The dissolution of the union between the Ba’athist regimes in Syria and Iraq did not become apparent immediately after the signing of the Joint National Action Charter in 1978. This charter outlined the formation of a joint federal government with Iraqis and Syrians taking turns as its leaders. It revealed not only the extent of the ideological, sectarian, and geographic differences that led to the rupture between Damascus and Baghdad but also shed light on the complex relationship between Hafez al-Assad and Saddam Hussein.
Despite the Syrian leadership’s disappointment at Saddam’s role in thwarting the “Action Charter,” Assad did not reject his Iraqi counterpart’s initiative to open channels of communication. However, he approached it with suspicion of Saddam’s intentions and subjected it to various tests before taking public steps to end the rift between the two countries, according to confidential messages carried by the late Syrian regime’s deputy head, Abdul Halim Khaddam, from his office to Paris upon leaving Syria in 2005, later published by “Al-Sharq Al-Awsat” newspaper.
The exchanged messages between Assad and Saddam revealed their desire to restore diplomatic relations between the two countries and their shared concerns about the “Araba Valley Agreement.” This peace treaty was signed between Jordan and Israel, ending the official state of hostility between the two countries, thereby shifting the balance of power in the region. The secret communication channel played a crucial role in breaking the ice after years of disputes and escalation between Damascus and Baghdad, starting from Iraq severing ties with Syria in 1980 in response to its stance in the Iraq-Iran War, and culminating in Syria’s decision to close its borders with Iraq, leading to the cutoff of the Iraqi oil pipeline to the Mediterranean.
Reason for the Initiative
According to the Iraqi Ambassador to Qatar at the time, Anwar Al-Qaisi, who was tasked by Saddam with overseeing the “secret channel,” the initiative came from Assad after he publicly stated that Jordan’s federalism project threatened both Syria and Iraq. He received a signal from the Syrian regime’s deputy head, Abdul Halim Khaddam, about opening a channel between the two presidents. Khaddam states that the Iraqi president took the step in August 1995, and Assad met it with “doubts” due to his Ba’athist comrade’s role in the collapse of the union project, as reported by the London-based “Al-Sharq Al-Awsat,” which exclusively published the secret correspondences between the two presidents.
Al-Qaisi, confirming the authenticity of the documents, stated that the direct reason for opening the communication channel between Assad and Saddam was to “convince the Syrian brothers not to receive Hussein Kamil (Saddam’s son-in-law and the Minister of Military Industry during his reign).” Indeed, he was not received due to the mutual concern about a Jordanian project proposing federalism. The Iraqi diplomat also pointed out that Saddam suggested holding a secret summit with Assad on the border, forming a joint political leadership, discussing the revival of the “Action Charter,” and exchanging proposals for an Arab summit in Damascus for Iraqi-Arab reconciliation.
Haste and Caution
The first messages between Saddam Hussein and Hafez al-Assad reveal that Saddam appeared eager to reopen the embassies that had been closed in 1982, hold political meetings, and open borders. However, Assad met this desire with caution, informing his Iraqi counterpart that he intended to engage in communications with several Arab countries to avoid further complicating the Arab situation.
In August 1995, Iraqi Ambassador Ra’af Al-Tikriti delivered a personal message from Saddam to Assad, stating, “I confirm that the step we are taking towards Syria with the aim of building trust and closeness between our two countries is a very serious step. Any sensitivity from the past will not be repeated. The experiences of the past have their circumstances and details, and we must forget them and start with genuine openness and sincerity in this critical stage.” Later that month, the Iraqi Ambassador in Qatar contacted the General Director of the “Arab Organization for Agricultural Development,” Yahya Bakour, asking to convey Saddam’s desire to visit carrying a message.
After discussing the content of the two messages with his deputy and foreign minister, Assad decided to approve the Iraqi ambassador’s secret attendance. Care was taken to ensure communication with the Iraqi ambassador in Qatar rather than Ankara for various reasons, including information security, considering the possibility that both embassies (Syrian and Iraqi) in Turkey might be compromised by multiple intelligence agencies. This also indicated a lack of Syrian conviction at the time regarding the seriousness of the Iraqi regime in making a fundamental change in its policies.
