Abstract
The Arab-Israeli conflict in 1973-1974, has occupied a wide space and great interest by the Syrian government, which took the lead in confronting the Zionist entity. And set up political and military plans to fight Israel, and liberation of the occupied Arab lands, according to the foreign policy developed by Abdel Halim Khadam , who focused his work in this period on the war to liberate the occupied territories, as well as the removal of the effects of Israeli aggression on Arab Nation and return of Palestinian rights.
Which is at the forefront of Syrian foreign policy in accordance with political, social and cultural developments. According to Israeli plans on the issue.
The study of political figures is an important component of modern and contemporary studies due to their significant role in shaping and transforming various aspects in accordance with their ideas and aspirations. Such studies provide a broad perspective on political developments within countries, encompassing internal, regional, and international contexts.
Thus, the objective of this research study was to examine Syria’s stance on the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1973-1974, as well as Abdel Halim Khaddam’s efforts towards this conflict and his role in the resulting developments and changes.
The research demonstrated the characteristics of Arab solidarity and the united front of Arab countries in their confrontation with Israel, exemplified by the October 1973-1974 war. Notably, Syria and Egypt took the lead in this confrontation and played significant roles in the liberation war, diligently preparing for battle. Additionally, continuous contacts and meetings were conducted to secure support from other nations for their cause, while simultaneously strengthening relationships to obtain weapons, ammunition, and other supplies necessary to achieve victory over Israel. The ultimate goals were the liberation of Arab territories occupied by Israel, the triumph of the Palestinian cause, and the restoration of Palestinian rights.
According to these developments, the research closely observed Abdel Halim Khaddam’s actions and contributions during the October 1973 war, in which Syria fought alongside Egypt. He served as a crucial link between his country and other Arab and foreign nations, conveying Syria’s cause and providing updates on the Arab arena to various parts of the world. Furthermore, he aimed to address Israel’s grievances towards Syria, aligning with his responsibilities within Syrian foreign policy and prioritizing the interests of his country and fellow Arab nations.
The research also elucidated Abdel Halim Khaddam’s stances regarding the changes that occurred in the Arab-Israeli conflict following the October war. It highlighted Syria’s refusal to attend the peace conference in Geneva, in solidarity with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) who also declined to participate. Additionally, Khaddam intensified his efforts in denouncing the unilateral agreement reached between Egypt and Israel in early January 1974, as it contradicted his vision for a comprehensive settlement and because both countries had been actively engaged in the war. He also emphasized the need to support the Palestinian cause and recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.
Through his statements and the working paper he presented at the Conference of Arab Foreign Ministers, which paved the way for the subsequent summit conference in Rabat in 1974, Khaddam advocated for a set of demands and resolutions that aligned with the aspirations of the Palestinian people. These demands were acknowledged by the League of Arab States and urged the United Nations Security Council to consider them. Consequently, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution No. (3236), affirming the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine, including their right to return to their homes and properties from which they were displaced and uprooted.
The research encompassed two main themes. The first focused on Abdel Halim Khaddam’s role in the October War of 1973, while the second delved into his positions regarding the transformations that took place in the Arab-Israeli conflict between 1973 and 1974.
Firstly, Abdel Halim Khaddam’s role in the October 1973 war, following Syria’s emergence from its isolation after the corrective movement in 1970, bolstered its relations with Arab countries, particularly Egypt. Several agreements were reached, including the elimination of the repercussions of the Israeli aggression that occurred in June 1967, the support of the Palestinian cause, and the liberation of Arab territories.
The culmination of these efforts and preparations for the war resulted in the establishment of the Union of Arab Republics between Syria, Egypt, and Libya on April 26, 1971. Abdel Halim Khaddam regarded this union as the fundamental basis for achieving the desired goals. The underlying vision was that Syria should not bear the sole responsibility for defending, liberating, and fighting the battle for the occupied territories; rather, Arab countries should unite in this endeavor.
