The former Secretary General of the Lebanese Communist Party remembers. George Hawi: Moawad informed us that a soldier was assigned to assassinate him

publisher: سورس

AUTHOR: غسان شربل

Publishing date: 1996-06-24

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The third station was a reflection on the beginnings of the “Second Republic.” On November 22, 1989, the body of President René Moawad was scattered, marking the anniversary of independence and putting an end to his 17-day consensus republic. Hawi emphasizes that MP Pierre Helou refused to assume the presidency, and the competition at that time was between MP Elias El-Hrawi and Mr. Jean Obeid, and it was settled in favor of the former. Here is the text of the sixth episode:

When Deputy Elias El-Hrawi was elected President of the Republic, where were you at that station?

  • I don’t hide from you that we considered René Moawad’s election a significant gain for Lebanon and the solution. We had a friendship with the man. He is a person with impeccable morals and a truly patriotic man eager to save Lebanon. I held more than one meeting with him, one in Zgharta, another in Beirut, and a third with common friends, and we consulted on several matters. In one of these meetings, I informed him about an assassination plot against him. A friend of our party in the Lebanese army was assigned to assassinate him. He is a soldier commissioned by circles with connections to the army to carry out the assassination. He informed us of the mission assigned to him. President Moawad – may he rest in peace – was briefed on the details, so he summoned his personal companion, Colonel Tanous Moawad, and Comrade Karim Mroue was present, and we developed a plan to follow up on the matter.

I told him, “Your Excellency, they are planning to assassinate you before forming the government, and the precaution is to expedite its formation because the diligent one claims that legitimacy, in the event of your assassination before forming the government, will be for Michel Aoun. However, after forming the government, legitimacy will be for the Sunni Prime Minister, thus reducing the danger of your assassination.” He said that the matters related to the formation of the government are almost ready, and he has a hurdle that he wants you to help him solve. I won’t say it now, but I will send you a message through a common friend regarding it. On the second day, the common friend, René Khaddou, an ally of Moawad, relative of Minister Elias Hobeika, called me and said that President Moawad asked him to have lunch together to consult on the issue of Christian representation in the government and to propose a suggestion related to Elias Hobeika. Will he be in the government or will he take responsibility for a security apparatus or a joint security room to assist the government in achieving security stability? The lunch was scheduled for November 23, 1989, but 24 hours before, on Independence Day, President Moawad was assassinated.

Was Moawad planning to resolve Aoun’s crisis by force?

  • He wanted to resolve Aoun’s crisis through dialogue. If it proved impossible to resolve it through dialogue, then it could be resolved through military means. He intended to appoint Emile Lahoud as the army commander and deal firmly with the issue of the return of legitimacy. He wanted to put Aoun in front of two choices: either join legitimacy, with a position for him within it, or confront legitimacy.

When the news of President Moawad’s martyrdom spread, I rushed to the residence of Hussein Al-Husseini, the then Speaker of Parliament, who was meeting with several MPs in a state of turmoil and confusion. I spoke privately with him in the presence of Dr. Elie Mansour and expressed my opinion about the necessity of holding presidential elections as soon as possible, regardless of the person. I suggested convening the parliamentary council the next day before President Moawad’s funeral to consult on the president’s person on the same night. I told him, “I am going to Damascus to arrange a meeting.” He said, “Inform Abu Jamal Abdul Halim Khaddam that I am coming as soon as the official procedures are completed, and we will meet there to discuss.”

I went to President Salim Al-Hoss’s house and consulted with him on the same direction. I attended the official announcement of the martyrdom. Al-Hoss had to repeat it three times because he was overwhelmed with tears. I reinforced his determination and informed him of what I discussed with President Hussein and that I was going to Damascus.

