He said that Yasser Arafat would talk to you to please you, and when he left you, he would implement what was in his head.
Inside his home near the Arc de Triomphe, in the heart of the French capital, Paris, Al-Massae met Abdel Halim Khaddam—one of the most knowledgeable figures on the secrets of the Syrian file. He was the close associate of both Presidents Hafez and Bashar al-Assad, serving as their vice president and foreign minister, entrusted with two of the most sensitive and complex dossiers in the Middle East: the Lebanese file and the Iraqi file.
Sitting in Al-Massae‘s chair, Abdel Halim Khaddam revealed secrets about his relationship with the regime of both father and son, which he described as “deeply corrupt and authoritarian.” He spoke of Hafez al-Assad’s obsession with passing power to his family and how Bashar al-Assad sought his company, even criticizing his father’s regime while addressing him as “Uncle Abdel Halim.” He also recalled the moment he found himself president of the republic after Hafez al-Assad’s death and the behind-the-scenes maneuvering to amend the constitution so that Bashar could take power. He explained why he decided to leave Syria and become the fiercest opponent of a regime he accused of planning to establish a mini-state along the coast, where the Alawite majority, to which the Assad family belongs, resides.
Khaddam also spoke about his relationship with Hassan II and Mehdi Ben Barka, as well as how Syria’s position on the Western Sahara issue shifted. He claimed that Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika never truly departed from the ideology of his predecessor, Houari Boumédiène.
In one of your books, you mentioned three threats to the region: Israeli, American, and Iranian. Isn’t it an exaggeration to compare the Iranian project to the American and Israeli ones?
“Add to these dangerous projects the Russian project in the region. As for the Iranian project, its threat is significant because it is based on an expansionist doctrine aiming to control a region stretching from the Mediterranean to Afghanistan. Whoever controls this area controls the entire Arab Mashreq.”
– Is the Iranian project truly Iranian, or is it Persian?
We cannot say it is purely a Persian project because Iran is composed of multiple ethnic groups, with Persians being the largest. However, some key decision-makers in Iran are not Persian, such as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who is from Azerbaijan, meaning he is of Turkish origin. The Iranian project is an international one through which Iran seeks to restore the glory of the Persian Empire.
– But in terms of severity, isn’t the Iranian project different from the others, as it possesses elements of harmony and alignment with the history and identity of Arab and Islamic peoples?
(Laughs) You’re trying to lead me to another answer. The danger of the Iranian project lies in the fact that it is young, dynamic, and driven by a religious ideology. Religious ideology is more powerful than nationalist or patriotic ideology for the average citizen. This makes the religious project far more dangerous, as it mobilizes people blindly. That is the real threat of this project—it is a national Iranian project, but its tool is religion. Iran succeeded in making Tehran the religious reference point for most Shia Muslims, and the danger lies in the fact that this project will divide the Islamic world into a Sunni-Shia conflict, which no one spoke about until after the Iran-Iraq war, once Iran had secured itself.
– What is the secret behind the relationship between Syria’s secular regime and Iran’s Islamic Shiite regime?
The Syrian regime cannot be described as either secular or religious—it is a regime that has used sectarian tools to manage conflicts.
– It is said that the relationship between the Assad regime in Syria and the Shia in Lebanon runs so deep that Hafez al-Assad did not trust any Christian or Sunni politicians as much as he trusted the Shia. Is this true?
This can be attributed to Hafez al-Assad’s sectarian perspective. Among Sunni leaders in Lebanon, the only one he truly respected was the late Rashid Karami. As for the other sects, their political figures were equally sidelined by him. However, the Shia community as a whole worked closely with Hafez al-Assad—whether it was Sheikh Musa al-Sadr, Sheikh Muhammad Mahdi Shamseddine, or Sheikh Abdul Amir Qabalan. Whenever Hafez al-Assad wanted to shift the balance of power in Lebanon, he used them. Secular or political figures within the Shia community were largely neglected, except for Nabih Berri, as he was the leader of the Amal Movement, which was founded by Musa al-Sadr and was closely linked to Syria.
– In your book The Syrian-Iranian Alliance and the Region, you mentioned a conversation with the Iranian ambassador to Syria, where you asked him: “Is it reasonable that Hezbollah holds a higher status in Iran than Syria itself?” What was his response?
He denied it, saying that Syria held a different position. He told me, “Hezbollah is your party.” But his words were mere flattery.
– Deep down, did you believe that Iran valued Hezbollah more than Syria?
I cannot say that outright.
– But you did say it to him!
I said it in reaction to what he was saying about Hezbollah. At that time, Iran was at war with Iraq and had no open communication with any Arab country except Syria.
– Did Iran really incite Hafez al-Assad against Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat?
No, the one who incited Hafez al-Assad against the late Yasser Arafat was Arafat himself. When the Palestinians came under pressure due to the chaos in Jordan, particularly in Amman, the Syrian regime sided with the Palestinians against Jordan. We even entered Jordan to support them, and we only withdrew after significant pressure from President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who told us, “If you don’t withdraw, Israel will intervene.”
That’s how Yasser Arafat ended up in Syria and then in Egypt before settling in Lebanon. However, the Palestinian factions repeated the same mistake they had made in Jordan—trying to dominate Lebanese politicians. What they failed to realize was that there was a huge difference between Jordan and Lebanon. Jordan had a homogenous Arab Sunni Muslim society, whereas Lebanon had 18 different sects. If chaos erupted in Lebanon, it would spill over into Syria.
– So you mean that Arafat’s attempt to take control of the Lebanese situation is what turned Hafez al-Assad against him?
Yes, and as the one in charge of the Lebanese file, I tried to explain this to Palestinian delegations in my meetings with them. I warned them against repeating the Jordanian scenario. I advised them not to hold armed demonstrations or occupy buildings. The mistake of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was that it funded certain neighborhood leaders in Lebanon and formed its own organizations, which then ignited sectarian tensions between Muslims and Christians.
– Did Hafez al-Assad ever verbally attack Yasser Arafat in any meeting?
No, he would receive him frequently, speak with him, and discuss matters respectfully. Arafat, in his characteristic way, would respond with: “Yes, sir. Of course, sir.” He had a way of making you feel satisfied, but the moment he left, he would do whatever he had in mind. May God have mercy on him—he was a political school of his own, and no Palestinian has been able to replace him since his death, which is why they became disoriented afterward.
– Was Yasser Arafat killed by poisoning?
No, I don’t believe so. He was sick and died.
