“Letters of Love and Threats” Between Reagan and Assad… America Withdraws from Lebanon, Israel Pulls Back, and Syria “Goes It Alone”

Damascus Releases the American Pilot Amid Rumsfeld’s Shuttle Diplomacy as the White House Envoy… and Washington Fails in a Secret Visit by Hikmat al-Shihabi

Amid an exchange of U.S.–Syrian military fire in Lebanon, President Hafez al-Assad’s illness, Colonel Rifaat al-Assad’s ambitions for power, and the escalating Iran–Iraq War, Syrian Foreign Minister Abdul Halim Khaddam met with U.S. Ambassador Robert Paganelli in Damascus in December 1983. The following conversation took place:

Khaddam: Would you allow Syrian aircraft to fly over the American forces?

Ambassador: These aircraft have permission from the Lebanese government to conduct operations as part of the multinational force.

Khaddam: Yes, and we are also a legitimate force in Lebanon, and we have various rights as well. We have given strict instructions to our forces not to fire a single shot from areas where they are deployed toward the multinational force. This remains in effect on the ground, so why are you carrying out this raid against our forces? One of the most basic principles of military science is that any force over which foreign aircraft fly will fire at them, regardless of whether they actually hit them or not.

Therefore, we can reach an implicit understanding whereby we say: the Syrian forces will strictly prevent any shots from being fired from their positions toward the multinational force, and in return, the aircraft of that force will refrain from flying over Syrian forces and will not attack areas where Syrian forces are deployed with any kind of weapons.

We genuinely do not want a confrontation, and the battle is not between us and the Americans. The problem is between us and Israel, so why is the United States involving itself in this way?

Believe me, I am saddened by the American pilot who was killed (in a Syrian attack, along with another pilot who was captured) just as I am saddened by the Syrian soldier. We are concerned about our forces in Lebanon because of the presence of the Sixth Fleet, particularly following Isaac Shamir’s recent visit to Washington.

How can we eliminate this danger? Would the U.S. Sixth Fleet allow us to fly over it every day? Of course it would not. And regardless of the fact that the United States of America is a great power—and we are a small country—we must deal with one another according to equal rules.

AFP

Israeli troops in Beirut during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982

An American Pilot Held Captive in Syria

Ambassador Paganelli asked Khaddam to release the American pilot, Robert Goodman, whom Syria had detained after the air raid on its positions in December. He asked about Goodman’s health, and Khaddam replied that he was well and that a committee from the International Red Cross visited him regularly. He also pointed out that Goodman was a prisoner of war and had been carrying out an act of aggression against Syrian forces.

When Khaddam would not allow the discussion on this matter to continue, Ambassador Paganelli concluded by saying: “It must be completely clear on the part of the United States that we will continue our air operations.” Khaddam replied: “And it is equally completely clear that the response from the Syrian forces will continue.”

Ambassador: And once again, we will respond to the response.

Khaddam: And we will use the means available to us to respond to the response. We are telling you that we do not want a confrontation with you, nor do we want to escalate the situation. We want to create the conditions conducive to restoring normal relations between the two countries. Yet you say: We will continue to challenge and harass you. The American people do not approve of this. The American presence in Lebanon is unjustified. You came to protect the Palestinian camps, and now you are attacking the Syrian army. I fear that you may attack other Arab countries…

The American side proposed continuing the talks in Washington and suggested that Syrian Army Chief of Staff General Hikmat al-Shihabi visit Washington to follow up on the Goodman issue, given that he had participated in similar talks in 1974—an apparent reference to the Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement brokered by the United States. U.S. Ambassador Paganelli stressed that the visit would be “completely confidential” and that “only a very small number of our officials would know about it.”

Khaddam asked for time to discuss the matter with the Syrian leadership. However, George Shultz reneged on the promise and told the American media that a senior Syrian official would soon visit Washington over the issue of the captive pilot. As a result, al-Shihabi’s visit never took place, and the talks resumed in Damascus, eventually leading to Goodman’s release by the Reverend Jesse Jackson, a Democratic candidate for the U.S. presidency, in early 1984.

Assad ordered Goodman to be handed over to Jackson at the Syrian Foreign Ministry. Khaddam told him: “Legally, Pilot Goodman is at the disposal of the American ambassador, Robert Paganelli, and politically he is at the disposal of Reverend Jackson.” The ambassador smiled and said: “You Syrians are skilled and clever.”

After the captive pilot was handed over, Damascus issued the following statement:

In response to the humanitarian appeal made by Reverend Jackson to President Hafez al-Assad, President of the Republic, during his reception of him, and to the requests made by the American government for the release of the captive American pilot, Lieutenant Goodman, and as a contribution by the Syrian government toward creating conditions that would facilitate the withdrawal of American forces from Lebanon, the Syrian government has decided to release the captive pilot.

