“Corona” seized everything. It spread like wildfire in the “global village,” becoming a worrisome obsession for governments and citizens alike. It became the sole topic of discussion. Our days begin by inspecting the extent of the crimes committed overnight, and we review its latest achievements before going to sleep. In between, we see images of the world wearing masks. Experts provide advice on screens, and cautionary voices rise, warning that the worst is yet to come. They emphasize that post-“Corona” will not be the same as before and that changes will reshape the dynamics of nations. The global economy will pay a hefty price for this unprecedented earthquake. Human relationships will also bear the cost of isolation, quarantine, and fear of the other.
Despite all that has been presented, I felt a desire to escape from this topic that has dominated our articles for weeks. I was searching for an excuse, and I felt I found it when I learned about the death of the former Syrian Vice President and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdul Halim Khaddam, in his French exile. Death in the time of “Corona” compounds the cruelty of death. It magnifies isolation and estrangement, reinforcing the belief that, in these times, individuals are pushed alone into a dark tunnel with known, bleak ends.
Khaddam did not escape the curse of “Corona.” Only one of his sons managed to accompany the coffin on his final journey. Airports are closed, and measures are strict. The pandemic intensified the estrangement of the man who seemed captive to alienation for years. The man who left his country and position in its regime, protesting the assassination of his friend, Rafik Hariri, in 2005, could not find another place for himself. He found no balcony or chair. He failed to don the attire of an opposition figure, haunted by a long shadow in the waters of the regime, its lexicon, and the justifications for its practices. Khaddam lost his standing in the place where he spent his entire life and found no compensation from the world he tried to escape to. In his French residence, he always appeared as a man of the past. He avoided any straightforward criticism of the era of President Hafez al-Assad, as if fearing to throw his own life out of the window. Therefore, he steered clear of directing criticism at the father, attempting to solely burden the son with the responsibility of what Syria had become.
Those familiar with some intricacies of Syrian politics know that Khaddam, who retained the title of Vice President, exited the decision-making circle years before leaving the country. Some who witnessed that stage believe that Bashar al-Assad’s era practically began in 1998, with the election of Emile Lahoud as President of Lebanon. However, he had to wait two more years for his era to officially start after his father’s death. This does not negate Khaddam’s extensive and rich experience. He was involved in promoting the policies of Assad senior in Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, and elsewhere. This civil party member did not hesitate to master the art of living in a system where generals were the backbone, under the leadership of a commander skilled in manipulating pawns, infusing power into players’ veins, and then withdrawing it from them. He was entirely loyal to the commanding president and did not hesitate to use harsh language to enforce his policies and criticize his opponents who rejected the Syrian interpretation of Lebanon or the region’s conditions.
When I learned of his death, I recalled a few issues I heard from him in Damascus and Paris. One day, I asked him about Lebanese politicians criticizing his brusque style during Syria’s peak of power. He responded, “I was not representing a charity organization; I was speaking on behalf of a state that is concerned with defending its interests, security, and stability. Negotiation has its methods and arts, especially when you believe it is necessary to quickly force the other party to reduce its demands or reservations, and that their actual interest lies in taking the shortest path to a settlement. Sometimes, you have to negotiate harshly because the balance of power is not in your favor. You have the right to resort to deception. We practiced this approach with major countries, and it was fruitful. I do not deny that I was harsh at times with some Lebanese politicians, especially when they tried to present personal and petty accounts at the expense of issues concerning the interests of both countries and major issues. I heard a lot about this topic, and I don’t want to provoke anyone. But let me mention a certain fact: we did not ask Lebanese ministers, deputies, or security officials to report daily to the Syrian officer stationed in Anjar (Lebanon’s Beqaa Valley), nor did we ask them to write reports for him. There is always someone volunteering, then washing his hands later, and starting to criticize.”
Another issue worth noting. Khaddam said, “Khomeini sent us a message asking if Syria was ready to receive him because staying in Iraq had become impossible. Of course, being in Syria ensured his personal safety, as well as continuing his battle with the Iranian regime, without forgetting staying close to Iraq’s Shiites. Assad was aware of the consequences of hosting Khomeini, so he advised our envoys to contact the Algerians, who agreed after hesitation. When we contacted them, and when the Algerians agreed, we were surprised that France announced its willingness to host him on its soil, and that’s what happened.”
A third issue. He said, “The Iranians asked Syria for surface-to-surface missiles to respond to the Iraqi missiles in the city war. Assad did not want to record that Iraqi cities were bombed by Syrian missiles during his tenure, so the Iranians advised us to contact the Libyans, and they encouraged us. The Iranians overlooked the story of Imam Musa al-Sadr’s disappearance during a visit to Libya and obtained a stockpile of weapons from Gaddafi.”
A fourth issue. Khaddam said, “We did not expect the collapse of the tripartite agreement we sponsored in Lebanon. Elie Hobeika was confident in his group, and he informed us that he was coordinating with General Michel Aoun, who participated in formulating the military aspect, and they were coordinating against President Amin Gemayel. We did not expect Samir Geagea to dare to lead a coup, in agreement with Gemayel, which frightened Aoun and pushed him to back down.”
Khaddam is gone, and he carried many news, events, and secrets in his baggage. He preferred silence and claimed that his memoirs were ready, waiting for the right timing. Recent Syrian developments in recent years reinforced his stay in the gloomy tunnel, and he left alone in the time of “Corona.”
