Khaddam, in notes published by Asharq Al-Awsat, reports that the Iraqi president had presented a draft comprehensive peace agreement to his Iranian counterpart prior to the invasion of their Arab neighbor.
Today, in the seventh episode of Syrian Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam’s memoirs, Asharq Al-Awsat continues to publish the messages exchanged between Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and former Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani before and two weeks after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 4, 1990.
Simultaneously with the messages, discussions were taking place between the two ambassadors, Iraqi Barzani Al-Tikriti and Iranian Sirus Nasseri, in Geneva.
It is evident from all communication channels that Saddam was determined to establish calm with Iran at any cost, both before and after the invasion. On the eve of the war, he presented a written initiative to achieve a “comprehensive peace” and expressed his frustration that Rafsanjani did not agree to receive an Iraqi presidential envoy.
Following the invasion of Kuwait, on August 14, 1990, Rafsanjani wrote: “As a gesture of good faith, our withdrawal from the border with Iran will begin on Friday, August 17, 1990. We will withdraw our forces that face you along the border, leaving only symbolic presence of border guards and police to perform their daily duties under normal circumstances.” He added, “There will be an immediate and comprehensive exchange of all prisoners of war held in both Iraq and Iran. This will take place through land borders and via Khanaqin and Qaser Shirin.”
On the other hand, the Iranian side was determined to press for the implementation of peace provisions and maintained its rejection and criticism of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Rafsanjani even criticized Saddam’s discussion of “Arab nationalism and his criticism of our stance against the occupation of Kuwait.”
On August 17, Rafsanjani responded to Saddam, stating: “The withdrawal of your forces from the occupied Iranian territories is evidence of your sincerity and commitment to the path of peace with the Islamic Republic of Iran. We hope that the withdrawal of your forces will continue as per the announced schedule and that the process of releasing prisoners from both sides will accelerate until it is completed.”
After Asharq Al-Awsat published Saddam’s initial messages since April 21, here are four messages exchanged between July 30 and August 14, 1990.
On July 30, three days prior to the invasion of Kuwait, Saddam sent a message exclusively to Rafsanjani. Upon scrutinizing this message, it became evident that Baghdad was resolute in reaching an agreement with Tehran at any cost, as Saddam’s decision to wage war against Kuwait was on the verge of implementation.
Here is the text:
After carefully considering all relevant factors, reviewing the evolution of relations and the prevailing situation between Iraq and Iran, and recognizing the regional dangers, we have found ourselves, driven by our national responsibility and the humanitarian principles we uphold, compelled to present a new initiative. This initiative aims to provide broader opportunities for achieving peace.
Our proposal this time encompasses all the core issues outlined in Resolution 598 within a unified and detailed framework. We earnestly hope that these issues will be addressed at this level, with a high level of seriousness in our interaction. Based on these considerations, I put forth the following:
I would like to emphasize the idea of promptly arranging a meeting between the heads of state of both countries in a mutually agreed-upon location… The discussions and agreements should encompass all unresolved matters. It is unacceptable for either party to introduce new topics after reaching a comprehensive agreement without the consent of the other party, as it would constitute a violation of the agreement… The starting point of the dialogue and the agreement on the topics is not of primary importance. However, agreement on an individual topic or a set of topics should remain pending until agreement is reached on the other items… The withdrawal should be completed within a period not exceeding two months from the date of final ratification of the comprehensive agreement we reach… We maintain the view that the issue of prisoners should be governed by the Geneva Conventions. Therefore, we assume that their release should be carried out in accordance with the provisions of this Convention… The dialogue concerning the Shatt al-Arab should be based on the following three principles:
a. Iraq’s full sovereignty over it, as its legitimate historical right.
b. Implementing the concept of the Taluk Line (Al-Qar Line) for navigation rights between Iraq and Iran, which includes the right of navigation and fishing, joint management of navigation in the area, and sharing profits from it.
c. Referring the Shatt al-Arab matter to arbitration and committing to accepting the outcome.
Omit the sixth paragraph of Resolution 598 (regarding determining responsibility for starting the war) from the discussion and disregard it completely. It does not contribute to peace and may even hinder it. Its consequences could lead to future animosity, hatred, and revenge.
Officially and in writing, notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the agreement we reach.
Do not initiate any of the mentioned steps until all legislative procedures for approval are completed. The relevant documents must be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The peace agreement should encompass all agreed-upon aspects. The agreements should include clear principles regarding the establishment of good neighborly relations and non-interference in internal affairs. They should unequivocally recognize all forms of navigation rights in international waters. It might be appropriate to ensure the proper implementation of the Convention through an international body agreed upon by the Security Council. We believe that international aid should be divided equitably between Iraq and Iran. We believe it is necessary to reopen our embassies in Tehran and Baghdad, especially since they have remained in a state of war and were closed only in September 1987.