Consequently, the Syrian government attached great importance to the issue of liberating the occupied Arab territories, driven by the accusations and neglect it faced in the aftermath of the June 1967 war. It diligently sought a way out of the impasse it encountered. This approach aligns with the policy and objectives adopted by Egypt, which aimed to retain all territories occupied during the 1967 war without making any concessions.
Similarly, the strategic objective for Syria, under the leadership of President Hafez al-Assad and with the involvement of Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam, was to prepare for war. They firmly believed that any unilateral Syrian action lacking favorable consequences should be met with joint Arab action, in which Egypt would play a significant role. Syria maintained its refusal to recognize Israel but considered a just peace to be a strategic goal. The liberation of the Golan Heights was deemed an imperative objective, accompanied by the long-term aspiration of eliminating Israel and restoring the rights of the Palestinian people.
In pursuit of these immediate goals, Syria aligned its policy with Egypt, which prioritized the restoration of the Sinai Peninsula. Consequently, an agreement was reached between Presidents Hafez al-Assad and Anwar Sadat to involve Arab resources in the upcoming war, utilize the Arab League, and intensify communication with the Soviet Union to secure military support. As a result, Abdel Halim Khaddam declared that Syria had fully prepared its arsenal for battle, emphasizing the close and mutually beneficial cooperation between Egypt and Syria.
Therefore, Abdel Halim Khaddam’s approach to preparing for the liberation war was centered around the consolidation of efforts to meet the battle’s requirements and taking initial steps to mend Syria’s severed relations with Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Tunisia, and Jordan. Additionally, he aimed to normalize relations with Iraq. Khaddam firmly believed that Syrian policy should have a focused interim goal of liberating the land and restoring the national rights of the Palestinian people by bolstering their own strength and achieving a military balance vis-à-vis Israel.
The international dimensions of the conflict, with major powers, particularly the United States of America, aligning themselves with Israel, rendered the Arabs alone unable to confront Israel effectively. Hence, Khaddam emphasized the importance of not only seeking an international ally but also establishing a balance against Israel’s allies.
In this context, Abdel Halim Khaddam’s policy became evident even before the outbreak of the war. He sought to strengthen Syria’s relationships with other nations, enlisting their support and solidarity in Syria’s aggression against Israel and the liberation of occupied territories. This was an essential part of his political responsibilities as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister, involving the dissemination of the agreements between Syria and Egypt regarding the liberation war to various countries. His efforts extended beyond Arab nations, reaching out to foreign countries as well.
On September 30, 1972, Abdel Halim Khaddam traveled to Belgium, as part of Syria’s political outreach to the international community. The purpose of the visit was to discuss the ongoing situation in the Arab region, the aggression by Israel against Arab nations, and its consequences on European countries.
Abdel Halim Khaddam continued his diplomatic endeavors, extending his movements further. In late 1972, he traveled to China and held a meeting with Prime Minister Shuan Lai. At that time, Sino-Soviet relations were highly strained. During the meeting, Khaddam discussed the assistance Syria required to confront Israeli aggression. When reviewing the Middle East situation, the Chinese Prime Minister expressed understanding for Syria’s relations with the Soviet Union and recommended maintaining them, emphasizing that there was no alternative country that could offer what the Soviet Union could. Khaddam had anticipated this response.
On February 11, 1973, Abdel Halim Khaddam received the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia, Slova Kia, and engaged in discussions concerning Syria’s internal and external conditions, as well as the Israeli attacks and occupation of Syrian territory. Following the talks, a joint statement was issued, condemning Israeli aggression against Syria and Israeli attempts to alter the demographic characteristics of the occupied territory. The statement reaffirmed the legitimacy of Palestinian resistance.
From March 23 to 26, 1973, a Vietnamese delegation visited Damascus and met with Abdel Halim Khaddam. The discussions centered on the prevailing situation in both countries. A Syrian-Vietnamese statement was issued, condemning Israel for its actions against the Arab population in the occupied territories and highlighting that such actions were in violation of the agreements to end the war. Both parties expressed wholehearted support for the struggle of the Palestinian people.
