The late Syrian Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam talks about his recent meeting with “Mr. President” and his talk about “a new corrective movement... not the one you want.”
In early April 1984, Khaddam received an invitation from the Prime Minister of France, Jacques Chirac, to visit France. When President Hafez was informed of the invitation, he said, “We want to find a way to lift Rifaat from the country. I think he should travel instead of you.” Khaddam replied, “No problem for me, and I will ask the Foreign Minister to summon the French ambassador and inform him that Vice President Rifaat will be the one making the visit.”
Indeed, Khaddam informed the Foreign Minister of the matter, and on the second day, the French ambassador came to the Foreign Ministry and informed them that the invitation was directed to Vice President Mr. Abdul Halim Khaddam. After informing President Hafez of the French response, he said, “We will arrange an invitation for Rifaat from the Soviet Union, and he asked me about the topics I had prepared for the visit to France, and I informed him of what had been prepared in this regard.”
One of the conditions of the settlement between President Hafez and his brother Rifaat is that the latter be paid about $500 million
Abdul Halim Khaddam
After communications with Moscow, the Soviets extended an invitation to Rifaat, and he proceeded with the visit. He stipulated that officers Shafiq Fayadh and Ali Haydar accompany him, and his request was accommodated. Also accompanying him on the visit were Brigadier Naji Jameel and the Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa. Khaddam recounts, “It is essential to note that one of the conditions for the settlement between President Hafez and his brother Rifaat was that a large sum of money be paid to him. As I learned, approximately five hundred million dollars were given, a significant portion of which was a loan from Libya.”
Before leaving Damascus, Rifaat remarked in a meeting with his friends, “It seems that my brother no longer loves me; when he sees me, he scowls. But I am not an American agent, and I did not conspire against my country. If I were foolish, I could have destroyed the entire city, but I love this place. My men have been here for eighteen years, and people are accustomed to us; they love us, and now these mercenaries want to expel us.”
On May 28, 1984, a plane filled with officers, including Rifaat, headed to Moscow for a cooling-off period. After the visit to Moscow concluded, Rifaat traveled to Geneva. After a few days, the delegation members left for Damascus, except for Brigadier Naji Jameel, who remained with him.
Khaddam continues: “President Hafez did not take practical measures to liquidate Rifaat’s group in the armed forces, especially in the Defense Brigades. The officers loyal to him remained in their positions, except for those who accompanied him abroad, causing concern and questioning among those who confronted Rifaat and defended the president during his illness.”
Not long after Rifaat left Syria, a regulation was issued deporting a number of company officers from the armed forces
In early July of that year, “I was returning from Bloudan, driving the car. After passing the Saboura area, I saw a car on the right side of the road, positioned at the top of the rise. In front of it was one of the command centers of the Defense Brigades. As I approached it, a strong explosion occurred, and the tires of my car burst. I did not stop and continued driving on the rims for about three hundred meters. The car finally stopped, and my wife and I got into one of the accompanying cars and headed home. The explosion propelled the engine of the exploded car a distance of over two hundred meters due to the force of the blast.”
Upon examining the remaining structure of the car, it was revealed to belong to a lawyer whose house was adjacent to the Security Office of the Defense Brigades. All evidence pointed to accusing the Security of the Brigades of carrying out the explosion using remote-controlled devices, and no one was held accountable, according to Khaddam’s documents.
Not long after Rifaat left Syria, a list was issued to deport several officers from the Defense Brigades outside the armed forces. Additionally, a new commander, Brigadier Hikmat Ibrahim, known for his loyalty to the president, was appointed to lead the Defense Brigades.
Assad invited Khaddam to a meeting in his office during the conference, and Khaddam was surprised by Assad’s remarks about his brother and his continued leadership within the party and his positions. According to Khaddam’s documents:
Assad: “Rifaat is a closed chapter, and he will not return to Syria. I want to keep him in leadership for a certain period, and then he will be removed from the party and the state.”
Khaddam: “This decision will have negative repercussions, especially for you. He rebelled, and you rewarded him, and now you want to maintain him. How will our comrades interpret this stance? They will wonder, if one of them committed what Rifaat did, what would be his fate?”
Assad: “I invite you to gather our military leaders and convince them not to be sensitive about it.”
Khaddam: “I am not convinced, so how do I convince them?”
Assad: “There are circumstances that require this stance. I know well what Rifaat did, and he deserves severe punishment, but using force against him would lead to the death of thousands of people and the destruction of the country. The goal is to uproot the factors of discord before eliminating them. Therefore, I ask you to meet with them and try to calm them down. Collaborate with General Hikmat.”
Khaddam continues: “Indeed, I spoke with General Hikmat, and he had the same concerns. I contacted the officers who needed to meet with him: Ali Doba, Ibrahim Al-Safi, Shafiq Fayadh, Ali Al-Saleh, and Ali Haydar. We agreed to a meeting in General Hikmat’s office. During the lunch break, we headed to General Hikmat’s office, presented the matter, and the reaction was intense. Some spoke harshly, a lengthy discussion ensued, their tempers cooled, and we returned to the conference.”