Mr. President, we believe that this proposal, which we consider a comprehensive and lasting peace initiative between Iraq and Iran, is an interconnected and indivisible package. Our experience has helped us identify these elements, including those discussed between our representatives in Geneva, Cyrus Nasseri and Barzan Al-Tikriti.
I swear to God, the greatest,
Saddam Hussein.
After the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces, Iran expressed a clear condemnation of the invasion. This prompted Saddam to send the following message to Rafsanjani on Friday morning, August 3, 1990:
I have reviewed a summary of your political activities and a portion of the statements issued by the Iranian government, including the Iranian Foreign Ministry’s statement, your meeting with military leaders, and the news related to it.
In order to reaffirm our commitment to the humanitarian responsibility towards the Iranian people, as well as our national responsibility towards our own people, I deemed it necessary to write to you once again.
On July 16, 1990, we proposed that you receive our envoy regarding a matter pertaining to advancing the peace process as soon as possible. When you postponed your response regarding setting a date for receiving the envoy, we took the initiative to deliver the written message that the envoy entrusted us with. We wanted you to have ample time to read it and discuss its concepts, opinions, and suggestions with your colleagues in leadership. This way, we would be aware of your position.
One aspect of this matter is when your circumstances allow you to receive the two envoys for whom you have not yet scheduled a meeting, as an alternative to the day we initially proposed, which was Monday, July 30, 1990.
Prior to this letter, on August 2, 1990, we sent you an explanation of our initiative through your representative in Geneva, Nasseri. We did all this not only to demonstrate our desire for peace, but also to emphasize the urgency of achieving peace as soon as possible. Our goal is to keep our two countries and peoples out of the cycle of regional and global developments and away from their potential dangers.
Mr. President, I have taken these steps to facilitate a better understanding between warriors and to quickly discern each other’s intentions, even if the warrior status was acquired through armed conflict between us. Now, the issue of Kuwait has emerged as a crisis that may escalate into a conflict for those who have not been sufficiently cautious.
What we understand about your stated goals is your desire for peace. On our part, we have also provided evidence of our commitment to peace. We are aware that your objective is to achieve withdrawal, as confirmed in our letter dated July 30, 1990, which outlined a specific timeframe for the withdrawal that should not be exceeded.
Our letter presented concrete measures and practical proposals, rather than vague statements, regarding each item outlined in resolution 598, to which both Iraq and Iran have expressed their commitment. We are still awaiting your agreement to set a date for the reception of our two envoys, namely the Minister of Foreign Affairs and our Permanent Representative in Geneva. Once we have engaged in discussions with you and those you designate, we will enter a crucial phase for peace. With divine permission, we hope that your intentions align with what has been stated and what we are aware of. If our response encompasses all the points I have mentioned, we must avoid getting entangled in the complexities of circumstantial factors related to Arab relations. These factors may divert your efforts from the ultimate goal and cloud its true nature. When the goal becomes blurred, it becomes challenging for us to make the necessary arrangements that will expedite the achievement of peace.
It is possible that this may disrupt the calculations of those who lack experience, but I do not anticipate or wish for individuals such as yourself and your leadership in Iran, who have experienced an eight-year war, to deviate from what is in Iran’s best interest and falls within its legitimate objectives.
Undoubtedly, and this is my personal belief, you are well aware of the motives behind the statements made on the morning of Thursday, August 2, 1990, both within and outside the region. You have assessed the various parties involved, just as we have assessed them. We all understand their underlying motives. However, it is important to recognize that these parties are capable of solidifying their positions using their own means and resources when they realize that their statements will not sway or delay the will of the resilient people of Iraq, who are determined to seek truth and address injustice, betrayal, and conspiracy.
Those who supply us with weapons and authorize their export but later halt their exportation will have to address the matter upon their re-exportation to us. Likewise, those who choose to sever or suspend economic relations will need to resolve the matter upon restoring those relations with us. In the case of Iraq and Iran, if either party deviates from its rightful position, it will miss a historic opportunity for its people to secure peace and assert their legitimate rights. The consequences would be significant if the progress we have made through dialogue is jeopardized along this path, which has laid the foundation for mutual trust in each other’s actions. We do not desire this outcome for you, just as we do not desire it for ourselves.
