In the first installment of the classified documents on Yasser Arafat and his fighters’ departure from Beirut in 1982: What did Israel ask Syria through the Lebanese liaison officer, and what was Hafez al-Assad’s response? What was the reaction of the commander of the gendarmerie company at Baabda Palace when Ariel Sharon entered and Presidents Elias Sarkis and René Moawad did not believe the news and continued “playing backgammon”? And what did the American and Israeli position, conveyed by U.S. envoy Philip Habib to the Palestinians and “Abu Ammar,” entail?
Following its invasion of Lebanon, where Syrian forces had been deployed under the banner of the “Arab Deterrent Force” since 1976, the Israeli army advanced toward Beirut in June 1982, tightened its siege of the city, and threatened to destroy it, demanding the departure of Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat (“Abu Ammar”) and his fighters, as well as the Syrian forces.
On June 13, Damascus received the following message from the military command in Beirut:
“Major General Youssef Hanan and his deputy, Major General Alous, the commander of the Israeli campaign in Baabda, sent a message in French through a Lebanese army officer to Brigadier General Sami al-Khatib, the Lebanese commander of the Arab Deterrent Force. It read as follows:
Given the present circumstances, he [the Israeli commander] finds himself under a moral and material obligation to use the Lebanese Army’s communications channels to inform the commander of the Arab Deterrent Force that he is being given one final opportunity for the honorable withdrawal of the Syrian forces from Beirut, the Ghaboun [Joumhour] area, and Aley. The deadline for a response is noon on June 15, 1982.
In the event of no response or a negative response, the Syrians will be considered responsible for the casualties and destruction that will befall them, because the mission of the Israeli forces is to expel the Syrians from Beirut. In all other respects, he wishes to avoid a battle whose outcome is known to him, given the considerable imbalance between the forces.”
Getty
Yasser Arafat, carrying a Soviet-made Kalashnikov rifle, walks with one of his companions in Beirut in September 1982.
After consultations among the leadership, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad decided to convey the following response to Brigadier General Sami al-Khatib:
“We are present in Beirut pursuant to an Arab decision and with the approval of the legitimate Lebanese authorities. Lebanon is an Arab and independent state, and we will defend Lebanon, its legitimate authorities, and the Palestinian people with all the means at our disposal.”
On June 15, Syrian Foreign Minister Abdul Halim Khaddam (who became vice president in 1984) received from Brigadier General al-Khatib a message from President Elias Sarkis. It read:
“The current military situation on the ground offers no reassurance regarding the so-called promises given to us that [Israel] would not enter Beirut. We have been unable to obtain any guarantees, and it is our duty to prevent the destruction of the capital and to do everything possible to ensure that it does not suffer the fate of Sidon and Tyre [in southern Lebanon].
In light of these considerations, it is necessary to order the Lebanese Army to enter Beirut, because this could be used politically under any circumstances, even if we assume that it would not prevent an invasion of the capital. I expect to issue this order at any moment, and this would entail the withdrawal of all forces [including the Syrian forces] inside the capital to other positions to be determined later.
I believe it is my duty to inform you of this measure so that you will not be surprised by any such decision, which is intended to save whatever can be saved and to fulfill my duty during these critical hours in the history of my country.”
According to the minutes of the meeting, al-Khatib informed Khaddam of two incidents.
“The first: Israeli Defense Minister [Ariel Sharon] entered the office of the commander of the gendarmerie company in Baabda, Lieutenant Colonel Rafiq al-Hassan, and said to him, ‘I am the Minister of Defense.’ The lieutenant colonel immediately stood up and saluted him, and then said, ‘But you are not His Excellency Joseph Bek Skaff.’ The Israeli replied, ‘I am Ariel Sharon, Defense Minister of Israel,’ whereupon the lieutenant colonel collapsed into his chair in astonishment.”
The account prompted some analysts to ask: Could a Lebanese officer really have failed to recognize the difference between Joseph Skaff and Ariel Sharon?
Getty
The late Lebanese President Elias Sarkis.
