SYRIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1973–1977
A STUDY OF SECURITY COOPERATION IN REGIONAL CONFLICTS
Andrew James Bowen
A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, September 2013.
ABSTRACT
The United States, a great power, and Syria, a small state, have both been at the heart of the politics of the Middle East since the end of World War II. The systemic conditions of the international system and the shifting politics of the region brought these states into contact and, at times, confrontation, but these interactions never produced a sustained period of security cooperation. By the beginning of the 1970s, both states had begun to reconsider and reshape their positions in the region. The period from 1973 to 1977 produced a rare period of cooperation between these two states in the case of two regional conflicts: the Arab–Israeli conflict and the Lebanese Civil War. To understand that shift in relations, this thesis explores the question: What accounts for the security cooperation between Syria and the US during this period? This thesis makes four observations: first, as results of changes in both states’ leaderships, realpolitik, alongside ideational considerations, became more pronounced in both states’ conceptions of their security environment in the Middle East and their relations with one another. Second, while the Cold War was the predominant context for the US’s interactions with Syria at the start of the 1970s, interactions between the US and Syria were also shaped by local conditions that emerged after the October War. Third, both states, distrustful of the other’s intentions, formed temporary alliances based on short-term common interests. Finally, the regional conflicts themselves introduced circumstances that both strengthened and weakened their security cooperation.
While their security cooperation achieved limited results, their relations established a framework for these two states’ subsequent relations. The unresolved issues that emerged from this period of their relations served as the main context for their cooperation and conflict in the following decades, even after the death of Hafiz al-Asad in 2000.
The new constitution of 1973 banned all political participation except for through the Ba’th Party and put all state power in the hands of the presidency. By integrating the state bureaucracy with the Ba’th Party, Asad made the party the entry point into positions within state institutions, and the party became responsible for directly implementing his will and carrying out the administration of the country. A group of technocrats were appointed to ministerial positions within the state, but in all reality the Ba’th Party, according to Abdul Halim Khaddam, a senior Ba’ath Party member, merely became a tool of political organization, legitimacy, and implementation for the president, instead of a source for actual policy formulation.
In Asad and Nixon’s first encounter, the identity and interests of both states precluded cooperation. In the US’s estimation, Syria was a client of the Soviet Union whose perceived radical politics after 1967 had obstructed any opportunity for cooperation and engagement. Containment represented the best strategy for limiting Syria’s potential destabilizing role in the region. For Syria, the US was seen as a state completely inimical to its interests. In an interview with Abdul Halim Khaddam, a senior political leader in the Ba’th Party in the 1970s, he argued that Syrian public opinion was decisively turned against the United States, after the 1967 war and would have precluded any direct cooperation between the United States and Syria.
Addressing his relations with the Soviet Union, Asad stressed, “Our policy is decided in light of our national interests. We want to build our line in a completely independent way. Syria is non-aligned.” Noting Syria’s close relations militarily and politically with the Soviet Union, Kissinger responded, “The Soviets should not feel your talking with the US makes you anymore dependent on the US than arms purchases makes you dependent on the Soviet Union.” Abdul Halim Khaddam, Syria’s foreign minister, rejoined to Kissinger, “The matter is not looked at through the eyes of the big powers. We see the matters through the eyes of our own interests. It is important that the big powers recognize the interests of the local nations.”36 While Asad’s relations with the Soviet Union were not as extensive as America’s relations with Israel in terms of material and political support, looking back at this period of Syria’s relations, Khaddam repeatedly stressed that relations with the United States were never seen as replacing Damascus’ relations with the Soviet Union, which were both deep and materially essential to Syria’s strategic parity with Israel and their position in the region. Generations of Syrians either studied or were trained in Moscow, including Rifaat al-Asad, the younger brother of Hafiz, senior member of the Ba’th Party, and head of Asad’s elite military forces, who received his doctorate in Moscow. In addition, the relationship aligned more with the ruling Ba’th party’s ideology. The loss of Egypt to the United States after 1973 allowed Hafiz al-Asad to better negotiate the terms of his Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union.
