Son of the ancient party, he talked about the party’s journey and the leadership that took the forefront during Hafez al-Assad’s rule, considering the individuals who remained with Assad after the party’s division to be of the second and third tier.
Abdul Halim Khaddam, who extensively discussed the Lebanese civil war, said that the late leader Kamal Jumblatt had a 6-hour conversation with the late President Hafez al-Assad in order to reach an agreement to stop the Lebanese civil war. However, the result of the discussion was without an agreement.
He said, “If Syria had agreed to Jumblatt’s request for arms supply, Israel would have entered the Lebanese civil war.” He emphasized that Syria was concerned about Israel’s actions in Lebanon, considering Lebanon as a soft flank towards Damascus.
Khaddam rejected any accusations against him regarding supporting normalization with Israel, considering anyone who speaks about this matter as either crazy or ignorant of Abdul Halim Khaddam’s history in Syrian foreign policy.
Now, diving into the details of the dialogue:
Were you the only Sunni close to Assad?
No, I wasn’t the only Sunni in the government. The majority were Sunnis. However, I was the only influential Sunni in Hafez al-Assad’s decisions.
The problem that emerged afterward was that the party split after the November Movement. A portion was with us, and another portion was against us, aligned with the previous leadership. When we chose a temporary Qatari leadership, the choice practically came from the second and third ranks in the party. There was a difference in terms of experience and expertise. A new generation came into leadership and governance. There were setbacks, which were natural in such circumstances.
How was your influence on Hafez al-Assad?
Firstly, in personal interactions with the man in reality. We’ve known each other since 1947, and we are from the same region in Latakia.
Secondly, when I addressed an issue, I studied it comprehensively from various angles and presented it in a way that left no opportunity or gap for debate. Hafez al-Assad was primarily occupied with domestic issues and reorganizing the army.
Does that mean you had absolute discretion in foreign policy?
No, of course not. There’s no doubt that Hafez al-Assad had a role in foreign policy because he was the head of state. Decisions couldn’t be made without his agreement. However, I formulated policies, proposed decisions, and discussed projects with him.
You were the Foreign Minister and had a significant role in the Arab region, particularly in the Lebanese file. You negotiated with Kamal Jumblatt during the civil war?
Kamal Jumblatt was a friend of Syria, and undoubtedly a nationalist. When the Lebanese civil war erupted, we decided to put an end to it. Its continuation could lead to Israel’s intervention, as many Lebanese were cornered by nationalist forces. They had no option but to turn to Western countries or Israel. We feared these groups would seek help from Israel. This became a concern for us because if Israel entered the area, it would take all of Lebanon and be on Syria’s southern border from Tripoli in the north to the Jordanian border. This was against our interests and would harm Lebanon as well. We didn’t aspire to annex Lebanon or achieve unity with it. We considered unity with Mauritania before Lebanon because we knew Lebanon’s situation was complex, and we shouldn’t get involved in decisions that would further complicate the region.
Kamal Jumblatt, may he rest in peace, was obstinate in rejecting a ceasefire. We had many differences. I met him several times along with Emad Hakim and Naji Chamie, but he insisted on continuing the war without negotiations.
One night, Yasser Arafat called me at midnight and said, “I saw Kamal and he wants to visit Syria. He agrees to end the matter with President Hafez al-Assad.”
Did Yasser Arafat succeed where you failed with Kamal Jumblatt?
This is where the crux lies. I discussed the matter with Hafez al-Assad, and he told me, “Make sure with Abu Ammar if what he said is true.” I called Yasser Arafat and asked him, “Are you sure about what Jumblatt told you?” Yasser Arafat replied, “God forbid, when I talked to you, I was outside his house.” I told him, “Then welcome.” Kamal Jumblatt came and met with President Hafez al-Assad for six hours. Hafez al-Assad talked about stopping the war and holding a national conference, while Kamal Jumblatt said, “Mr. President, if possible,could you provide us with some cannons and ammunition?”
Of course, he was asking for weapons to continue the war, to eliminate the Maronites, and to liberate Bekaa, Jezzine, and the remaining Christian areas.
After six hours, they left without an agreement. We rejected his demands, and had we accepted, Israel would have entered Lebanon directly.
On January 21, 1976, an agreement was reached to cease fire. However, Israel managed to enter Lebanon in a later stage.
Did you create or at least contribute to the formation of governments in Lebanon?
Practically, all the governments formed in Lebanon were friendly to Syria. Therefore, all political issues related to security were managed between the Syrian army leadership in Lebanon and the Lebanese military authorities. Relations related to security policies and general policies were discussed between us and the Lebanese President and Prime Minister. Thus, Lebanon’s foreign policy aligned with Syria’s foreign policy. When an Arab conference or meeting was held, Lebanon adopted the Syrian stance immediately. This was the reality.
Did you attempt to push Syria towards normalizing with Israel during your time in power?
I closed all doors to Israel and stood against its ambitions. I was its biggest enemy. So, how could I push for normalization with it? Anyone speaking in such a way is one of two: either mad or harboring resentment and has his own motives. No one can tarnish my patriotism and national work.