Episode 5: Clinton tried to “neutralize” Assad in the face of bombing Iraq by resuming negotiations with Israel

publisher: الشرق الأوسط

AUTHOR: ابراهيم حميدي

Publishing date: 2021-07-01

Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn
WhatsApp

Secret messages between the Syrian and Iraqi presidents revealed the formation of a higher committee that does not discuss political matters due to “lack of trust

In the second half of 1998, Syria found itself secure in its “guardianship” of Lebanon in the west, while also exploring covert channels of communication with Benjamin Netanyahu, the new decision maker in the “Southern Front”. However, Syria faced challenges from the Iraqi conflict in the east and the looming threat of Turkish aggression and military build-up on its northern border. These factors aimed to pressure President Hafez al-Assad into taking action against PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan.

With tensions escalating in Iraq in early 1998, Assad instructed his deputy Abdel Halim Khaddam and Foreign Minister Farouq al-Shara to travel to Cairo and deliver a message to the late Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. According to the minutes of this meeting, which were obtained from Khaddam’s papers by Asharq Al-Awsat, Assad and Mubarak were convinced that Saddam Hussein “would not shy away” from using pretexts to prevent military escalation. As a response, they agreed to send a joint message to Saddam Hussein, explicitly stating that the strike would target him and his regime, emphasizing the necessity of regime change.

As the year drew to a close, the American operation known as “Desert Fox” approached Iraqi territory. Upon examining documents and messages exchanged between Saddam Hussein, Assad, and other leaders, it becomes evident once again that the Iraq issue was connected to other matters, including Syria’s interests. In July 1996, French President Jacques Chirac attempted to persuade Assad to disarm Hezbollah in Lebanon by offering cooperation with Netanyahu to facilitate Israel’s withdrawal from the Golan Heights and ensure Syria’s military presence in Lebanon.

After nearly two years, another opportunity arose from a different perspective and context. Former US President Bill Clinton explicitly presented Assad’s “neutrality” in the face of a strike against Iraq as an opportunity to resume peace negotiations with Netanyahu, picking up where they had left off under Shimon Peres in 1996. During those negotiations, the Syrian President secured Israel’s commitment to a complete withdrawal from the occupied Syrian Golan Heights, returning to the pre-June 4, 1967 borders.

On February 21, 1998, Clinton wrote to Assad, stating, “If we compel Saddam to take military action, it will be crucial for Syria to maintain its commitment to Iraq’s full compliance with United Nations resolutions… I am fully aware of our previous efforts in the Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations, and I am not willing to start from scratch. However, based on my discussions with the Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, I believe that it is still possible, even at this stage, to achieve a peace agreement. Flexibility will be required from both sides.”

In response, Assad replied on March 13, 1998, saying, “You have observed the level of anxiety and tension prevailing in public opinion, especially in the Arab and Islamic worlds, due to the possibility of military action against Iraq, which will only exacerbate the suffering.” He further added, “However, resuming negotiations without picking up where they left off and continuing to build on the progress made in the Syrian track would not only waste five challenging years of American, Syrian, and Israeli efforts but also risk derailing the negotiations.”

The Iraqi crisis emerged as one of the most significant challenges in the region following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. American pressure was mounting, and the scent of escalation in Iraq, along with its fate and unity, was palpable and didn’t require further analysis or research. The main issue revolved around weapons of mass destruction and inspections, which were being conducted by the Monitoring and Inspection Committee appointed by the United Nations Secretary-General.

Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam stated, “Despite numerous warnings from various Arab and foreign parties regarding the true objectives of the American campaign and the need to reassess Iraq’s position to remove pretexts and strengthen its internal, Arab, and international standing, we were not overly concerned about the Iraqi leadership. They have persisted in using the same methods and practices, convinced that the Iraqi masses support them.”

Given the crisis situation, President Hafez Al-Assad contacted President Hosni Mubarak, and they agreed that Khaddam and Foreign Minister Farouq al-Shara would visit Cairo to assess the situation and determine the appropriate position that would minimize harm to Iraq.