In his meetings with the Syrian president, Kissinger came to see Asad as a leader who was more independent from Moscow than he had originally estimated.38 In a conversation in Damascus, Asad raised the Jordanian Crisis of 1970. Kissinger noted that he perceived Syria’s actions in the crisis in Jordan to be in line with his perception that their actions were being taken on behalf of the Soviet Union’s interests in the Middle East. Asad countered that his decision to intervene in Jordan was separate from any decision of the Soviet Union. Kissinger raised the role of Soviet military advisors during the conflict. Asad stressed that Moscow had no advance knowledge of Damascus’ decision to intervene. Asad’s willingness to act independently from the Soviet Union and, at times, to keep them at arms’ length from his negotiations with the United States reflected Asad’s pragmatic pursuit of Syria’s interests above and beyond the demands and requirements of his allies.
According to Abdul Halim Khaddam, Hafiz al-Asad entered the post-disengagement agreements with great confidence. As president of Syria, he successfully re-acquired lost land on the Golan seized by Israel in 1967. While the October War ended in defeat for Syria, it proved that the country was still a strategic threat to Israel. Sadat’s betrayal allowed Asad to portray himself as the leading frontline state against Israel and this deepened his relations with Arab states in the region. In particular, his relations with Riyadh grew, with King Faisal providing substantial financial support to the Asad regime.
Asad insisted step-by-step agreements could no longer suffice. In his estimation, he could not sell multiple partial agreements with Israel. Equally, the president could not support a negotiating process which prioritized Egypt over Syria. Asad did not trust Israel’s intentions in the negotiating process, and believed that if Israel concluded another agreement with Egypt, there would be no incentive to seek a territorial settlement with Syria. In a meeting with Kissinger on the 10th of October 1974, Asad stressed, “The French stayed here as long as Israel has been established. And, I know, it’s my generation that experienced it. But they seem to be a people determined with expansionism, fascists in every sense of the word. . . . So, it is very difficult to see if peace can be brought in this area. Of course, this doesn’t mean we’ll give up our efforts here. But the Arabs shouldn’t be deceived.” The Syrian president believed that the only way forward was concurrent negotiations between Israel and its neighbours on the return of territory lost in the 1967 war. The question of Palestine would have to be settled as well.
On the 15th of June 1975, Kissinger agreed to Rabin’s “cosmetic line” offer. Simon Dinitz, the Israeli ambassador to the US, asked Kissinger, “Would there be a principle agreed that we would not be asked to get out of the Golan Heights although the line there might change?” Kissinger assured the Israeli team of his support and noted that he could construct the negotiations in a way that would deceive Asad so that Tel Aviv would not have to make substantial concessions:
As to my ideas in regard to Syria. . . .We would both understand that they would not be likely to succeed. Then at a time when a stalemate appears near, you would make some cosmetic changes unilaterally as a gesture of good will. Then we would jointly recommend that the negotiations be moved to the overall stage. By that time there would be no compulsion to enter into intensive talks. We would conduct ourselves defensively, aiming at avoiding being isolated.131 As Ford and Kissinger were finalizing the details of the “cosmetic line” with Israel, the president and Kissinger met with Abdul Halim Khaddam and the Syrian ambassador to the United States, Sabah Kabbani, on the 20th of June 1975 in Washington. Ford made the case to the Syrian delegation that a step-by-step approach towards a final settlement, including possibly Geneva was the conclusion of their review of policy. They informed Khaddam that Egypt would be the first step. Kissinger did not disclose during the meeting the “cosmetic” concession Israel was willing to offer on the Golan, however. In response to Kissinger, Khaddam stressed: Our view is that activities should start simultaneously, because otherwise it would leave the impression of favouritism. . . . We actually appeal to President Ford and the US Government to consider our attitude. We can’t afford to ignore Arab public opinion. If Israel can’t ignore the views of a few settlers on the Golan, how can we ignore the views of 100 million Arabs? Every day Israel makes statements about keeping the Golan, the West Bank, and Gaza, etc. If Israel is not dilly-dallying to reach the end of the US elections, how does that jell with the fact that nothing has happened for 10 months? In fact, I repeat my plea — we desire peace, but we are apprehensive because we don’t want another year of stalemate.