Regardless, if what we understand to be one of your objectives in these negotiations aligns with all your goals, and we assure you that all the goals we have announced are certainly our own, then we should promptly convene the meeting. You should swiftly schedule a day for the reception of our two envoys. By doing so, we can potentially achieve our legitimate objectives and attain the noble goal of peace for the peoples of both countries.
Allah is the greatest.
Saddam Hussein
Baghdad, August 3, 1990
Rafsanjani responded with the following message. Greetings, here is the text: We have received your letter. While the original message seems to have been structured based on progress in the negotiations, some of its contents are regrettable.
First and foremost, I believe it is necessary to reaffirm the will and desire of the Islamic Republic of Iran to achieve a just and enduring peace. I hope that you too have arrived at this conclusion.
Upon the acceptance of Resolution 598, we embarked on a sincere initiative, making it clear to our officials about the significance of peace and its implications. We have undertaken this endeavor with the understanding that nothing should impede the peace process, except when it comes to the legitimate and unalterable rights of our people.
If you carefully examine the discussions that took place under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as well as our responses to your letters and the negotiations between our representative and your representative in Geneva, you would have found this issue to be clarified. Rather than engaging in protracted correspondence and talks, our initial assurance to our representatives in Geneva was to expedite the attainment of peace and take practical steps to implement Resolution 598 (…) To provide clarity, we believe it is necessary to address the following points regarding the contents of the letters dated August 3, 1990, July 30, 1990, and July 1, 1990:
- Meetings and discussions at a higher level than the current level in Geneva will only take place when we witness concrete results in the ongoing talks that can serve as a foundation for the subsequent stages (…) The meeting between the presidents of both republics will be fruitful only if the fundamental issues are clearly addressed and resolved. Conversely, the failure of talks between the two presidents would have detrimental effects on peace and further distance both countries from achieving it.
- In your letter regarding the Arund River, a suggestion was made that appears to backtrack on your previous claims. It is evident that we cannot accept this.
Our renewed proposal is to adopt the 1975 treaty as the basis for conducting peace negotiations. Without compliance with previous treaties, it is not possible to rely on the current statements made in this regard.
- Concerning the withdrawal from the occupied Iranian territories, you have proposed a two-month period for implementation. This duration is perplexing because, if accompanied by good faith, this action could be completed within one or two days. The Secretary-General of the United Nations has suggested a two-week period for withdrawal and three months in exchange for the release of prisoners.
- What is puzzling is that, despite your commitment to Arab nationalism, you have criticized our true stance regarding the occupation of Kuwaiti territory by the Iraqi army. Meanwhile, you overlook the most glaring issues, including the creation of a favorable environment for the presence of foreign forces in the region, the disturbance and destabilization of Muslims, the challenges faced in fostering Islamic solidarity, jeopardizing the region’s security and managing frontlines, as well as international guarantees. It is difficult to interpret a message that begins with “in the name of Allah Almighty” and ends with the slogan “Allah is greater,” which contradicts the explicit and national teachings of Islam and the Quran, where the Islamic and doctrinal principles should prevail over national and ethnic considerations.
- There is no doubt that while peace talks are underway between our delegations, an unforeseen attack by a country against its neighboring nation, carried out without any knowledge, awareness, or coordination, would have immediate and adverse effects on us. Such an attack could undermine our confidence and raise serious doubts about the objectives of the talks that have been taking place over the past few months, particularly since we have not witnessed any actions during this period that reflect good faith.
As before, we continue to occupy our lands. We have even witnessed objections to the smallest issues, such as extinguishing oil well fires, which have no impact on you other than causing destruction and squandering the sources of wealth in our Islamic country.
- The tone of your recent letter does not match the required atmosphere for the ongoing discussions. You utilized a language that has previously proven ineffective with our revolutionary Muslim people. Additionally, you attempted to persuade us by analyzing the changed attitudes of our former allies and motherland. This approach is also unsuitable because you are aware that we have already experienced and completed these stages. We have demonstrated that our calculations rely on the faith, resilience, and support of the public above all else. We do not assign significant value to the distress or benevolence of others in shaping our life programs, attitudes, and crucial decisions. Furthermore, we are not seeking to exploit the current circumstances. Our sole objective is to attain our legitimate and lawful rights, as we have consistently emphasized throughout our discussions.
- We fully acknowledge the emphasis you placed in your letter on expediting progress towards peace. However, this does not imply that haste and advancement should be pursued solely in presenting formal proposals and elevating the level of talks without substantial progress in their content. Instead, we must adhere to internationally recognized bilateral agreements. We do not demand more than our legitimate rights because it is inconceivable for them to be granted within the negotiations unless they were achieved during the eight-year war.
