Khaddam’s book discusses an alleged agreement between Abu Nidal, Iranians, and Gaddafi to target Kuwaiti and Saudi facilities.

publisher: ايلاف

Publishing date: 2010-12-21

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In the first chapter of his book, titled “The Syrian-Iranian Alliance and the Region,” former Syrian Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam emphasizes his objective approach in presenting facts and analysis without being influenced by emotions. The book serves as Khaddam’s first political memoir, where he shares his experiences, participation, and acquired knowledge. He sheds light on how Damascus facilitated Iranian activities and helped establish regional alliances in countries like Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine.

Before delving into the details of Syrian-Iranian relations, Khaddam highlights the increased American interest in Iran following World War II and the onset of the Cold War against the Soviets. The United States provided significant support to the Shah of Iran, viewing the country as a front line against Soviet expansion. Khaddam also explores how Washington uses the Iranian nuclear issue as a cover for more significant concerns and fears in the West, particularly regarding the nature of the Islamic regime.

Khaddam asserts that the dispute between Washington and Tehran did not originate from the American hostage crisis in the embassy in Iran but rather began when the Shah’s regime collapsed and Ayatollah Khomeini assumed power in Tehran. He refers to the United States as the “Great Satan.”

According to Khaddam, the United States and Israel serve as obstacles to Iran’s regional aspirations. However, he highlights the challenges in the American strategy of destabilizing Iran’s internal situation, as external tensions could weaken the opposition’s ability to bring about change from within.

Regarding the foundations of Syrian-Iranian relations, Abdel Halim Khaddam traces their early origins, including the role played by Mr. Musa Al-Sadr, the President of the Supreme Shiite Council in Lebanon. Khaddam also discusses his personal relationship with Iran and Syria’s decision to establish a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union and form an alliance with the Islamic Republic.

Khaddam reveals that one of the primary objectives of the Syrian-Iranian alliance was the overthrow of the Iraqi regime, which put Syria in a state of war with Iraq while simultaneously battling Iran.

Despite the ideological differences between the secular regime in Syria and the Islamic regime in Iran, Khaddam argues that this contrast only served to solidify the alliance since they did not dispute the major issues at hand.

He acknowledges that the nature of the regime in Damascus prevented Syria from having a long-term strategy but instead created a space for maneuvering. This led Syria to prioritize the liberation of the Golan Heights through war due to the regime’s inability to build the state and its institutions.

In significant parts of his memoir, Khaddam recounts the relationship between the late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and Lebanese politicians, highlighting the president’s trust in them. He raises the question of why mostly Christian and Sunni Muslim politicians did not feel secure under the Assad regime.?

The text refers to the broader and significant Iranian involvement in Lebanon during the Israeli invasion of the country in 1982. It describes the rise and expansion of Iranian influence in Lebanon and the specific tasks undertaken by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard within Lebanese territory.

It highlights that President Hafez al-Assad did not view Iranian influence as a concern and was not mindful of Iran’s expansionist ambitions. Additionally, it mentions Syria’s ongoing support for Hezbollah, emphasizing the strong backing it has received from Syria since its establishment.

The text reveals the details of the dispute between Damascus and the late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and how Iran exacerbated the tensions between them. Khaddam recounts a conversation he had with the Iranian ambassador in his country, which touched upon the relationship between Damascus and Tehran. He even goes so far as to question whether it is reasonable for “Hezbollah” to hold greater weight in Iran than in Syria.

In an important chapter of his memoir, Khaddam shares the efforts made by Hafez al-Assad to halt the Iran-Iraq war in its early stages due to Saddam Hussein’s uncompromising stance. Some in the Gulf anticipated a swift victory for Iraq, which, combined with other events, strained Syrian-Gulf relations and led to periods of tension.

Khaddam discloses the role he personally played in assuring the Gulf states about Iranian intentions towards them. He recounts his visits to their leaders, describes the regional atmosphere, and explores the nature of relations among the countries in the region. He also suggests that Iraqi-Iranian reconciliation was much easier compared to the reconciliation between Damascus and Baghdad.

“Rai” publishes four chapters of Khaddam’s book, with the fourth and final part yet to be revealed.

Under the title “We, the Gulf and Iran,” the fourth chapter of former Syrian Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam’s book “The Syrian-Iranian Alliance and the Region” holds significant implications for the regional situation and Syrian relations with the Gulf Arab states.

Khaddam writes, “It was wise to work towards stopping this war before it escalated. This is what President Hafez al-Assad attempted in the early days through contacts with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Algeria. However, this attempt failed due to the intransigence of the Iraqi government on one hand and the Gulf brothers’ expectations for a swift victory for Iraq in its war against Iran.”