Avoiding Khaddam’s substantive critique of US policy, Kissinger sought to ameliorate Syria’s concerns, noting that President Ford genuinely hoped to pursue peace between Israel and Syria and recognized “Syria as the center of the Arab nation.” 132 Finalizing the “cosmetic” line agreement, Ambassador Dinitz met with Kissinger on the 1st of July 1975. Dinitiz asked Kissinger, “With regard to Syria, is it clear and understood that an interim agreement with Syria would only constitute cosmetic changes and that to the extent there was no agreement with Syria it would not affect U.S.–Israeli relations in the political, economic or military spheres?” Kissinger replied that the United States was amenable to this position.
In terms of American relations with Syria, Ford precluded an opportunity for substantial security cooperation between the United States and Syria on the Arab–Israeli conflict. While the US may have entertained the idea that a more isolated Syria would be more willing to make peace on terms more favourable to Israel, after the signing of the disengagement agreement with Egypt, according to Abdul Halim Khaddam, President Asad showed no substantial interest in re-engaging the United States on a settlement during Ford’s term in office. Asad was not interested in getting drawn into further empty promises. As noted in this chapter, Kissinger came away with the similar conclusion that merely isolating Asad wouldn’t make him more amenable to making peace on Israel’s terms, but instead, this agreement succeeded in preventing Egypt and Syria from going to war with Israel
Also surprising to the United States, Asad was willing to enter into substantive negotiations with the United States and Israel to achieve a settlement of 1967, a first in his country’s history. As Abdul Halim Khaddam noted, Asad engaged in the negotiations under the impression that Kissinger was a serious broker.140 Asad even offered Kissinger security concessions on the border between Israel and Syria, including demilitarizing the border between Syria and Israel, to try to assuage Israeli concerns about withdrawing from the Golan, but by the autumn of 1975 neither the United States nor Israel wished to engage Syria in substantive terms on the Arab–Israeli conflict.
Relations, though, could have taken a different turn if President Ford and Henry Kissinger had taken the risk of expending political capital and genuinely engaged Asad in the peace process, instead of prioritizing Egypt at the cost of a disengagement agreement with Syria. Khaddam recalled that Asad was prepared to sign a disengagement agreement with Syria if Israel was willing to end the occupation of Syrian territory. Khaddam noted as well that Asad, however, would not sign a formal peace agreement until the status of the Palestinians was resolved. Inherent in Syria’s identity, Asad could not make a formal peace with Israel at the expense of the Palestinians. Rifaat al-Asad noted as well that his brother was prepared to take the necessary steps to achieve a settlement with Israel.142 By not taking this path, Ford and Kissinger succeeded in disengaging Egypt from conflict with Israel, but didn’t achieve a wider peace in the region. Khaddam recalled that after the failure of these talks, Asad had no further interest in speaking to Kissinger. Khaddam noted that while Asad respected America’s interests in the region, the Syrian president stressed that America’s interests should not come at the expense of Syria’s. The Syrian president was willing to maintain relations with the United States, but came away from these talks with the conclusion that the US could not be a reliable partner for peace because its interests were too interlinked with Israel’s.
- Syria’s Relations with Lebanon, Autumn 1975 to Spring 1976
Reflective of the broader trends illustrated in this study, both interests and identity shaped how Asad viewed his southern neighbour. The concept of al-Sham which once included both Syria and Lebanon, resonated strongly with Hafiz al-Asad. Richard Murphy recalls how Asad always pointed out that, while the actions of the Ottomans and their successors had divided “Greater Syria” politically, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, and Syria shared “one people.” Asad repeatedly made reference to Murphy the injustice of Sykes–Picot Agreement, which in his view had robbed “Greater Syria” of its unity, invoking this common identity in a number of his public comments. Murphy concluded that Asad viewed his involvement in his neighbour’s affairs as natural, because both states had links that bound them together around common historical, cultural, economic, and familial ties.