The severity of the Zionist project and the need to confront the Israeli military machine backed by the West necessitated the mobilization of Arab resources and their involvement in the conflict. Consequently, it became essential to seek an alternative source to meet the military needs, especially as Western markets were closed to Syria and Egypt. The Soviet Union emerged as the most capable provider of the requirements for the Egyptian and Syrian armies. Therefore, considerable emphasis was placed on this aspect.
Thus, the joint meetings between Egyptians, Syrians, and the Soviet Union commenced, activating the supply of military assistance to both countries. The most significant meeting took place on May 6, 1973, after Syria and Egypt agreed to set a date to initiate military operations and commence the war. It was essential to inform the Soviet Union, seek political support, and address their military needs. Consequently, President Hafez al-Assad, accompanied by Abdel Halim Khaddam, secretly traveled to Moscow. They met with the Soviet leadership, headed by Leonid Brezhnev, who was taken aback by the decision of Syria and Egypt to launch a war of liberation earlier than expected. Brezhnev’s initial confusion gradually dissipated as he posed questions to Assad and Khaddam, seeking clarification on their decision-making process and the readiness of Syria and Egypt. President Assad responded by expressing that they had no alternative but to take this step to meet the requirements of the war.
However, the Soviet leadership rejected President Assad’s statement, as Leonid Brezhnev assured him that such a decision would jeopardize his scheduled meeting with American President Richard Nixon in June. He emphasized that it would be a loss for both parties and detrimental to the policy of international breakthrough.
In light of this, Abdel Halim Khaddam pointed out the embarrassment faced by the Soviet leadership, highlighting that the declaration of war by Syrian and Egyptian forces without Soviet consent posed a significant problem for the Arab side. Retreating from this decision would only exacerbate the problem. He emphasized the difficulty of breaking away from the influence of the Soviet Union, as doing so would leave the Arab region vulnerable to the United States of America and the Soviet Union’s control.
In the face of the crisis during the negotiations between the two parties, President Hafez al-Assad acted with great responsibility and firmly asserted that the war was a matter that needed resolution, not open for debate. However, he proposed the possibility of postponing it until August or September, depending on the Soviet Union’s achievements, in order to secure Soviet military support for both countries. Remarkably, the Soviet Union approved this decision.
Furthermore, President al-Assad expressed concerns about the ongoing clashes in Beirut between the Palestinian resistance and the Lebanese side, which were hindering their intention to wage the war of liberation against Israel. Consequently, Abdel Halim Khaddam was sent with the hope of halting the clashes. In May 1973, representing President Hafez al-Assad, Khaddam traveled to Beirut. He attended a meeting presided over by President Suleiman Franjieh, with Mahmoud Riad representing President Anwar Sadat. The discussions primarily revolved around the factors contributing to the worsening situation between the two parties, seeking solutions to end the clashes.
Abdel Halim Khaddam continued his talks with both the Lebanese and Palestinian sides, aiming to restore full trust between them and return to the previous normal conditions. During the meeting, he emphasized that the continuation of hostilities between the two parties was disrupting the joint Syrian-Egyptian efforts to fight the war against Israel, which required establishment and liberation of the occupied territories.
As a result of the efforts exerted by Abdel Halim Khaddam and Mahmoud Riad with Lebanese officials, a ceasefire was achieved on May 10, 1973, with only a few isolated incidents occurring afterwards.
Abdel Halim Khaddam continued his diplomatic efforts to defuse the crisis in Lebanon. On August 17, 1973, he traveled to Beirut and held a meeting with the Foreign Minister, Fuad Nafaa. During their discussions, they focused on strengthening the brotherly relations between the Palestinian and Lebanese people, as well as the relations between Syria and Lebanon. They agreed on several key aspects regarding the socio-economic situation of both countries.
