According to notes published by Asharq Al-Awsat, it has been reported that the Americans warned Syria against utilizing Saddam Hussein to launch an attack.
There was an impression that the removal of General Michel Aoun from the Palace of Baabda in October 1990 was carried out in a deal between Damascus and Washington. It was decided that Syria would contribute some of its forces to the operation to thwart the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in exchange for its mandate to remove Aoun and gain control over Lebanon. At the end of 1989 and the beginning of 1990, a series of diplomatic contacts took place between Damascus and Washington, including the exchange of letters between former US President George H.W. Bush, his Secretary of State James Baker, and the late President Hafez Al-Assad, his deputy Abdel Halim Khaddam, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Farouq al-Shara. In this episode of his memoirs, chapters of which are published by Asharq Al-Awsat, Khaddam reviews the details of this correspondence, Assad’s meetings with Lebanese President Elias Hraoui before the military operation against Aoun on October 13, 1990, after laying the groundwork bilaterally and internationally, and Syria’s contribution to the liberation of Kuwait. On November 29, Shara told Djirjian, “Aoun is a rebel. The state has the right to deal with him on this basis. Obstructing the state’s efforts to end his rebellion means continuing the crisis in Lebanon and the ongoing bleeding.” In December 1989, Shara received a letter from Bush to Assad, informing him of “the latest developments in the situation in Lebanon and the contacts we have made to normalize the situation, support Lebanese legitimacy represented by the new Lebanese president Hrawi and the government of (Salim) Al-Hoss, and remove obstacles that prevent the implementation of the Taif Document.” In his letter, Bush stated, “It has become clear to all that General Aoun is the main obstacle to strengthening the new legitimate authority, restoring the unity of Lebanon, and implementing the Taif Agreement.”
On the other hand, French envoy Francois Scheer, who visited Damascus on November 28 and conveyed a message from President Francois Mitterrand, acknowledged that General Aoun is an obstacle in Lebanon and that all contacts made with him to support the Taif Agreement and comply with the new legitimate authority in Lebanon have not succeeded, despite the efforts of the French government to continue convincing him to do so. However, the French government believes in using peaceful means to persuade Aoun to abandon his positions.
On August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait, causing a major earthquake in the region and shifting priorities. The invasion and its potential consequences captured the attention of the Arab world, including Syria, turning the focus towards the Gulf. Undoubtedly, the new situation weakened Aoun, who was supported by the Iraqi government, and some Arab countries sympathized with him due to Iraqi pressure. The invasion created further complications for Michel Aoun.
On August 29, President Hafez al-Assad received President Hraoui. According to the meeting minutes, Hraoui expressed gratitude to Syria for helping overcome the constitutional crisis by approving constitutional reforms, despite some Lebanese claiming the problem in Lebanon is external. He reviewed the situation leading up to the Taif Agreement, in which Syria played a major role. Hraoui emphasized that Taif is not exactly what they desired, but rather a settlement to end the war, and that the implementation of the Taif Agreement marks a significant step forward.
Hraoui inquired about addressing the situation and mentioned that the government issued a statement on July 11, which received support. He discussed the contacts with Aoun, despite objections from some politicians, noting that these contacts have not yielded any results. He expressed concern that Aoun continues to complicate the situation and emphasized the need for Aoun to put an end to his actions in order to complete the reforms. Additionally, Hraoui highlighted the role of the state in this regard.
He emphasized that Aoun’s continued presence is a significant problem, and it remains uncertain when the events in the Gulf will conclude, especially considering the prolonged involvement of the Americans.
Al-Harawi further elaborated:
“At our meeting in Cairo, you gave us the green light. General Shihabi and General Bayraqdar came to meet us. We had several discussions. Lahoud will deploy eight thousand soldiers. Bayraqdar assured Lahoud, ‘We will provide you with artillery, ammunition, and weapons.’ Our hope is to remove Aoun, and I believe that a show of strength alone will lead to his collapse.”
Dr. Salim Al-Hoss commented on how Aoun’s presence contradicts everything, as Aoun is banking on the situation in the region.
Assad inquired, “After Aoun, will there be no more issues?” Al-Harawi responded, “His departure marks the beginning of a solution, and we will proceed with the formation of a new ministry.” Assad then asked, “Do the other factions, like the Lebanese forces, not require military efforts?”
