First Question: Who holds the decision-making power in Syria now?
In Syria, governmental and party decision-making authority is concentrated in the hands of the President of the Republic. The existence of constitutional and party institutions serves as a formal cover for the decisions of the President. In both domestic and foreign policies, away from any scrutiny or accountability, Syria finds itself in a state of weakness, underdevelopment, and isolation. Additionally, there is a domination of close associates over state institutions, including economic, security, judicial, and administrative entities.
Second Question: Could there be another Abdul Haleem Khaddam in Syria?
I am confident that many in Syria who understand the magnitude of their national responsibilities will bear the burden of working towards the salvation, revival, and construction of a civil democratic system in the country.
Third Question: Why does the Syrian President fear the International Court in the case of the late Rafik Hariri?
What is happening in Lebanon, with the hindrance of state institutions and the national economy, as well as the security and political tensions, along with the declaration by Bashar al-Assad’s partners of their rejection of the International Court, is a clear indication of fear and concern. If he is not afraid, why threaten to burn Lebanon if the court is formed? This is because he knows what he has done. The reluctance to recognize the court and the refusal to hand over any Syrian accused under the pretext of sovereignty are clear evidence of fear and anxiety.
Fourth Question: Do you believe that your life is in danger, and is your head wanted?
The International Investigative Committee is carrying out its work, and I expect it to uncover the crime. Consequently, it will be the one to identify the names of the accused. The judiciary will decide based on the evidence available.
Fifth Question: Will you testify against him if summoned?
The matter is not about testifying for or against him; it is about speaking the truth. If summoned to testify, I will do so.
Sixth Question: How do you see the resolution of the crisis in Lebanon? And whose side are you on in the current scene?
The crisis in Lebanon can only be resolved through national consensus. After a fifteen-year civil war, the Lebanese found no solution but national reconciliation. Therefore, I hope all parties realize that the victory of one is a defeat for all. In civil wars, both the victor and the defeated are equal in defeat and the real victory occurs when everyone triumphs.
I sympathize with national reconciliation, and I believe that some Lebanese forces, which work to protect the ruling regime in Syria while understanding its tyranny and the suffering of the Syrian people, have placed themselves in the wrong position. Therefore, I sympathize with the team keen on Lebanon’s unity, stability, and sovereignty, representing Lebanese legitimacy.
Seventh Question: In the past, you had a stance against Azmi Bishara, considering him an agent. After his resignation, do you still have the same stance?
I did not accuse Dr. Azmi Bishara of being an agent. What I stated was that he carried an Israeli message to Bashar al-Assad. The man has a national history, and he made an error in judgment, especially in thinking that the Syrian regime is a resisting regime, working against the United States and Israel. While, in reality, it is intensifying its efforts daily to reconcile with the Americans and the Israelis. This explains Israel’s keenness on the continuity of this regime and its defense.
Eighth Question: When you were in power, how far did secret negotiations with Israel go?
I was not aware of any secret negotiations with Israel, and I did not know that such secret negotiations had taken place until recently when news about Dr. Ibrahim Suleiman’s meetings with Israelis, a figure close to Bashar al-Assad, was published. All previous negotiations I know of were conducted under the supervision of the United States and were publicly announced, taking place within the framework of the Madrid Conference.
Ninth Question: Has it surpassed what is called the “Wadi’a Rabin” (Rabin’s Deposit)?
I don’t have information about those secret negotiations, so I cannot judge whether they have surpassed the Wadi’a Rabin or not. What is clear to me is that the goal of the negotiations was not to achieve peace but to gain Israel’s support for its regime and reconciliation with the United States through the Israeli gateway.
Tenth Question: Do you believe that Ehud Olmert or others in Tel Aviv are eager for peace with the Arabs?
Those among the Israelis who are eager for peace with the Arabs know that the path to peace is the implementation of United Nations resolutions on the Arab-Israeli conflict. This is rejected by the Israelis.
Eleventh Question: It was astonishing that Syria resisted Israel in southern Lebanon while not moving across the Golan Heights. Isn’t that so?
Let me tell you that resistance requires first achieving national unity and building a democratic state where citizens are equal in rights and duties. In such a state, power is circulated, and citizens feel that the state belongs to them, that they are citizens, not subjects, and that the nation is for everyone, not a prison. The security apparatus is meant to protect their security, not suppress them and protect corruption.
Two conditions do not exist objectively in Syria due to the nature and behavior of the regime. The war or resistance to liberate the Golan is not feasible because of the regime’s nature and behavior. Therefore, the regime uses a political discourse in one direction while practicing opposing measures and behaviors. Whoever wants resistance does not make his country a prison and his people suffer from poverty, unemployment, and misery.
Twelfth Question: Is the Syrian regime involved in the ongoing war in Iraq?
The Syrian regime, through its involvement in certain aspects of the Iraqi problem, is attempting, as it perceives, to exert pressure on the Americans to close the file of the international investigation into the assassination of President Rafik Hariri and several politicians. However, it is unaware that it is in a position where it cannot give the Americans what they want, just as the Americans cannot provide what Bashar al-Assad desires.