On February 17, 1998, Khaddam and Shara met in Cairo with Kamal El Ganzouri, the Egyptian Prime Minister, Amr Moussa, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Osama El-Baz, the Advisor to the President of the Republic for Political Affairs, before their meeting with President Mubarak.

According to the meeting minutes, after exchanging pleasantries, President Mubarak inquired about the current atmosphere, the Iraq problem, the United Nations, and America, as well as the validity of the news regarding the American intention to strike Iraq and the Israeli presence in the Iraqi issue.

Khaddam responded, “Certainly, Israel is involved, Mr. President. In light of these intense campaigns and extensive searches for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, including the presidential palaces, is there more to this for us as Arabs and for the region? The focus on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction is merely an argument, nothing more and nothing less. Moreover, Saddam states that there is nothing there, that the weapons have been destroyed, and that the eight presidential palaces are open to inspection by America and the United Nations. However, the Americans, the British, and others who have joined them insist on implementing international legitimacy and United Nations resolutions, allowing international American inspectors to search for weapons of mass destruction, biological or chemical weapons, and come up with their opinions and theories about their existence and locations.”

The question at hand is whether this ongoing campaign and mobilization, focused on the issue of weapons, truly serves that purpose or if there is another underlying agenda planned in the past and now being implemented. As Arabs in this region, we find ourselves waiting to discern their true intentions.”

President Mubarak interjected, stating, “They only talk about inspections and weapons of mass destruction, but the true objectives of this operation will become apparent later.”

Khaddam continued, “Eventually, these objectives will be revealed, but even now, they seem evident to us. Merely claiming that this campaign, mobilization, and show of force are solely for international security needs and not for war or military strikes is illogical and unreasonable. Do you believe that the Israeli dimension ends with the scope of inspections, or is there a specific program being devised for the region, disguised as mere maneuvers? From our perspective, it suggests that something is being prepared to target a particular regime in this area. Otherwise, how else can we explain these actions in practice?”

At this point, President Mubarak inquired about the necessary steps to address this issue.

Khaddam responded, “Exactly, that is the question that has already been posed. We agree that measures must be taken to address the situation and prevent an escalation.”

President Mubarak concurred, emphasizing the importance of actively dealing with the ongoing developments.

Khaddam responded, “Indeed, there is a conviction among Arab citizens and on the Arab street that what is unfolding is a planned effort by the Americans and Israelis. On one hand, it aims to provide support to Israel, and on the other hand, it aims to assert control and dominance over this region, aligning with the historical trajectory of Israeli ambitions. I hope that we can work together to confront and thoroughly analyze this situation, exploring its possibilities and seeking solutions. This collaboration should involve Amr Moussa, Farouq al-Shara, and myself, allowing us to gain a clear understanding of the situation from all angles.

“I believe our first step should be working together to prevent a devastating military strike on Iraq. This can be achieved by sending a delegation to Iraq, establishing necessary contacts, and extending compassion to the Iraqi people, thereby averting a second catastrophe that would only bring destruction and division to Iraq. I have a message from President Hafez Al-Assad on this matter. Mr. Farooq al-Shara has already spoken to Al-Sahaf, Iraq’s Minister of Foreign Affairs. President Assad has also engaged in discussions concerning this issue. Our positions align in addressing this matter and finding a suitable resolution.”

President Mubarak expressed his gratitude for President Hafez’s message, stating, “Certainly, we must adhere to the content of the Security Council and United Nations resolutions regarding the inspection and destruction of weapons of mass destruction and other armaments. We should cooperate with the inspection mission and not oppose the American inspectors. This approach aims to prevent a military strike, as they claim, taking into account the lessons learned from the previous strike on Iraq.”

Khaddam replied, “Indeed, that is an important point to mention. I am fully confident that no Iraqi delegate would dare to convey such words directly to Saddam.”

