The seventh installment of the memoirs of former Syrian Vice President Abdulhaleem Khaddam has been published by Al-Sharq Al-Awsat. It resumed the ongoing exchange of messages between Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and Iranian President Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, parallel to the discussions taking place between the Iraqi Ambassador Barzani Al-Tikriti and the Iranian Ambassador Cyrus Naseri in Geneva, Austria.
Khaddam mentioned that Saddam was determined for peace at any cost, evidenced by his willingness not to raise any contentious issue directly with Tehran. Before initiating the war against Kuwait in 1990, Saddam Hussein presented a comprehensive peace plan to Rafsanjani. On the night of August 14, 1990, he wrote to Rafsanjani, “As a goodwill gesture, if we withdraw from our borders with Iran, the withdrawal will start on Friday, August 17, 1990, and will continue for two months, keeping the border guards and the police as a symbolic presence for us.
His proposal also included the immediate and comprehensive exchange of all war prisoners held in both Iraq and Iran according to the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war. The exchange deal would take place across the land borders through Khanaqin and Qasr-e Shirin.
Additionally, he stipulated the unanimous recognition of Iraq’s complete sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab region. Both parties would share the navigation rights of the deep-water channel and collaborate in its use, share fishing rights, and divide the profits between them. The paragraph related to blaming either side for igniting the war was to be dropped, as it could hinder the peace negotiations between the two parties. The documents were to be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations before commencing the implementation of any clause of the agreement.
Saddam concluded with the condition of non-interference in the internal affairs of both countries, equal sharing of aid between Tehran and Baghdad, along with the reopening of the embassies of both nations.
While Saddam criticized Rafsanjani for his dual stance on Arab nationalism at a time when his forces were invading Kuwait, on the other hand, he welcomed his counterpart’s proposal for the withdrawal of forces and the release of prisoners of both sides according to a specified timetable.
After Iraq’s invasion, Tehran condemned the military operation of Iraqi forces and their invasion of Kuwaiti territories. In response, Saddam sent a message to Rafsanjani, considering Tehran’s position on Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait as distancing it from its peace efforts with Baghdad. Therefore, he believed that a comprehensive and permanent peace agreement between the two countries would be difficult to achieve. According to him, statements opposing Iraq’s intervention in Kuwait, including those from Iran, would not delay Iraq’s determination to seek justice and address oppression.
Saddam assessed Iran’s shift from its “rightful position” as a missed historical opportunity for peace with Iraq. He reiterated the declared goals of making peace with Tehran and urged the expeditious dispatch of negotiators for this purpose.
Rafsanjani, responding on August 3 to Saddam’s letter, expressed regret over some of its contents. He believed that a direct meeting between the leaders of both countries was conditioned on clarifying fundamental and contentious issues first and working in light of the 1975 peace treaty to conduct peace negotiations between them.
Rafsanjani objected to Saddam’s specified timeline for the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Iranian territories, considering it necessary for Baghdad to complete the withdrawal within days, not two months. However, he deferred the release of prisoners to a maximum of three months. Rafsanjani criticized Saddam’s claims about his commitment to Arab nationalism while “robbing peace and stability from Muslims” and not allowing foreign forces to enter the region.
Rafsanjani also criticized Saddam for beginning his previous messages with “Bismillah” and ending them with “Allahu Akbar,” claiming that it contradicted Islamic teachings and nationalism. He considered Iraq’s failure to inform or coordinate with Tehran about its attack on Kuwait as “unimaginable,” weakening Tehran’s confidence in Baghdad’s sincerity for easing tensions. Rafsanjani commented on Saddam’s recent message, welcoming the Iraqi response.
Khaddam commented on the correspondence, noting that both parties had clear goals for signing a peace treaty. Tehran also gained advantages, benefiting from the Iraqi situation. He added that Iraqi delegations visited Iran in an attempt to sway the Iranian position in favor of Baghdad, but these efforts were unsuccessful.