Hraoui replied, “With your assistance, we can resolve matters with Walid Jumblatt and Nabih Berri. The issue lies with Geagea.”
I interjected into the conversation, discussing Geagea’s maneuvers, messages, and divisive positions.
Assad spoke again, stating, “We live alongside you and share your thoughts and sentiments. I am not against your desires. My impression is that the French stance is not favorable. It is necessary to contact them to understand their true position. They are obligated to provide assistance. Our concern for a speedy resolution is no less than yours. The situation in the region is grave. Thus, our sense of urgency in finding a solution is as strong as ever. Lebanon’s problem remains of utmost importance to us. However, there is an unusual convergence of interests among regional states, and each country has its own challenges.
There is the Iraq problem, which raises numerous explanations and questions. Syria’s position has not changed regarding any issue. Others are discussing Iraq as we used to discuss it. Some countries hope that other problems will not impact their political or military arrangements, such as the United States concerning Iraq and Kuwait.”
You are aware of our commitment. We deployed troops and refrained from withdrawing them to avoid giving the impression of a retreat. There are numerous reasons why we must conclude this swiftly. We are determined not to disrupt the stability achieved through the Taif Agreement. The involvement of the Lebanese Army is crucial as it represents the physical manifestation of the movement. We would appreciate understanding the global sentiment and your perspective since certain world powers are currently apprehensive about disrupting their strategies.”
Hraoui responded, “You raised two issues. Firstly, do we require military action to resolve the Aoun situation? Once we handle Aoun with the Lebanese Army in cooperation with Syria, everyone will cooperate, and resistance will cease. Regarding the external front, I have an employee from the Foreign Ministry named Tony Shadid who was summoned two days ago to the American Embassy in Damascus. He shared with me the minutes of his meeting with Djerjian, who visited Minister Sharia. Sharia expressed firmness, while Djerjian was hesitant. Tony replied to him, ‘The state has made its decision, and we will seek Syria’s assistance.’ Djirejian responded that it is the responsibility of the Lebanese government.”
“I contacted our ambassador in Washington to inquire about the matter, but he had no information. He mentioned his visit to the National Security Council to gather updates on the Gulf situation. We discussed the situation in Lebanon, and the ambassador informed me that Bush was content with the approved reforms. Naseeb Lahoud informed him that Harawi would resolve the Aoun issue. The American responded, ‘Will you seek Syrian assistance?’ Lahoud replied, ‘Yes.’ The American then stated, ‘We wonder if Syria is willing to help. Perhaps Syria wishes to maintain its positive image in the West and contribute an army to the Gulf for the liberation of Kuwait.'”
I interjected into the conversation, saying, “The current situation in the region is complex. Iraq has invaded Kuwait, leading to the formation of an international coalition to expel them. The possibility of war is grave. As the Americans have informed us, they are concerned about France withdrawing from the coalition if military operations commence in Lebanon, and the Gulf states are also worried. Initiating military action in Lebanon now raises concerns among certain Gulf countries as they fear it may impact the liberation of Kuwait.”
At the conclusion of the meeting, Assad pledged to thoroughly analyze the situation in light of regional and international developments.
After the meeting, the situation in Lebanon escalated as Aoun implemented measures against other areas in the country. The Lebanese government made the decision to impose a siege on the area under his control. Despite attempts made by the Arab Committee and various Lebanese figures, no successful resolutions were reached with Aoun.
On October 7, 1990, I contacted the American ambassador in Damascus. The following is a summary of our conversation, as documented in the minutes. The ambassador began by stating, “I have the mail, if I can give you the results of the meetings in New York and Washington. Regarding Lebanon, Mr. Vice President, Foreign Minister Sharaa may have already briefed you on the matter. However, I would like to discuss it directly with you, as you specifically requested me to call Washington regarding the issue of Lebanon. I have reported our conversation to Washington and received the following response: During Sharaa’s meeting with Secretary of State Baker, he discussed an initiative that entailed the possibility of using military force against General Aoun. However, Baker reminded Sharaa that the topic of Lebanon had been discussed in a general sense with President Assad, and the issue of a military solution was not addressed.”