According to Abdul Halim Khaddam, the introduction of Palestinian refugees to the fragile confessional environment in Lebanon by 1971 further complicated Asad’s ideational relationship with Lebanon; their presence in Lebanon threatened the balance of power within the Lebanese political system. Asad found himself faced with two larger, competing ideational interests in the small Lebanese state: the Palestinian community and the Lebanese people.3 In addition to these larger identities, Syria’s relationship with Lebanon was further complicated by the number of sub-national Lebanese confessional identities, each of which had differing identities and interests. In Asad’s estimations, the Maronite Christian community in particular differed from other groups because they had identity ties with Israel based around their common Judeo-Christian identity.
Both Abdul Halim Khaddam and Rifaat al-Asad, in separate interviews, also noted that Syria had to take into account how this instability in Lebanon could threaten its wider interests in the region, and this factored into Asad’s Lebanon policy. First, in relation to Israel, Lebanon proved to be critical to the balance of power in the region according to Abdul Halim Khaddam. If the Lebanese state collapsed and the Maronite Christian community emerged as the clear victor, it could create a space for Israel to further assert its influence in the Levant at the expense of Syria’s already vulnerable position after the failure to secure an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights in 1975. Rifaat al-Asad noted that building relations with all of the confessional groups in Lebanon proved to be the best safeguard against one group forming exclusive relations with another country at the expense of Syria. According to Khaddam, Hafiz al-Asad sought to prevent a situation where Israel surrounded Syria on two of its borders whether directly with a military intervention in Lebanon or indirectly with a pro-Israeli government.
Second, the escalation of violence in Lebanon or the collapse of the Lebanese state could lead to the intervention of Israel into Lebanon. A direct military intervention in Lebanon would pose a strategic threat to Syria, with Lebanon geographically acting as a direct corridor from which Israel could attack Syria. With Damascus only 50 miles from Beirut and with the loss of the Golan Heights, Asad, according to both Khaddam and Rifaat alAsad, viewed Lebanon then as a critical fault line for the security of his state. In Asad’s estimation, according to Khaddam, Syria would be in too weak of strategic position to contest Israel if Israel controlled both of Syria’s borders. According to Rifaat al-Asad, in Hafiz al-Asad’s estimation, Israel also importantly would be in an advantageous position to contain Syria’s ambitions in the Levant or go as far to overthrow or undermine Asad’s government domestically.9 Third, the collapse of Lebanon’s National Pact could lead to the partition of the Lebanese state. In Asad’s estimations, according to Khaddam, such a partition would benefit Israel if the Maronite Christian community established their own, separate state. Managing a number of separate Lebanese states would amplify the security risks along its border — ones that Syria would find it very difficult to contain from spreading across its own borders.10 Finally, the collapse of Lebanon could lead to the deeper radicalization of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian militant community at the expense of Syria. With backing from both Egypt and Iraq, the Palestinian militant community could change its position at the expense of Syria’s perceived leadership of the Palestinians
Hafiz al-Asad’s initial intentions were not to increase Syria’s role in the Lebanese state. As Abdul Halim Khaddam notes, President Asad considered Lebanon an “independent, sovereign country,” and one that should ideally remain in that form. Hafiz al-Asad sent Khaddam to Lebanon with the mission to seek a political settlement, believing that the system governing Lebanon was profoundly unstable and that it would not serve Syria’s interests if one group dominated the political system. Khaddam recalled, “Unfortunately, Lebanon is based on factions and is not based around a common national identity. Our efforts attempted to move Lebanon from these factional politics to a state based around a common national identity
In Hafiz al-Asad’s view, the situation in Lebanon was on the verge of deteriorating further, and it had the potential to spark more clashes between the Lebanese Right and Left, as well as the Palestinians. He therefore decided to intervene more directly in Lebanese politics. To handle the Lebanese portfolio, he assembled a committee of Abdul Halim Khaddam, Major General Naji Jamil (Chief of Staff of the Air Force) and Major General Hikmat Shihabi (Chief of Staff of the Syrian Army). Rifaat al-Asad, commander of the Defence Companies, and Ali Douba, head of Military Intelligence, also informed on the Lebanon policy.22 On the 24th of May, Khaddam and Naji Jamil visited with President Frangieh in Beirut, urging him to appoint a new government. Syria was concerned that the military government could spark more fighting in Lebanon, but also that it was too anti-Palestinian. They also met with the leaders of the Lebanese Right and the Maronite Patriarch, who supported the new government, in Beirut. On the 25th of May, President Frangieh announced the dissolution of the military government. In its place, he appointed Rashid Karami, a rival of his but a close ally of Damascus, to the premiership. Khaddam subsequently helped Karami broker a compromise agreement on the cabinet acceptable to the Sunni political elite and the Phalange Party on the 28th of June 1975. Both parties expressed their willingness to accommodate one another in the political process.