The Syrian government hopes that the American government will take steps to end its military involvement in Lebanon, which has brought suffering to Lebanon, the region, and the American people themselves, while further complicating the situation in the brotherly country and throughout the region.

Assad wanted the handover of Goodman to “kill two birds with one stone”: to extend a hand of cooperation to Reagan while, in return, persuading him of the necessity of Syria’s continued presence in Lebanon as a stabilizing force for all sides. If the incident increased public pressure in the United States for a withdrawal from Lebanon, that would be welcomed by the Syrian leadership.

On January 13, 1984, President Assad received the following letter from his American counterpart:

On behalf of the American people, I would like to thank you and your government for the release of Robert Goodman on January 3. I would like to assure you that this humanitarian gesture has had a beneficial effect on the atmosphere of our relations with Syria. Please be assured, Mr. President, that the United States harbors no hostile intentions toward Syria, and I hope that the spirit of the initiative you have taken today will extend to our ongoing dialogue.

I was pleased to learn of your recovery from the illness that recently afflicted you, and I am glad to know that you are increasingly able to resume your activities. I congratulate you and hope that your health will continue to improve. My personal representative, Ambassador Donald Rumsfeld, looks forward to exchanging views with you when he visits Syria in the near future.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,
Ronald Reagan

AFP

Former U.S. President Ronald Reagan

Assad replied with the following letter:

I received with pleasure your letter dated January 3, and I would like on this occasion to share your desire for continued dialogue between us. Mr. Donald Rumsfeld, your personal envoy, will be most welcome in Damascus, and I will be pleased to receive him during his forthcoming visit. Thank you for your concern for my health. Please accept my best wishes for your health and happiness.

January 9, 1984
Sincerely,
Hafez al-Assad

Rumsfeld’s Second Visit

Rumsfeld arrived in Damascus on January 14, 1984, and returned on the twelfth of the same month. He told Khaddam:

I am pleased about the release of Lieutenant Goodman. As you know, the United States felt that the matter had to be dealt with on a humanitarian basis, and we did not want it to become entangled with other issues and problems. I am pleased that you handled it in this manner, and President Reagan feels that the Syrian government’s decision has opened the way for cooperation. He believes this step represents a constructive opportunity to move forward toward resolving the other problems. I feel that you understood President Reagan’s letter in this spirit, as reflected in President Assad’s reply. The president personally regards it as a genuine gesture of goodwill.

The following day, Rumsfeld held a meeting with the Syrian president, and they engaged in a lengthy discussion, even though the meeting had been scheduled for only one hour. Rumsfeld raised the possibility of a partial withdrawal from Lebanon, together with the separation of the militias. Assad replied:

“We are now in a U.S. election year, and it is generally understood that during an election year the American administration becomes more susceptible to Zionist influence. We do not believe that this is in the interest of the United States or in our interest.”

The president added:

“On the other hand, from a moral or ethical standpoint, Lebanon is not an American or European country. Lebanon is an Arab country, so where are America’s interests in it? Some say it is to defend the Gulf, and I believe that is the ultimate insult to American public opinion. I have only a modest understanding of military affairs, but I cannot understand how the defense of Lebanon can be linked to the defense of the Gulf. Is the Sixth Fleet going to defend the Gulf from Lebanon?”

On January 30, 1984, Rumsfeld returned to Damascus for the fourth time, this time to discuss the issue of missing persons and Israeli prisoners of war with the Syrian leadership. He said that the Israelis were prepared to discuss these individuals and wanted to receive the bodies of those who had died, whether they were in Syrian prisons or in the detention facilities of Ahmed Jibril, leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command (PFLP-GC).

They asked Syria to make a “genuine effort” to locate the missing, through negotiations conducted via the International Red Cross and under American auspices. The Syrians told him that they had no connection with the people held by Ahmed Jibril and that they were concerned only with prisoners held in Syrian prisons.

The Killing of the President of the American University of Beirut

The discussion then turned to the killing of Malcolm Kerr, president of the American University of Beirut, just days before Rumsfeld’s arrival in Syria. Kerr taught Middle Eastern history and lived on the fortified university campus in the Ras Beirut area.

He had prevented Israeli forces from entering the university. When they told him, “We are the Israeli army,” he replied, “And this is American territory,” before unidentified gunmen opened fire and killed him on January 18, 1984. The Islamic Jihad Movement claimed responsibility for the operation; it was the same organization that had claimed responsibility for the bombing of the Marine barracks.

