In the mid-nineties of the last century, President Saddam Hussein initiated the opening of two secret channels of communication with President Hafez al-Assad. However, Assad expressed “doubts” about Saddam’s intentions due to past experiences and his role in thwarting the implementation of the “Joint National Action Charter” between Syria and Iraq in 1979. Nevertheless, Assad decided to continue the dialogue while subjecting Saddam to several tests to establish a foundation with Arab countries and the Iraqi opposition before taking public steps to mend the rift between the “Baath” regimes in Baghdad and Damascus. These secret messages, revealed for the first time by Asharq Al-Awsat, are part of the numerous documents carried by the late Syrian Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam to Paris when he defected from Syria in 2005.
Asharq Al-Awsat contacted the Iraqi envoy, Ambassador Anwar Sabri Abdul Razzaq Al-Qaisi, who confirmed the authenticity of the documents. In Saddam’s first letter in August 1995, he appeared eager to reopen the two embassies that had been closed since 1982, hold high-level and public political meetings, and open the borders. However, Assad decided to consult with Arab nations before responding to Saddam’s proposals, in order to safeguard the interests of the Arab nation and the two brotherly countries.
According to Khaddam’s account, in August 1995, Iraqi Ambassador Rafi Al-Tikriti requested a meeting with the Syrian Ambassador Abdul Aziz Al-Masri. They met on the same day, and Al-Tikriti informed Al-Masri that he had received a personal letter from President Saddam intended for Assad. The letter stated: “I confirm that the step we are taking towards Syria to build trust and reconciliation between the two countries is a very serious step, and we should not let past sensitivities hinder our progress. Past experiences had their own circumstances, and we should forget them and start anew with genuine and sincere openness in this critical phase.”
In late August 1995, Anwar Sabri Abdul Razzaq Al-Qaisi, the Iraqi ambassador to Qatar, contacted Yahya Bakour, the Director General of the Arab Organization for Agricultural Development, requesting him to convey his desire to visit Damascus with a message from Saddam.
Assad discussed the two letters with me and Foreign Minister Farooq al-Shara. He decided to accept the presence of the Iraqi ambassador in secret and limited the contacts to me. The concern was to establish contact with the Iraqi ambassador in Qatar rather than in Ankara due to various reasons, including information security. The embassies (Syrian and Iraqi) in Ankara might be vulnerable to surveillance devices used by intelligence agencies. We were not convinced of the seriousness of the Iraqi regime in bringing about fundamental changes in its policies and building genuine relations with us. The history of relations between Syria and Iraq has been marked by negatives, harm, and significant damage to Syria and the Arab nation. Additionally, we wanted to maintain our relations with the Iraqi opposition. Our Arab relations with them and the Iraqi regime are characterized by deep hostility.
On September 5, 1995, I received Anwar Sabri Abdel Razak in the evening. It was a friendly meeting during which we reviewed the relations between the two countries and Baghdad’s role in disrupting these relations, including the alleged conspiracy in July 1979.
He conveyed the following message: “Warm greetings from the Iraqi President to President Hafez Wali. Saddam affirms that Iraq’s desire to restore normal relations with Syria is not a reactionary or pressure-induced event due to American pressures and the ongoing siege. Instead, this desire stems from considerations related to Arab national security and crucial Arab interests.”
The ambassador further stated, “President Saddam and all Iraqis welcome President Hafez’s statements and your statements in Iran, and they highly appreciate them. It signifies your concern for Iraq’s unity, its territory, and its people, and your rejection of any foreign intervention.”
He further added that Saddam states that the American-Zionist plan is evident, and Jordan has become a part of it. It is a scheme that intends to harm not only Iraq but also Syria and all Arab interests. The objective is not just to weaken and divide Iraq but to politically, militarily, and economically invade the entire Arab region.
Moreover, Saddam was also quoted as expressing Iraq’s intention to engage in dialogue with all parties with an open mind and sincere intentions, without any exceptions. The purpose is to create a favorable atmosphere and facilitate Arab reconciliations based on an objective foundation. This approach considers the higher Arab interest and addresses the challenges that pose threats to all of us. Additionally, it aims to keep the region away from cycles of complexity and blackmail. As a result, President Saddam suggests that Mohammed Said Al-Sahaf, the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs, visit Damascus for a comprehensive political dialogue where both sides can determine their perspectives and assessments of events. Saddam is ready for the visit to take place immediately, whether secretly or publicly.
Continuing his message, he stated, “President Saddam emphasizes that the situation within Iraq has not been affected by the media noise generated by Jordan after the defection of the traitor Hussein Kamel, who has been manipulating the situation in Iraq. The official and party institutions remain strong, and all the rumors being circulated are mere products of Jordan’s imagination. President Hafez was right and accurate in confirming this. Your comrades in Iraq have remained steadfast for five years.”
I presented the letter to President Hafez, and we discussed it at length, considering the complicated history between our two countries. However, he believed that our response should be positive and friendly, requesting a meeting to assess the seriousness of the Iraqi position.
On September 13, 1995, I received the Iraqi ambassador and conveyed the following message to him: “Greetings from President Hafez, and warm regards to President Saddam. President Hafez emphasizes that the current phase faced by the Arab nation, along with the threats to both Iraq and Syria, necessitates immediate action from both parties to overcome obstacles and resolve differences. It is crucial to halt the deterioration of the Arab situation and prevent its division into factions, where each faction seeks to undermine the other in pursuit of self-serving and known interests that are entirely detached from the greater interests of the Arab nation and its satisfaction of any particular international party.
Hence, the destiny of Syria and Iraq compels them to rescue the Arab situation from a state of falseness and decay, as they represent a significant force in countering the dangers that the Arab world confronts. Among the prominent risks is the Jordanian role, which, as previously stated, has become a significant component of the American-Zionist strategy. Its suspicious attempts to engage with Washington, Turkey, and the Zionist entity, as well as the reported alliances forming and becoming public, pose a threat not only to Syria and Iraq but to the entire Arab nation. Therefore, reestablishing normal relations between the two brotherly countries, Iraq and Syria, at this critical juncture, holds the potential to construct a unified and influential Arab stance capable of addressing the challenges that are progressively emerging day by day. These challenges include the Zionist endeavor to undermine Arab identity and the Turkish threat with its water and military projects, which enjoy the support of the American-Zionist alliance.”
I suggested that it would be useful to understand the stance of the Iraqi Brotherhood regarding the resumption of relations and cooperation before the meeting takes place. This would help in determining the level of the meeting. The Iraqi ambassador received this message with great satisfaction and appeared eager for an immediate return to Iraq.
On September 19, the Iraqi ambassador met with his Syrian counterpart in Ankara and conveyed that the leadership in Baghdad has received the inquiries from the Syrian leadership with satisfaction. They leave it to the Syrian leadership to decide the nature, level, and scope of the dialogue and cooperation. The Iraqi leadership is prepared to meet with a representative from Syria at the Syrian-Iraqi border. The degree of confidentiality, level, and date will be determined by the Syrian leadership. Furthermore, the Iraqi leadership expresses its desire to reinstate diplomatic relations, either at the level of interests, chargé d’affaires, or ambassador.
This situation raised concerns for us, considering the actions of the United States and Jordan on one hand, and our past experiences on the other.