Declassified British documents, released on its 30th anniversary, reveal that the government of James Callahan sought the assistance of the late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad’s regime to improve London’s relations with the Iraqi government led by President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. Damascus agreed to mediate, but it seems that their efforts did not bear fruit due to Al-Bakr’s resignation in favor of Saddam Hussein, widely believed to have been forced by Saddam himself. Relations between Damascus and Baghdad deteriorated under Saddam’s rule.
The documents provide a detailed account of the discussions held in London between Prime Minister James Callahan and the then Syrian Foreign Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam. Khaddam explained Syria’s opposition to peace initiatives between Egypt and Israel, expressing strong criticism of the late President Anwar Sadat. He likened Sadat’s actions to those of the Shah of Iran, who had recently been overthrown by supporters of the late Ayatollah Khomeini. Khaddam also revealed Syria’s intervention in South Yemen, which was governed by a communist regime, aimed at preventing hostility and the overthrow of the regime in North Yemen. This action was driven by Syria’s desire to prevent the Gulf states from facing a unified Yemen, led by communists, with a population of ten million. Furthermore, he emphasized that the stability of the Gulf states hinged on their rejection of Sadat’s peace efforts with Israel.
Callahan’s Special Secretary (April 1976 to May 1979) provides a confidential report dated March 21, 1979, containing the minutes of an afternoon meeting held at 10 Downing Street, the Prime Minister’s headquarters. The meeting involved Callahan, Khaddam, Dr. Goyjati (head of the Western European Department of the Syrian Foreign Ministry), and the Syrian Ambassador in London. Also present were Sir Anthony Parsons, the former ambassador to Iran, and either James Craig or Patrick Wright, the British ambassador to Damascus (unclear who replaced Parsons in 1979).
The meeting, lasting one hour and fifteen minutes, commenced with Callahan welcoming his Syrian guest and expressing appreciation for the opportunity to engage in talks, as he had more frequent discussions with Israeli and Egyptian leaders than with the Syrian government. While acknowledging differences between the UK’s and Syria’s positions on the current Middle East situation, Callahan emphasized the importance of both governments making efforts to understand each other. The minutes indicate that the British Prime Minister praised “the wisdom of President Assad, confirmed by many, including former US Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger.” Callahan asked Khaddam to convey his best wishes to President Assad.
Khaddam began by recalling his meeting with the British Prime Minister four years earlier. He conveyed President Assad’s greetings and extended an invitation for Callahan to visit Syria at the earliest opportunity, emphasizing that such a visit would represent a positive step in the development of relations between Britain and Syria.
The author of the minutes noted that Khaddam repeatedly stressed the importance of Callahan visiting Syria.
From the beginning of the meeting, it became evident that there was a significant disagreement between the two parties concerning the developments in the Middle East. At that time, Syria was leading a “rejection front” with other Arab countries in opposition to the decision made by the late Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to engage in peace negotiations with Israel independently, without involving the rest of the Arab nations. Khaddam provided a detailed explanation of Syria’s efforts to isolate President Sadat due to his signing of the Camp David Accords in September 1978. He stated that these agreements were not a step forward towards the just and comprehensive peace that everyone hoped for, but rather a step backward. Khaddam further added that a just peace required the participation of all relevant parties and should address all the fundamental problems in the region. However, the Camp David Accords did not meet these criteria. Instead, they created a new situation in the region that posed a threat to peace. The agreements caused a division among the Arab nations, whereas peace required Arab solidarity. The Arabs turned against President Sadat because he attempted to address issues that were the collective concern of all Arabs without consulting them.
According to the British minutes, Khaddam drew a comparison between President Sadat’s negotiations with Israel and the actions of the United Kingdom during World War II when it refused to enter into a separate peace agreement with Nazi Germany. He also mentioned the refusal of the United States and the United Kingdom to abandon their Soviet ally despite their ideological differences. Khaddam emphasized that President Sadat should understand that Egypt’s power existed only within a framework that included all Arabs. Without the support of the Arab nations, Egypt would be an insignificant country. President Sadat had no right to pursue a unilateral peace agreement or to relinquish Jerusalem as he did. Khaddam further stated that the United States would not succeed in finding a single Arab country that would ally with President Sadat. The Camp David Accords failed to address the core issue of Palestinian rights and did not succeed in resolving the underlying tensions in the region. Moreover, by not acknowledging Palestinian rights, the agreements effectively undermined these rights and only reorganized the Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank.
