“A Reassurance Letter” from Bashir Gemayel, Aspiring to the Lebanese Presidency, to Assad… and “Obstacles” Facing the U.S. Envoy’s Plan (3 of 5)

Negotiations between Arafat and the Israelis continued through the U.S. envoy and Prime Minister Wazzan until an agreement was reached in early August 1982.

The previous two installments covered the beginning of U.S. envoy Philip Habib’s mediation to secure the departure of Yasser Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and his forces from Beirut amid Israeli bombardment and Lebanese divisions over the situation, as well as the escalating campaigns between Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and Abu Ammar, who had begun accepting the principle of leaving Lebanon under pressure.

In this installment, we reveal details of a letter from Bashir Gemayel, Syria’s staunchest adversary, to Assad to reassure Damascus as he pursued the presidency, as well as details of Habib’s plan to remove Arafat and his fighters.

In addition to the reports that Brigadier General Ghazi Kanaan, head of Syrian intelligence in Lebanon, sent to Assad and his foreign minister, Abdul Halim Khaddam, Brigadier General Sami al-Khatib, commander of the Arab Deterrent Force, would also send his reports to Damascus “from time to time,” with President Elias Sarkis kept informed.

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Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat on the eve of his departure from Beirut, August 30, 1982.

On July 1, Khaddam received the following message from Brigadier General al-Khatib:

“Mr. Abdul Halim Khaddam, greetings and best wishes,

Further to my previous letter concerning the general situation and the negotiations with [Philip] Habib, the situation now, as of this morning, appears somewhat better than before. The resistance has begun to signal its acceptance of the principle of leaving Beirut and Lebanon, prior to the departure of its leadership, and it is likely to give this answer definitively to Prime Minister Wazzan today, who will in turn convey it to Habib. This would thereby avert an operation to invade or destroy Beirut, and this is the crux of the matter at present.

Of course, discussions are also now underway on how the withdrawal will take place. The Lebanese government is insisting that the Palestinians withdraw with their weapons, particularly their heavy weapons, in order to prevent the consequences that could result from leaving them behind, whether they fell into the hands of the National Movement parties, were confiscated by the army, or found their way to other factions.”

Al-Khatib added:

“As for the sticking points that are still under discussion, they are as follows:

1 — The issue of a symbolic military presence of the Palestinian leadership in Lebanon: Habib continues to reject this, based on the Israelis’ insistence. We are trying to reconcile the two positions through a compromise formula that might be acceptable, but I am not very optimistic on this point.

2 — The issue of the Lebanese Army entering Beirut and deploying there: The resistance nevertheless wants genuine guarantees for the Palestinians remaining in Beirut. The attempts by the Phalange to establish control over the Chouf and Matn in the mountain have not encouraged them to surrender without such guarantees. The National Movement has supported the resistance on this position, and the government has accepted it. On this basis, a request for international and multinational forces now appears inevitable. The government may formally request this after the completion of the departure of the Palestinians and their weapons—or, more precisely, after a final agreement has been reached on the evacuation process.

3 — The issue of collecting weapons from West Beirut: I rejected this completely and stipulated that, alongside their withdrawal, weapons must be removed from all of Beirut, both East and West.

4 — As for the ‘deterrent force’: I refused to discuss its status as part of these conditions and asked Habib that this matter be discussed separately by the Lebanese government with Damascus, within the framework of the established bilateral relations between the two countries.”

Al-Khatib concluded:

“This is roughly a brief picture of the general political situation during the morning hours of July 1, 1982. As for the military situation, it has remained static since the Battle of Bhamdoun, but preparations and preparations for action are continuing, particularly along the Upper Matn axis toward the Matn, Ain Saadeh, and the Zahle area, as well as around Beirut itself.”

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Yasser Arafat in the Fakahani area of West Beirut on July 30, 1982. To his left is Lebanese leftist leader Mohsen Ibrahim, and to his right is Lebanese journalist and former minister Bassem Al-Sabeh.

On the Phalange side, there had been some military movements by Phalangists returning to their villages after the period of forced displacement imposed since 1975 and 1976, particularly in the villages of the Chouf and Matn. These movements had led to bloody clashes with their traditional rivals in those villages and created an atmosphere of tension and sharp polarization that cast its shadow over the political situation and even over Habib’s negotiations themselves. Efforts are now underway to address this situation at every level.

President Sarkis has been suffering from a severe illness for three days and remains bedridden, with his temperature approaching 40 degrees Celsius. I was unable to see him today, but when I met him the day before yesterday, he sent his greetings to you and to President Assad.”

He continued:

“I still refuse to meet with Israeli General Ben-Hanan, and I do not know when the surveillance outside my home in Hazmieh [east of Beirut] will end. As for my escort, my car, and the driver, they remain held by our friend and yours, the late President Suleiman Frangieh. They are innocent, and decency and honor dictate that people should not be punished for the sins of others, if others are the ones who have committed them.”

Al-Khatib concluded his letter:

“My greetings and best wishes to you and to your entire esteemed family, as well as to our friend and elder brother, General Hikmat al-Shihabi, and his family, and Major General Ali Duba and his family. Until we meet again soon, God willing.”

Khaddam discussed developments in the negotiations over Arafat’s departure from Beirut with President Assad, who believed that “we should issue a statement declaring that we are not prepared to receive the fighters, because that would constitute a bargaining chip in the hands of the Palestinian negotiator.”

Following Assad’s instructions, the following statement was issued on July 9:

“In response to a question from the Syrian official news agency (SANA) concerning reports circulating among news agencies about the transfer of Palestinians from Beirut to Syria, an official spokesman stated that the Palestine Liberation Organization has not proposed anything to us in this regard.”

The statement added:

“In any case, under normal circumstances Syria is a homeland for Palestinians and Arabs in general. Under the present circumstances, however, there can be no transfer of Palestinian fighters from Beirut to Syria, because their natural place is where they are now, awaiting the restoration of their legitimate rights.”

Letters from Bashir Gemayel to Assad

In parallel with the negotiations, efforts were underway to secure Bashir Gemayel’s election as president of the republic. Through a Phalange delegation that visited Damascus in June, consisting of George Saadeh, Karim Pakradouni, and Joseph Abu Khalil, Bashir sought to “reassure [Assad], and we stipulated that he take a clear position on the Israeli occupation and participate in resisting it.”

AFP

Commander of the Lebanese Forces militia and former Lebanese President Bashir Gemayel.