If we accept this principle, there is no need for us to pursue a path of territorial delineation beyond what was established in the 1975 treaty. If we find the current proposal unsatisfactory, it would be preferable to transfer the implementation of the resolution to the United Nations and the Security Council while maintaining the Geneva focal point to facilitate discussions on common issues.
Peace be upon you,
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani
On August 14, Saddam sent this message to Rafsanjani.
After seeking guidance from Allah Almighty, and with the intention of removing obstacles that hinder the establishment of brotherly relations with all Muslims, including those who consider Iranians as brothers, we aim to foster meaningful engagement with all believers in order to confront those who harbor ill intentions towards Muslims and the Arab nation. Our objective is to distance Iraq and Iran from the manipulation, games, and sinful acts of malicious international powers in the region. This is in line with the spirit of the initiative we announced on August 12, 1990, which aimed to achieve comprehensive and enduring peace in the region. Our aim is to eliminate any arguments that hinder interaction, dispel concerns, and foster a mindset where none of Iraq’s energies remain restrained outside the realm of significant endeavors. We seek to mobilize these energies towards the rightful goals that Muslims and honest Arabs have agreed upon, while keeping interference away from our ranks and alleviating suspicions and concerns, so that virtuous individuals can find their way to normal relations between Iraq and…
As a result of our direct dialogue, which has spanned from our letter to you on April 21, 1990, to your most recent letter to us on August 8, 1990, and as a definitive and unequivocal solution that leaves no room for excuses, we have reached the following decisions:
- We approve your proposal, as stated in your response letter of August 8, 1990, which was received by our representative, Barzan Al-Tikriti, in Geneva, from your representative, Cyrus Nasri. This proposal entails adopting the 1975 agreement in line with the principles outlined in our letter dated July 3, 1990, particularly regarding the exchange of prisoners and paragraphs 6 and 7 of Security Council Resolution 598.
- Based on the content of “1” in this letter and our letter to you dated July 30, 1990, we are prepared to send a delegation to Tehran or receive a delegation from you in Baghdad to negotiate and prepare agreements for signing at the mutually agreed level.
- As a gesture of goodwill, our withdrawal will commence on Friday, August 17, 1990. We will gradually withdraw our forces positioned along the border that faces you, while maintaining symbolic presence through border guards and police to fulfill daily duties under normal conditions.
- There should be an immediate and comprehensive exchange of all prisoners of war, encompassing all individuals detained in both Iraq and Iran. This exchange should take place through land borders and via agreed-upon ports such as Khanaqin and Ghasr Shirin. We will take the initiative and commence the exchange on Friday, August 17, 1990.
Dear President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani,
Our decision has brought clarity to the situation. We have successfully achieved everything you desired and focused on. All that remains is to formalize the necessary documents and view them together, assuming a position of clear supervision over a new era where cooperation prevails in accordance with the principles of Islam. We will uphold each other’s rights and keep at bay any disruptive elements in the troubled waters off our shores. Together, we can work towards ensuring that the Gulf remains a peaceful and secure haven, free from the presence of foreign fleets and forces that pose a threat to our sovereignty, as well as in other aspects of our shared lives.
Allahu Akbar. Thanks to God.
Saddam Hussein President of the Republic of Iraq
August 14, 1990
Rafsanjani responded with the following message:
We have received your letter dated 14 August 1990. Your reaffirmation of the acceptance of the 1975 Treaty has opened the path towards implementing the resolution and resolving differences within the framework of resolution 598. This change in ceasefire can lead to a lasting and enduring peace. The withdrawal of your forces from the occupied Iranian territories serves as evidence of your sincerity and seriousness in pursuing peace with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Furthermore, it aligns with the planned release of prisoners. We hope that the withdrawal of your forces continues according to the announced schedule.
The process of releasing prisoners from both sides should proceed expeditiously to facilitate integration.
As we have communicated through our representative in Geneva, we are prepared to welcome your representative in Tehran. We hope to maintain the positive atmosphere and goodwill, as it is crucial for us to achieve comprehensive and stable peace while preserving the rights and legitimate borders of both peoples and countries.
Peace be upon you.
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani
President of the Islamic Republic of Iran
I refrain from commenting on these messages because the motives behind their composition from the Iraqi side are apparent, just as the Iranian side’s intentions are evident. The Iraqi party sought to capitalize on Iraq’s situation and pursue its interests, including its stance on the Kuwait issue. Despite several Iraqi delegations visiting Tehran during the Kuwait crisis in an attempt to influence the Iranian position, they were unsuccessful in achieving their goal.