Mubarak responded, “This is precisely what has been happening and what occurred during his invasion of Kuwait. We offered advice, but he rejected it, and the consequences we witness today are a testament to that.”

Khaddam remarked, “Absolutely. I reiterate our discussion on the analysis of this pressing issue. If the goal is to create a new map for the region, I believe it will lead to a bleak and ominous future for the Arab world, and we will not be forgiven for it.”

Mubarak acknowledged, “Exactly. This is an important and grave matter.”

Khaddam responded, “After recognizing the danger posed by the planned developments in the region through the Iraqi gateway, we must take action to halt this project on one hand. On the other hand, we need to seriously consider a project that confronts it within the Arab region. The initial and crucial step is to prevent the strike from targeting Iraq. If the strike occurs, the situation will become highly dangerous and unfavorable.”

Osama Al-Baz interjected, “Yes, it will cause confusion among governments. Currently, the average citizen, regardless of their age or location, feels sympathetic towards Iraq. If the strike takes place, as witnessed in the Kuwait war, we will witness the repercussions of that war on the Arab situation, and it will have negative consequences. What are your thoughts? Moreover, we observe Israel conducting strikes, occupying territories, and violating United Nations resolutions without anyone raising a voice against it.”

Khaddam informed President Mubarak of his belief that Saddam Hussein should be openly informed that the strike will specifically target him as a regime and his country. The objective is to bring about a change in the regime, which can only be achieved by striking Saddam. This is how the message should be conveyed to him. President Mubarak agreed with this approach.

Khaddam proposed, “I suggest sending someone to Baghdad to meet with Saddam Hussein, offering advice and warning him to spare Iraq from the strike. One representative should come from Egypt and another from Syria. What is your opinion?”

The discussion then turned to deciding who would go. Prime Minister Kamal Al-Janzouri suggested that the foreign ministers of both countries should be the delegation members, and President Mubarak agreed. Khaddam informed Mubarak that he would discuss the idea with President Hafez to seek his opinion. He added, “We must also keep our brothers in Saudi Arabia informed. President Mubarak agreed to this.”

Khaddam made a phone call to President Al-Assad and presented the idea of sending a delegation to Baghdad. Al-Assad welcomed the idea and emphasized that the delegation should consist of the two foreign ministers, with a clear message to be conveyed.

According to a document from Khaddam, “During the meeting with President Mubarak, we reached an agreement that the message to Saddam Hussein should be clear. The delegation will inform him that Syria and Egypt have thoroughly analyzed the gravity of the situation. All the available data indicate that the American mobilization is serious, and there is an opportunity to prevent a strike. The way forward is to reach an agreement with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, thus gaining the support and sympathy of the international community. We believe that the Iraqi Government should exert every effort to ensure a positive mission for the Secretary-General of the United Nations. It was also decided that the two foreign ministers would travel to Saudi Arabia to inform its leaders about our intentions.” Khaddam added, “In conclusion, the leaders of Egypt and Syria share the view on the seriousness of the situation. They agreed to analyze the causes and objectives of the crisis and stressed the importance of overcoming it to spare Iraq from a military strike.”

Days after the trip to Cairo, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, arrived in Baghdad and engaged in talks with the Iraqi leadership, which resulted in the signing of an agreement where the Iraqi leadership accepted the terms of the Security Council for supervision and inspection. As a result, the storm subsided, but for how long? Have the objectives of the United States changed, or will its methods change?

During this intense crisis between Iraq and the United States, the American administration made several contacts with us in an attempt to neutralize Syria’s position and evoke memories of the 1990 alliance during the Kuwait occupation.

On February 21, 1998, President Clinton sent the following message to President Assad: “As we continue diplomatic efforts to resolve the current crisis between Iraq and the United Nations, I would like to share with you the goals of the United States and my hopes for a peaceful solution to this conflict.

I am aware that Syria, as a member of the coalition in the 1991 Gulf War and a strong advocate for Iraq’s compliance with United Nations resolutions, shares our concern in preventing Saddam Hussein from ever posing a threat to his neighbors again.