Even though this violence continued in the north, the summer of 1975 represented a rare lull in the civil war in other respects. After a meeting with President Frangieh, on the 25th of June Yasir Arafat re-affirmed his commitment to the Cairo agreement and promised that the Palestinian resistance would refrain from interfering in Lebanese domestic politics. Arafat wrote to President Asad, expressing gratitude for Syria’s role in “preserving LebanesePalestinian fraternity” and praising Syria’s role in these negotiations, stating that they “confirmed Syria’s vanguard role under your wise leadership.” Arafat was keen to show Asad that the Palestinian Resistance would support Syria’s mediatory efforts. Recognizing Syria’s role in preserving the Palestinian position in the Lebanese state, Arafat sought to avoid a situation where he was in direct confrontation with Syria.25 Hoping to decrease the tensions between the Maronites and the Lebanese Left, Khaddam invited the Christian political leadership to visit Damascus. On the 1st of August, Prime Minister Karami also visited Damascus for talks aimed at resolving the civil war.
In the midst of this increasing civil conflict, President Asad, according to both Khaddam and Rifaat al-Asad, sought to initiate a more expansive diplomatic initiative, which started on the 19th of September. President Asad expanded his Lebanon portfolio advisory committee to include Zuhayr Muhsin and Muhammed al-Khuli, the chief of security in the Syrian Air Force. Khaddam and Shihabi were sent to Lebanon to stabilize the situation. On the 20th of September 1975, a Syria-sponsored ceasefire to halt the fighting was reached in Beirut.31 In attempt to prevent a return to violence, Khaddam proposed a Committee for National Dialogue. He initiated a series of consultations with the various political factions in Lebanon to try to reformulate the National Pact so that it was more reflective of Lebanon’s changing demographics. Khaddam, who viewed President Frangieh as a close friend of Damascus,
recalled that he hoped that this solution would create a Lebanese political system based first and foremost around a common national identity that could transcend confessional politics. This goal would be achieved by reforming the Constitution and the electoral law. Debate emerged between the different groups on who should be a member of this Committee for National Dialogue, however. Kamal Joumblatt, recalled in his memoir, that he objected to Khaddam’s initial formula of basing representation on confessional identity in order to achieve representation for all of Lebanon’s confessional groups, and instead proposed that the current political blocs choose representatives. Khaddam was able to reach a compromise, with 20 members — 6 from the Lebanese Left — and Joumblatt recognizing the Phalange Party’s place in the dialogue. 32 Khaddam publicly declared this initiative “a crowning [achievement] on the path of deepening confidence between the different parties.