The turning point towards the war came with a secret meeting convened by Anwar Sadat on August 21, 1973, for the Supreme Council of the Egyptian and Syrian Armed Forces. During this meeting, the Syrian Chief of Staff, Youssef Shakour, and Saad Eddin Shazly signed an official document that outlined the strategy for fighting the war. The Syrian plan entailed direct participation alongside Egypt in combating Israel, depleting its military capabilities, and destroying the bulk of the hostile forces stationed in the Golan Heights to liberate it.
In light of these developments, President Anwar Sadat embarked on a series of visits to various countries to garner support. He began his journey in Saudi Arabia, where he held discussions with King Faisal bin Abdulaziz regarding cutting off oil supplies to nations that supported Israel in the upcoming war. Subsequently, Sadat traveled to Syria and met with President Hafez al-Assad and Abdel Halim Khaddam. During their meeting, they agreed upon the zero hour for commencing the war, which was set for November 6, 1973.
Several days after the declaration of war on Israel was signed, Abdel Halim Khaddam traveled to Cairo on August 27, 1973. He was warmly received by President Anwar Sadat, and they discussed the current situation. This meeting took place on the sidelines of the Arab Defense Conference organized by the Arab League, which was attended by Abdel Halim Khaddam as the representative of President Assad, along with delegates from Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, and Qatar. The conference held on August 29, 1973, issued several important resolutions, including the definition of the unified military plan for liberating the occupied territories and determining how to provide financial and moral support for this battle.
Consequently, the war commenced on October 6, 1973, when the Syrian and Egyptian armies launched a joint attack. The Syrian forces successfully regained control of half of the Golan Heights. In light of these victories, President Hafez Al-Assad addressed the Syrian people, calling for the participation of all Arab countries in the battle. Abdel Halim Khaddam stated that Syria’s objective in entering the war was to respond to aggression, liberate the occupied Arab territories, and restore the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people.
The October war fostered a sense of solidarity and closer ties among Arab nations, which had a positive impact on Syrian-Lebanese relations. The tensions that had plagued their relationship in early 1973 were overcome. Lebanon granted permission for Syria to transport Soviet weapons through its territory to Syria. Additionally, Iraq and Jordan actively participated in the October war. Iraq deployed its forces to the Syrian Golan on October 10, 1973, while Jordan sent its forces to Syria in response to the evolving situation on the Syrian front. Consequently, a unified front comprising Iraqis, Jordanians, and Syrians fought side by side in the war.
It is worth noting that Abdel Halim Khaddam regarded the October war as an Arab war, with its primary front centered in Egypt and Syria, and receiving support from Arabs across all their respective countries.
President Hafez al-Assad also emphasized the need for the unification of Arab forces, seeing it as the only way to counter Israeli attacks. The Jordanian and Syrian leaders consistently pursued a policy of strengthening the Eastern Front, which President Hafez al-Assad deemed crucial in confronting Israel. Egypt insisted on continuing the war until all its territory was liberated or Israel relinquished the territories it occupied in 1967.
On the other hand, Israeli assessments consistently claimed that Egypt and Syria’s preparations were insufficient to declare war, believing them to be mere maneuvers. Israeli General Jarin testified before the Commission of Inquiry, stating that the chances of a war were low and that only attempts were being made.
During the war, the Syrian and Egyptian forces achieved successive victories and made advances in the occupied territories. These victories were attributed to joint Arab cooperation and unified efforts. At the war’s outset, the Israeli army was also plagued by cases of indiscipline and indifference among its members, particularly among senior leaders who had overestimated their chances of replicating their victory in the 1967 war.
Israel had strategic and economic objectives within Syria, aiming to disrupt its geographical unity and compromise its security.
In response to the joint cooperation between Syria and Egypt, the course of the war took a different turn due to Anwar Sadat’s new policy. Sadat sent a letter to US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, expressing that Egypt did not seek to escalate or expand the confrontation further. Kissinger inferred from the message that Egypt sought negotiations and an end to the war. Subsequently, he relayed this information to the Israeli ambassador in Washington, who then informed the Israeli leadership to focus on engaging Syrian forces in combat.
