Khaddam describes the Iraqi president as “crazy and stubborn”... and Riyadh ignores the provocations... and Tehran stipulates that in order to stop its attack, the Gulf stops its aid to Baghdad.
The "Norman Atlantic" ship flying the Singapore flag caught fire on December 6, 1987, after it was attacked by an Iranian warship in Omani territorial waters as it approached the Strait of Hormuz.
The first episode of “Tanker War” in the Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s addressed the mediation of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad between Riyadh and Tehran, as well as the suggestions of the Iranian President at the time, Ali Khamenei. The second episode focuses on the escalation of the “Tanker War” in the Gulf and the reaction of President Saddam Hussein. What did the Iranians say? How did Saudi Arabia respond?
The situation became more critical and tense with the escalation of the war between Baghdad and Tehran after more than two years, following the Iranians’ focus on their offensive military operations and the expulsion of Iraqi forces from most of their territories, turning the equation and penetrating Iraqi areas. With the increasing Iranian military pressure on Iraq, despite its military superiority, concerns grew in Iraq and Arab countries, and pressure mounted on Syria to take a stand against Tehran.
Iraq’s military situation became difficult in 1983 and early 1984, prompting it to strike Iranian economic facilities, especially oil installations, using French aircraft equipped with precision missiles, bombing the Kharg Island oil terminal. That area was declared a military operations zone, and Iraqi aircraft began targeting tankers heading to Iranian oil terminals.
As a result of this aerial blockade on Iran’s export and financial capabilities, which faced the challenges of the economic blockade imposed by the West in addition to the burdens of its fierce war with Iraq, Iran launched attacks on oil tankers heading to Kuwaiti ports.
In May 1983, Sheikh Abdul Aziz Al-Tuwaijri delivered a message to President Hafez al-Assad regarding "this situation and its risks, and the fear of the expansion of the war, because the continuation of Iranian operations will lead to the arrival of military forces from major powers to protect their interests, and if this happens, it will lead to the fall of oil into the hands of these countries and to their control of the region, which is not in the interest of the Gulf countries, Syria, or Iran."
President Hafez al-Assad and Iranian "Guide" Ali Khamenei in Tehran in 1990
The stance on aid
The Saudi response was: “We provide aid because Iran’s policy and its broadcasts were directed against the Gulf states, not just against Iraq. They want to change the policy of the Gulf states, and anyone who Khomeini does not want must disappear. They were wrong to make the Gulf states think that Iraq is fighting Iran with thousands of soldiers, and that this is the way to prevent Iran from coming to (invading) the Gulf.”
The Saudi leadership affirmed to Assad’s envoys, “That Saddam started the war against Iran without consulting us, it seems that the dispute between them began over the implementation of the 1975 agreement regarding the territories, and it could have been avoided through organizations or the International Court of Justice.”
The Saudi side continued: “Saddam’s claim that he fought Iran because of its harassment of its borders and the detonation of some explosives inside Iraq, this may be true or untrue. In the Arab League Charter, there is a provision that Arab states should assist any Arab country that is subjected to aggression, and the president whose country has been attacked should consult the heads of Arab states on the problem before starting the war, and then say help me, and Saddam did not consult us in Saudi Arabia when he started the war.”
There was an impression promoted by Iraq that Iran wants to occupy Iraq first, then move on to the Arab Gulf states afterwards. A senior Saudi official, as mentioned in Khaddam’s documents, said: “Our brothers in Iran made a mistake by starting to threaten the Gulf states. In Iran, they say that Saddam is the target, Saddam is just one person in Iraq, who says that the issue revolves around Saddam? Do you, as an Arab, think that the problem with Iraq is about Saddam? I believe that Saddam’s strength stems from Iran’s challenge to him. When Saddam entered Iranian territory, Iran may have been weak due to its internal circumstances. But now, the Iranian army’s forefront is inside Iraqi territory, and many international and Islamic mediations have been made in vain. Now, the war is raging on Iraqi borders.”