Al-Assad: I will make a correction movement. The situation in the country is no longer tolerable
Khaddam: This decision is sound, the country needs it, and people can no longer bear it
This is how Brigadier Rifaat continued as the Vice President in the Qatari leadership without attending any meetings. He returned to Syria only on two occasions: the first in 1992, following the desire of his mother, who passed away that year. In 1994, he returned when consoling his brother Hafez after the death of his son Basil. However, he was later dismissed from his position in the army in the same year but continued to hold the position of Vice President before being relieved later.
Khaddam says, “My assessment of President Hafez’s stance was that keeping his brother in the Qatari leadership was a matter of succession… When Rifaat’s role came to an end, he was expelled from the party and dismissed from the position of the Vice Presidency.”
When President Hafez passed away on June 10, 2000, Khaddam ordered the arrest of Rifaat if he attempted to attend the president’s funeral on June 13.
Assad-Khaddam: The Last Meeting
“On January 1, 1987, a decree was issued to form the government under the presidency of agricultural engineer Mahmoud Al-Zu’bi, who also held the position of Speaker of the People’s Council. He continued to lead the government until March 13, 2000. This made his tenure as head of the government the longest in this position since the independence of Syria.
On December 6, 1999, President Hafez called me and invited me to his house at 8:00 PM. The meeting between us lasted from 8:00 PM until 1:00 AM, and this was the last time we met.”
Khaddam says, “The signs of illness and fatigue were evident on his face. Every time I tried to leave, he insisted on staying, as if he felt it was our last meeting. He was friendly, and our conversation about our youth lasted a long time. Then, we shifted to discussing the internal situation and the deteriorating conditions. I reiterated what I had been telling him about the country, and he concluded by saying: ‘I will carry out a corrective movement. The situation in the country is unbearable.’ I commented that this decision is sound, and the country needs it; people can no longer tolerate the situation.”
After that, “We talked about the regional situation, and he asked me about what I expected from the upcoming visit of the U.S. Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, to Syria scheduled in a few days. I replied: ‘I expect her to request a meeting between you and the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak.’ I don’t think you will agree to this, he said, ‘After this age, such a thing is impossible.’ Khaddam answered that the Americans do not expect him (Assad) to accept and that they want a lower level. Assad said, ‘I think their ambition is for the Syrian Foreign Minister to meet with his Israeli counterpart. Does this benefit us or harm us?’ Khaddam responded, according to his notes, ‘I believe their ambition is for the Syrian Foreign Minister to meet with his Israeli counterpart. Does this benefit us or harm us?'”
Khaddam continued, “There have been many direct meetings between the Israelis and the Syrian negotiation delegation in the Madrid Conference and afterward. The matter must be assessed from the angle of interests, and this issue is difficult to estimate until after your meeting with Albright and knowing what it holds. If the meeting is proposed, what is the purpose of the meeting? Do the Israelis intend to respond to our demands for a complete withdrawal from the Golan Heights, or is it just a maneuver? He replied, ‘This is true.'”
At one o’clock after midnight, Khaddam bid him farewell and left.
In early March 2000, an unexpected meeting was held in the Qatari leadership. “We were informed that the president would attend. We headed to the meeting hall, and then the president arrived. His face had become paler, and weakness was apparent. He began to speak hesitantly, saying, ‘I have decided to carry out a corrective movement. The government’s situation is bad, and the country’s situation is bad.'”
Khaddam says he made a remark, and he was close to him, saying, “For a long time, we’ve been telling you that the country needs a corrective movement.” Assad replied to me, dryly, “Abu Jamal, the corrective movement I will carry out is different from the corrective movement you are thinking of.”
Khaddam continues: “Here I said to him, ‘We didn’t discuss this matter in December, and we agreed on the lines. Qasim was next to me and whispered in my ear, ‘Don’t argue with him; he’s exhausted.’ Indeed, I remained silent. Assad continued his speech and said, ‘We will change the government.’ He forgot the name of the new Prime Minister, so Dr. Suleiman Qaddah was asked about the name designated to be the Prime Minister. Dr. Qaddah answered him, ‘Mohammed Mustafa Miro, the governor of Aleppo.’ At this point, the leadership members were stunned because the decision to dismiss Mohammed Mustafa Miro from his position as governor and retire him had been made two weeks earlier.”
Then, some names of ministers were mentioned, and none of the leadership members attempted to discuss because everyone realized that the decision had been made, and the discussion was futile. This is how Mahmoud Al-Zu’bi’s government ended, and he became dedicated to the Qatari leadership until his suicide on May 25, 2000.
Assad passed away on June 10, 2000. Khaddam signed the nomination decrees for Bashar al-Assad for the presidency. Khaddam went to Paris and announced his defection in 2005. Rifaat returned to Damascus in 2022.