Escalating Campaigns Between Assad and Arafat… and Reagan’s Envoy Presents His Plan to Remove the Palestinians from Beirut (2 of 5)

The Palestinian Presence on the Agenda of Lebanon’s Parties… “Abu Ammar” Begins His Departure… and the Lebanese Phalange Wants to “End the Three Occupations”

AFP

PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat is seen in an archival photograph dated September 1, 1989, in Tripoli, Libya, speaking with Syrian President Hafez al-Assad during celebrations marking the 20th anniversary of the Libyan Revolution.

After the first installment covered Syrian President Hafez al-Assad’s refusal to withdraw his forces from Beirut and allow the Lebanese Army to enter the city, the surprise arrival of Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon at the Baabda Palace, where President Elias Sarkis was playing backgammon, and the formation of the “Salvation Committee” in Lebanon to begin negotiations with U.S. envoy Philip Habib over the departure of PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, this installment examines the escalating media campaigns between Assad and Arafat and the U.S. envoy’s proposal for removing “Abu Ammar” from the Lebanese capital.

Amid the negotiations in Beirut led by U.S. envoy Philip Habib, “vicious campaigns” by Arafat escalated as soon as fighting began against Syria and its armed forces. According to what Abdul Halim Khaddam wrote in his papers, they focused on the following:

1. Accusing Syria of not participating in the fighting.
2. Accusing Syria of abandoning the Palestinians.
3. Accusing Syrian forces of abandoning their positions to the Israelis, thereby helping to lay siege to Beirut.

He added: “Some of his [Arafat’s] representatives abroad launched widespread campaigns of lies and slander at a time when the bodies of Syrian servicemen were being strewn across Beirut, the Mountain, and the Bekaa, while Arafat’s men were looking for a way to flee the battle.”

Khaddam said these “campaigns” targeted Assad personally. For example, Tayeb Abdel Rahim, the PLO representative in China, told Agence France-Presse that “Hafez al-Assad takes his orders from [Israeli Prime Minister Menachem] Begin.”

In response to these campaigns, Khaddam summoned Mohammed Ghanem, Fatah’s representative in Damascus. Khaddam wrote: “I conveyed to him our displeasure with this filthy language coming from Arafat and some of his supporters, while Syria alone was bearing the burden of fighting amid this atmosphere of Arab silence.”

Khaddam continued: “Mohammed Ghanem contacted Arafat in Beirut and asked him to take measures to stop these slanders, but he did not respond to his representative’s request in Damascus. We were not surprised by this campaign or by Arafat cutting off all forms of communication with us during the war, even though our forces were defending him while he moved from one house to another. We had no knowledge of his contacts and negotiations with the Lebanese, the Americans, and the Israelis, except through what President Sarkis or our security apparatus in Beirut reported to us.”

According to a document from the Syrian security service in Beirut dated June 26:

“We received the following from Mr. Mohsen Ibrahim:

The meetings of the Salvation Committee, which was established to address the conflict between two viewpoints, were held between the national viewpoint, represented by Walid and Nabih, which gives priority to ending the Israeli occupation and calls for Lebanese, Arab, and international action to secure the complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory, and regards the Palestinian presence as a secondary issue to be negotiated between the Lebanese authorities and the Palestine Liberation Organization, just as it regards the Syrian presence as governed by a formal agreement between the Lebanese state and a decision of the Arab Summit. This viewpoint rejects linking the Israeli occupation to the Syrian and Palestinian issues.

The second was the official Lebanese-Phalange viewpoint, represented by Sarkis, Boutros, and Bashir. It proceeds from the premise that there are three occupations—Israeli, Palestinian, and Syrian—and that efforts must be made to remove all three. It ultimately focuses on a single issue, considering it the starting point for addressing everything else: the Palestinian presence.

Philip Habib openly supported this viewpoint, while Wazzan adopted the national viewpoint but took a mediating position.

After lengthy arguments and direct intervention by Philip Habib, the Palestinian issue was imposed as the starting point on the agenda of the National Salvation Committee. Following several attempts to reach an agreed position on the matter, a proposal was made for the entire Salvation Committee, with the exception of Sarkis for security reasons, to meet with Abu Ammar. But Bashir disappeared at the last minute, and it became clear that Sharon had instructed him not to attend.

