Khaddam Threatens the U.S. Ambassador with “Immediate Expulsion”… and Syrian-American Shelling Exchanges
President Ronald Reagan tried to contain the crisis with President Hafez al-Assad following the Marine barracks bombing and the shelling, and sent his special envoy, Donald Rumsfeld, to Damascus on November 20, 1983. Rumsfeld had previously served as Secretary of Defense under President Gerald Ford before returning to the same position under President George W. Bush and becoming one of the principal architects of the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime.
In Damascus, Rumsfeld first met with Foreign Minister Abdul Halim Khaddam, who opened the conversation by saying: “Every day there is a statement by an American official. We have become part of the American daily program.” The following dialogue then took place:
AFP
U.S. Marines stand guard at a military site near Beirut Airport on October 23, 1983, following an attack on the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut.
Rumsfeld: I certainly agree that the lines of communication between Damascus and Washington should remain open, and our relations could be better. I will not go to great lengths to explain the American position, since it is clear that the American president wants to reach a solution regarding Lebanon. We want Lebanon to be sovereign and independent, and for all foreign forces to withdraw from its territory.
Khaddam: The President (Assad) had wanted to see you, and there is no doubt that he would be pleased to receive you on future occasions. His health did not allow him to do so now. As for the need for Israel to withdraw from all Lebanese territory without gaining any advantage as a result of its invasion of Lebanon, particularly since the direct or indirect Israeli presence threatens Lebanon as well as our security and interests.
Rumsfeld: What more can Syria do to improve the security situation in Lebanon? There is still infiltration from the south, and terrorism continues in Beirut. There is a feeling in the region and in the United States that this terrorism does not take place without Syria’s permission and acquiescence. Are there further steps you can take to prevent these terrorist acts?
Khaddam: Let us discuss the matter logically and realistically, away from the media campaign being waged against Syria. What interest does Syria have in terrorism? Syria is the country that has been most exposed to terrorism, and the American ambassador in Damascus, Robert Paganelli, knows that a single car bombing resulted in the deaths of 500 people [a reference to the violence carried out by the Muslim Brotherhood in the early 1980s]. Hundreds of Syrians were killed in terrorist incidents in Syria. Why was Syria unable to detect these acts before they occurred? If we had been able to detect them, we would have prevented them. If terrorism was carried out in the capital, Damascus, how can Syria be held responsible for acts in areas where Syria has no presence? And why assume that Syria authorizes such acts and that they cannot take place without its approval? What is the logic? If the purpose is to wage media campaigns against Syria, that is another matter. No one can control infiltration. We are a strong country and our security system is cohesive, yet thousands of weapons were infiltrated into Syria and used to carry out acts of sabotage.
In the city of Hama, the authorities seized dozens of tons of explosives, as well as weapons smuggled into Syria… More than ten thousand weapons of various types had infiltrated across the borders from Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan. Infiltration had occurred into a country with a cohesive security system, so how can we not imagine the possibility of infiltration into areas where we see such division, chaos, and fighting?
Syria is a country that acts responsibly. It is true that relations between Syria and America are not good, but we cannot approve of what was done against the Marines. Frankly, we want you to leave Lebanon, and we want your ships to leave. The only way for you to withdraw is to make the Lebanese national dialogue succeed. We are not children who would behave irresponsibly.
Rumsfeld: You have mentioned the media campaign twice, and I had read an editorial in Al-Baath [the newspaper of the ruling party] about the alleged purpose of my tour of the Middle East. I am not here to wage a media campaign. I think some of the reasons why your neighbors and the United States feel that you tolerate some of the terrorist activities are your relations with Iran, Libya, and the Soviet Union. These countries are believed to be involved in such activities.
I completely agree with you that no state can completely prevent terrorism. Even in America, two years ago, someone shot at the President of the United States [an attempt to assassinate President Reagan on March 30, 1981]. I do not want to suggest that I am naïve about terrorist operations… We always find some madman doing something against another person’s interests. I agree that the desirable course is for us to continue working to create a favorable atmosphere in Lebanon.
Khaddam: Our problem with the Americans is that, despite our numerous contacts with them up to now, they do not know Syria. The Syrian government is an independent state, and Syrians are the people most proud of their independence and most determined to preserve it.
We have good relations with the Soviet Union, partly because of Israel’s military posture and the scale of the assistance you provide to Israel. When [Yitzhak] Shamir says that Israel’s borders are defined in the Torah and expands on the ground, is it not my duty to seek every possible means of defending my country and securing weapons for that purpose?
Rumsfeld: To avoid any misunderstanding, it is clear that the United States recognizes Syria’s sovereignty and independence and its right to make its own decisions. My reference to the Soviet Union, Libya, and Iran has no bearing on this matter; it was made only in the narrow context of terrorism, not in the broader context of Syria’s relations. I met with President Reagan and Secretary Shultz two weeks ago, and there is support in the United States for the “May 17 Agreement.” The Lebanese government wants the foreign forces to leave, and you have said the same. You have good information about what is happening there. Could you give me an idea of what you define as your security interests in the north, east, or south?