“This difference in vision and political action has caused an imbalance in Syrian-Gulf relations. The imbalance has even led to tension with some of our brothers,” Khaddam explains.

“Despite the differing positions, we made a clear distinction between the Iraqi regime and our relations with other Arab countries, especially the Gulf states. We understood the concerns of those countries regarding the Islamic revolution in Iran, and we found justifications for their positions,” he continues.

Khaddam goes on to explain the two parallel lines of action they pursued: “The first line was to contain differences with the Gulf states through dialogue and provide reassurances and commitments that we would stand with them in any conflict they have with Iran or others. The second line was to focus on the Iranian leadership to assure the Gulf states and avoid taking any actions that would raise their concerns.”

“On January 10, 1982, at the request of President Hafez al-Assad, I traveled to Saudi Arabia, where I met with Crown Prince Fahd bin Abdul Aziz. I informed him of the results of the Iranian minister’s visit to Damascus. He confirmed that official opinions of the Iranian Islamic Revolution are expressed only by Khomeini, the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, or the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He also confirmed Iran’s willingness to send a goodwill mission to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, and to receive similar missions in Tehran. The demand was to put an end to the intervention in the war alongside Iraq. President Hafez al-Assad discussed this with him and assured him that the Kingdom would be informed of the content of these talks.”

Prince Fahd responded that the Kingdom agrees with this approach to avoid clashes and tension in the region. This is an excellent perspective in dealing with the reality. I am content with the President’s message and efforts, and I express gratitude for his endeavors to alleviate tensions. We hope he will continue his efforts and wish him success and good health.

The next day, I traveled to Kuwait on the same mission to report to Prince Fahd bin Abdulaziz. I had a meeting with the Emir of Kuwait, Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmed, in the presence of the then Minister of Foreign Affairs (His Highness the current Amir), Sheikh Sabah. I presented the details of the Iranian minister’s discussions in Syria, which were previously shared with Prince Fahd bin Abdulaziz.

Khaddam stated, “President Hafez agreed to the mediation and instructed me to travel to Tehran. Accompanied by the Foreign Minister, I went to Tehran and briefed the Iranian president on the situation, emphasizing the risks of expanding the war and the possibility of Gulf countries calling for American intervention, which poses a great danger to both Iran and Syria. The Iranian president expressed their desire to avoid further escalation of the war, but believed that Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states were providing significant support to Iraq in terms of finances, military facilities, and political backing. He requested our assistance in pressuring the Gulf Arab countries to halt their aid to Iraq, as it only prolongs the conflict and does not serve their own interests or the interests of the entire region.”

Khaddam continued, “Upon our return from Tehran, the President instructed me to travel to Jeddah to update King Fahd on the progress of the talks with the Iranian leadership. On May 26, 1984, I visited Jeddah and met with King Fahd. I informed him that President Hafez, after receiving the letter you sent through Sheikh Abdulaziz Al-Tuwaijri, had instructed me to travel to Tehran, and that we have engaged in discussions there. However, upon our arrival, we were surprised by a speech from Saddam Hussein and the subsequent bombing of two Iranian ships in the Gulf.”

Meeting with King Fahd,

Khaddam continued, “I have fulfilled my mission and met with King Fahd to provide him with an update on the situation. The king asked me, ‘What did they say?’

I replied, ‘They (Iranians) expressed a genuine desire for good relations with the Gulf states. They are prepared to do whatever it takes to improve these relations. However, they believe that the Gulf countries are providing assistance to Saddam. Without this aid, he would not have the means to sustain the fight against them.’

The king stated, ‘We inquired with Zaki Al-Yamani about this statement, and he denied making it. We told him that he should not lie about it.’

I responded, ‘I wanted to inform you of their perspective. They also mentioned that Zaki Al-Yamani had stated in Kuwait that Iraqi pilots were unable to differentiate between the nationalities of the aircraft they targeted, using this as justification for Iraq’s attack on a Saudi carrier.’

  • So they perceive these actions, aid, and tanker attacks, as support for Saddam.
  • They are making efforts to dissuade other countries from purchasing Iranian oil, as seen with the delegation sent to Japan for this purpose.
  • They also believe that Saudi Arabia is facilitating the landing of Iraqi planes and subsequently targeting tankers. Additionally, they claim that Saudi Arabia assists Iraq in gathering information through AWACS aircraft.’

The king replied, ‘These claims are unfounded.’

Prince Saud Al-Faisal, the Minister of Foreign Affairs (present at the meeting), clarified that AWACS aircraft are designed for low-level surveillance and do not detect carriers.’

I continued, ‘We are presenting their perspective to gain a better understanding of the issue. Furthermore, they do not consider the likelihood of American or Western intervention to be high. Even if such intervention were to occur, they are prepared to confront the Americans in Iran.’

