Former Syrian Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam dealt a blow to his country’s leadership when he denounced the government of President Bashar al-Assad, stating that it had “made numerous mistakes during its period of dominance” over its neighbor, Lebanon. In an interview with the Al Arabiyah satellite TV channel yesterday from Paris, Khaddam launched an unprecedented attack on President Assad and the Syrian leadership. He acknowledged “direct Syrian threats” made to Hariri and provided examples of Syria’s political mistakes in Lebanon. Diplomatic observers have noted that Khaddam’s resignation was the initial catalyst for the silent split during a period when Damascus faces tremendous international pressure. This pressure stems from allegations of Syrian involvement in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, as well as direct Syrian involvement in subsequent assassination crimes that have affected Lebanon since Hariri’s death.
During the interview, Khaddam denied being deported or estranged and described his arrival in Paris as an opportunity to “contribute to an important phase in the history of his country.” He believed it was his national duty to present what he called “the correct facts and information” and added that being in Paris allowed him to write without the political noise that surrounds his home country. Additionally, he denied being abused or threatened, emphasizing his good relationship with President Assad. He stated that all their meetings were “friendly” and that President Assad had shown him respect and met with him just two days before his departure from Damascus. However, Khaddam acknowledged differences in their views, emphasizing that such differences did not eliminate mutual respect. When asked about potential threats, he expressed his expectation of facing such threats from those who misled President Assad. Khaddam highlighted that his assassination attempts in the past were not due to disagreements in a “gambling casino” but rather because of his concerns for his country’s interests.
Khaddam stated that he possesses numerous files that he intends to present, not against individuals, but for what he considers the country’s best interests. He warned those who attempt to expose him that he possesses a substantial amount of dangerous information, although he refrained from providing specific details.
Khaddam admitted that he left Syria during a challenging time, citing it as a sacrifice for the sake of Syria. He justified his resignation from his post nearly a year ago by explaining his lack of compatibility with certain individuals within the regime who disagreed with the necessary reform steps he proposed for the country. He mentioned his prior support for President Assad, offering assistance and presenting him with a study on party development, Syria’s political system, methods to overcome the economic crisis, the relationship between Islam and Arabism, and the issue of modernity. Khaddam expressed his belief that if President Assad had adopted this strategy, Syria would not have fallen into the current predicament, stating, “The major problem arises when a state lacks a clear policy and navigates through minefields in complete darkness.”
Khaddam stated that in early September 2004, two Americans, Darrell Issa and Matten Indyk, who criticized Syria, visited the country. However, there were individuals who convinced the president that “the United States will come crawling to him regarding Iraq to maintain its influence in Lebanon.”
Khaddam admitted that he requested French President Chirac to send experts to assess the situation, and this request was fulfilled. However, the proposed solutions remained unimplemented. He expressed his conviction that the reform process would not progress and ultimately decided to resign. He explained that he had to choose between siding with the regime or standing with the country, and he chose the latter due to the transient nature of leadership. He referred to the isolation of authority, the absence of constitutional institutions, party leadership, and leadership within popular organizations. He emphasized that the role of the leadership had become limited to “endorsing decisions made by the president.” Khaddam highlighted the rampant corruption in Syria, giving an example of an employee with a salary of only 400 pounds who managed to accumulate a wealth of at least 4 billion dollars. He noted the increasing number of average citizens who had to search for food in garbage bins, considering it an unprecedented phenomenon in Syrian political life since the country’s independence. He accused the close circle of the political authority of exploiting their influence and engaging in illegal wealth accumulation. He stated that more than half of the Syrian population lived below the poverty line, while the majority of the remaining half were on the poverty line. Only a fortunate few dominated and became wealthy.
Khaddam recounted his experiences during the leadership meeting after the death of President Hafez Al-Assad in 2000. He presented reform ideas aimed at broader political participation, but a team close to President Bashar hindered and frustrated all his attempts. He accused the security services of covering up the failure to implement reforms and attributed it to the old guard. He criticized the leadership for misinterpreting Arab and international events and making erroneous decisions in response to these developments.