President Hafez al-Assad expressed his resentment towards Anwar Sadat’s policy of engaging in negotiations with Israel, stating, “We fought the war believing that there would be no satisfactory negotiations with Israel until the Arabs regain some of their lost lands.” Abdel Halim Khaddam also expressed Syria and Egypt’s firm rejection of direct negotiations.
Additionally, Abdel Halim Khaddam emphasized that the political objective of the Egyptian president in the October war was more modest compared to the military objective. Sadat aimed to initiate negotiations with Israel and therefore sought to launch a limited military operation to liberate the occupied territory. The political goal of Sadat’s message overshadowed the military objective as he aimed to progress negotiations with Israel through the military operation.
Abdel Halim Khaddam denounced Sadat’s approach, stating that it was a peaceful initiative intended to embarrass Israel in the eyes of international public opinion. However, Syria was taken by surprise by this initiative, and it had a negative impact on the morale of the fighters who questioned the need for sacrifice and death if peace was imminent.
Since the early days of the conflict, Abdel Halim Khaddam emphasized that the military and political plan agreed upon between the leaders of Syria and Egypt had been progressing in the right direction. However, due to the complexities of the international situation and other factors, its course has been altered. The following issues have contributed to this deviation:
- Lack of coordination and exchange of information during combat operations as per the agreed plan. The military plan required Egyptian forces to advance and secure the corridors without stopping, while Syrian forces were to fully liberate the Golan Heights.
- The United States of America swiftly provided military support to Israel, along with exerting political pressure, aiming to prevent an Israeli defeat.
- Ongoing contacts between the United States of America and Anwar Sadat, who expressed his desire to negotiate and seek a ceasefire.
- Despite the commitment to continue fighting, Israeli violations on the Egyptian front and the passage of the Suez Canal to the West Bank caused turmoil in Egypt’s political and military position.
On October 16, 1973, the situation worsened when Egyptian President Anwar Sadat sent a letter to American President Richard Nixon, outlining several demands. These included proposals for a ceasefire and peace, Israel’s withdrawal from the territories occupied since 1967, and the restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.
The demands were as follows:
- Ceasefire, immediate Israeli withdrawal from all Arab lands, and preparation for attending an international conference.
- Clearing and reopening the Suez Canal for global navigation, rejecting vague promises.
As a result, President Hafez Al-Assad felt resentful towards President Anwar Sadat’s policy because he was not informed about the ceasefire proposal despite both of them being involved in the war. Abdel Halim Khaddam expressed his opinion on this matter, stating that while moving towards peace is an Arab approach, opting for a unilateral settlement is far from it. The Arab nations were distant from such a decision, raising questions about their partnership and alliance. If they are partners, why should they bear the burden of participation without having a share in the decision-making process?
Syria declared its rejection of partial solutions and insisted on a comprehensive resolution based on the complete withdrawal of Israel from Arab lands and a secure guarantee of the rights of the Palestinian Arab people. It emphasized that the October war marked the first Arab victory. However, within a few days, the initial victory turned into fear and frustration, and concerns arose about the defeat, not due to military losses but because of the deterioration of Egyptian-Syrian relations. This situation provided a sense of security to Israel and increased its hostility towards the Arab nation.
In response to President Hafez al-Assad’s rejection, Anwar Sadat sent a telegram on October 16, 1973, stating that he accepted the Soviet-American efforts for a ceasefire because the United States of America was providing Israel with weapons and equipment. He highlighted that he was not afraid to confront Israel but refused to confront America. He expressed his unwillingness to allow Egyptian forces to be destroyed again and stated his readiness to be held accountable to his people in Egypt for this decision.
Consequently, on October 17, 1973, Abdel Halim Khaddam announced on Syrian radio that Anwar Sadat did not make good use of the element of surprise with Israel, as his intention was to conduct limited operations aimed at advancing the peace process rather than liberating the occupied territory.
According to President Anwar Sadat’s position, which indicates his agreement to end the war, the United States and the Soviet Union reached an agreement to establish a ceasefire within twelve hours and implement Resolution 242. Secret negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union commenced to seek a settlement between the two parties.
