the way up that I am qualified after this job only to be chief director of a lunatic asylum. [Laughter].
Khaddam: Actually, I believe this will be an excellent qualification. [Laughter] if only to judge the situation from what one hears. They don’t jell.
Kissinger: Exactly. The Cairo press gives an impression of optimism for which there is no basis. The Israeli press gives the impression of pessimism, which is also exaggerated. The situation is not as good as Cairo says and not as bad as the Israelis say.
Khaddam: President Sadat’s optimism is based on the fact that you’ve moved to certain definite things
Kissinger: But the reason he. said or I , is frankly to bring pressure on the Israeli Cabinet, which is meeting Sunday, to come up with something definite. They are both doing a veil dance. And every once in a while they both peek out from behind the veil. And both act as if the Secretary of State of the United States has nothing to do except massage them and adjust to their domestic requirements.
Khaddam: You don’t have to. My opinion is the best thing you could do for both is just freeze it and say goodbye to them.
Kissinger: That’s not very hospitable! I’ll give you a ride as far as Washington. .
Khaddam: ‘Perhaps if you want to conduct this kind of negotiation in Washington
Kissinger: There is a definite chance — there is a chance of an agreement; I don’t want to mislead you — but there is also a chance I’ll go home.
Khaddam: I don’t mean you should go home. We could arrange a beautiful touristic program. You could still be here and have a good time!
With Egypt, even if there is a signing of an agreement, things will not move smoothly.
Kissinger: I consider myself morally and politically obligated to move with Syria. Whether Syria wants it is something else, but I don’t believe Syria should be left out for any length of time. And I am already working with Israel in that sense.
Khaddam: By suggesting that you sort of freeze up to them, I meant that that would make your job easier. It would make your attempt to make an overall settlement easier.
Kissinger: I cannot refuse if the parties want an agreement. I’m not in a position to refuse. But I’m not pushing. In the case of Syria last year, I felt it was an absolute necessity. I do not feel that now
[Pointing to trees along the airport road:] Beautiful.
Khaddam: Apricots.
Kissinger: When I reach a certain point, where last year I would keep going, this year I will go home. I was good to see the Foreign Minister at the airport, difficult as. he is.
Khaddam: As far as we are concerned, It is no trouble
Kissinger: But I would have missed him. If I had been in Syria without him, it would not have been the same.
Khaddam: I stayed for you.
Kissinger: I know. Is my friend Boutefika still here?
Khaddam: He left.
Kissinger: Did he speak well of me?
Khaddam: With respect.
Kissinger: Because I like Bouteflika and the Algerians.
Khaddam: He came through Damascus to make clear that Algeria is placing at Syria’s disposal all its potential, military and economic. Whatever Syria decides to do.
Kissinger: There was a press announcement.
Khaddam: Yes, he said on his arrival that our viewpoints are coinciding, Syria and Algeria.
Kissinger: That was my impression from my many talks with President Boumedienne.
Khaddam: The relations between us and Algeria have a special nature. Who is going to guarantee for Israel the Egyptian signature? Or for the Egyptians the Israeli signature?
Kissinger: I don’t understand. They guarantee each other.
Khaddam: Suppose in an election Rabin falls and Begin comes in and rescinds it? One has to bear in mind possible changes.
Kissinger: [To Sabbagh:] He has an obsession with Begin . Maybe he should be the first Israeli Ambassador’ to Damascus. I told the Israelis that the only thing preventing a war is the absence of direct negotiations; if they met together they’d kill each other on the spot.
Khaddam: I state it as a matter of fact that the first real defeat· Israel will suffer will be at the hands of Begin. Because of Begin. The Arabs would be very lucky if the Israeli leadership was in his hands, or Rabin
Kissinger: I’m changing my mind about Rabin. I think there is the possibility of dealing with him. I had some long private talks with him. He is the first Israeli who talked with understanding about Syria. Most Israelis say something can’t be done.
Khaddam: Apparently yesterday a number of Congressmen who came with a delegation to Israel said yesterday that Israel will not go down from the Golan Heights and is building fortifications in the rock so as not to leave.
Kissinger: There are two problems. American Congressmen say anything. There are even some who say things unfriendly about me. And then you know it’s a crazy world. [Laughter] Seriously, Congressmen we can’t be responsible for. They have their own purposes. Secondly, in Israel, there is always a fever chart. At the beginning of a negotiation they always say, ‘no, impossible, II and you’re a criminal for suggesting it. It takes weeks -and even months of psychological preparation in Israel, and also in America. And so this is a process that is unavoidable. But I’ve started to begin the process now with Syria. It always starts low key.
Khaddam: The trouble is, by the time the process takes on momentum, no one can tell what other factors come in.
Kissinger: That is true — that is the dilemma. ‘Unfortunately, we lost four months last year when President Nixon resigned. Is the President going to let some of our correspondents come in today? As he did last year? I think it’s a good idea. I have no particular interest in it. They would inevitably write about it. And I have a suggestion. He will not be talking to an Arab audience, so the more moderate he can sound, the more it will be helpful in countering your enemies in America So if he talked about
understanding, etc. — without giving up any principles: I’m talking as a friend.
Khaddam: Of course, we don’t see we are moving in the direction of peace enough to say so.
Kissinger: No, but there is a general indication of readiness. So the blame falls on others.
Khaddam: I’ll talk to the President.
Kissinger: It is up to you.
Khaddam: What is your opinion? Should I let them in?
Kissinger: If he can talk in that sense, yes. Because it will give a good image in America. It makes it easier for us to do things in America. It is entirely up to you.
KhaddaIn: I’ll ta 1k to the Presidency.
[The Secretary’s motorcade arrived at the Guest House at 12:29, and the party sat down in the sitting room.]
Kissinger: In which flower is the microphone? When President Nixon was in office, we killed ourselves to take notes in meetings. We didn’t know he was recording everything.
Khaddam: But you’re head of national security.
Kissinger: But this was done by the domestic staff. We didn’t know about it.
Khaddam: You’d like Some rest before lunch?
Kissinger: We’re having a Syrian lunch? It’s psychological warfare! I have a colleague of Whom it was said, “He has the best intelligence service in Washington, but unfortunately it’s directed against you… He’s a colleague of Sisco. Between the two of them, I’m helpless. I’m like the Queen of England; I just sign the documents they send me. [Laughter]
Khaddam: We’ll take care of Sisco for you. [Laughter] We’ll have an exchange and we’ll take Sisco and give you an Arab in his place.
Kissinger: That’s good. I like Arabs. I told the Foreign Minister that when I’am through with this job I can be director of a lunatic asylum.
Khaddam: You’ll be directing that kind of hospital before you retire. [Laughter]
Kissinger: We’re ready for lunch, whenever you want.
Khaddam: You can rest half an hour and then we’ll have lunch.
Kissinger: Good.
[The conversation ended. ]