He accused President Bashar of acting based on emotions and reactions, claiming that he had lost the ability to distinguish between right and wrong. He argued that the president was influenced by illusions created by those around him, who portrayed his mistakes and injustices as fair. Khaddam refrained from commenting on his relationship with the president’s brother-in-law, Asaf Shawkat, and the president’s brother, Maher Al-Assad, stating that his interactions with the armed forces were solely through the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff. When asked about the comparison to Foreign Minister Farouq al-Shara, who became the second-ranking figure in the regime, Khaddam refused to make such a comparison, stating that al-Shara was not the “second or tenth” man, and emphasized the distance between them. He questioned who was protecting Ghazali ?
Regarding the questioning of Ghazi Kanaan’s suicide, Khaddam stated that he had no information but acknowledged that considering the circumstances and situation Kanaan was in, suicide could be a likely possibility. He expressed uncertainty about whether a thorough investigation had taken place but mentioned taking into account relevant factors.
He revealed that on the day before the suicide, he was invited to spend time with a friend who seemed cheerful and did not exhibit any signs of distress. However, the following day, the situation was entirely different. Nevertheless, nobody knew exactly what had transpired. He accused individuals in power of exerting pressure on Kanaan, particularly regarding the Lebanese situation and holding him responsible for the issues in Lebanon. Khaddam deliberately overlooked the role of Rustam Ghazali, whom he described as acting like an absolute ruler in Lebanon. He admitted that Ghazali had insulted President Hariri, President Nabih Berri, and Walid Jumblatt. Khaddam criticized the evident protection provided by President Bashar Al-Assad to General Rustam Ghazali, the former head of Syrian intelligence in Lebanon. People began questioning why Ghazali was being protected despite his known actions. Khaddam revealed that he had repeatedly asked President Bashar to dismiss Ghazali. He advised President Assad to take a stance against him but claimed that the president only issued a warning. Over time, Khaddam accused Ghazali of embezzling 35 million dollars, to which President Assad responded, admitting that it was a sinful act.
Khaddam mentioned that after Hariri’s assassination, he informed Assad that Ghazali was the culprit, but President Assad addressed the People’s Assembly, acknowledging mistakes in Lebanon without taking concrete actions. Khaddam added that he had requested the president to hold those responsible for the mistakes in Lebanon accountable, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who implicated the country in resolution 1559. However, no action was taken. He expressed his growing concerns about the specific protection given to Rustam Ghazali and who was truly responsible for Hariri’s assassination. When asked about the identity of Hariri’s killer, Khaddam stated that it was necessary to await the results of the international investigation, supported by all parties, before making any accusations. He emphasized that the political campaign against President Hariri had created a crisis with Lebanon.
He admitted that numerous Syrian threats had been made against President Hariri. He recounted an incident when the head of the security service, Rustam Ghazali, would play with his gun while telling his visitors, “I will do such and such.” Such conversations indicated a serious concern for President Hariri’s safety. On one occasion, President Bashar expressed harsh words to President Hariri, three months before his term was extended, saying, “You want to act as the President of Lebanon… I won’t allow it. I will crush anyone who tries to defy our decision.” The pressure on President Hariri escalated, and he even started experiencing nosebleeds.
Khaddam then addressed President Mutab, saying, “How can you speak to the Prime Minister of Lebanon in such a manner, in the presence of junior officers?” Khaddam acknowledged that President Bashar realized his mistake and instructed him to resolve the crisis. He mentioned that months prior to Hariri’s assassination, Hariri was summoned and told that he was no longer wanted, but he didn’t expect his own country to be behind the assassination. Khaddam emphasized that no Syrian security agency could make such a decision without the knowledge of the president (Assad), a claim Assad personally denied in an interview with the German magazine Der Spiegel, insisting on waiting for the investigation results.
Regarding his presence as the sole Syrian official at President Hariri’s funeral, Khaddam clarified that he attended in his personal capacity, not in an official capacity, as a sign of their friendly relationship. He praised Hariri’s contributions to Syria at various stages and highlighted two phases in their relationship. The first phase was under the rule of the late President Hafez Al-Assad, who believed in strengthening the relationship rather than weakening it, recognizing that Lebanon needed Syria and vice versa. The second phase occurred during President Bashar’s tenure, where the treatment differed, and Khaddam pointed to severe campaigns against Hariri led by President Emile Lahoud and an influential Lebanese faction that successfully influenced Syria’s position against the late Prime Minister.