On September 5, 1995, Al-Qaisi delivered another message from Saddam, which stated, “Warm greetings from the Iraqi President to President Hafez al-Assad. Saddam confirms that Iraq’s desire to normalize relations with Syria is not a sudden or momentary event due to the pressures Iraq is facing from the United States and the deliberate insistence on continuing the blockade. Instead, this desire stems from considerations related to Arab national security and vital Arab interests.”
The Iraqi envoy also stated, “President Saddam and all Iraqis warmly applaud President Hafez’s statements and your statements in Iran, highly appreciating them. They affirmed his keenness on the unity of Iraq, both its land and people, rejecting any foreign interference.” He added that Saddam said, “The American-Zionist plan is clear, and Jordan has become a part of it. It is a concoction aimed not only at harming Iraq but also Syria and all Arab interests. The goal is not to weaken and divide Iraq but to violate the Arab region politically, militarily, and economically.”
Shifting Alliances
Abdul Halim Khaddam revealed that Hafez al-Assad saw the response to the Iraqi messages positively and amicably, coordinating for a meeting to assess the seriousness of the Iraqi stance. Khaddam conveyed to the Iraqi ambassador a message stating, “Greetings from President Hafez, and my greetings to President Saddam. President Hafez affirms that the current phase the Arab nation is going through and the threats facing both Iraq and Syria necessitate immediate action by both parties to overcome obstacles and differences. This is to halt the deterioration in the Arab situation and prevent its division into paralysis and axes. Each axis attempts to play on the other, ensuring specific and known interests that completely deviate from the higher interests of the Arab nation, appeasing this international party or that.”
It became evident through the Syrian discourse that Damascus was willing to engage with Baghdad in the desire to restore relations between the two countries to face the challenges and new alliances that had swept the region. Khaddam mentioned in his message to the Iraqis that “the Jordanian role has become an integral part of the American-Zionist strategy, and the suspicious attempts to align either with Washington, Turkey, or the Zionist entity. There are reports about alliances taking shape and becoming public, and their danger is not only on Syria and Iraq but also on the Arab nation.”
Efforts to Restore Relations
On September 19, 1995, the Iraqi Ambassador in Ankara met with his Syrian counterpart, informing him that the leadership in Baghdad received the inquiries from the Syrian leadership with great satisfaction. Baghdad leaves it to the Syrian leadership to determine the nature, level, and extent of the dialogue and cooperation. Baghdad is ready for a meeting on the Syrian-Iraqi border, and the Syrian leadership can specify the secrecy level, the level, and the date “as the Iraqi leadership wishes to restore diplomatic relations, either at the level of charge d’affaires or ambassador.”
Khaddam stated that “the situation for us is concerning due to the American and Jordanian movements on one side, and on the other side, the past experiences with the Iraqi leadership and the bitterness and pain we suffered, have created a cautious approach. In addition, rapid rapprochement, without Arab preparation, will lead to disrupting our Arab relations and creating a state of coldness with the nationalist current in the Iraqi opposition, and suspicions between us and the Islamic current and the Kurdish front with which we have good relations.”
In February 1996, the Deputy Head of the Syrian regime received another message from the Iraqi ambassador proposing the restoration of diplomatic relations, initiating political contacts at the highest levels, and starting direct security talks, in addition to opening borders according to agreed-upon procedures.
After presenting the Iraqi message to Hafez al-Assad, he agreed with his deputy to prepare a response that keeps the dialogue open to explore the possibility of reaching a new agreement on one hand, and creating a conducive atmosphere, especially with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the countries most affected by the Kuwait invasion and the most sensitive among the Gulf states to this issue, on the other hand.
Assad agreed to the draft response on February 4, 1996, and it stated: “President Hafez sends his greetings to his brother President Saddam, expressing his satisfaction with his initiative and sharing his concern about the situation in the region and the conspiracy aimed at dismantling the Arabs and erasing Arab identity (…) The Jordanian-Israeli project is part of this conspiracy targeting Arabs in their past, present, and future… Our concern has been there for a while, and we anticipated such ongoing developments in the Arab arena. Therefore, President Hafez spoke about the necessity of achieving Arab reconciliation and overcoming events of the past, as everyone is threatened from abroad.”