US President Ronald Reagan with Prince Saud Al Faisal and Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam at the White House, on August 20 1982
The document also included an explanation that “Iraqis are not defending Saddam but their country, because if we assume that Iran occupied the major cities in Iraq, would Iran be satisfied with just taking Saddam and then withdrawing? I believe that Iran would impose a certain regime suitable for it in Iraq, because if Iran occupied Iraq, it would then become an occupier and do as it pleases, as happened in Germany when it was occupied by the Allies. The deep problem that affects the Gulf, Syria, and every Arab, is if Iran militarily occupies Iraq, the problem will not end with the overthrow of Saddam. The Iraqi people now say the problem is not Saddam but the possibility of Iran occupying Iraq. I hope that things will end, Iraq sees clearly, and Iran sees clearly.”
He continued: “The countries are being destroyed. Is it possible for this war to end and each country regains its territories? Considering Saddam as the problem is nothing but an excuse, because then the problem of Saddam can only be resolved by two solutions: Iran’s military occupation of Iraq and its overthrow, or Saddam’s killing by his army or his people. Saddam now wants to defend himself, and he doesn’t care whether Iraq is destroyed or collapses… Saddam continues.”
According to the Saudi clarification, “Saddam may say that Iran destroyed its ports in the Gulf and that I have no outlet except the pipeline through Turkey, and as long as I lost my oil in the Gulf, I will make Iran lose its income by hitting the tankers carrying Iranian oil. No one can convince the Iraqis except by force. The question is: doesn’t Iran have the capability to protect its ships from Iraqi aircraft with missiles or otherwise? Anyway, this is something up to them.”
The Saudi side refuted Tehran’s claims, stating, “No Iraqi military aircraft landed in Saudi Arabia, and no Iraqi aircraft were refueled in the air, nor were any Iraqi military aircraft allowed to land at Saudi airports, and we challenge satellites to prove otherwise. It seems that Iran’s perspective is to hit our Gulf tankers to pressure Saddam to stop hitting Iranian tankers.”
They continued, “Iran does not benefit from hitting ships in the Gulf. How long will Iran continue to hit these ships carrying petroleum to different countries in Europe and elsewhere, some of which are friendly to Iran? Perhaps Iran can prevent ships from passing through the Gulf, but what is the result? If the Gulf states find themselves threatened with death, then life has no meaning. Thus, Iran burdens itself in addition to Saddam, because these countries may resort to foreign aid, or others may help them assist Saddam.”
They added, “We still resist and will resist any foreign intervention, and we will maintain our sovereignty. We are concerned about the major powers, and we say this frankly. We fight with our lives against any Eastern or Western foreigner who comes to occupy us. We have nothing but oil, and they want to occupy it. If this occupation happens, our loss will be great, and if there is foreign intervention in the Gulf, it will be assistance and protection for Israel. I say there are no emotions with the major powers, but they have interests. If their interests conflict with yours.”
Khadam conveyed that he was informed by the Saudi leadership that “all the aircraft we have, including F-16s, F-15s, and F-6s, which we bought for billions of dollars, are for Syria, and events will prove that. So why do we have to defend ourselves against Iran? All our statements regarding the Gulf events are filled with reasonableness. This is not out of fear of Iran, but we do not want to create a problem. The Liberian ship recently hit in the area between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, we could have chased the Iranian plane and hit it, but we do not want to create a problem.”
Prince Abdullah said, “We wanted to hit the Iranian plane, but His Majesty the King stopped that,” according to Khadam. He quoted King Fahd as saying, “Yes, I stopped the operation, and we did not announce that we chased the Iranian planes. What we did was we saved the passengers of the stricken ship.
“We act with reasonableness and do not want a problem with Iran.”