Regarding the hypothesis involving Ahmed Abu Adass’s role in Hariri’s assassination, Khaddam dismissed it, calling those who proposed the hypothesis extremely foolish. The bombing required a significant amount of explosives, around a thousand kilos, and a technical operation to disrupt Hariri’s convoy. If Abu Adass was in the car, where are his remains? Khaddam asserted that no rational person would accept such an explanation, considering the complexity of planning and execution required for such an operation.
In conclusion, Khaddam stated that the investigation results would determine the identity of the individual behind the crime. He added that this was yet to be determined.
Regarding Melis’ report, which some claim is unfair to Syrian and Lebanese parties, he commented, “He is a lawyer. The report is technical and professional. He has provided a summary of the available information but cannot disclose everything as it would compromise the integrity of the investigation.” Khaddam emphasized the need to avoid politicizing the investigation, despite its inherently political nature. He pointed out that those who politicized the investigation were the suspects themselves, praising it when it suited their interests.
When discussing the impact of the assassination within Syria, he mentioned a meeting with the Qatari leadership where the shocking news was received. All participants believed it to be a disaster for Syria. However, Khaddam highlighted a statement made by Foreign Minister Farouq Al-Shara, who referred to the explosion that killed several Lebanese individuals without specifically mentioning President Hariri’s name, as if he were an unknown figure. Khaddam interpreted this as subconscious bias against President Hariri. He also revealed that he initially opposed the selection of President Lahoud and had warned President Bashar Al-Assad about extending Lahoud’s term due to the potential dangers it posed to both Syria and Lebanon. A few days later, President Hariri contacted him and mentioned that Khaddam’s group had changed their stance. President Hariri asked for his opinion, and Khaddam advised him to extend his term and then resign, as he believed Hariri would not be able to withstand the political and security pressures that would ensue.
Khaddam criticized the fact that after thirty years in Lebanon, Syria had only Emile Lahoud and Suleiman Franjieh as presidents, considering it a significant failure in political leadership.
Addressing the accusation of freezing the Taif Agreement, Khaddam denied it, stating that the agreement was neither frozen nor fully implemented. He acknowledged shared responsibility between Syrian negligence and joint Lebanese-Syrian abuses that led to this situation. He mentioned that the mistake lay in the elections that followed Omar Karami’s government, which resulted in the formation of governments aligning with the political blocs in Parliament. Thus, the perception of Syria freezing the Taif Agreement emerged, with recognition of Syria’s role in forming Lebanese governments.
In response to a question about the delay in the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, Khaddam pointed to two reasons: the Lebanese government’s concern about potential security vulnerabilities and the insufficient readiness of the Lebanese army. He also mentioned a Syrian reason, which was the presence of Israel in the south. However, he noted that Syrian forces should have withdrawn after the Israeli withdrawal and anticipated the subsequent collapse that occurred.
Abdel Halim Khaddam, who served as Deputy to two presidents, was born in 1932 in the city of Banias in the Tartous governorate. He is married to Mrs. Najat Marqabi and has three sons and one daughter.
Previous Positions:
- 1951: Graduated from the Faculty of Law at the Syrian University in Damascus.
- 1947-1964: Secretary of the Party Division in Banias.
- 1954-1964: Practiced law in Banias and Latakia.
- 1964: Governor of Hama.
- 1964-1965: Governor of Quneitra.
- 1965-1969: Governor of Damascus.
- 1969-1970: Minister of Economy and Foreign Trade in the Ministry of Dr. Yousef Zaeen.
- 1970-1971: Member of the interim Qatari leadership after the corrective movement.
- 1971-2000: Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- 1971-2005: Member of the Qatari leadership.
- 1984-2005: Vice President of the Republic.
Upon the death of President Hafez Al-Assad in 2000, Khaddam assumed the position of President of Syria for 37 days as the late First Vice President until President Bashar Al-Assad took office. Khaddam continued to serve as Vice President until he stepped down from office.
