Assad replied
Al-Assad responded to Clinton’s letter on March 13, 1998, saying: “You noticed the extent of anxiety and tension that prevailed in public opinion, especially in the Arab and Islamic worlds, due to the possibility of military action against Iraq that would increase the suffering.”
Addressing Clinton, he added: “I am committed to cooperating with you to achieve just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East.” I want you, Mr. President, to know that if Syria had not been flexible enough during the peace process since the Madrid Conference, this process would not have continued until now, and important achievements would not have been achieved under your auspices.”
He continued: “But resuming negotiations without the point at which they stopped and continuing to build on what has been achieved on the Syrian track is not only considered a waste of five difficult years of American, Syrian and Israeli efforts, but will also lead to derailing the negotiations.”
Coordination between Damascus and Cairo
The exchange of letters between Damascus and Washington was preceded by Assad’s contact with former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, and the contact was followed by a visit by Khaddam and former Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa to Cairo, on February 17, 1998, where it was agreed to send a joint delegation to Iraq, to inform Saddam Hussein that “ Syria and Egypt have studied the dangerous situation, because all the data we have says that this American mobilization is serious, and the opportunity exists to avoid a strike, and the way out is agreement with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.” It was also agreed that the foreign ministers of the two countries will travel to Saudi Arabia to inform its leaders of the background of the move.
Days after the Cairo trip, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan arrived in Baghdad and held talks with the Iraqi leadership that led to the signing of an agreement in which that leadership accepted the Security Council’s conditions for oversight and inspection.
Regarding the relationship with Iraq, Khaddam says, “The directions given to the Syrian side in all visits and meetings (with the Iraqi side) were not to enter into a discussion of political relations, because the ground for such discussions is not available due to the lack of trust between the two sides.” Therefore, the political conversation during the meetings with officials focused on the issue of the siege and working to remove it.”