Abu Ammar then summoned the members of the Salvation Committee who were in West Beirut—Wazzan, Nabih [Berri], and Walid [Jumblatt]—and presented to them the Palestinian position, which was as follows:

1. A comprehensive ceasefire and the establishment of a separation of forces around Beirut, under which the Israelis would withdraw several kilometers and the resistance would withdraw, with its weapons, to the refugee camps. The Lebanese Army would undertake the task of separating the forces and would enter West Beirut, with a request for an international force to be deployed alongside it to guarantee the ceasefire and implement the separation of forces.

2. The opening of free negotiations between the Lebanese authorities and the Palestine Liberation Organization to determine the future of the Palestinian presence—politically, militarily, and among the population—within the framework of full Lebanese sovereignty over all Lebanese territory.

In this regard, it was clear that the resistance was seeking no more than the minimum: diplomatic recognition, political and media activity, a symbolic regular military presence, and civil organization of Palestinian affairs—in other words, a status below that which it enjoyed in the other Arab countries.

However, the official Lebanese-Phalange response, backed by Philip Habib and supported by Israel, rejected this proposal and called for complete Palestinian surrender, under which the resistance would hand over all its weapons, the PLO would lose any special status, and Palestinians would enjoy no civil immunity. All of this would be in exchange for guaranteeing the personal safety of the resistance leadership upon its departure from Lebanon—a departure that had always been a strong American demand.

In addition to this response to the Palestinian proposal, it was clear that Sarkis and Boutros were obstructing any serious international effort to achieve a ceasefire, create an opportunity for the separation of forces, and conduct free negotiations between the Lebanese authorities and the PLO. This obstruction was taking place amid an intensification of Israeli military action in the Mountain and around Beirut, together with increasingly explicit threats to invade Beirut.

In view of all this, it was no longer possible to remain in the National Salvation Committee or to allow the government to continue providing cover for the positions of Sarkis, Boutros, and Bashir, and for Philip Habib’s role in the Israeli military escalation and American political pressure.

Therefore, Walid announced his withdrawal from the Salvation Committee, Nabih froze his membership, and six ministers asked Wazzan to resign. When Wazzan found himself faced with a demand to sign off on complete Palestinian surrender amid all the pressure, he too announced that he was placing his resignation at the disposal of the President of the Republic.”

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U.S. envoy Philip Habib.

The document continues:

“These positions caused major upheavals in the country’s political life and made it clear to Sarkis, Boutros, Philip Habib, Bashir, and the Israelis that they would not find a Muslim politician willing to sign a document of surrender. The resignations were followed by extremely intense and brutal shelling of the neighborhoods of West Beirut on Friday afternoon. Then, that same evening, Philip Habib informed Saeb Salam that there was a decision for a serious and comprehensive ceasefire this time, beginning at 9 p.m. on Friday itself. Throughout June 26, 1982, we tried to convene an Islamic national conference to support the resignations and issue a unified position, but so far we have not succeeded.”

Regarding Walid Jumblatt’s position, the document says that it was “good and based on his refusal to play the role of messenger conveying the American and official Lebanese surrender terms to the Palestinian resistance, just as it is based on his refusal to act as a false witness in the conspiracy to slaughter the Palestinian people. He repeatedly says that he will not fire the coup de grâce at the Palestinian revolution. In addition, he supports the Palestinian proposal that Abu Ammar presented to the National Salvation Committee.”

The document then outlines the positions of the other factions and states:

“The immediate objective of the French initiative is to save Beirut from the siege and invasion under the banner of neutralizing the city through the separation of forces, guaranteed by an international force alongside the Lebanese Army, with free negotiations to take place between the Lebanese authorities and the Palestine Liberation Organization in order to conclude a new agreement between them within the framework of full Lebanese sovereignty.”

On June 27, a document from the Syrian security service in Beirut stated:

**“The position conveyed to us by Prime Minister Shafic Wazzan in a telephone conversation was as follows: Through his membership in the National Salvation Committee and in his capacity as prime minister, he had worked tirelessly to find a way out of the predicament into which the Palestinian resistance leadership and the city of Beirut had been placed, as the first issue imposed by Israel and the United States. But he was unable to continue because of the political and military pressure to which he, along with the other members of the Salvation Committee, had been subjected.