Watching their mediation efforts flounder, Asad and Khaddam continued to seek a political solution to the crisis. In a meeting in Damascus in October, Prime Minister Karami met with Arafat, Asad, and Khaddam to discuss a way to break through this deadlock. Karami raised the possibility that he could deploy the army to restore order, but he did not think such a deployment would be advisable at that time. He also offered to resign. Asad and Khaddam noted their own objections to the use of the Army, and also to Karami’s resignation. They also opposed the use of the Lebanese Army, because it could empower the Maronites at the expense of the Palestinians, and in the meeting Asad noted their predominant concern — above and beyond the LNM’s proposals — was the protection of the Palestinian community. Asad noted to Karami and Arafat:
We believe that the National Movement . . . should give priority in its patriotic and national struggle to the defense of the Resistance, and that it should place this as [its] first objective, before the realization of the demands for political, economic, and social reform of the Lebanese regime. For it is possible to realize some of these demands at present time, and to continue the struggle for their realization during the coming years. However, the matter depends on the Lebanese National Movement itself.35 Arafat left the meeting confident of Asad’s support, and on the 29th of October he informed Karami that the Resistance would help bring stability to West Beirut. Khaddam told Karami that Syria supported these efforts. Working with Khaddam, Karami created a Higher Coordination Committee comprising the Army and the Ministry of the Interior, as well as Palestinian militias, to calm inter-communal conflict and better enforce the past ceasefire agreements.
Syrian mediation failed to stem this violence. Asad and Khaddam were unable to build enough trust between the confessional groups to achieve a permanent ceasefire, and by the end of 1975 none of the parties had committed to a peaceful settlement. While Damascus did indeed prioritize the protection of the Palestinian community and, to a degree, the LNM, they recognized that supporting those groups alone would not secure Lebanon’s stability and security and, as a result, Syria’s security. As both Abdul Halim Khaddam and Richard Murphy noted, Asad was not seeking to escalate Syria’s involvement in Lebanon, but was looking for a political solution to avoid a situation where Syria would be drawn militarily in Lebanon’s civil war
1.1.3. Engagement with the Maronites
With the mediation efforts struggling, in December 1975 Hafiz al-Asad invited Pierre Gemayel, the leader of the Lebanese Phalange Party, to Damascus to meet with him and Abdul Halim Khaddam. News of this visit surprised Syria’s Leftist allies and the PLO in Lebanon, who believed Syria was attentive exclusively to their interests. Asad reportedly told Gemayel that Syria would offer “every possible service” and re-affirmed Syria’s mediatory role. Importantly, Asad stressed to Gemayel that Syria should be regarded as “a friend of all Lebanese without exception.” He encouraged the Phalange to not seek a partition of the country, and also encouraged the party to support the confessional system he was trying to preserve. In that meeting, Gemayel stressed to Asad the positive role Syria could play in bringing an end to the conflict. He noted that he did not oppose the Palestinian Resistance, but was concerned by their “excess and involvement in internal Lebanese affairs.” Asad used this meeting to build stronger relations with the wider Maronite Christian community and to send a message to the LNM and the PLO that the pursuit of Syria’s interests in Lebanon would not be constrained by its relationship with any one confessional group. This meeting marked the beginning of a dialogue between Damascus and the Phalange to form closer relations.
While Hafiz al-Asad and Khaddam were engaged in their mediatory effort, by 1975 Rifaat al-Asad had begun to covertly arm and equip members of the Christian militias. Rifaat had a number of friends within the Maronite Christian community, and he felt he could not let his friends be slaughtered as the violence erupted in 1975. In an interview conducted in 2012, he noted as a particular concern that if Syria did not protect this minority community, the Maronites would be forced to flee Lebanon due to the violence.42 Samir Frangieh, Suleiman Frangieh’s nephew, observed that Suleiman Frangieh was initially inclined to look more to Israel than Syria for support, but Tony, a recipient of Rifaat’s military aid and his business partner, pushed his father to seek assistance from the Syrians, instead of relying on assistance from the Israelis. Suleiman Frangieh, according to Samir Frangieh, concluded that political mediation by Syria was essential to guaranteeing his presidency. Khaddam noted that Frangieh was also a good friend of Hafiz al-Asad.