The very real regional threat, coupled with compelling evidence that Saddam Hussein is actively trying to enhance his capacity to develop and deploy weapons of mass destruction, underscores the importance of ensuring unrestricted and complete access for Special Commission inspectors to all potential Iraqi weapons sites.

My preference is to achieve a diplomatic resolution to this crisis, and I want to assure you that we have exerted every effort towards that end since the outset of this conflict.

We are now awaiting Saddam Hussein’s response to the proposals put forth by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Kofi Annan. Should these diplomatic efforts prove unsuccessful and the use of force becomes necessary to ensure Iraq’s compliance, the United States stands prepared to launch a substantial strike that will significantly diminish the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction and curtail his ability to menace his neighbors. It should be clear that the destiny of Iraq rests in Saddam’s hands. I believe that Iraq would be more inclined to agree to a peaceful resolution of this conflict if Saddam Hussein is convinced of our readiness for military action. In the event diplomacy fails despite our best efforts and we are compelled to take military action, it will be crucial for Syria to remain committed to Iraq’s full compliance with United Nations resolutions.”

The United States acknowledges and shares your concern for the suffering of the Iraqi people. That is why the United States supports the Security Council’s adoption of measures to significantly increase oil for food, on the condition that we have adequate guarantees to ensure that this humanitarian aid reaches the Iraqi people and does not benefit Saddam’s regime. We agree that safeguarding Iraq’s sovereignty is crucial for regional security and stability. I want you to know that I understand your apprehensions regarding this matter, and I assure you that the United States remains committed to upholding the territorial integrity of Iraq.

In this crisis, our objective is to mitigate the threat posed by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction to its neighboring countries, without seeking the dismantling of Iraq or punishing its people.

Your decision to join the coalition in the 1991 Gulf War played a vital role in strengthening our bilateral relations and fostering progress towards our shared goal of achieving comprehensive peace in the Middle East.

In your letter dated February 2, you mentioned an important point regarding the talks between Syria and Israel, which yielded an agreement on crucial issues central to the peace process. Their significance surpassed the remaining elements of agreement. It is important to note that those talks were conducted with the previous Israeli government. While I acknowledge our past efforts and the need to avoid starting from scratch, based on my discussions with the Prime Minister of Israel, I believe that it is still possible to reach a peace agreement, even at this juncture. Flexibility will be required from both sides to resume negotiations with Israel and achieve our shared objective.

By continuing our collaborative efforts, we can effectively address the renewed threat posed by Saddam Hussein and reinvigorate our pursuit of regional peace.

President Al-Assad sent the following response letter on March 13, 1998:

“Thank you for your letter dated February 21, 1998. I am confident that you are aware of our position on the recent crisis involving Iraq, which emphasizes Iraq’s full compliance with Security Council resolutions, the avoidance of military action, and the preservation of Iraq’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

You have acknowledged the level of concern and tension prevailing in public opinion, particularly in the Arab and Islamic worlds, due to the potential military action against Iraq. This action would only exacerbate the suffering of the Iraqi people without leading to a resolution of the problem. Undoubtedly, you have also observed the sensitivity and dissatisfaction of Arab opinion towards Israel, which possesses nuclear weapons and continues its occupation of Arab territories in contravention of the Security Council resolutions that formed the basis of the peace process, as well as its failure to fulfill the resulting obligations.

Mr. President, we appreciate your statement in your letter that you share our aspiration for a just and comprehensive peace in our region. This is our steadfast desire, based on the terms of reference and the foundations established at the Madrid Conference, in which the United States played a crucial role in drafting and conducting negotiations that yielded significant outcomes, almost culminating in a peace agreement. However, the continued rejection by the current Israeli government of the outcomes achieved through negotiations prevented their realization.