The known Israeli-American conditions have not changed, and the ceasefire has not taken place; rather, the shelling has escalated to an intolerable and insane level. This prompted him to place his resignation at the disposal of the President of the Republic.”**

Regarding Sarkis’s position, Wazzan said:

“I do not accuse Sarkis of treason. But regardless of the fact that he is the President of the Republic, he represents one segment of the Lebanese people, while I represent another segment, and each of us has his own approach.”

Regarding the position on the Arab Deterrent Force, he said:

“We did not request the withdrawal of the Deterrent Force from Lebanon, nor did we discuss this issue. Rather, in order to save the city, we proposed that the Deterrent Force units stationed in the city withdraw to their positions and that the Lebanese Army enter Beirut. If this proved unable to prevent the Israelis from entering Beirut, we could then use the issue politically.”

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Israeli shelling of areas in West Beirut during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, July 30, 1982.

According to a document, Nabih Berri also informed the Syrian side that “during the meeting, there was heavy shelling of the southern suburbs, which personally affected me—since I considered this shelling a means of putting pressure on the committee—and I asked to leave.”

However, President Sarkis sent for Philip Habib to come to the palace, where he requested an immediate ceasefire and presented the Palestinian issue to Habib and the committee in detail. “At this point, Habib insisted that the resistance must be informed that their armed presence was no longer acceptable and that they must transform themselves into a political organization and end their military status. The questions are as follows:

1. Will the Palestinians agree to remain in Lebanon under Lebanese control?
2. Will there be no independent Palestinian armed force?
3. Lebanese sovereignty over all Lebanese territory without exception.
4. How do the Palestinians envision their immediate future?”

Habib also asked specific questions:

1. Will the leadership remain or not?
2. Will the military units remain here or not?

According to Berri:

“When we negotiated with Abu Ammar, we made it clear to him that we were not a party against him, nor were we trying to extract concessions. We simply wanted to hear from him what he considered appropriate for the interests of his people and his cause.”

The following proposal was then put forward:

“A disengagement under which the Israelis would withdraw 5–8 kilometers and the Palestinians would withdraw to the refugee camps, while the Lebanese Army would deploy to separate the combatants, either on its own or jointly with international forces.”

At the second meeting, this proposal was rejected, and Walid Jumblatt explicitly conveyed, quoting Philip Habib, that the requirement was to hand over the weapons here and that the Palestinian resistance leaders must leave Lebanon.

Berri added, according to the document:

**“Meanwhile, the shelling of our areas intensified and the presence of fighters diminished. Almost the only fighters remaining on the front lines around Hay al-Sullum, the Faculty of Science, and Laylaki [southern Beirut] were Amal Movement fighters. At a private meeting that brought together Walid, Shafic Wazzan, the resistance, and me, I proposed that Walid and I freeze our activities in the Salvation Committee, because we should not act as middlemen [messengers] between Philip Habib and the Palestinians under pressure.

Walid accepted the proposal, and I announced that I was freezing my activities. Twelve hours later, Walid Jumblatt announced his withdrawal rather than merely freezing his activities.

Meanwhile, the French proposal had arrived and was presented at the United Nations. We asked Shafic Wazzan to adopt it, although I already knew that it would not receive the authorities’ approval. The following day I added some observations to it, and the government adopted it, but it was rejected because of the American veto.

As a result of the freezing of the Salvation Committee, Shafic Wazzan resigned. In reality, he did not resign outright but placed his resignation in the hands of the President of the Republic because he knew that I had frozen my participation [in the committee], that Walid had withdrawn, and that Marwan Hamadeh and Khaled Jumblatt had resigned. The man resigned under unprecedented pressure that day. I believe he will return to the government.

The publicly stated positions of Walid Jumblatt, Shafic Wazzan, and Nasri al-Maalouf were good.”**

According to Berri’s report, Abu Ammar wanted a solution to the situation he was experiencing every day. He had felt the difference between yesterday and today, and had agreed to the following measures:

1. Disengagement of the forces.
2. Removal of heavy weapons from Lebanon, while light weapons would remain inside the refugee camps.
3. Establishing a political and media status for the organization consistent with the United Nations proposal.