Rumsfeld told Abdul Halim Khaddam:

“You realize that Mr. Malcolm Kerr was recently killed in Beirut, and I would appreciate any assessment you can give me as to who might have been responsible.”

According to Rumsfeld, it was widely known in the United States, “and specifically within the U.S. government,” that terrorists were moving through Syria and through areas of the Bekaa under Syrian control, including Iranians. “We have evidence that they participated in planning and carrying out attacks against American citizens,” he said.

Khaddam replied that his government blamed the Lebanese Forces led by Samir Geagea, and that Kerr had been killed in order to implicate Syria and undermine the rapprochement then developing between Syria and the United States.

“The president of the American University of Beirut was generally regarded as sympathetic to Muslims, and shortly before his death, a media report appeared attacking him and portraying him as biased in favor of Muslims.”

Getty

U.S. President Ronald Reagan with Prince Saud al-Faisal and Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam at the White House on August 20, 1982

The Syrian side linked the prisoner negotiations to Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon, while referring to an incident that had occurred several days before Rumsfeld’s arrival, when a 14-year-old boy from the Sabra refugee camp attacked an Israeli patrol with a Kalashnikov rifle. He killed several soldiers before being killed himself, inspiring further unorganized retaliatory attacks in southern Lebanon. Khaddam summed up the position by saying:

“An occupied country will resist the occupation… The best way to prevent a recurrence of this incident is to withdraw. Remaining in Lebanon will continually expose them to more acts of Lebanese national resistance.”

Rumsfeld stopped at this point and said:

“There are Iranians and others who came from Syria, and they have been facilitated in crossing the Syrian border in the areas of Lebanon occupied by Syria. They are participating in planning and carrying out operations against the United States and the multinational force in Lebanon. This is happening, it is organized, and Syria is participating and involved. These individuals cannot move with their weapons without Syria’s knowledge and awareness.”

Khaddam replied:

“Any Muslim who comes to Syria to visit the holy sites, including the tomb of Sayyida [Zaynab]… They come here every year. For decades, tens of thousands of Shiites have come from Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan and then traveled to Lebanon. The border between us and Lebanon is open; we cannot station a soldier every meter. If I told you that thousands of weapons had been smuggled from Lebanon into Syria and used to carry out terrorist acts against Syria, would you believe me? If we wanted to secure the border with Lebanon, we would need an army twice the size of our present army.”

Khaddam continued, saying that the United States was placing far greater responsibility on Iran than was warranted in connection with Lebanon, and that “Iran has nothing to do with the operations taking place against Israel.”

Khaddam denied knowing who was behind these operations, saying:

“We in Syria genuinely do not know who they are. Lebanon has more weapons than any country in the world. From 1975 until now, more than a million weapons have entered Lebanon. There is not a single home in Lebanon that does not contain all kinds of weapons.”

Rumsfeld was not convinced by his argument and repeated:

“Mr. Minister, there are extensive contacts between the Syrians and the Iranians, and the degree of terrorist planning and involvement in Lebanon and in the areas of Lebanon occupied by Syria is clear. It cannot be denied or dismissed…”

Khaddam: This is incorrect. There is no Syrian who has contacts with the political organizations operating in Lebanon, and there is no Syrian contact for the purpose of coordinating operations against the multinational force or anyone else in Lebanon. The information you are receiving from the Lebanese Forces is intended to disrupt relations between us and you. We hope it will not become the source of your convictions.

Three weeks ago, we seized a car loaded with explosives in the Bekaa and arrested the people involved. The car contained 200 kilograms of explosives and was intended to be placed in Baalbek. The person who rigged the car with explosives was an officer in the Lebanese Army. Three members of the Kataeb Party were in the car; they are in our custody.

The formula acceptable to us is for Israel to withdraw from all of Lebanon.

Rumsfeld summarized the position as involving two options:

First option: Implement the May 17 Agreement without any restrictions, with an Israeli-Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon and security arrangements guaranteed for both countries along their borders.

Second option: Achieve a joint withdrawal on the condition that the May 17 Agreement be cancelled, with appropriate security arrangements for both sides.

Getty

Palestinian and Syrian soldiers leaving Beirut, Lebanon, on August 27, 1982

In both cases, Syria and Israel would have to withdraw, whether partially or completely.

Khaddam replied:

“Israel wants reciprocal withdrawals, but it began with a partial withdrawal from the Chouf. Syria wants a complete Israeli withdrawal. If we assume that neither side will get its first choice, this creates the possibility of another formula: Israel could carry out another partial withdrawal, perhaps one or two more withdrawals, and complete its own withdrawal before Syria completes its withdrawal, without directly linking it to Syria’s withdrawal.”

