Mr. Abdul Halim Khaddam didn’t just shuffle the cards in Syria when he appeared on Al-Arabiya TV from his home in Paris, speaking about Syrian politics as if he had defected from its leadership. He confirmed, after two days, on French television the responsibility of President Bashar al-Assad for the collapse of the Syrian regime, as well as his responsibility for the assassination of President Hariri, according to what he personally heard from President Assad about the atmosphere and explicit words that prevailed during the meeting between Assad and Hariri at the end of 2003.
This narrative was not new. Those close to President Hariri knew it in detail. How the attending officers, including General Ghazi Kanaan, Colonel Rustum Ghazaleh, and Colonel Mohammed Khalouf, spoke during the meeting. How deliberately President Assad let them delve into personal and political criticisms. How President Assad listened to them and followed the verbal attack, with an accusatory tone that lacked rationality. In contrast to his father, President Hafez al-Assad, who used to let his deputy, Abdul Halim Khaddam, communicate objections to his policies.
Then, President Hariri went to President Hafez al-Assad to find him calmly comprehending the results of his message, showing understanding and appreciation for the proposed solutions open to discussion and modification.
The message that was not subject to modification and discussion, except in rare cases, was the one conveyed by General Hikmat Shihabi to President Hariri.
Shihabi’s resignation between the father and the son When the late President heard the words of General Hikmat Shihabi, he considered what he heard as President Assad’s personal and final decision, not open to any interpretation. Therefore, the messages that General Shihabi was entrusted to convey to President Hariri were few in comparison to the messages conveyed by Khaddam.
Shihabi’s resignation in 1998, strongly urged by him, posed a serious problem in his relationship with both President Assad Sr. and President Assad Jr. It was clear that Shihabi did not want to salute the young president who took office two years after his resignation. He refused an offer to form the government as an alternative to extending his position as Chief of Staff. He told President Assad, “It’s time for the youth to take over in the army and in the government after we held them back for so long.”
President Assad Sr. accepted Shihabi’s resignation, but did not accept its justifications. He expressed his displeasure to his aides once or twice. President Assad considered Shihabi’s resignation as a rejection of his son assuming power after him. However, he didn’t take any action against him or his children.
Shihabi, known for his integrity and high competence, was one of the officers highly regarded for his work. He led the Syrian-Israeli military negotiations and the Syrian-American negotiations for a period. Nonetheless, this didn’t prevent the Soviet leaders at the time from expressing their high regard for him. Moreover, senior officers in the army, division commanders, and weapons commanders had deep respect for their Chief of Staff.
Thus, President Assad used his famous wisdom not to allow any form of attack on Shihabi, in order to preserve their shared history and prevent unnecessary reactions.
General Shihabi moved between his three sons. The first worked in the textile industry in Damascus, the second in London in the field of investments, and the third is a doctor in Los Angeles who owns a clinic considered among the finest in the city.
In the year 2000, he came to Beirut for medical treatment at the American University Hospital, just ten days before President Hafez al-Assad’s death. A mysterious and untraceable Syrian attack targeted General Shihabi, portraying him as part of the Lebanese-Syrian corruption alliance.
President Hariri sensed the danger, but he did not abandon him. He hosted him in his Quraitem residence for a period of recovery, during which only a few acquaintances and friends visited him, who used to wait patiently on the staircase of his office, adorned with red carpets. The period of recovery extended until General Ghazi Kanaan, the Syrian security chief in Lebanon at the time, arrived by permission of President Assad and allowed him to travel, and so it was. General Kanaan accompanied him respectfully from Quraitem all the way to the plane at Beirut Airport.
Khaddam worked as if nothing had happened.
With a simple scrutiny, it became clear that General Bahjat Suleiman, who was close to Dr. Bashar before assuming the presidency, was behind the attack on Shihabi in Al-Hayat newspaper.
It was evident that the mentioned alliance of corruption included Shihabi, Abdul Halim Khaddam, and Ghazi Kanaan, nurtured from the Lebanese side by Prime Minister Hariri. Khaddam returned to his work as if nothing had occurred. He knew he had lost his main ally in 1998 when General Shihabi resigned. He had to continue the battle alone. He wouldn’t let go of 40 years of his life in the ruling party and in power in vain.
He removed Lebanon from his agenda. He began spreading among the party leadership. He brought experts from Lebanon, asking them about matters of economic openness, its means and ways. He engaged in the battle against party extremism in the face of political forums that spread in Syrian cities. He used examples from Algeria and Yugoslavia to warn against the continuation of political chaos.
He responded to imprisoned MP Riad Seif. He addressed the respected professor Antoine Mekdad, who, in a meeting with “Al-Hayat,” called for the necessity of democracy and civil institutions.
He didn’t do this for President Assad, but for his own history, whether it was right or wrong. That’s how he said it. Nevertheless, President Assad found in him a party energy that he couldn’t do without.