Khaddam: The United States supports the “May 17 Agreement,” and we reject it because it conflicts with the United States’ commitments to Lebanon and with our interests. I told Mr. Shultz and Mr. McFarlane that we could define our respective commitments toward Lebanon—you and us. Are we agreed on Lebanon’s unity, sovereignty, and independence? If we are, then we put the agreement before us and strike out everything that contradicts those principles. The security issue that concerns us is the Israeli presence in Lebanon.
Rumsfeld: The assumption is that the Israelis will leave?
Khaddam: Yes, completely.
AFP
The late Lebanese president-elect, Bashir Gemayel, in the late 1970s.
Rumsfeld: What matters to me is knowing whether Syria will allow the Lebanese government to choose whomever it wants and do whatever it wants. It seems to me that one of the undesirable things is for foreign forces to remain for a longer period. If an arm is broken and not properly set, all the muscles and veins grow incorrectly, and the resulting disability remains permanently. It seems that the surest way for Lebanon to remain with its two broken arms is to delay the departure of the foreign forces.
Khaddam: Can anyone imagine that we would withdraw and leave Israel just 23 kilometers from our capital? We agree that Lebanon’s security interests and whatever the Lebanese state decides should have first priority. But for Lebanon to be seized and handed over to Israel—that is something we cannot accept.
Rumsfeld: No one is saying that.
Khaddam: The “May 17 Agreement” says exactly that… Please read the agreement carefully, and you will understand Syria’s concerns and those of many Lebanese.
Rumsfeld: I am going back to President Reagan, and my assessment is that two states are occupying parts of Lebanon. Both say they should leave, and one of them agrees to withdraw. The Lebanese government wants both of them to leave together, and the longer they remain, the less likely it is that they will leave.
Khaddam: I do not agree with calling our presence in Lebanon an occupation.
Rumsfeld: It is a presence…
Khaddam: But it is not an occupation.
Rumsfeld’s visit came after President Hafez al-Assad suffered a cardiac health episode, which required him to be hospitalized and prevented him from carrying out his duties.
Khaddam says that U.S. Ambassador Robert Paganelli came to meet with him and said: “He informed me that President Reagan wanted to send his representative to Syria and Lebanon, Mr. Donald Rumsfeld. Since President Hafez was ill, he would meet with me and with Colonel Rifaat,” the Syrian president’s brother.
Khaddam immediately responded, angrily: “There is a state and institutions in Syria. The foreign minister is the one who represents Syria. If you insist on meeting Colonel Rifaat, then we will refuse to receive Mr. Rumsfeld and will not grant him a visa to enter Syrian territory. And if you meet with me first, and then, after Mr. Rumsfeld arrives in Syria, you meet with Colonel Rifaat al-Assad, we will put you and Mr. Rumsfeld in a car and throw you both into Lebanon.”
Khaddam recalls: “The ambassador’s face [Robert Paganelli] turned pale, and he was annoyed and said, ‘I will report this to my government.’ The following day, he asked to meet with Khaddam and informed him that Washington had decided that Rumsfeld would ‘meet with you only.’ I then welcomed Rumsfeld’s visit.”
Amid these disagreements between Damascus and Washington, events took a major turn. On the morning of December 4, 1983, U.S. aircraft bombed Syrian positions in the Lebanese mountains in response to the attack on the Marines.
Following the bombing, Khaddam says he met with General Hikmat [al-Shihabi, the chief of staff] and Brigadier General Ali Duba [the head of military intelligence]. “We discussed the matter and concluded that failing to respond would expand the scope of the aggression and weaken the morale of our forces. We therefore decided to respond, and General Hikmat instructed our forces to use the air-defense weapons at their disposal against aircraft flying over our forces.”
Syrian ground-based air defenses engaged the American aircraft. One U.S. aircraft was shot down and its pilot was captured. The United States considered the Syrian forces’ interception of American aircraft “an act of aggression,” while it described its own flights over and bombing of Syrian forces as “self-defense.”
The American operation was a test of Syria’s position and its response during the period of the Syrian president’s illness. Khaddam says: “The immediate response was decisive and firm. It should be noted that the Americans had placed considerable hopes on the president’s illness and on the possibility of fundamental changes in Syria’s policy in the event of his absence from the leadership of the country.”
When his brother Hafez fell ill in November 1983, Rifaat acted as though he had been waiting for this moment. He began operating as the “legitimate heir,” believing himself to be the only successor, and started rallying support among his generals, which greatly angered the president. The interplay between what was happening in Lebanon and the struggle for power in Damascus was particularly striking.
The elder brother, Hafez, ultimately prevailed in the power struggle and decided to exile his younger brother. On May 28, 1984, a plane headed to Moscow carrying a number of officers, including Rifaat.
He returned temporarily on two occasions: first in 1992, at the request of his mother, who died that year; and again in 1994, when he returned to offer condolences to his brother Hafez following the death of his son, Basil.
In October 2021, he returned permanently, following a decision by President Bashar al-Assad.