I am committed to collaborating with you to achieve a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East. I want you to know, Mr. President, that if Syria had not demonstrated sufficient flexibility throughout the peace process since the Madrid Conference, this process would not have endured until now, and substantial achievements under your leadership would not have been made. Nevertheless, resuming negotiations without building upon the progress already achieved on the Syrian track would not only disregard the arduous five years of American, Syrian, and Israeli efforts, but also risk derailing the negotiations and reducing them to mere formalities in which the other party does not genuinely seek the desired just and comprehensive peace envisioned by the peoples of the region.”

We wholeheartedly welcome your firm determination to intensify your efforts in achieving a just and comprehensive peace. Without such peace, ensuring the security and stability of our region and effectively safeguarding the shared interests of those truly invested in establishing this peace would be practically impossible.

Saddam Hussein eventually agreed to the demands presented by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Following accusations of non-cooperation with United Nations inspectors and observers, US President Clinton made the decision to bomb Iraq on December 15, 1998. The bombing primarily targeted strategic sites in Baghdad and across Iraq.

On December 19, President Clinton ordered the cessation of the bombing, with Britain as a partner in the decision and air operations.

These operations resonated deeply in the Arab and Islamic worlds, prompting widespread demonstrations. In Damascus, Syrians took to the streets, launching attacks on the American Embassy, lowering the flag, and targeting the Ambassador’s House and the British Ambassador’s headquarters.

In bilateral relations, following the opening of borders, there was increased commercial traffic and mutual visits between concerned ministers and chambers of commerce. Several agreements were signed, particularly during the visit of Syrian Prime Minister Mohammad Mustafa Miro to Baghdad on August 11, 2001. The formation of a joint higher committee between the two countries was the most notable agreement.

The second visit at the level of Chairman of the Supreme Committee was Taha Yassin Ramadan’s visit to Damascus on August 11, 2002, to chair the meeting of the Joint Supreme Committee. During these meetings, the agreements were reviewed, and their stages of implementation were discussed. Trade openness towards Syria increased due to Iraq’s isolation on one hand, Jordanian pressure on the other hand, and Syria’s rejection of the imposed blockade policy on Iraq. This economic openness helped stimulate the Syrian market, as believed by Damascus.

Notably, Khaddam states that the directions given to the Syrian side in all visits and meetings did not include discussions on political relations. The lack of trust between the two sides hindered such discussions. Therefore, political talks during meetings with officials focused on the issue of the siege and working towards its removal.

Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn
WhatsApp

Recent Articles


Khaddam’s memoirs… “letters of love and threats” between Reagan and Assad… America withdraws from Lebanon, Israel retreats, and Syria “is isolated”

2024-10-28

Damascus releases the American pilot amidst shuttle tours of White House envoy Rumsfeld…and Washington foils a secret visit by Hikmat Al-Shihabi In the midst of the U.S.-Syrian military exchanges in Lebanon, President Hafez al-Assad’s illness, Colonel Rifaat’s ambitions for power, and the intensifying Iran-Iraq war, Syrian Foreign Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam met with U.S. Ambassador […]

Khaddam’s memoirs…an American-Syrian clash in Lebanon…and Reagan’s envoy requests a meeting with Rifaat al-Assad after “Mr. President” fell ill

2024-10-27

Khaddam threatens Washington’s ambassador with “immediate expulsion”… and exchange of Syrian-American bombing President Ronald Reagan attempted to contain the crisis with President Hafez al-Assad following the bombing of the “Marines” and the shelling, sending his special envoy, Donald Rumsfeld, to Damascus on November 20, 1983. Rumsfeld, a former Secretary of Defense under President Gerald Ford, […]

Khaddam’s memoirs…the Marine bombing before the Lebanese Geneva dialogue…and America accuses Iran of working “behind the lines” of Syria

2024-10-26

Washington accuses Tehran of being behind the Beirut attacks and criticizes Damascus for “facilitating the Iranian role” Robert McFarlane, Deputy National Security Advisor in the United States, returned to Damascus on September 7, reiterating previous statements about the necessity of a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon to coincide with the Israeli withdrawal. On the 22nd of […]