I arrived at Abu Jamal’s office, where the news of Moawad’s martyrdom was painful. We discussed the circumstances, and he asked me about the alternative from my perspective. I said: Deputy Pierre Helou. He said: We don’t know him. I replied: That’s not the criterion. Pierre Helou has not been involved in politics recently. Is he capable of addressing the situation? I answered: Pierre Helou left Lebanon when he had no place here. His friends were Imam Musa Sadr, who was replaced by Nabih Berri, Kamal Jumblatt, who was replaced by Walid Jumblatt, and Prince Majid Arslan, who was replaced by Princes Faisal and Talal. He looked around and found no place for himself, so he traveled to Saudi Arabia. He said: George, Pierre Helou and Shafik Badr are the only two Maronite deputies who have not visited Syria, even for hunting. How do you want me to promote them? We were talking when Professor Mohsen Dalloul entered. Abu Jamal asked him whom he suggested, and he answered: Pierre Helou. Abu Jamal asked him if he agreed with George, and he replied: I haven’t seen him before my arrival. Dalloul explained why he suggested the name. At this time, Abu Jamal called President Assad and informed him that President Hussein was coming. Upon Hussein’s arrival, Abu Jamal asked him whom he suggested, and he answered: Pierre Helou. He said, “You’re all in agreement!” Abu Jamal and Hussein went to meet President Assad, and I waited with Dalloul for the result.

Pierre Helou Apologizes

In reality, we proposed priorities starting with Pierre Helou, then the discussion would move to Jean Obeid or Elias El-Hrawi. Obeid is from outside the parliament, and El-Hrawi is from within. Hussein came out of his meeting with President Assad agreeing on these priorities. I was tasked with contacting Obeid, who was in Paris, to come immediately to Damascus. Hussein and Dalloul returned to Lebanon to contact Pierre Helou. Several attempts were made to persuade Helou, but he remained unconvinced. Karim Mroue and Saadallah Mazraani from the party participated in these efforts. I met Pierre Helou late in the day, and President Hussein made a final attempt.

Here’s a funny anecdote: Helou’s argument was that the new president must be fierce, reaching the point of using the word “Az3ar” (tough). Because Aoun would not leave Baabda Palace except by force of arms, and we don’t have any weapons that can remove him without the help of the Syrian army. We must bring a president who requests the Syrian army to storm the presidential palace to oust Aoun. I cannot do that, and without it, there is no solution in Lebanon. First, my home is in Baabda, and secondly, I am not a bloodthirsty person. I have never killed a bird in my life. Helou said this statement to President Hoss, and the latter smiled and said, “You never killed a bird, but I haven’t eaten a bird in my life.” Helou replied, “I found someone who is… like me.”

While we were dealing with the issue of Pierre Helou, Jean Obeid visited Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir. Then, he visited Abu Jamal, and it became clear that the situation required someone from within the parliament.

And Here Comes El-Hrawi

Does this mean that Obeid was almost about to become the president?

  • Yes, it was seriously considered. At that time, our friend, Deputy Khalil El-Hrawi, was taking his uncle Elias El-Hrawi to Damascus. Khalil was trusted in Damascus, a friend of the officials there, and an agreement was reached on the presidential program to face the challenges of the phase.

Who did El-Hrawi meet in Damascus?

  • President Assad and Abu Jamal. I was informed that the choice was either Pierre Helou or, if not, you or Jean Obeid. When attempts to convince Helou failed, President El-Hrawi’s choice was pursued.

Was there a friendship between you and President Elias El-Hrawi?

  • Initially, there was enmity when he was part of the other Zahle that we were besieging as national forces during the days of the War of Liberation. Later, we had a relationship based on respect. President El-Hrawi was accommodating and friendly to everyone. I was among the first to meet him after his election at the “St. George Park Hotel,” where we talked about the situation, tasks, ways to confront Aoun, and restore legitimacy. The atmosphere was positive.

In this context, it can be said that President Elias El-Hrawi played a significant role, which the Lebanese should acknowledge regardless of their differences with him on this issue or that. He faced significant difficulties and assumed the responsibility of making major decisions, including the decision to establish the authority of legitimacy and end Aoun’s phenomenon on October 13, 1990. Of course, President Hrawi should have contributed to launching a Lebanese-Lebanese dialogue, encouraging a Lebanese conference for national reconciliation, and benefiting from his position at the head of the authority. This significant moral position, despite the amendments to the sectarian system, allows him to be a father to all Lebanese, calling for dialogue among all Lebanese. Unfortunately, this did not happen, making the authority in general and the Christian position in the authority specifically, in a state of a vacuum filled to this day with opposing currents and tendencies, some of which are negative, and some do not benefit from its positives.

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