He revealed to the Syrian envoys, “An Iranian pilot landed in the kingdom with his plane, and we did not make a fuss and requested Iran to take over this plane. We do not attack Iran in our broadcasts or newspapers, and we blame Kuwait for doing so. We have the power and can chase Iranian planes, but we do not want to create a problem. A few days ago, an Iranian plane loaded with missiles entered the kingdom’s territory, so Saudi aircraft flew over it and warned the plane to return within two minutes, so it returned. We did not want to create a problem, otherwise, we could have hit it, and we informed the Iranian chargé d’affaires about this incident, who said the pilot made a mistake. How could he make a mistake while flying over the kingdom for long distances? We have missiles that can hit a fighter plane from a distance of 100 kilometers and do not miss a single inch, but we do not want to use these weapons against Iran.”
President Hafez al-Assad between Iranian "Guide" Ali Khamenei and President Hashemi Rafsanjani in Tehran
Khadam mentions that insurance companies have raised insurance premiums for ships coming to the Gulf, asking, “What does Iran gain from this? If the Gulf is permanently closed, foreign warships will enter and occupy the region, and who will be able to fight them then?” The King’s prediction was indeed realized after the continued attacks on Kuwaiti oil tankers, and US naval forces entered the Gulf waters.
Khadam writes, “His Majesty the King responded: The explanation you provided is good, and the kingdom’s policy based on wisdom has proven its effectiveness. We are all in a quagmire and do not know how to get out of it, and the biggest example of this is the quagmire Saddam fell into. This problem affects all of us.”
Khadam adds, “There are two issues: the Iraq-Iran war, and the explosive situation between the Arab Gulf states and Iran. Discussion about the first issue must be preceded by calming the situation between Iran and the Gulf states. These relations involve two issues: complaints about Iran’s interference in the Gulf, met with Iran’s desire to improve relations, and Iranian complaints about the aid provided to Saddam.”
The Saudi side said, “This aid is old.”
Khadam said that Assad “understood from Sheikh Abdulaziz that you are ready to stop the aid, so if we tell the Iranians that Saudi Arabia will not give aid to Saddam,” the Saudi response was that “Iranians should calm down first.”
The discussion continued about stopping the aid and issuing a stance against tanker bombings, revealing a divergence in positions. Among what the Saudi side said was, “We haven’t provided aid to the Iraqis for a while, but if we see Iraq shedding its blood, we will provide assistance. We hope that President Assad tells them: calm down, especially since they returned your planes and did not accuse you of anything, so why are you pressuring them? If things calm down and the minds of the Gulf states are at ease, then we can consider taking action.”
Khadam writes that he promised to convey “the image to Mr. President” and that he said, “I reiterate that Syria’s commitment to the Kingdom is not up for discussion.” He comments, “It became clear to me that the possibility of a meeting between the two sides is almost non-existent, if not impossible. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states are practically with Iraq, politically and economically, because they have an interest in stopping Iranian threats and they believe that Iraq is fighting the war on their behalf.”
On the other hand, “Iran’s policy since the revolution has not been based on serious steps to practically calm the situation with the Gulf states. Several senior Iranian politicians, including the leader of the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, were launching campaigns against those Gulf states, despite the Iranian government expressing a desire for reconciliation and calming the situation.”
Despite periods of calm in relations between Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states on one hand, and Iran on the other, thanks to Syria’s significant efforts, tensions remained and media campaigns did not stop.
According to another document, on July 16, 1985, the Saudi side presented to the Syrian side “secret documents signed by Iranian leaders regarding their plans to send twenty thousand fighters during the Hajj season to the Haram to stir up trouble in the Kingdom.”
According to their plan, “they want to send a hundred thousand Iranian pilgrims to fight against two million Muslims during the Hajj season.” A Saudi official commented, “What is the interest of Muslims in that? Would they accept demonstrations against them in the streets of Iran, so that they would ask us to allow Iranian pilgrims to demonstrate during the Hajj season? There are fifty countries sending pilgrims to the Kingdom, and if we allow every country to organize demonstrations, security becomes chaos, especially since there are many political agendas among the pilgrims.” The documents were sent to Assad with a request to “follow up on the matter with the Iranians.”