Secret messages between Hafez al-Assad and Saddam Hussein… revealed by Abdel Halim Khaddam in his memoirs

publisher: BAZ_NEWS

Publishing date: 2021-06-27

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Abdel Halim Khaddam. He was a witness and a participant in the major events that swept through Syria and its role in the region. In an interview with “Al-Sharq Al-Awsat,” Khaddam revealed that the late Iraqi President Saddam Hussein initiated secret communication channels with the late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, but Hafez al-Assad had suspicions about Saddam’s intentions.

The First Episode

Khaddam said in the first episode of the “Secret Letters Between Presidents Saddam and Assad” series, published by “Al-Sharq Al-Awsat” today, that President Saddam initiated in the mid-1990s to open secret communication channels with Assad. However, Assad met this with suspicions about Saddam’s intentions, in light of past experiences.

Assad decided to engage in dialogue but subjected Saddam to several tests before taking public steps to end the rift between the two regimes. Khaddam added that in his first messages in August 1995, Saddam urgently requested the reopening of embassies, holding high-profile and public political meetings, and opening borders. However, Assad decided to conduct Arab consultations before responding to that.

First Messages:

In the first of Saddam’s messages, conveyed by the Iraqi Ambassador Rafea Al-Tikriti to the Syrian Ambassador Abdel Aziz Al-Masri, it was stated, “I confirm that the step we are taking towards Syria, aiming to build trust and closeness between the two countries, is a very serious step. Any sensitivity from the past will not be repeated.”

In late August 1995, the Iraqi Ambassador in Qatar, Anwar Al-Qaisi, requested from the Director-General of the “Arab Organization for Agricultural Development,” Yahya Bakour, to inform Damascus of his desire to visit, carrying a message from Saddam.

Khaddam added that Assad discussed the two messages with him and the former Foreign Minister Farouk Al-Sharaa. Assad agreed to secretly host Al-Qaisi, and communication would take place with Al-Qaisi in Qatar rather than Ankara, for security reasons and due to doubts about the seriousness of the Iraqi regime.

On September 5, 1995, Al-Qaisi confirmed that Saddam wanted to restore relations, explaining that Saddam said Jordan had become part of the American-Zionist plan, aiming to harm not only Iraq but also Syria to dominate the region. Therefore, Iraq seeks open-minded and sincere dialogue. Saddam suggested that Iraqi Foreign Minister Mohammed Saeed Al-Sahhaf visit Damascus for a wide-ranging political dialogue.

Khaddam added that Assad discussed the message with him and saw that the response should be positive and friendly. On September 13, 1995, Khaddam conveyed to Al-Qaisi the necessity for both parties to overcome obstacles, differences, and risks, notably the Jordanian and Turkish roles in their water projects.

On September 19, the Iraqi Ambassador in Ankara informed his Syrian counterpart of the Iraqi leadership’s satisfaction, leaving it to them to determine the nature and level of the dialogue. Khaddam confirmed that the situation was concerning for Syria, and rapid rapprochement with Iraq without Arab preparation would disturb Arab relations.

Saddam proposed the restoration of relations, the reopening of the oil pipeline passing through Syria, the initiation of political contacts, security talks, and the opening of borders between the two countries. Khaddam explained Syria’s position on the Jordanian project and its obstruction. Assad believed that what the Iraqi leadership was going through would benefit Syria significantly, but the fear was of Iraqi retreat, leading to the loss of the Arab bloc and Iraq. Khaddam stated that he agreed with Assad on preparing a response project to keep the dialogue open, creating an atmosphere with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. In it, Assad expressed satisfaction with Khaddam’s initiative, sharing concerns about the situation in the region. Assad spoke about the necessity of achieving Arab reconciliation and restoring Arab solidarity.

The relationship between Assad and Saddam is complex, intertwined with party, sectarian, ideological, and geographical factors, as well as competition for leadership in the region.

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