The rise of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri to the top of his personal relations with the Syrian regime, as mentioned in the previous episode, was based on information available to “Al-Nahar” from a prominent Lebanese political figure currently living abroad away from the spotlight. This progress continued through the 1980s and most of the 1990s. The main driving force for this ascent was the role that Saudi King Fahd bin Abdulaziz assigned to Hariri since ascending to the throne in June 13, 1982, extending his tenure until August 1, 2005, after Hariri’s assassination on February 14, 2005. Hariri’s decline from the top of the Syrian hierarchy coincided with the end of Hafez al-Assad’s life, two years before his death in 1998.
Much has been written about Hariri’s political journey in Lebanon, leaving lasting impacts on the country. However, the prominent Lebanese political figure focuses on a significant development in 1998, which marked an internal turning point accompanying Hariri until his absence after seven years. They say:
“After the election of General Emile Lahoud as president on November 24, 1998, succeeding President Elias Hrawi, his first visit outside Lebanon was to Damascus to thank President Hafez al-Assad for the support that enabled him to reach the presidency. During his visit to the Syrian capital, he detoured to the command headquarters of the Syrian forces in the Bekaa to be accompanied to the Syrian presidential palace by the head of security and reconnaissance in those forces, effectively the military governor of Lebanon, Brigadier General Ghazi Kanaan. The meeting between Assad and Lahoud concluded with the following dialogue:
Assad: Now, after we have completed the presidential elections, it is time to form the new government. Of course, Rafik Hariri will be its prime minister.
Lahoud: I think President Sleiman Franjieh is suitable.
Assad: Franjieh is good and decent, but Hariri is more suitable.
Lahoud: Former President Omar Karami could also be the prime minister.
Assad: Omar Karami is fine. But Hariri must be the prime minister.”
The source of this information adds: It was clear that President Lahoud was determined not to have Hariri as the head of the first government in his tenure. Assad’s assistants, at his request, instructed Kanaan to persuade Lahoud during their journey back to Lebanon to reconsider his position on Hariri. However, Kanaan did not achieve any results throughout the trip between Damascus and the Bekaa Valley before getting off the new president’s car in Lebanon, while the car continued with President Lahoud to the Baabda Palace.
The same personality recounts, citing Kanaan later, that he utterly failed to persuade Lahoud to comply with Assad’s request. It was added that Lahoud did not act on his own but expressed the will of the actual ruler of Syria at that time, Bashar al-Assad, who took over the Lebanon file with the approval of his father, at a time when the latter was declining in health, seemingly close to death.
How did the situation unfold until Hariri was removed from the premiership? It is useful here to mention what Khaddam said in the famous interview conducted with him by the Al-Arabiya channel in Paris after his defection from Bashar al-Assad’s regime at the end of 2005: “The relationship between President Hariri and President Hafez al-Assad was very strong. President Assad was very keen on the success of President Hariri, who provided significant services to Syria in international relations, in relations with the West in general, and with France in particular, and in relations with Saudi Arabia. He largely played a role that the Syrian Foreign Minister did not play at that time… The communication between him and me was almost daily, and meetings with President Assad were once or twice every month.”
Khaddam continues: The campaign against President Hariri began in 1998, and President Assad protected him from it. During the parliamentary consultations (to name the Prime Minister after electing the President) where some voices delegated the choice to President Lahoud, Hariri objected and disagreed with Lahoud on this matter. Here, Ghazi Kanaan contacted President Hafez, as I later understood, and informed him that Hariri is requesting a redo of the consultations and wants parallel votes to Lahoud’s presidential election votes. Mohsen Daloul conveyed this information to President Assad upon Hariri’s request. In reality, President Assad was disturbed (and commented: “What is this confusion!”), and he told Ghazi, “He (Hariri) must apologize, so let him apologize!” Kanaan conveyed the apology to Hariri. I later asked Hariri, and he said this incident did not happen. Then, I spoke to Daloul, and he told me that he never spoke with Ghazi. Later, Kanaan passed by, and I asked him, “What is the matter?” He replied, “Bashar (Assad) asked me to inform the president (Assad) that this (Hariri) is playing games and wants to redo the consultations.” I asked him, “Did you convey this to President Assad?” He answered, denying it. So I said to him, “Why did you do what you did?” He replied, “I can’t be between two fires. If I convey the message, I can’t bear the campaigns of Bashar.”
The period between 1998, when Bashar Assad’s influence began to establish itself in both Syria and Lebanon, preparing to fill the imminent vacuum left by Hafez Assad, who passed away in 2000, and 2005, when Rafik Hariri was physically eliminated, marked the end of a phase where the latter reached the peak of his roles, both domestically and internationally. The Lebanese personality, the source of this information, narrates that there were suggestions from those within Hariri’s circle of friends when they sensed the pressure exerted by Assad’s team on Hariri to voluntarily step down from power, even if based on the power-sharing principle. However, Hariri did not accept those suggestions. When he rejected the method adopted by President Lahoud’s team for the appointment in 1998, Hariri began preparing for the electoral battle in 2000, achieving a resounding victory, and returned to the Serail on the back of a white horse. Could this victory end the problem of Hariri’s relationship with Assad’s heir?
The answer is undoubtedly in the negative. The Lebanese personality revealed the concessions made by Hariri to Bashar Assad when the latter was in the Republican Guard from early January 1998 until his father’s death in June 2000. However, the chemistry of friendship during Hafez Assad’s time turned into the chemistry of estrangement during Bashar’s time. This affected the Lebanese team that surrounded Bashar from 1998.
In this context, Khaddam says that until the moment of his death, Hariri hoped for reconciliation with Bashar Assad. Hariri was a man of solutions, not confrontation. He faced many campaigns but only responded with solutions. However, Hariri frightened them with his ability to attract people…
On February 12, 2005, a Saturday, Khaddam met in his office in Damascus with the common friend who had initiated the friendship between the Syrian Vice President and Hariri in the first half of the 1980s. Khaddam urgently requested him to convey a verbal message to Hariri in Beirut, asking him to leave Lebanon as quickly as possible because there was a looming danger. Indeed, the common friend met with Hariri the next day, Sunday, February 13, 2005, at Qoreitem Palace and delivered the message. On the same day, Khaddam called Hariri on the phone and asked him: “Did you meet with so-and-so (the common friend)?” Hariri replied that he did meet with Khaddam’s messenger, and Khaddam knew that his message had been delivered. However, Hariri, afterwards, did not pack his bags for travel but instead prepared a schedule of activities for the next day, Monday, February 14, 2005. However, this day turned out to be his last in life.
Responding to a question from the Lebanese personality about whether he believes that Bashar al-Assad was involved in the assassination of Hariri 15 years ago, despite the fact that the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is preparing to announce its verdict, condemning individuals from “Hezbollah,” she replied: “A crime of this magnitude cannot happen without Assad’s knowledge at least.” And she provided evidence, which the Special Tribunal has had for a long time, proving that the Syrian regime was an actual accomplice in the 2005 explosion, stating that General Asef Shawkat, the head of Syrian military intelligence, was in a hotel very close to the explosion site near the St. George Hotel on February 14, 2005.