Khaddam’s memoirs… “letters of love and threats” between Reagan and Assad… America withdraws from Lebanon, Israel retreats, and Syria “is isolated”

In the midst of the U.S.-Syrian military exchanges in Lebanon, President Hafez al-Assad’s illness, Colonel Rifaat’s ambitions for power, and the intensifying Iran-Iraq war, Syrian Foreign Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam met with U.S. Ambassador Robert Paganelli in Damascus in December 1983. The following conversation took place:

Khaddam: Would you allow Syrian aircraft to fly over U.S. forces?

Ambassador: These aircraft have authorization from the Lebanese government to operate within the multinational forces.

Khaddam: Yes, and we are also a legitimate force in Lebanon with various rights. We have issued strict instructions to our forces not to fire a single shot from their positions toward the multinational forces. This directive remains in effect on the ground, so why conduct this raid on our forces? One of the basic principles of military science is that any forces with foreign aircraft flying overhead will respond, regardless of whether they hit the target. So we could reach an implicit agreement where the Syrian forces strictly prevent any firing from their positions towards the multinational forces, and in return, these forces’ aircraft refrain from flying over Syrian forces and avoid attacking Syrian positions with different weapons. We really do not seek confrontation; the battle is not between us and the Americans. Our issue is with Israel, so why is the United States inserting itself in this way? Believe me, I am saddened by the death of that American pilot (killed by Syrian shelling, with another pilot captured), just as I am for the Syrian soldier. We are also concerned about our forces in Lebanon due to the presence of the Sixth Fleet, especially after Yitzhak Shamir’s recent visit to Washington. How can we mitigate this danger? Would the U.S. Sixth Fleet allow Syrian aircraft to fly over it daily? Of course, it wouldn’t. And regardless of the fact that the United States is a superpower and we are a small country, we should engage on equal terms.

Assad sought to “kill two birds with one stone” by releasing Goodman: extending a hand of cooperation to Reagan and, in return, persuading him of the necessity for Syria to remain in Lebanon as a stabilizing force for all parties involved. If the incident increased U.S. public pressure to withdraw from Lebanon, the Syrian leadership would welcome that outcome.

On January 13, 1984, President Assad received the following letter from his American counterpart:

“On behalf of the American people, I would like to thank you and your government for releasing Robert Goodman on January 3. I want to assure you that this humanitarian gesture has had a positive impact on the atmosphere of our relations with Syria. Please be assured, Mr. President, that the United States harbors no hostile intentions toward Syria, and I hope that the spirit of goodwill you have shown today will carry over into our ongoing dialogue.

I was pleased to learn of your recent recovery, and I am glad to hear that you are increasingly active. Congratulations, and I hope your health continues to improve. My personal representative, Ambassador Donald Rumsfeld, looks forward to exchanging views with you when he visits Syria in the near future.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,
Ronald Reagan”

The Syrian side linked the prisoner negotiations to Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon, referring to an incident that had occurred days before Rumsfeld’s arrival: a 14-year-old boy from the Sabra camp attacked an Israeli patrol with a Kalashnikov, killing several soldiers before being killed himself. This act inspired further, unorganized retaliatory operations in southern Lebanon. Khaddam summarized the situation by saying, “An occupied country will resist occupation… the best way to prevent such incidents from recurring is to withdraw. Remaining in Lebanon only continually exposes them to more acts of Lebanese national resistance.”

At this point, Rumsfeld interjected: “There are Iranians and others who have come from Syria and were facilitated in crossing the border through Syrian-controlled areas in Lebanon. They are involved in planning and conducting actions against the United States and the multinational forces in Lebanon. This is happening in an organized manner, and Syria is involved and complicit; these individuals cannot move with their weapons without Syria’s knowledge and consent.”

“In both cases, Syria and Israel need to withdraw, either partially or completely.”