Both of them forgot what they did to each other during the period when Assad took over the presidency and the secretary-generalship of the party from his father. This event has a long narrative that would have ended well if not for the intervention of General Tlass with the young president.
President Assad began to regularly receive him. He asked him to nominate names for the ministries he intended to form. Then he handed him the file of communications with the Sunni Iraqi leadership to effectively enter the Iraqi game. Khaddam held ten meetings at the Ebla Hotel in Damascus. His plan didn’t succeed. Ayad Allawi left the scene of power. The resistance against the American occupation became active. No army, no party. There was no one left to hand over politically to the Americans to prove Syrian effectiveness and goodwill.
Why did “the Giant” choose this timing? Abu Jamal did what General Shihabi couldn’t achieve. He is the companion of President Assad Sr. in the secondary ranks. He is his companion in the Ba’ath Party since their early days of affiliation. Nevertheless, he puts himself at the disposal of the new president, recognizing and accommodating.
How? Why? What made him silent for seven years since he abandoned the Lebanese issue, not willingly of course, and suddenly opens the file of Syria to the entire world from Paris?
No one knows the exact reason. Some say that Mr. Khaddam received a warning not to return to Syria and that his properties in Banias were confiscated. This happened before the Syrian Ministry of Finance issued the decision to seize all his properties and those of his children in Syria.
Others say that the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri, his friend and ally for over 20 years, from Damascus, made him calmly plan for an organized departure with his family.
The suicide of Ghazi Kanaan, the corner of the triangle in the Lebanese issue in his days, adds to the list of reasons. It was reported that a member of the Kanaan family, described as the most important Japanese samurai in the world, committed suicide with ten shots, both hands tied behind his back. (“Samurai” is a historical Japanese warrior who commits suicide with his sword in honor of the emperor.)
Perhaps the humiliation that Khaddam felt from the junior party security personnel during the party’s recent conference, and his sense of hopelessness in portraying a new image for himself and his party after all these years of working on the toughest issues, where errors are attributed to him and successes to others.
Each of these reasons is sufficient for defection or at least withdrawal. So how if they all converge on a party that has been around for fifty years, holding the position of Vice President of the Arab Republic of Syria for 28 years?
Mr. Khaddam is known to be a “political giant” who doesn’t hesitate to do anything to achieve success in the issue he takes on.
He acted the same way with Rifaat al-Assad in his prime. He claimed, on his behalf, all the Arab disagreements with Syria. He was assassinated four times and didn’t hesitate to use rhetoric justifying his assassination again.
He handled the Lebanese issue from 1976 to 1998. No one was immune from his political ferocity, even those who support him today. Therefore, he appeared on Al-Arabiya TV, perplexing, using Lebanese and Syrian narratives, terms, and names, often not knowing which country he was talking about, Lebanon or Syria, treating them as one country.
Every fault is Lebanese and Syrian. Every crisis has a Damascene and a Beiruti. Every dispute has someone from the mountains here and someone from the mountains there.
The point is that matters have become so mixed up that you can no longer choose whom to support, whether speaking about Lebanon or calling for the liberation of Syria from its president.
The question returns: What made this political Giant adopt the policy of “sleeper cells” for seven years?
Was he waiting for his turn, his chance, the right timing, and the accumulation of others’ mistakes to achieve what he believes is his right, i.e., presidency of the state?
Mr. Khaddam knows more than anyone else about the centers of influence in the army, the keys to security apparatuses, the party’s ability to mobilize, and also the accumulated ability of the regime to defend itself. So, who does he rely on in his Parisian statements? If he aims to bring people out of their homes into the streets, he has no organization other than the Muslim Brotherhood, which he fought for a long time. Despite that, the Brotherhood’s Secretary-General from London announced their readiness to cooperate with him. What about his closer comrades?
General Shihabi, residing in Paris, won’t join this movement for several reasons, the foremost being his health condition, which requires him to be hospitalized twice a month.
Major General Ali Duba, the former head of military intelligence, is interested in entirely different matters than politics, and if he has a role, he will play it from within Syria, not outside.
Regional interest in preserving Assad Before and after all of this, there is a clear and specific international decision not to overthrow the Syrian regime. Moreover, there is a serious interest in preserving President Assad personally until the end of his term in mid-2007.
This statement is openly adopted by three major countries: the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, as well as the two major Arab states, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and the two major Islamic states, Iran and Turkey. And what about Israel?
Why?
It must be acknowledged that Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak succeeded in penetrating the theory that says Syria is no longer an ally of Iran but a subordinate state revolving in its orbit. Therefore, this line must be cut in Syria to save Lebanon from its clutches.
President Mubarak’s initial response during the early days of the Lebanese-Syrian crisis was that matters must be resolved through dialogue. Because the fall of the Syrian regime exposes the entire Arab system to security and terrorist repercussions beyond anyone’s control.
He began in Saudi Arabia as usual and continued to Paris, seeking the assistance of President Chirac with President Bush.