These developments were accompanied by an escalation of fighting on the Syrian and Egyptian fronts, prompting the Kuwaiti government to call for an emergency conference of Arab oil ministers. The conference, held on October 17, 1973, was attended by delegations from Arab oil-exporting countries. During the meeting, important decisions were made, including the reduction of Arab oil production by 5% initially, followed by an additional 5% each month until the evacuation of the lands occupied by Israel in 1967 and the restoration of the rights of the Palestinian people. This reduction in oil production was to be applied primarily to the United States of America and other industrialized countries that supported Israel. Subsequently, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates all announced a complete cessation of oil exports to the United States of America.
The immediate goal of the decision made during the October war was to liberate the occupied territories of Arabia, restore the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, and consider America as the primary source of support for Israel. In response to these actions, Prime Minister Golda Meir announced that the decision to ban oil had imposed certain limits on their actions.
Abdel Halim Khaddam regarded the decision to impose an oil ban on the United States as an integral part of the overall war initiated by America during the October war. It represented the collective participation of Arab governments, positioning themselves against the United States of America. The embargo decision caused confusion in the global economy. Its significance lies in the fact that it targeted the United States with the aim of achieving its strategic objective, which is oil. The United States was willing to confront not only the Soviet Union but any power that posed a risk of oil supply disruption due to the oil embargo.
Due to concerns about possible Soviet intervention in the war, President Nixon instructed his Secretary of State, Kissinger, to maintain constant contact with the Soviet Union’s Ambassador in Washington. Furthermore, Nixon sent a letter to Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev proposing a session of the Security Council to seek a ceasefire. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger emphasized that the United States of America remained prepared to exert its influence in order to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict through negotiations. On October 20, 1973, Kissinger traveled to Moscow, where an agreement was reached for a ceasefire, and both countries agreed to hold peace talks.
As a result, on October 22, 1973, the International Security Council convened and issued Resolution No. 338, urging all parties engaged in the ongoing conflict to immediately cease fire and implement Resolution 242. The text of the resolution is as follows:
The Security Council calls upon all parties involved in the current hostilities to cease fire and promptly end all military activities within twelve hours of this resolution’s issuance and at their current positions.
It further calls upon the concerned parties to promptly initiate the implementation of Resolution 242 of 1967 in full compliance with all its provisions.
The Security Council determines that negotiations should be conducted between the relevant parties under suitable supervision, with the aim of establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.
On the same day that the resolution was issued, Egypt agreed to a ceasefire, while Syria rejected it. The fighting halted for 12 hours after Abdel Halim Khaddam endorsed the Security Council resolution, stating that the United States of America had achieved its objectives with the assistance of the political leadership in Egypt. He noted that Egypt’s stance had transitioned qualitatively from active participation in the war to a state of reliance on the United States of America to provide solutions.
Therefore, Abdel Halim Khaddam regarded the October 1973 war as the most significant transformation witnessed by the Arab nation in the twentieth century for two reasons. Firstly, it resulted from Arab solidarity in which all Arabs directly and indirectly contributed, showcasing their ability to defend themselves and transition from being on the receiving end of Israeli strikes to taking the military initiative. It marked the first war launched by Arabs against external aggression, accompanied by the unified actions of sending troops and halting oil pumping. Secondly, the decisions affecting the fate of the entire nation were made by a single ruler, leading to severe consequences for all Arabs, particularly the Palestinian people. This decision obstructed progress, unity, and solidarity, ultimately strengthening Israel’s position and power.
After Egypt agreed to a ceasefire and subsequently endorsed the international resolution, which came as a surprise to Syria, President Hafez Al-Assad initiated communication with the Egyptian president and Soviet officials to confirm their acceptance of the ceasefire decision. He believed that their agreement would entail a complete withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories and the safeguarding of the rights of the Palestinian people. However, Syria hesitated in accepting the decision and declared its intention to continue fighting.