Khaddam observed in his analysis that the then Israeli Prime Minister, Mr. Menachem Begin, displayed boldness and courage in speaking the truth during his speech in the Knesset the day before the meeting with Callahan. In contrast, President Sadat and Mr. Khalil, the Egyptian Foreign Minister at the time, were providing false statements about the peace treaty. Khaddam highlighted that Mr. Begin accurately pointed out that the agreement lacked references to the establishment of a Palestinian state, the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people, Israeli settlements in the West Bank, or Jerusalem.
He stated that the Camp David Accords contradicted United Nations resolutions, particularly Security Council Resolution 338, which called for a peace conference involving all relevant parties. However, Syria, Jordan, the Soviet Union, the Palestinians, and even the United Nations itself were excluded from Camp David.
Khaddam further added that President Sadat appeared determined to assume the role of a policeman in the Middle East, and the Americans had agreed to provide him with weapons to fulfill this role. He warned that these weapons would be used against Arab and African countries, compelling them to seek assistance from the Soviet Union. He cautioned that American policy was opening the door to increased Soviet influence in the Middle East and emphasized that while Syria could safeguard its independence, other countries would struggle to resist and would eventually turn to the Soviets for support.
The Syrian Foreign Minister drew a comparison between President Sadat’s role and that of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain in 1938, as well as Marshal Pétain’s role in France during World War II. He stated that President Sadat, like Chamberlain, was retreating, while Begin, like Hitler, was advancing. He added that, similar to Bitan, President Sadat would fail to protect his country.
Khaddam expressed his belief that the Camp David Accords would ultimately fail, stating that President Sadat would follow the same path as the Shah of Iran. He anticipated that Arabs would soon gather to impose sanctions on Egypt, which would have a significant impact on the country. He expressed gratitude to Mr. Begin for his recent speech to the Knesset, which supported the Arab cause. Khaddam highlighted the inaccuracies in the statements made by Mr. Vance, the US Secretary of State at the time, and President Sadat, regarding the peace treaty leading to the realization of Palestinian rights. He emphasized that Syria’s ultimate goal is to achieve peace and that their objection to the Camp David Accords stemmed from their belief that it endangered the prospects for peace.
The British response
expressed gratitude to Callahan and commended Khaddam for his strong statement in defense of Syria’s position against President Sadat’s move. They acknowledged Syria’s commitment to peace but expressed uncertainty about how Syria envisions advancing peace efforts. The British response highlighted various regional challenges, including Islamic growth, the clash between Islamic and Western ideas in Iran, the resurgence of Kurdish activity, issues faced by Turkey, turmoil in Afghanistan, and difficulties encountered by the regime in Pakistan. They stated that these factors contribute to instability in the region.
However, against this backdrop of regional unrest, the British response presented a different perspective on Khaddam’s position regarding the Camp David Accords. They recognized the problems raised by Khaddam but viewed the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty as a potential step toward resolving a longstanding issue. They mentioned that the West now has a better understanding of the Palestinian position compared to the past, and Israel no longer enjoys unconditional support as it did a decade ago. The British Prime Minister emphasized that he does not share Khaddam’s view that Palestinian rights can be disregarded or crushed. He acknowledged the division among Arab ranks but believed that the Camp David Accords offer the best way forward.
The British response asserted that they would do everything within their power to use the Egyptian-Israeli agreements as a starting point for a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East. They emphasized that the agreements are not an end in themselves but a beginning. They reassured Syria that they would seek to bridge the gap between Arab countries without harming their relations with Syria. They concluded by stating that they believe in seizing the opportunity presented and working towards a comprehensive settlement in the region.
However, Khaddam reiterated many of the points he had previously made in his intervention and emphasized that Israel would never be allowed to benefit from its aggression, regardless of the sacrifices and harm inflicted on the Arabs. He stated that improving Syria’s relations with Iraq would compensate for Egypt’s departure from the Arab cause, referring to the efforts of rapprochement between the Baathist regimes in Syria and Iraq under President Hafez al-Assad and President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. Khaddam further highlighted the four groups of Palestinians, including the 1948 refugees, refugees recognized by UNRWA, refugees after the 1967 war, and Palestinians living in Gaza and the West Bank. He asserted that the Camp David Accords failed to guarantee the rights of any of these groups.