Reliable narrators say that President Chirac suspended, up until now, two American decisions for a U.S. aerial military attack on Syria to strike all the main and military installations in Syria. Meanwhile, President Assad is not helping himself with any logical decision except leaking that he is waiting for Chirac to leave the presidency and also for Bush to be relieved from pressure. Then he goes on with more assassinations in Lebanon and doesn’t assist in implementing Resolution 1559 with his allies. What do you want me to do?
Mubarak asks for a new chance for the regime
The Egyptian President requested giving another chance for settlement through Saudi Arabia and Egypt. President Mubarak stated that he told President Assad during his recent visit to Cairo that he takes responsibility for any assassination operation that occurs in Lebanon from now on. And he emphasized to King Abdullah, during his short visit to Jeddah before Paris, to calm the atmosphere with Syria and arrange a dignified and open visit for President Assad, after the statements made by the Saudi King in the “Al-Hayat” and “Al-Sharq Al-Awsat” newspapers and Khaddam’s appearance on “Al-Arabiya” TV owned by the Saudi Ibrahim family. This actually happened yesterday after diplomatic protocols necessitated a secret visit by Deputy Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallem to Jeddah, and he diplomatically urged King Abdullah to contact President Assad and invite him for a visit to the Kingdom.
The French President agreed to continue his European and Washington efforts to reassure President Assad that there is no plan to overthrow him.
The French version of the “Financial Times” confirmed Chirac’s role and mentioned an unnamed French company “Total” that desires an agreement with Syria for oil exploration. The tender will be conducted three months from now.
So, President Chirac moved from the camp of the avengers in Syria to the role of mediator.
The Israeli stance is clearer than that; they are not comfortable with the rules of the game adopted only between Syria and Israel. Moreover, the adviser to the Israeli Defense Minister, the son of the former Israeli President Chaim Herzog, told a Jordanian diplomat he met in Washington that his government does not see the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon as a positive element. He is embarrassed to say that they do not support Resolution 1559, which deprived them of Syrian guarantees against terrorist operations or solving the problem of Hezbollah’s weapons when the time comes.
What did President Assad do in parallel with President Mubarak’s movements?
First: He told an Egyptian newspaper that those responsible for the mistakes he mentioned in his speech before the People’s Council have been held accountable. How? By whom? No one knows.
Second: He accused, without naming in his speech, Prime Minister Siniora, Walid Beik Jumblatt, and Saad Hariri of exploiting the current situation to drive it towards sectarian directions, similar to what is happening in Iraq.
Third: He refused a request to meet with the International Investigation Committee. He agreed and then refused to listen to Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa.
He did not take into consideration that President Mubarak is working on a conciliatory formula that is being implemented in stages in Syria’s relations with its neighboring countries, particularly Lebanon.
He ignored that President Mubarak, King Abdullah, and President Chirac categorically reject linking any political progress with the work of the International Investigation Committee. Syria must cooperate clearly and unconditionally with the international committee. Otherwise, President Assad will expose his country, after a few months, to a different confrontation with the United Nations Security Council. The Egyptian Ambassador in Beirut, Hussein Darrar, expressed surprise at talk of a settlement, focusing on General Assef Shawkat as a suspect that President Mubarak is working on.
Will the new attempt succeed?
All of this assumes that President Mubarak heard from President Assad an acknowledgment of Syria’s responsibility for the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri. This didn’t happen, and if it did, President Mubarak would turn into a witness before the International Investigation Committee.
Did President Assad hear such words, and more, from King Abdullah? Royal palace sources say that Saudi Arabia has intervened three times in Syrian matters at the request of President Hafez al-Assad. He was precise in his words, promises, and execution. Our intervention was with the young president, who King Abdullah values dozens of times, and each time the connection was severed due to a mistake on the Syrian side.
Will the new attempt lead to the desired change?
The Egyptian plan suggests the following:
First: Restoring Lebanese security.
Second: Resolving the political crisis through the forces that influence Syria.
Third: Cooperation without artificial obstruction with the International Investigation Committee.
Fourth: Talks to improve Lebanese-Syrian relations.
Fifth: Improving relations with France.
It’s not possible to answer any of these points right now. But it’s clear that the Investigation Committee has a new witness, who holds the title of Deputy President of the Syrian Republic until a few weeks ago and can directly convey President Assad’s words and actions to the late President Rafik Hariri. The account of the December 2, 2003, meeting is the best proof. We saw the king, and you saw your barber, to use the words of colleague Dawood Sharayan.
Reliable narrators say that the committee also has the incident of the fall of “Barber” Hisham Hisham in the trap of filming, coincidentally in the candlelight, for the soul of George Hawi. Then his status as a patient treating his visual impairment was discovered by Dr. Sawsan Madiwan, the wife of the late Hawi.
Added to that is the appearance of another Syrian witness, Ibrahim Jarjoura. He possesses serious and detailed information. Four sensory evidence pieces are being prepared for presentation in the next few days.
Will all of this change Syrian behavior?
No one bears the responsibility to answer.