Rumsfeld returned to Washington empty-handed. On February 7, 1984, President Reagan delivered a speech in which he said:

“In order to enhance the safety of Americans and others serving in the multinational force in Lebanon, I have authorized U.S. naval forces operating as part of the multinational force to provide naval gunfire and air support against any units firing on Greater Beirut from Lebanese areas under Syrian control, as well as against any units directly attacking Americans and others in the multinational force. Those carrying out these attacks will no longer have a haven from which they can shell Beirut at will. We will stand firm to deter those who seek to influence Lebanon’s future through coercion.”

After these stern words, however, Reagan began to retreat, saying:

“Consistent with these steps, I have asked the Secretary of Defense to provide me with a plan for redeploying the Marines from Beirut airport to their ships offshore and for redeployment. These steps will begin soon and will proceed in stages. A military contingent will remain on the ground in Lebanon to train and equip the Lebanese Army and to protect the remaining Americans. Our naval and Marine forces will remain offshore, ready as before to provide support and protection to Americans and others in the multinational force in Lebanon and thereby to help maintain security in the Beirut area, as I have previously explained.”

This marked the beginning of the United States’ retreat and disengagement from the Lebanese quagmire in which it had found itself. That same day, U.S. Ambassador Robert Paganelli in Damascus requested an urgent meeting with President Assad. He told him:

“As you have noted, President Reagan now wants to scale back the American presence on the ground in Lebanon. He will gradually withdraw the Marines from Lebanon to the shore and then to somewhere else, but we will maintain our presence offshore. We hope these measures will make everyone understand that no progress can be achieved through the use of armed force. The time has come for serious negotiations, and terrorism has continued for longer than it should have.”

Assad regarded Reagan’s message as containing an implicit threat to Syria and asked Ambassador Paganelli:

**“This message… is it a threat or is it a message of political dialogue? My other question is: Why is there a desire for this message to be conveyed to me personally? If the message is a threat, and the intention is to deliver that threat directly to me, then I will return it directly to President Reagan, with the same force of threat. But if the message is intended as political dialogue, far removed from any influence of threats or superiority, and based on equal dealings between equals, then we have already said that we are in favor of dialogue. Syria is not a party to the fighting in Lebanon. The Syrian positions referred to in the message were not established recently; they have existed for eight years, with the consent of the Lebanese people and the legitimate Lebanese government at the time.

The United States says, ‘We will use artillery and aircraft,’ whereas we say, ‘We will do politically whatever we can and exert as much pressure as possible on all parties to meet, engage in dialogue, and refrain from fighting.’ I do not know why there is such insistence on using language that is inappropriate to the reality of the situation, undesirable in this age, and ineffective. No one expects us to say, ‘Yes, sir,’ to someone who tells us he is going to attack us.”**

On February 10, the U.S. Marines began withdrawing from Beirut, marking the beginning of the major American retreat—not only from Lebanon but from the region as a whole. This coincided with the withdrawal of Israeli forces to the security zone in southern Lebanon, leaving Syrian forces alone on the ground for many years.

The May 17 Agreement was abandoned, and Syria gained free rein in Lebanon.

Following Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May 2000, after the failure of peace negotiations, and the death of President Hafez al-Assad in June 2000, Iran’s and Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanon increased. After the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1559 and the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005, the Syrian army withdrew at the end of April that year, five years after Hafez al-Assad’s death.

After that, Hezbollah gained free rein in Lebanon and strengthened its relationship with President Bashar al-Assad. Hezbollah, together with Iran, helped “save the regime” in Syria after 2011. It is now facing an unprecedented Israeli war that has included the assassination of its leaders, including Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, as well as surprise strikes and security breaches.

Tel Aviv says the objective is to implement Resolution 1701, adopted after the 2006 war, which called for Hezbollah to withdraw north of the Litani River and for the Lebanese Army to deploy in its place. Some believe, however, that the objective is to implement Resolution 1559, which, in addition to calling for the withdrawal of the Syrian army, called for the “disarmament of militias,” meaning Hezbollah.

“Letters of Love and Threats” Between Reagan and Assad… America Withdraws from Lebanon, Israel Pulls Back, and Syria “Goes It Alone”

publisher: AL MAJALLA

AUTHOR: ابراهيم حميدي

Publishing date: 2024-10-28

An American Pilot Held Captive in Syria

Rumsfeld’s Second Visit

The Killing of the President of the American University of Beirut

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“Letters of Love and Threats” Between Reagan and Assad… America Withdraws from Lebanon, Israel Pulls Back, and Syria “Goes It Alone”

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AUTHOR: ابراهيم حميدي

Publishing date: 2024-10-28

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