Solidarity and a Secret Summit
Meeting minutes reveal that the Iraqi ambassador to Qatar emphasized, during his meeting with the Director-General of the “Arab Organization for Agricultural Development,” the “importance attached by Iraq in this phase to restoring relations with Syria, in response to the joint aggression orchestrated by the United States and Israel in cooperation with Jordan and Turkey, against both Iraq and Syria.”
Al-Qaisi narrates that Saddam contacted him “during the aggression on Lebanon, informing him to convey to Syria that all of Iraq’s capabilities are at Syria’s disposal, and they want a signal in this regard, attempting to arrange a meeting with President Hafez during the holiday. According to the Iraqi diplomat, Saddam believed that merely holding the meeting would resolve all outstanding issues, and Iraqis believed that the news of the meeting was accurate, as President Saddam was on a visit to Mosul and the border areas with Syria during the holiday week.”
Saddam and Bridging Ties with Iran
In light of the Iraqi president’s concerns about a major conspiracy targeting the region and Iraq, al-Qaisi reveals that Saddam contacted him to investigate what was being plotted and the reasons for the visit of the U.S. Chief of Staff to the region. He learned about “a letter signed by President Bill Clinton proposing that he agrees to the formation of a Middle East Security Council, including Turkey, Jordan, Israel, Qatar, Egypt, and other countries, tasked with combating terrorism and arranging the region’s affairs, and punishing countries supporting terrorism.”
Tariq Aziz, who held positions as the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister in Iraq, spoke about the two meetings held with the initiative of Moscow. One of these meetings was with the Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa. They did not prove beneficial as they were motivated by external pressures and the Soviets’ collaboration. He explained that “the conspiracy is significant for the region and is multifaceted, targeting not only Iraq but also Syria and Iran. The United States will isolate each Arab country individually, and anyone supporting liberation movements from dominance.”
Aziz added, according to the minutes, “Iraq tried to bridge ties with the Iranians and settle relations with them. They took good steps in opening borders and developing trade relations based on the exchange of Iranian goods with Iraqi oil derivatives and goods. The problem with the Iranians is that their leadership is not unanimous in opinion, which reflects on their actions and opinions at every meeting. The Iraqi leadership received positive responses from the Syrian leadership to Saddam’s initiative to restore relations between the two countries, and Iraq proceeds from its keenness on joint action and the importance of the two countries in restoring Arab solidarity.”
Regarding the positive and encouraging signals from the Syrian side, Saddam said that letting others know about what would happen between Syria and Iraq is a positive and necessary situation, not a negative one. Informing Iran is a positive action, despite it being a foreign country, and coordinating with them is useful even though their view of matters is limited because they want to achieve everything or nothing.
Disarming Hezbollah: What’s the Exchange?
Following the Iraqi-Syrian diplomatic efforts to restore relations, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad decided to send Khaddam to Paris to meet with French President Jacques Chirac and inform him of the decision to open the Syrian-Iraqi border, closed since 1982.
According to the meeting minutes, Chirac proposed to Assad the disarmament of Hezbollah in exchange for its continued presence in Lebanon. The French President wondered, “But can Hezbollah’s weapons be disarmed? The army can do so tactically, but politically it cannot. Syria is the one that can. What does Syria ask for in return for disarming Hezbollah?”
Khaddam replied, “Israel withdraws unilaterally, leaving a vacuum. In the south, in addition to Hezbollah and Palestinian factions, there are other groups. The media greatly exaggerate the issue of Hezbollah. Overall, this matter is discussed internally and within the framework of Lebanon’s interests, not Israel’s. Israel wants to create a problem in Lebanon, but all Lebanese are aware of this game. Discussing the issue of weapons and disarmament beforehand is an Israeli precondition, and Netanyahu does not want preconditions.”
President Chirac added, “If the withdrawal (Israeli) occurs without disarming Hezbollah, this will lead to provocations and other matters. If its weapons are disarmed, Syria loses something then, and there must be something in return, which is the guarantee of Syrian presence in Lebanon. Perhaps these are dreams. What I want is to have a strong and close connection.”