In response, Abdel Halim Khaddam conducted a series of contacts with Arab governments to gauge their support and positions regarding Syria’s determination and ongoing battle. It was discovered that there were concerns about Syria’s decision to persist with the war after Egypt had agreed to the ceasefire. As a result, President Hafez Al-Assad, along with his Foreign Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam and other officials, deliberated on the matter and approved Resolution 338 on October 23, 1973. The resolution emphasized the complete withdrawal of Israel from all Arab territories occupied in 1967 and the subsequent fulfillment of the rights of the Palestinian people in accordance with United Nations resolutions.
Despite Israel’s announcement of accepting the ceasefire, its forces launched significant attacks on the Egyptian army in the Suez Canal. Consequently, the Security Council adopted Resolution 339, which reaffirmed the previous Resolution 338. However, Israel has yet to implement these two preceding Security Council resolutions.
This resulted in the Council convening once again to address Israel’s defiance of its resolutions. The discussion concluded with the adoption of Resolution No. 340 on October 25, 1973. The resolution called for an immediate and comprehensive ceasefire, the establishment of an international emergency force under the United Nations, and granted the Secretary-General the authority to form and define the tasks of this force in implementing Resolutions 338 and 339.
Recognizing the importance of maintaining Arab unity in support of Syria and Egypt, it became necessary to hold an Arab summit. Concurrently, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) demanded the right to represent the Palestinian people in the peace conference.
Subsequently, both Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat urged Arab presidents and kings to convene an Arab summit, which took place in Algiers on October 26, 1973. President Hafez al-Assad, accompanied by Abdel Halim Khaddam, attended the summit, along with other kings and presidents from Arab countries. Several resolutions were put forth, with the most significant emphasizing that a ceasefire does not equate to peace. True peace necessitates two conditions: the complete withdrawal of Israel from all occupied Arab territories, particularly Jerusalem, and the restoration of the rights of the Palestinian people, with the PLO recognized as their legitimate representative at the upcoming peace conference in Geneva.
To implement the resolutions of the Arab Summit Conference, which called for Arab foreign ministers to elucidate the decisions of the aforementioned conference, Abdel Halim Khaddam traveled to Japan and the Philippines. On December 7, 1973, he held a meeting with Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos, discussing the impact of the October War on global public opinion. Khaddam emphasized that this war positioned Arabs commensurate with their natural significance in international politics, underscoring the Arab nation as a major influential force. He elucidated the reasons that precipitated the October 1973 war, rooted in Israel’s aggression against the Palestinian people, its criminal acts spanning from 1948 to 1967, and its occupation of Arab territories.
In Japan, on December 14, 1973, Abdel Halim Khaddam conducted meetings with Japanese Prime Minister Kakue Tanaka. During these meetings, he elucidated the nature of the Arab-Zionist conflict and highlighted the perils posed by Israel to the world and its civilization due to its stubbornness and disregard for all United Nations resolutions concerning the Palestinian issue. Japanese officials expressed their support for Khaddam’s approach and declared full backing for the Arab stance in liberating the territories occupied since 1967.
Based on the aforementioned, it becomes evident that Abdel Halim Khaddam’s efforts and role in conveying the grievances of the Arab world and exposing the Israeli enemy to different parts of the globe have contributed to the increased influence of the Syrian leadership against Israel during the war. This has elevated the status of the Syrian president as a significant leader in the Arab world. Additionally, Syria’s growing military power has elevated its position to a level where it cannot be easily disregarded or neutralized within the Arab sphere. Consequently, the potential of Abdel Halim Khaddam, who served as a vital link between his country and other Arab nations, has also risen. He played a crucial role in addressing political matters and communicating his country’s cause and the developments in the Arab arena to various parts of the world, thereby shedding light on Israel’s transgressions.
These actions align with his responsibilities in Syrian foreign policy, which is centered around the settlement process of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This process emphasizes the liberation of the occupied Arab territories from the clutches of the aggressors and the restoration of the rights of the Palestinian people.