We conveyed to them, ‘The problem lies between you and Iraq. The Gulf states have no involvement in this war other than providing aid.'”

The king remarked, “Yes, aid is well known.”

I continued the discussion, saying, “They (the Iranians) have proposed that we agree to cease all actions regarding oil tankers. This would imply that the security of oil ships is a shared responsibility, and the Gulf countries can exert pressure on Saddam to stop targeting tankers in the Gulf. We explained to them: you claim that Saddam is irrational, powerful, and obstinate. If he does not respond to pressure, what is the solution?” The king replied, “Indeed, he did not respond to the pressure.”

I stated, “In this regard, we had in mind the conversation between President Hafez and Sheikh Al-Tuwaijri, where the Kingdom expressed readiness to halt aid. We informed them that if Saddam does not respond to the pressure to stop targeting tankers, aid can be cut off from him. The Kingdom will issue a statement condemning the attacks on ships in the Gulf. There has been a misperception promoted by Iraq that Iran intends to occupy Iraq first and then the Arab Gulf states.”

Khaddam continued, “The mistake our Iranian brothers make is that they have started to threaten and create fear among the Gulf states. Our Iranian brothers assert that when they mention Saddam, it refers to Saddam alone… as he is an outcast in Iraq.”

Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz stated, “We considered targeting the Iranian plane, but His Majesty the King halted the operation.”

The king added, “Yes, the operation was aborted, and we denied chasing the Iranian planes. All we did was rescue the passengers from the damaged ship. An Iranian pilot sought refuge in the Kingdom with his plane. We handled the situation discreetly. We requested Iran to accept the return of the plane. We do not launch attacks against Iran through our radio stations or newspapers. We attribute such actions to Kuwait. Although we have the capability to pursue Iranian planes, we do not wish to create a problem. Recently, an Iranian plane loaded with missiles entered the Kingdom’s airspace. Saudi aircraft flew over it and issued a warning for the plane to return within two minutes. The plane complied. We had no intention of creating a problem; otherwise, we could have taken action. We reported this incident to the Iranian charge d’affaires, and he claimed that the pilot made a mistake.”

I interjected, “How can a pilot make a mistake while flying over a wide expanse of the Kingdom? We possess missiles that can hit targets up to 100 kilometers away from the plane, without missing by an inch. However, we do not want to employ these weapons against Iran. We are preserving them for your safety.”

The king further remarked, “This requires careful study and examination. Iraq claims that all my oil facilities in the Gulf have been destroyed by Iran. I am left with no choice but to perish or take Iran down with me.”

“We cannot prevent Iran from striking Iraq or Iraq from hitting Iran, but is there any hope for a solution?” I asked. “Or does Iran persist in occupying Iraq to apprehend Saddam because it refuses to submit itself to the Iranians? They are bolstering Saddam.”

The king continued, “It is possible for the President to convey to the Iranians that the Gulf states are now desperate to prevent the intervention of foreign powers in the Gulf. Why do you target their tankers and exert pressure on them? Strike Iraq as you wish, but refrain from pressuring the Gulf states. Allow this oil to flow to Europe and Japan, so as not to provide a justification for them to occupy the Gulf.”

I inquired, “Regarding the discussion Sheikh Abdul Aziz brought up about aid?” The king replied, “We haven’t provided assistance to them for some time. However, if we see Iraq sacrificing its blood, we will provide aid. It is preferable to avoid involving the Americans. We can act discreetly and through special means. If the war ceases, we are prepared to assist Iran generously. We will spare no effort.”

Khaddam included in his book the text of a letter from Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmed, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kuwait, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Syria on October 2, 1986. The letter stated, “Undoubtedly, you have followed with us the news of the escalating situation on the Iraqi-Iranian front. This escalation has led to rapid developments, causing us great concern as it may result in the infiltration of Arab territories in Iraq. Simultaneously, I draw your attention to the real dangers that this poses to a fellow Arab country and the potential threat it poses to the security and safety of our Arab nation. I would like to highlight the national positions expressed by sister Syria, as represented by your assurances of the sanctity of Arab soil, wherever it may be, and your opposition to any Iranian encroachment into Arab lands.”

Here, I would like to appeal to Your Excellency, in our national responsibility, to take action and make your best efforts to bring an end to this dangerous escalation.”

Khaddam further elaborated in his book, “Regarding Iraq, they do not desire Iraq’s defeat due to the concerns we have discussed. Nor do they wish for Saddam’s victory, as his triumph would mean alignment with America. Hence, you can observe that the Soviets are supporting and sustaining Saddam to prevent his downfall. Meanwhile, they provide assistance to the Iranians indirectly through socialist countries, without supplying them with direct weapons.”