When the British Prime Minister inquired about any developments in the PLO’s position towards Israel, Khaddam responded that the PLO advocates for the implementation of United Nations resolutions. He clarified that the Palestinians do not deny Israel’s right to exist but deemed it wrong to expect the victim of aggression to be the first to recognize the aggressor. Khaddam also predicted that the influence of Ayatollah Khomeini would dominate the Middle East, highlighting that even the late King Hassan II of Morocco did not dare to support the Camp David Accords, and no Arab country had offered support to Egypt in its peace efforts with Israel. Regarding the British Prime Minister’s comment on Iran, Khaddam stated that the Islamic awakening was viewed positively from the Syrian perspective, with Iran being a confrontational state aligned with the Arabs against Israel. He further mentioned that Syria was not concerned about the resumption of Kurdish movements.
The relations between Britain and Iraq
were remarkable during the meeting with Khaddam, as Britain sought Syrian mediation to bring London and Baghdad closer. At that time, the regime of the late President Assad was aligning with the Bakr regime in Baghdad. Khaddam expressed to the British Prime Minister that Syria hopes to improve its relations with Iraq, a country that has a long history of traditional ties with Britain. He emphasized that Syria, through its influence, could help facilitate this improvement. According to the report, Khaddam informed the British Prime Minister that he would be visiting Baghdad on March 27 and would have discussions with Iraqi leaders regarding this matter. He also emphasized Syria’s support for the development of cooperative relations between Arab countries, Britain, and other European countries. It is unclear whether Khaddam raised the British request during his visit to Baghdad, which occurred a day after the signing of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel on March 26, 1979.
However, as widely known, the Syrian-Iraqi rapprochement did not endure. Al-Bakr stepped down, or possibly was forced to do so, on July 16, 1979, and was succeeded by Saddam Hussein. During Saddam Hussein’s rule, Iraq’s relations with Syria deteriorated significantly.
The Gulf
The British minutes reveal that Prime Minister Callahan inquired about Mr. Khaddam’s views on stability in the Gulf. Khaddam responded by stating that Syria’s policy is to promote stability in the Gulf region as instability goes against Syria’s interests.
He further explained, “Since Syria opposes the use of force in resolving disputes between Arab countries, the Syrian government has exerted pressure on the government of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) to end hostilities with northern Yemen. Syria’s intervention prevented the collapse of the regime in northern Yemen, which could have led to a unified Yemen with a population of ten million, resulting in greater instability in the Arabian Peninsula.”
Khaddam also highlighted the connection between the stability of Gulf states and their stance on the Camp David Accords. He mentioned that currently, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE have sided with Syria in rejecting the agreements. He emphasized that if their policy were to change, Syria would not adopt a position that aligns with its interests, potentially leading to instability.
In response to the British Prime Minister’s inquiry about the internal situation in the Sultanate of Oman, Khaddam acknowledged that Syria’s relations with the Sultan of Oman (Qaboos bin Said) were not favorable. However, he clarified that Syria refrained from encouraging opposition against the Sultan to avoid causing concern among the Saudis. Khaddam suggested that Britain should instead promote internal reforms in Oman and enhance its relations with neighboring countries, particularly the UAE.
Lebanon
At the end of the meeting, Callahan inquired about Syria’s policy in Lebanon. The Syrian Foreign Minister responded, stating, “Syria’s objective is to prevent the recurrence of fighting in Lebanon and to assist the Lebanese in rebuilding their nation as a sovereign and independent country.”
He further added, “Syria is making significant sacrifices toward this goal, including the deployment of 40,000 of its forces in Lebanon. However, Syria cannot sustain this burden indefinitely. Unfortunately, the process of rebuilding the Lebanese national army is progressing very slowly.” He expressed that Syria might have to reconsider the presence of its forces in Lebanon, but emphasized that their withdrawal would likely result in a renewed outbreak of civil war.
The meeting concluded with gratitude expressed to British Prime Minister Khaddam for the invitation extended by President Al-Assad to visit Syria. Khaddam acknowledged the invitation and affirmed that he would respond to the call in a timely manner.