In response to this violence and the resignation of Karami, Khaddam warned, “This is a very sensitive situation in relation to us in Syria, and in relation to the presence of the Palestinian resistance there.”52 While Asad sought to deepen his ties with the Maronite Christian community, he objected equally to the Christian community’s onslaught of violence and their refusal to stop the fighting. Trying to prevent a massacre of Palestinians, an important aspect of Syria’s identity, and contain the Maronite Christians’ indiscriminate violence, Asad shifted from employing only political mediation to using limited force as well. The Syrian president sought to avoid a situation where one group could shift the balance of power too far in their favour at the expense of another group. Syria’s Saqa’a and PLA units entered Lebanon in the beginning of January and assisted the Palestinians in their counteroffensive. They also assisted Sunni militiamen in attacking Christian towns in the northern Akkar region. In a warning to the Christians, Khaddam declared, “We have made it clear in a decisive manner that we would not permit the partition of Lebanon. Any initiative for partition would mean our immediate intervention. For Lebanon was part of Syria and we would restore it with any attempt at partition.
Facing difficulty with the LNM–PLO siege of Damur, Kamal Joumblatt asked for more Syrian assistance. Asad hesitated over deepening his involvement in Syria. Khaddam, however, warned that if he did not increase Syrian assistance, the Maronite Christians’ January offensive could lead to them capturing the Muslim neighbourhoods in West Beirut. While Asad was willing to deploy Syria’s trained Palestinian militias to prevent the Maronite Christians from overwhelming the Palestinians and the LNM, on the 18th of January Asad first sought another cease-fire, hoping to prevent escalating his involvement in the state even more. Asad wanted to avoid as much as possible a sustained military role in Lebanon and a situation where he tilted the balance of power too much in favour of the LNM and the Palestinians. Much to Asad’s consternation, the ceasefire was broken almost immediately upon implementation.
In a conversation on the 20th of January 1976, Frangieh protested to Asad, “There are Syrian forces entering Lebanon!” Asad rejoined, “There is a red line in relation to the Palestinians that we will absolutely not permit anyone to cross.”56 Khaddam declared on the 1st of February 1976 that “if the PLA had not intervened, Lebanon would now be devouring itself and be destroyed.”57 Seeking a ceasefire once again, President Frangieh and Asad agreed that Khaddam, Shihabi, and Jamil would visit Beirut to broker a ceasefire.58 Building on Syria’s failed National Dialogue, President Asad still hoped he could refashion the Lebanese political system and bring it stability. Abdul Halim Khaddam proposed the “Constitutional Document” as a solution. The proposal sought to re-shape the political system to account for the demographic shifts in the country and to give more power to the Muslim population. Importantly, the Document proposed re-allocating how seats would be assigned in Parliament to give more representation to the Muslim community. It also proposed new institutional structures to build more checks and balances into the political system. It re-orientated the civil service from one where appointments were made based on sectarian affiliation to one based on merit. However, the Document also made concessions to the Maronite Christian community to protect their interests in the state. Khaddam recalled that, after long negotiations, he convinced President Frangieh to accept the Document on the 14th of February 1976
In the midst of the siege on the Presidential Palace, Khaddam met with Robert Pelletreau, the US chargé d’affaires in Damascus, on the 23rd of March and informed him of President Frangieh’s request for Syrian military assistance. Khaddam inquired what the American response would be if a Syrian intervention did occur. Through Pelletreau, Kissinger informed Khaddam that the introduction of full-scale ground forces could trigger an Israeli push into southern Lebanon.94 In the Washington Special Actions Group meeting on the 24th of March 1976, Kissinger stressed that “[g]iven the likely Egyptian reaction and the Israeli re-action, allowing the Syrians to go in would just be opening an impossible can of worms. If the Syrians go in, the Israelis would almost certainly go in themselves. They would probably tell us to buzz off — face us down
Reflecting on Syria’s intervention in support of President Frangieh, Kissinger saw this shift in Syria’s attitude against the Lebanese Left as beneficial to American and Israeli interests. He told President Ford on the 24th of March 1976: We have a really bizarre situation in Lebanon. Syria is supporting the conservatives and Christians against the PLO and the Communists. Egypt is supporting the leftists and the PLO against Syria. The Soviet Union should be supporting Syria, but it also supports the PLO. Israel is, of course, against the PLO. We cannot allow Israel to go into South Lebanon. If we don’t restrain them, there will be a UN Security Council meeting where we will either have to condemn them or veto — and either one is bad.96 For the United States, then, the situation in Lebanon confounded Kissinger’s expectations about Syria’s behaviour. The case of Lebanon illustrated how a state such as Syria can be willing to balance its identity with its interests, and even support the same group as its ideational enemy, in this case Israel, to achieve its strategic and ideational aims, even if that group posed a threat to the Palestinian Resistance. Strategically, Asad aligned with a group that had less in common with Syria’s identity than the Lebanese Left in order to prevent the collapse of the Lebanese state, which could in turn threaten Syria’s stability and also draw Israel into Lebanon. However, while Kissinger saw this shift as beneficial to American interests, he had concerns about how Israel would view Syria’s intentions.