Khaddam replied, “Israel wants mutual withdrawals, but it began with a partial pullback from the Shouf. Syria wants a full Israeli withdrawal, and if we assume that no one will get their first choice, this creates the possibility of another arrangement: Israel could make one or two additional partial withdrawals and complete its full withdrawal before Syria completes its full withdrawal, without directly linking it to Syria’s actions.”

Rumsfeld returned to Washington empty-handed. On February 7, 1984, President Reagan delivered a speech in which he stated:

“To ensure the safety of Americans and others in the multinational forces in Lebanon, I have authorized U.S. naval forces operating as part of the multinational forces to provide naval gunfire and air support against any units firing on greater Beirut from Lebanese areas under Syrian control, as well as against any units directly attacking Americans and others in the multinational forces. Those carrying out these attacks will no longer have a safe haven from which to shell Beirut at will. We will stand firm to deter those who seek to coerce Lebanon’s future.”

After this firm statement, Reagan began to soften his stance, saying:

“In alignment with these steps, I have asked the Secretary of Defense to provide me with a plan to redeploy the Marines from Beirut airport to their offshore ships and reposition them. This process will start soon and proceed in phases. A military presence will remain on the ground in Lebanon to train and equip the Lebanese Army and to protect the remaining Americans. Our naval and Marine forces offshore will be on standby as before, ready to offer support and protection to Americans and others in the multinational forces in Lebanon, and to help maintain security in the Beirut area, as I previously explained.”

This marked the beginning of the United States’ gradual withdrawal from the Lebanese quagmire it found itself in. On the same day, the U.S. ambassador in Damascus, Robert Paganelli, requested an urgent meeting with President Assad, where he said, “As you have noticed, President Reagan now intends to limit the American presence on the ground in Lebanon. The Marines will be gradually withdrawn from Lebanon to the coast, and then to another location, but we will maintain our presence near the shores. We hope that these actions will make everyone understand that no progress can be achieved through force, and that it is time for serious negotiations, as terrorism has lasted far longer than it should have.”

Assad interpreted Reagan’s message as a veiled threat to Syria and asked Ambassador Paganelli, “Is this message a threat or an invitation for political dialogue? The other question: what is the reason for wanting me to receive this message personally? If it is intended as a direct threat to me, I am returning it directly to President Reagan with equal force. But if the message is meant as a political dialogue, far removed from any influence of threats or superiority, and based on equal engagement between two parties, then, as we have said before, we support dialogue. Syria is not a party in the fighting in Lebanon, and the Syrian positions mentioned in the message have not just appeared but have been there for eight years, with the support of the Lebanese people and their legitimate government at the time. The United States says it will use artillery and planes, while we say we will do what we can politically and exert as much pressure as possible on all parties to meet and negotiate without fighting. I do not understand the insistence on using language that does not match the reality, is undesirable in this era, and is ineffective. No one expects us to respond with ‘Yes, sir’ to anyone saying they will strike us.”

On February 10, the U.S. Marine Corps began its withdrawal from Beirut, marking the start of a major American retreat, not only from Lebanon but from the region as a whole. This coincided with Israeli forces pulling back to the security zone in the south, leaving Syrian forces as the sole power in the field for many years. The May 17 Agreement collapsed, and Syria held sway over Lebanon.

With Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May 2000 following the failure of peace talks and the death of President Hafez al-Assad in June 2000, Iran and Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanon grew. After the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 1559 and the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005, the Syrian army withdrew at the end of April that same year, five years after Hafez al-Assad’s death.

Following this, Hezbollah took a dominant role in Lebanon, strengthening its ties with President Bashar al-Assad. Hezbollah, along with Iran, helped “save the Syrian regime” after 2011. Currently, it faces an unprecedented war from Israel, which has targeted its leaders, including Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, with unexpected security breaches and strikes. Tel Aviv states that its goal is to implement Resolution 1701, passed after the 2006 war, which calls for Hezbollah to withdraw beyond the Litani River and for the Lebanese army to be deployed in its place. Some believe the true objective is to implement Resolution 1559, which, in addition to the Syrian army’s withdrawal, mandates the “disarmament of militias,” specifically Hezbollah.