The second incident recounted by al-Khatib to Khaddam was that “Mr. Farouk Abi al-Lamaa, Director-General of Lebanese Public Security and President Sarkis’s confidant, went to the palace and found the President and Mr. René Moawad playing backgammon. He informed them that Sharon was at Baabda Palace, but Moawad replied, ‘Enough of this joke. There’s no time for such a bad joke. Let’s continue playing.’”
After Brigadier General Sami al-Khatib left, Khaddam presented the message to President Assad. “The President’s view was that the response should be flexible, conveying an indirect refusal while emphasizing the continuation of the relationship with President Sarkis and our continued readiness to assist him and Lebanon. I drafted the response and presented it to the President, who approved it after making some amendments.”
The following day, June 16, Khaddam delivered Assad’s response to al-Khatib:
“1. We hope that President Sarkis will take into consideration the historical stage, national imperatives, and the circumstances of the Israeli occupation threatening the Arab nation.
2. We have previously cooperated with President Sarkis and made sacrifices for Lebanon, and we sought to establish a strong central authority despite the difficulties we faced from one side or another. President Sarkis will recall that at one point we proposed the necessity of imposing the authority of the state on everyone, because this was in everyone’s interest. Our position remains, to this day, that a strong Lebanese central authority should be established, exercising control over an independent Lebanon in its entirety. We are ready to work and cooperate toward this goal now and in the future.
Within this framework, we believe that the first thing we must do is cooperate collectively to rid Lebanon of the Israeli occupation of its territory. Our cooperation should address the removal of the Israeli occupation and the measures to be taken after the occupation to establish the authority of the central government over all Lebanese territory. Our cooperation on this matter should proceed according to a specific and detailed plan that we agree upon now and commit ourselves to implementing with complete precision and good faith. If President Sarkis wishes this plan to have an Arab character, we can call for an expanded or limited Arab summit conference. We await his response on this matter.
3. We commend the National Salvation Committee formed by President Sarkis and hope that it will carry out its activities. If he wishes us to assist in this regard, we will make every effort to do so.
4. From a position of strength, we believe that the measure President Sarkis is considering should serve to heal the wounds and bridge the gap between the Lebanese, rather than achieve the opposite—particularly since the circumstances of the Israeli occupation make this matter all the more sensitive.
5. We regard the decision President Sarkis is considering to withdraw the Deterrent Force from Beirut while Israeli forces are occupying the area surrounding Beirut as extremely dangerous. It would simply mean that the Syrian forces, along with the Palestinians and Lebanese confronting the enemy, would surrender to the Israeli forces. President Sarkis may not be aware of this implication, because we are all concerned with preserving the dignity of the Lebanese, Syrians, Palestinians, and all Arabs, particularly when it comes to confronting Israeli aggression.”**
After receiving Assad’s response to his letter, Sarkis abandoned the idea of sending the army into Beirut, according to Khaddam’s papers.
Khaddam adds:
“A state of shock, resentment, and confusion prevailed in Lebanon. The state was not merely incapable of confronting the occupation; it was also unwilling to do so. From the very beginning, the army cooperated and appointed Lieutenant Colonel Fawzi Abu Sarhan as a liaison officer with the Israeli military command, while the Lebanese Forces provided cover and support to the invading forces. As for the others, they were being subjected to the enemy’s air, land, and naval attacks. All of this was taking place while [U.S. envoy] Philip Habib moved between the American ambassador’s residence and the presidential palace in Baabda. The only initiative undertaken by the state was the formation of the National Salvation Committee, headed by President Sarkis.”
The committee held several meetings to seek a way out of the crisis, with proposals put forward by the various parties.