While the United States did condone the increased Syrian role in Lebanon, the Syrians’ decision to launch a full-scale military intervention in the beginning of June came independent of American considerations. With the failure to broker a peace agreement between the different factions and the possible repercussions of an Israeli intervention in Lebanon if the Christians turned to Israel for more support, President Asad concluded that the only way to bring order and stability to the state was to increase Syria’s role in Lebanon. Explaining the rationale for Syria’s military intervention, Abdul Halim Khaddam noted, “Too much said about this . . . but the fact is simple, Lebanon is a sister country . . . in a very bad civil war which reflected badly on Syria as well. If the Christians were marginalized even more, they may have resorted to Israel.” Khaddam also stressed that Syria was defending not only the unity of Lebanon, but also the security of Syria. He noted that Lebanon could not be partitioned, and that Syria could not allow division between the Christians and the Palestinians.
Concurring with Khaddam’s assessment of the Syrian intervention, Rifaat al-Asad explained that Syria’s decision to intervene in Lebanon was based on the concern that if Syria did not act, the Christians would be defeated. He envisioned Syria’s role in Lebanon as a limited one, and had preferred that UN intervene instead of Syria. Rifaat al-Asad stated that he was generally against a long-term intervention, but circumstances drew Syria in.122 Both Khaddam and Asad repeatedly stressed that American concerns played little role in Hafiz al-Asad’s calculations. They stressed that after Sinai II, relations between the two states were not very strong. Khaddam recalled that prior to the invasion, President Asad had the impression that the United States did not approve of Syria’s presence in Lebanon. Rifaat al-Asad had also concluded that the United States was not supportive of a Syrian intervention in Lebanon.123 Khaddam also emphasized that the Soviet Union was not consulted. Khaddam recalled how the Soviet premier, Alexei Kosygin, arrived in Damascus on the 1st of June 1976 to meet with Hafiz al-Asad, unaware of Syria’s full-scale intervention. The Soviet premier was deeply surprised to find out that Asad had decided to intervene without notifying Moscow. That decision illustrates his willingness to act independently from the Soviet Union to pursue his country’s interests.124 Richard Murphy recalled a Soviet diplomat telling him when he was stationed in Damascus during this period: “It is true that Syria accepts everything from the Soviet Union except advice
1.2.6. The Storms on the Horizon
Even though Syria had succeeded in defeating the LNM and the Palestinians and becoming the political and military steward of Lebanon by October 1976, by 1978 it was struggling to keep Lebanon stable. Increasing differences between the different groups could not be contained purely by Syrian military oversight. With the Maronite Christian community’s turn towards Israel in 1978 and their growing differences with Damascus, Asad switched his support to the Lebanese Left and the Palestinians. Syria’s intervention failed to achieve Asad’s initial objective of refashioning the Lebanese political system around a stable national identity. Lacking that, Lebanon continued to be vulnerable to outside interference and domestic infighting. Khaddam noted how Syria had to apply pressure constantly so that no group was stronger than any of the others, to keep any one group from destabilizing the confessional system. In Asad’s estimation, a Maronite-dominated state or a Leftist or Palestinian state carried equally unpleasant risks. The only way to prevent this was to ensure these groups were balanced through a confessional system.