He added, “The discussion between Prince Saud and myself continued without yielding any results. What Syria sought from Iraq was rejected by Baghdad, and what Iraq sought from Syria was rejected by Damascus. The conflict between the governments of the two countries was deep-rooted, and negative incidents had accumulated over more than 18 years. During this period, the threat of war arose on two occasions, and Iraq supported the killing in Syria while Syria backed its opponents in Lebanon. Reconciliation between Iraq and Iran proved to be easier than reconciliation between us and the Iraqi government, rendering Arab mediation futile due to our differing understanding of the nature and dangers posed by the Iraqi regime.”

Hariri’s Meeting

The former Syrian Vice President continued, “On March 27, 1986, I received Mr. Rafic Hariri along with a delegation from King Fahd bin Abdulaziz. He conveyed the following information to me: There are reports of an agreement between Gaddafi, Abu Nidal, and the Iranians to target American facilities in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Of course, we understand that you have no association with Abu Nidal and may not be involved in such operations.”

In Saudi Arabia, there are no American facilities; instead, there are Saudi facilities where Americans operate. Any strike against these facilities is considered an attack on Saudi Arabia. Another important development is that three days ago, Iranian President Ali Khamenei (the current leader of the Islamic Republic) made a phone call to King Fahd. This call marked the first contact between them, and the conversation was very positive, with excellent and praiseworthy words. President Khamenei expressed admiration for Saudi Arabia, its positions, and praised the king.

King Fahd sees this Iranian initiative as a result of President Hafez al-Assad’s efforts, for which he expresses gratitude. He considers it a positive development and emphasizes that Saudi Arabia is not involved in the Iran-Iraq issue. Additionally, as you may know, the President has previously stated that Iran’s attacks on any Arab country, especially the Gulf states, are unacceptable. He also emphasized that any Iranian aggression against Arab countries is considered an attack on Syria. King Fahd has full confidence in this statement and firmly believes that Syria would defend Saudi Arabia if it were attacked by Iran or any other country. He acknowledges that if Iran were to target any country in the region, it would affect all of them, and they wouldn’t allow it to devour them one by one.

Furthermore, in another interview on 12/8/1986, Mr. Rafic Hariri visited, and I informed him about the outcomes of Farooq al-Shara’s visit to Tehran, which I had previously reported. The key points discussed were as follows:

  • Regarding Sri Island, the Kingdom has no involvement whatsoever. The allegations made by Iranians that the Kingdom aided Iraq in attacking Sri Island are baseless and devoid of truth. If the Kingdom had supported Iraq in the manner claimed by the Iranians, it would have significantly altered the course of the war.
  • Concerning the Iraqi pipeline passing through Saudi territory, this is an established matter and not open to debate. It has been in operation for several years, and raising the issue now only leads to unnecessary confusion.
  • Financial aid to Iraq has been suspended for a considerable period. Saudi Arabia has consistently called for an end to the destructive war between the two Islamic countries.

Regarding the issue of bags and explosives, the involvement of Saudi customs officers in their discovery is evident. The investigation is still ongoing with the individuals who brought them, and the identity of the culprits who planted them remains unknown. However, if Iran truly had no connection to the bags that were carried by Iranian pilgrims traveling from Isfahan to Jeddah, it raises questions about the attacks on ships that occurred before and after the operation on Sri Island.

In our previous joint analysis, we highlighted the following points:

  • Saddam Hussein has a vested interest in expanding the war in the region to encompass other countries. By involving a larger number of Arab countries, he aims to strengthen his front, garner broad support, and engage the Iranian revolution in a series of wars and skirmishes.
  • Global imperialism, particularly American imperialism, also benefits from expanding the conflict to include other Arab countries. This creates a greater need for these countries to fully protect and assist American decisions, which can be used to encircle, besiege, weaken, and strike the Islamic revolution in Iran, while obstructing progressive Arab forces.
  • The ongoing bombing of Saudi and other ships entering or leaving Saudi Arabia may provoke Saudi reactions, leading to strikes against Iranian aircraft. This escalation would contribute to the expansion of the war.

Khaddam concludes that continuous contacts between Syria and all Gulf countries have revolved around the main topic of Iran. Any action taken by Iran has raised concerns among these countries, despite their full support for Iraq. Syria was the party engaged in dialogue due to its relations with Tehran.

Furthermore, during that period, tensions between Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iran were heightened due to issues concerning oil tankers, military detachments with Iraq, and incidents during the Hajj pilgrimage in consecutive years, which tragically resulted in the deaths of hundreds of people. In such circumstances, Syria played a crucial role in extinguishing the fire and calming the situation to prevent its further escalation, recognizing the immense danger it posed.

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