Khaddam confirmed, saying, “That is true.” The ambassador continued, “According to reports and information, Baker may have mentioned this topic in his discussions with President Assad, but it is not accurate. Baker told Sharaa that they want to postpone or set aside any proposals related to pursuing this matter further if Sharaa shared a similar viewpoint. Baker stated that any military action by Syria against Aoun could be misinterpreted and potentially exploited by Saddam. Sharaa informed Baker that there is no misunderstanding between the United States and Syria regarding the situation. Syria sees the matter in the same way as Baker described. As you mentioned, Mr. Vice President, it is currently not feasible for Syria to shift its focus from the ongoing events in the Gulf. As Sharaa conveyed to Baker during our discussions, the possibility of a military solution may arise through Hraoui or the Lebanese forces. Sharaa assured Baker that the opinions and viewpoints of the United States would undoubtedly be taken into account.”
The ambassador continued, stating, “Sharaa informed Assistant Secretary of State Kelly that either Harawi or the army commander would undertake any military action, provided that they receive Syria’s support. In other words, if they decide to engage in military action, they would like Syria’s backing for such an operation.
Baker assured Assad, as President Hrawi had assured him, of the United States’ support for the legitimate Lebanese government. He emphasized that the Lebanese should carefully consider resorting to acts of violence. Baker warned them that any action involving Syria could divert attention from the Gulf, potentially leading to opposition from France and the Vatican against the Taif Agreement. Therefore, Assad advised the Lebanese to seek consultation to prevent France and the Vatican from taking advantage of the situation. Kelly stated, ‘When we inquired about the possibility of resorting to military action, we made it clear that the United States is not inclined to give the green light for such an operation, despite our agreement that Aoun is an obstacle.’ Kelly also reassured Sharaa that the United States has no reason to support military action. He highlighted the recent political progress made by the Lebanese government and emphasized that we have not indicated any support for Aoun. Our goal is for him to step down.”
Khaddam responded, saying, “In any case, the Lebanese government holds a different view of the American position. Dr. Al-Hoss, the Lebanese Prime Minister, and President Hraoui have clearly concluded that the American government has no objections and is in favor of the Lebanese government. However, from our perspective, we now believe that the current circumstances are not suitable due to the situation in the Gulf. Yet, the biggest challenge we face is the promotion by Aoun, his group, and other factions in Lebanon, claiming that Syria does not want Aoun’s removal. In practice, this goes against the Taif Agreement, despite the fact that we issue numerous statements daily expressing our support for Taif and legitimacy in Lebanon. We have exhausted all efforts to convince the Lebanese that we stand for legitimacy. However, there remains significant confusion regarding Syria’s position.”
I mentioned that some parties had requested Hraoui to suspend the Taif Agreement, to which the Ambassador commented that America is opposed to it. I said, “I understand the American position, but considering Aoun’s refusal to step down, the economic collapse, political turmoil, and differences among government ministers, the situation has become very dire. Our concern is that the Lebanese government may decide to take military action and officially request assistance from Syria, in line with the implementation of the Taif Agreement. This is something we are afraid of. Another concern is the potential collapse of legitimacy. Therefore, I believe it would be beneficial for the Ambassador to directly contact a representative of the Lebanese government and clearly communicate the American position.”
The Ambassador responded, “I will contact the representative of the Lebanese government tomorrow and convey the complete American position to eliminate any misunderstandings. We will assure the Lebanese that we have always been supportive and do not intend to criticize or cause annoyance. However, I prefer to engage with the Lebanese leadership through direct discussions. I have confidence in the representative that Hraoui will send, but face-to-face conversations are irreplaceable. I am working and hoping for our ambassador to return to Lebanon so that daily exchanges of views can take place. This is important, particularly for the Lebanese people, as I have known them for years. Regular communication is necessary to keep them on the right track. While I am here with my papers and credentials in Syria, enabling easy access to President Assad, I unfortunately do not have the time to meet with Hraoui. However, my government allows me to meet with Hoss, and that is the right approach. I will ensure that important matters are documented in writing, and I will personally draft them to be delivered by Harawi’s personal representative. This is the best approach, and I appreciate your input, hoping that the situation becomes clearer.”