Thirteenth Question: Does Damascus provide assistance to resistance groups to prolong the dilemma of the American occupier?
I do not have information on this subject.
Fourteenth Question: How do you evaluate the recent meeting between Rice and the Syrian Foreign Minister in Sharm El-Sheikh?
Based on the statements and leaks from this meeting, it did not produce any results. What the Americans want, Bashar al-Assad cannot provide, and what Bashar al-Assad wants, the Americans cannot supply.
Fifteenth Question: Are you optimistic about the possibility of peace in the region under any circumstances?
The situation in the region is becoming more complex, dangerous, and the intensity of regional and international conflicts is increasing. None of the parties involved in the interconnected crises of the region, whether in Iraq or Palestine, seem to have the key to victory so far. The coming months are expected to be more perilous for the security and stability of the region. The fundamental parties in these problems cannot make concessions because each of them has become closely linked to its strategic interests. The only opportunity for the Lebanese to escape from the network of regional and international crises is national reconciliation, support for Lebanese legitimacy, and adherence to the content of the National Reconciliation Document. Thus, the Lebanese problem can be removed from regional and international manipulations.
Sixteenth Question: Why, in your opinion, does another khaddam not emerge in many Arab dictatorships?
Many of those working in political positions in these regimes were brought in by the person in power and became part of the system but not part of its administration. As for me, I was a partner in establishing the system led by President Hafez al-Assad and a special partner in decisions related to foreign policy. We agreed on many things during thirty years, but we also disagreed a lot during that time. I never felt that I was an employee with a high rank; rather, my feeling was that I was a partner in the system. I did not leave President Hafez al-Assad for a single moment to feel otherwise. I am confident that there are those who sense their national responsibilities and will make their decision to work to save the country and liberate it from the constraints of the regime.
Seventeenth Question: How do you view Egypt and the Arab countries’ stance on your departure from Damascus?
Each country has its circumstances, so I did not attempt to know the positions of any of them. I carry many memories of working with their leaders when I was at the peak of power.
Eighteenth Question: Do you long for your home, your comrades, and your times there?
There is nothing dearer than the homeland. Longing for it, for family, friends, is a principal motive in working for Syria’s salvation from its suffering. I am confident, with the help of God, that the return is near, and the flag of freedom will rise. The Syrian people will regain their natural right to exercise sovereignty and build a civil, democratic state with ballot boxes as its reference.
Nineteenth Question: Have you met any Egyptian officials recently, or has Egypt requested intervention with Damascus?
I have not met any Egyptian official, nor have I asked any Arab official to intervene with Damascus. I did not leave the regime to reconcile with it, as our differences revolve around two fundamental issues. Firstly, the monopolization of power, the practice of oppression, the abolition of public and individual freedoms, and hindering political life. Secondly, the stance towards people’s suffering due to the regime’s corruption, which has caused significant economic crises, leading to a decline in living standards, increased poverty, unemployment, and the spread of corruption. Another factor related to domestic policy is the impromptu decision-making in foreign policy without considering the country’s interests and the potential major harm these decisions may cause, leading to Syria’s isolation and harming its people.
Twentieth Question: The tension in relations between Riyadh and Cairo with Syria, is it due to the lack of experience of the Syrian President, or what else?
The tension in relations between the Syrian regime and most Arab countries results from a flaw in the vision of common Arab interests and the prevalence of personal interests over national and nationalist interests. Syria’s position in Iran’s strategic interests to protect itself from the International Court that will prosecute those who committed assassinations in Lebanon, by using Iran’s allies in Lebanon to inflame the Lebanese situation to obstruct the formation of the International Court.
Twenty-First Question: Bashar al-Assad came to power through an inheritance scenario. Do we now realize the danger of the idea of a president’s son?
In true democratic systems where people exercise their right to choose their leaders without the presence of inheritance, there is no issue of inheriting power to one’s son. This does not mean that there is no possibility for the son to come to power in a period other than his father’s presidency, as happened in the United States with George W. Bush after President Clinton. In totalitarian regimes where constitutional institutions are formed by the regime under its security and interventions, inheritance becomes an existing issue imposed on the people. This results in significant damage to the country, as seen in Syria, and the issue of inheritance in Syria is considered one of the major mistakes committed by Hafez al-Assad. He prioritized the family’s interests over the nation’s interests.
Twenty-Second Question: The Syrian regime accuses you of conducting contacts here and there. Have you met with Israelis or Americans recently?
The Syrian regime spread rumors about my meeting with Israelis, knowing their falsehood. However, its aim was to cover up the secret communications it was having with Israelis. I believe political observers have noticed Israel’s support for Bashar al-Assad’s regime and its fear of change because there is no better servant of Israel’s interests than his policies and practices. Israel wants Syria weak, backward, and poor, and any change would lead Syria to overcome its challenges, advance, strengthen its national unity, which contradicts Israel’s interests.
Regarding contacts with Americans, that has not happened. What occurred was a series of meetings with some members of the National Salvation Front in the United States. If there is any meeting between me and any American official, I will announce it. I have no problem meeting with any American, European, Asian, or African official if such a meeting serves the national interests.
