Former Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam entered the tense political debate between Lebanon and Syria, providing a “credibility boost” and a morale boost to a portion of the Lebanese political spectrum. At the same time, he opened a part of the Syrian narrative about Lebanon, shedding light on its problems, complexities, and the challenges of decision-making. In both cases, Khaddam’s statement served as a prelude to a hint, much like the subtle signal in the insinuation, a clear indication of what the statement should encompass, presented in the form of a rhetorical question or expressed through a wait-and-see approach.
In the Lebanese context, Khaddam’s statement eliminated any political ambiguity regarding “Lebanese decision-making freedom, non-interference in Lebanese affairs, cooperation, and coordination between two separate governments,” etc. The dictated and imposed nature was evident in the management style of the relationship with the Lebanese. This was not hidden from the Lebanese mood, nor from those who approached politics from outside the “myth of the exemplary relationship between two Arab countries.” Nevertheless, the “official” recognition voiced by Mr. Khaddam remains significant. It adds to the popular Lebanese political mood and, from an informed and influential official position, exposes all the “Arab rhetoric” improvised by the Lebanese political class holding the reins of the country since the Taif Agreement and even before.
In the context of managing Lebanese political affairs from the outside and acknowledging that the official decision-making center was not in Beirut, Mr. Abdul Halim Khaddam included the assassination of President Rafik Hariri within the political agenda, not outside it. This brought back the consideration of a bundle of Lebanese opinions stating that “political suspicion is fundamental” in analyzing any political crime, and that the judicial investigation, with its different nature, does not negate “political suspicion.” Moreover, the time needed to reach the “tools of the material crime” may become an element against the “collective stability” if this assembly drops the “weapon” of political suspicion from its hands. The two suspicions, judicial and political, complement each other, although each has its own working mechanisms. In the field of “political suspicion,” the “former Vice President” did not absolve Syria of responsibility “somewhere.” In other words, he did not acquit the arena of “Syrian political decision-making,” even if he formulated the non-accusation in the form of “let’s wait for the investigation results.” Mr. Khaddam was more logical in this regard than a Lebanese chorus that still insists on contenting itself with “judicial suspicion” and calls on all parties to await the completion of assembling criminal elements, allowing the judiciary to then form a “judicial suspicion.” This might become another divisive issue among the Lebanese, as “politicizing the Hariri case occurs and has occurred by those who want to obscure the investigation,” according to Mr. Khaddam.
In the extension of this “political management,” Mr. Abdul Halim Khaddam provided another testimony about manipulation of the Lebanese affairs and the mishandling of its “political and economic resources.” This implies referring to “embezzlement from Bank Al-Madina,” announcing “contempt for some Lebanese leaders and insulting them,” and indicating that “intimidation and threats” were part of the main “persuasion” methods. However, the most alarming aspect remains in the response of the beneficiaries of this policy among the Lebanese, resorting to the weapon of gossip and the policy of incitement…
The conclusion arising from this disclosure by the “former Vice President” sheds light on the internal structure of Lebanon, which served as a platform for external Syrian dominance. This opens the door to another conclusion that has been reiterated many times and is always useful to mention: the “external” relationship with Lebanon always remains internal because it is built on actual internal interests, reproducing them and adding to them as well as taking from them. The reality is that the saying that “Lebanon’s internal situation is sound and healthy” and that it is enough to “expel the foreign virus from its body” is not valid!! The facts tell otherwise, with the latest being the statement of Abdul Halim Khaddam, indicating that the malaise is inherent in the Lebanese structure!
The testimony of the “former Vice President” regarding Lebanon is crucial, and it could provide momentum for the resumption of the international investigation. It offers support at this moment to the Lebanese who are facing a counter-political attack from the political circles that wanted to put Lebanon in a position to create its space of independence with its local forces and build its internal Arab identity without the interference of external Arab models or ideologies. In this Lebanese context, from the testimony of Mr. Abdul Halim Khaddam, there is also a significant internal Syrian aspect that carries great importance and a high degree of sensitivity, merely signaling it quickly because it undoubtedly has a clear impact on the Lebanese nation. Elements of this aspect include a focus on the “concentration of political decision-making and the marginalization of constitutional institutions,” in other words, the narrowness of the political initiative outside the decision-making center, resulting in the retreat of the popular system’s base, limiting the matter to a narrow circle of “insiders.” This touches on the issue of “legitimacy” thrown in the face of the general Arab regime, including the Syrian regime.
Another element is the refutation by “Khaddam of the old guard theory” hindering reform, attributing it to the security agencies and some “advisors” who misread regional and international transformations, wrongly placing “Syria at the center of danger” due to their mistakes. In other words, if there is any reform to be hoped for within the “system,” the old guard is one of its creators, and among them, if not at the forefront, is Mr. Abdul Halim Khaddam, who has “presented his reformist ideas”!
An additional element addressed by Khaddam is related to the “novelty of the Syrian leadership’s experience,” making it susceptible to “enthusiasm,” and thus its decisions become subject to the possibility of “inaccuracy,” necessitating “apology and revisiting with alternative measures.” The implied meaning of this additional statement raises questions about the ability of this leadership to deal with the new regional and international political circumstances and its readiness to adapt to their dictates and to comply with the conditions of their requirements.
What does Mr. Abdul Halim Khaddam want to convey to the Syrian audience? What additional elements is he seeking to crystallize? It might be premature to jump to assumptions now, and it might be more prudent to await the repercussions that will be triggered by the televised speech of the “former Vice President.” However, that does not preclude making some observations.
The first observation concerns delving into the future of the regime in Syria. Has Abdul Halim Khaddam decided to initiate internal discussions on this issue, publicly declaring it after the matter has been extensively discussed within closed political circles? The second observation is related to the “alternative,” which raises a question suggested by Khaddam’s remarks in brief: Does the “former Vice President” want to imply that the possibility of an internal Syrian “alternative” is possible within the regime itself? This would spare Syria from another Iraqi experience, which the West does not want now, and the Arabs, in general, reject.
The third and final observation concerns the “innocence and independence” of Mr. Abdul Halim Khaddam’s initiative. It cannot be overlooked that the “screen” that aired his speech has a well-known Arab reference, and the French space that hosted its transmission is not a neutral space!
Between Syria and Lebanon, from one homeland to another, Abdul Halim Khaddam moves with the agility of an expert and a connoisseur. He is the “son of the regime” and one of the key architects of its policies, not discounting the fact that he admitted being part of the team “dominating” Lebanon. This requires investigating the topics he raised, and whether they are true or not. Thus, the benefit is achieved by the weight of the meanings intended by the “former Vice President,” and perhaps it alleviates some of the weight derived from it, easing the burden suffered by both Syria and Lebanon.