George Habash, the secretary-general of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, however, believed that “we must fight and continue fighting to the end.”

Berri added:

“I believe Israel will not accept Abu Ammar’s proposals.”

And this was certainly not what George Habash, the secretary-general of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, wanted. Berri said he had learned that the French ambassador had conveyed a message from Philip Habib to the resistance stating that all Palestinian weapons must be handed over to the Lebanese authorities, while the resistance leaders could leave Lebanon with guarantees for resolving the Beirut issue.

• As for Saeb Salam, according to the information available, he discussed this proposal with Abu Ammar.
• The resistance, Amal, and the National Movement were at their strongest state of unity. Everyone had put aside their differences; even Iraqi Baathists had joined the ranks of Amal to fight the common enemy, and all sensitivities had disappeared.

Psychological and morale situation

Overall, the situation in Beirut was complicated. The shelling had cut off electricity and water. The severe siege, together with intimidation by warships and aircraft and the displacement of families to East Beirut, the south, and other areas, had created a degree of collapse.

Military situation

Morale was not high, and the number of fighters had begun to decline rapidly. The ability to continue fighting was weak because the basic military infrastructure of the Deterrent Force, the resistance, and the joint forces had been destroyed.

• The shelling was destructive, from the air, sea, and land, without any ability to respond to it.
• There was a vast disparity between the enemy’s combat capabilities and the capabilities available to all of us.
• There was intense popular pressure on every fighter, reaching excessive levels.
• “We will fight with whatever human resources and weapons remain until victory or martyrdom. In this way, we will inflict heavy losses on the enemy if it attempts to enter Beirut. This may prove useful in the future.”

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Yasser Arafat walks alongside Palestinian leader Saad Sayel and Palestinian fighters in Beirut, June 26, 1982.

According to a Syrian intelligence document from Beirut dated June 30:

“Philip Habib presented a number of points that constitute the basis for a political solution for the city of Beirut:

1. The departure of the Palestinian resistance leadership, together with its fighters, from the city of Beirut, carrying their individual weapons, by whatever route they choose and to whatever destination they select.
2. The withdrawal of all non-Lebanese armed personnel from Beirut, including the removal of the Arab Deterrent Force from the city.
3. The disarmament of Lebanese personnel in the western sector.
4. The Lebanese Army’s entry into West Beirut and the southern suburbs and its assumption of security responsibilities there.
5. Discussions with the Lebanese authorities concerning the future of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, politically and militarily.
6. He stated that he could not wait indefinitely and asked the resistance to set a date for the departure.

— Regarding the first point: There was an unannounced agreement by the Fatah leadership, while the matter was still under discussion among the resistance factions. It should be noted that the political negotiations were confined to Abu Ammar, Hani al-Hassan (a Fatah leader), and Nayef Hawatmeh (Secretary-General of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine). The issue of heavy weapons was also still under discussion with the authorities.

— Regarding the second point: Prime Minister Wazzan replied that the withdrawal of the Deterrent Force required an Arab decision, which was not currently available. Habib replied that this demand concerned the city of Beirut and did not mean withdrawal from Lebanon. The matter remained under discussion.

— Regarding the third point: Prime Minister Wazzan rejected this demand, saying that this was a Lebanese issue and that, if it were to be carried out, it should apply equally to both the western and eastern sectors. The matter remained under discussion.

— Regarding the fourth point: There was no disagreement on this. Prime Minister Wazzan proposed that international observers be stationed alongside the army at the request of the National Movement.

— Regarding the fifth point: Several meetings had taken place between Abu al-Walid (Saad Sayel, a Fatah military commander), Abu al-Za’im (Hazem Ata Allah, a Palestinian security official), representatives of the resistance, Johnny Abdo (Director of Military Intelligence in the Lebanese Army), and several Lebanese military commanders. We learned that there was preliminary agreement on the presence of a Palestine Liberation Organization office and a symbolic military force, the size of which would be determined. The matter remained under discussion, particularly the issue of Palestinian civilian settlements. The authorities were also demanding that the organization’s office be located outside Beirut, a demand rejected by the resistance.

— Regarding the sixth point: There had been no response from the resistance so far.”