According to a document from the Syrian intelligence service in Beirut—where Ghazi Kanaan subsequently became the leading figure and then headed the service after replacing Muhammad Ghanem in 1982—dated June 21:
“The Lebanese National Salvation Committee met under the chairmanship of President Elias Sarkis, with the attendance of Prime Minister Shafic Wazzan, Minister Fouad Boutros, MP Nasri Maalouf, Nabih Berri, Walid Jumblatt, and Bashir Gemayel, at 5:00 p.m. on June 20, 1982. The following common position was reached at this meeting:
1. Emphasis on the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Lebanese territory.
2. Lebanese sovereignty over all Lebanese territory.
The position of the National Movement and the Amal Movement was as follows:
1. Complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.
2. Protection of the Palestinian resistance.
3. Affirmation of the Syrian political and military presence in Lebanon.
The position of the Lebanese authorities and the Lebanese Front was as follows:
1. The entry of the Lebanese Army into West Beirut.
2. The handover of Palestinian heavy weapons in Beirut to the Lebanese Army, with light weapons confined to the refugee camps. Palestinians could remain in Lebanon under American guarantees and under the sovereignty of the legitimate authorities, engaging only in political and media activities—in other words, returning the Palestinians to the situation that existed before 1969.”**
Getty
A meeting between Yasser Arafat and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and Amal Movement leader Nabih Berri, shortly before Abu Ammar’s departure from Beirut, August 30, 1982.
Two committees were formed. The first consisted of Prime Minister Shafik al-Wazzan, Mr. Nabih Berri, and Mr. Walid Jumblatt. Its task was to present the position of the Lebanese authorities and the Lebanese Front and ascertain the position of the Palestinian resistance on the matter. It was understood that the representatives of the National Movement and the Amal Movement on the National Salvation Committee would present to the committee the joint Lebanese national-Palestinian position at the following day’s meeting, Tuesday, including the preservation of the Palestinian resistance’s popular, political, media, and military presence, while taking into account the realities of both Lebanon and the Palestinians.
The second committee was formed to contact Philip Habib and put pressure on the Israelis. It consisted of Minister Fouad Boutros, MP Nasri Maalouf, and Bashir Gemayel. Its task was to present the position of the National Movement and the Amal Movement, which was as follows:
- Prevent an Israeli invasion of Beirut.
- Demand that Israel withdraw five kilometers from Beirut so that negotiations could take place freely, away from threats and pressure.
The participants stated that the Arab Deterrent Force was a legitimate force present on Lebanese territory with the approval of the legitimate Lebanese authorities and the Arab Summit, and that its mission in Lebanon could not be terminated without the approval of both the Lebanese authorities and the Arab Summit.”
According to Khaddam, this position “confused the international and Arab positions by insisting on negotiating with the Palestinian resistance and ending its armed presence under the pressure of the Israeli occupation, before lifting the siege of Beirut. In the face of the military and political pressure brought to bear on the Palestinian resistance, it informed the National Salvation Committee of the following:
- It accepted withdrawing to the Palestinian refugee camps in return for a corresponding Israeli withdrawal—that is, lifting the siege of Beirut by a distance equal to the distance to which the resistance would withdraw toward the camps.
- It accepted that the Lebanese Army would carry out the separation operation and deploy in the positions that would be vacated, in return for a guarantee that the Israelis would not enter them with the army’s assistance.
- If these two points were implemented, the resistance would put forward its proposal to the Lebanese authorities on the basis that the Palestinian presence would be political, media-related, and military, as in the other Arab countries, while taking Lebanon’s particular circumstances into account.”
These demands were conveyed to Philip Habib, who promised to relay them to his government and to the Israelis.
On June 23, Habib conveyed the American and Israeli position to the Palestinians and to Yasser Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, as follows:
- There would be no military presence of the Palestinian resistance in Lebanon.
- Neither the organization nor anyone else would have sovereignty over any limited area.
- The Palestinians would be subject to the Lebanese authorities, even inside the refugee camps.
- The Lebanese authorities would exercise control over all Lebanese territory, with no special status for the Palestinians, either in Beirut or elsewhere.
He also posed two questions: Would the Palestinian leaders remain in Lebanon? They were free to decide that themselves. Would Palestinian factions remain in Lebanon? The organization was required to define its vision for its presence in Lebanon.