Considering the evolution of the situation in Lebanon and the Gulf crisis, there have been discussions regarding the possibility of military action that the Lebanese government insists on. Several meetings have taken place at the military level between Syrian and Lebanese military personnel. All necessary preparations have been made to execute this action. We have informed the Lebanese government that Syrian participation requires a formal request from Lebanon in order to act within the boundaries of legitimacy and to prevent any future confrontations. It is worth noting that we entered Lebanon in 1976 at the request of President Suleiman Franjieh and the Lebanese Front. However, months later, the front turned against Syria and engaged in combat operations against our forces. We have observed that the United States is fully engaged in the Gulf, which limits its capacity to oppose us or provoke Israel, as any Israeli action would undermine the Gulf process.
On October 9, 1990, I received Mr. Fares Bouez, the envoy of President Hrawi, who delivered a letter addressed to me and another to President Assad. The letter expressed readiness to end the Aoun rebellion.
It is important to note that during the Cabinet discussions on the matter, there was objection to the use of force. Despite the disagreement, a decision was made and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hraoui, signed the letter requesting Syrian assistance on behalf of the government.
On the morning of October 13, Syrian forces, in conjunction with the Lebanese army, initiated a massive attack on the area controlled by Aoun. The attack was preceded by artillery and air strikes. At 9:30 am, Aoun announced his surrender to legitimacy and sought refuge at the French Embassy, leaving his wife and two daughters behind. Our soldiers treated them with dignity and kindness. By noon, the entire area was under our control. This marks the conclusion of Aoun’s reign
This is how the rebel general’s story came to an end. Following several days of negotiations, an agreement was reached between the Lebanese government and the French ambassador to deport Aoun to France under certain conditions, one of which was not to return to Lebanon before a specified period.
Mr. President,
General Hafez Al-Assad, may God protect him.
Greetings.
In continuation of our previous discussions, which have covered the general situation in Lebanon, particularly the abnormal circumstances arising from the rebellion and insubordination of the former army commander against the legitimate authority,
I would like to refer to the recent Syrian-Lebanese summit. The summit, attended by esteemed individuals from the Lebanese side, including the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Mr. Hussein Al-Husseini, and the Prime Minister, Dr. Salim Al-Hoss, addressed the ongoing rebellion and negative actions of the former army commander. Discussions also revolved around the necessary measures and procedures to put an end to the insurgency, halt the bleeding in Lebanon, and pave the way for the legitimate authority to lead the path of salvation, reconciliation, and peace.
I am pleased to inform you that on the 9th of this month, the Council of Ministers thoroughly deliberated on all these matters and unanimously reaffirmed their previous decisions, empowering the Lebanese Army to suppress the rebellion of the former army commander. Furthermore, they earnestly appeal to you, in accordance with the document of national reconciliation and the strong brotherly relations between Syria and Lebanon, to issue your orders to the Syrian Arab forces stationed in Lebanon, instructing them to support the Lebanese Army in fulfilling the entrusted mission.
I have great confidence, Mr. President, that your swift response to this request exemplifies your unwavering determination to contribute effectively to the salvation of Lebanon and the realization of the aspirations and hopes of the Lebanese people for a secure, peaceful, and stable homeland. A healthy and prosperous Lebanon will serve as a shield to protect brotherly Syria under your wise leadership, which consistently provides immense support, especially during challenging times when assistance is needed.
May God protect you, Mr. President, and guide your steps to honor the brotherly Syrian people and promote the interests of our two countries and the Arab world.
Peace be upon you.
Your brother,
Elias Hraoui
Mr. Abdel Halim Khaddam, Vice President of the Syrian Arab Republic,
Greetings.
I am pleased to provide you with a copy of the decision made by the Council of Ministers during its meeting today, which addresses the urgent need to put an end to the abnormal situation caused by the rebellion of the former army commander. The decision also calls for the support of the Syrian Arab Army forces to assist the Lebanese Army in executing the assigned mission.
It is my hope that the successful completion of this mission will contribute to the restoration of stability, reconciliation, and peace in Lebanon, with the invaluable support of our sister country Syria, under the leadership of His Excellency President Hafez Al-Assad.
With sincere emotions and best wishes,
Your brother,
Elias Hraoui
