The regime in Damascus is described as ignorant, reckless, and unable to distinguish between what benefits the country and what harms it. Among Assad’s major mistakes are extending Lahoud’s term, the assassination of Hariri, and using Hezbollah to stir up the situation in Lebanon.
The Syrian regime is ungrateful and bears responsibility for the tension with Riyadh and Cairo and for falling into Iran’s embrace.
Former Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam confirmed in an interview with Al-Watan that the crisis between the Syrian regime and Saudi Arabia is the responsibility of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, contrary to what former Vice President Farouk al-Sharaa tried to portray as a personal matter. Khaddam pointed out that Saudi Arabia had provided Bashar al-Assad with advice, particularly concerning the Lebanese issue, because Saudi Arabia, like everyone else, knows that Bashar al-Assad is involved in Lebanon and that continued involvement will affect Syria as a country. According to Khaddam, the Syrian regime is implicated in the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, which will cause significant damage not only to the Syrian regime but also to the Syrian people and the future of Syria. Khaddam believes that Syria cannot remain isolated from the Arab states
- Former Syrian Vice President Farouk al-Sharaa attempted to personalize the deterioration in relations between Saudi Arabia and Syria during his response to a question on this matter during his meeting with the National Front parties in Syria. Do you share this view? Have relations between countries reached a personal level without considering the interests of nations and peoples?
- The greatest calamity that has befallen Syria and afflicted this country is the presence of an ignorant and reckless leadership. A leadership incapable of distinguishing between what benefits Syria and what harms it, and incapable of making a correct assessment of history and reality, whether this reality is Syrian, Arab, or international. This leadership has caused severe suffering for the Syrian people and committed major errors: it impoverished the country, worsened its economic crises, and the vast majority of Syrians have fallen below the poverty line. Their standard of living has declined, and unemployment has spread among the Syrian people, with 6 million Syrians now unemployed. Despite this, this leadership does not see what is happening or what it is doing within the country. This means it has inflicted damage on Syria and then committed major errors in Arab and international politics.
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- What are the mistakes that Saudi Arabia tried to help Bashar al-Assad avoid?
- First, in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia was aware of the imminent danger to Lebanon, the potential for internal situation to explode, and the possibility of a return to civil war in the country. Its concern for Lebanon and its stability led it to advise Bashar al-Assad to act rationally toward Lebanon. The kingdom advised him specifically for Syria’s sake because Saudi Arabia, like everyone else, knew that Bashar al-Assad was involved in Lebanon and that continued involvement would affect Syria as a country. Saudi Arabia wanted to protect Syria from Bashar al-Assad’s mistakes by providing advice because continuing this path would undoubtedly cause significant damage not only to Bashar al-Assad’s regime but also to the Syrian people and the future of Syria. Syria cannot remain isolated from Arab countries. The fundamental principle upon which this regime was established on November 13, 1970, was to achieve Arab solidarity, avoid Arab disputes, and work towards forming an Arab partnership.
Now what do we see? Instead of moving towards Arab partnership, the direction has shifted to another type of partnership. Therefore, I say that the problem is not personal but a problem caused by the Syrian regime. Saudi Arabia wanted to protect Lebanon and Syria through its positions. Unfortunately, Syria, as mentioned, is afflicted with a regime that is ignorant, reckless, and foolish.
- In your opinion, why did Saudi Arabia withdraw its support from Bashar al-Assad now after having supported him for so long, as you say?
- The kingdom bet on dialogue with Assad. It did not withdraw its support initially. It believed that through dialogue and discussion, Assad could be persuaded to retract his reckless and dangerous policies. The kidnapping of the two Israeli soldiers was not a coincidence. This kidnapping was planned in Damascus in a meeting between Hassan Nasrallah and a senior Syrian security officer just a few days before the operation. The kidnappers, or those who decided to carry out the kidnapping, knew that a war would follow, considering that when Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit was kidnapped in Gaza, Israel responded harshly and killed hundreds of Palestinians in retaliation. Therefore, Hezbollah had to anticipate an Israeli response.
What did Hassan Nasrallah say? He said: We carried out a preemptive operation because we knew Israel was preparing to launch a war against us in a few months. After the war ended, he said: If I had known the results, I would not have carried out the kidnapping. So, the kidnapping was originally designed to achieve a specific result. This result gave Hezbollah popular support through its steadfastness and Israel’s failure to make significant inroads into Lebanese territory. This popular support was utilized by Bashar al-Assad in two ways: first, to use this war as leverage in negotiations with Israel, and second, to employ Hezbollah’s victory to push the party from the south to the north and to Beirut, aiming to create the current situation in Lebanon. Let’s recall the dates: Bashar al-Assad gave speeches attacking a group of Lebanese, accusing them of being Israeli agents and claiming that the Lebanese people would overthrow this government, which was supposedly conspiring… and so on.
Then, two weeks later, Hassan Nasrallah delivered a fiery speech, more intense than any he had ever given even against the Israelis, directing a series of accusations and hostility towards his Lebanese partners. Why? The goal of overthrowing the government was to disrupt the international tribunal, and the July war was the means to achieve that goal.
Naturally, the Lebanese were surprised by the kidnapping because Nasrallah had promised at the dialogue table that the summer would be calm to boost the economy and support tourism. The Arabs were surprised as well. There is no country in the world where a party, group, or certain segment can decide on war and peace without involving others. This effectively amounts to the abolition of the state. The Lebanese were shocked but concealed their surprise due to the war; they embraced the displaced and the resistance. On the political front, they were more active against Israel than on the military front. The international mobilization by the Lebanese against Israel was immense.
The Arabs were surprised, the Syrians were surprised, and as for him (Bashar al-Assad), instead of dealing with the issue logically and calling for Lebanese unity, de-escalation, and cooperation, he called for escalating tensions and launched a campaign against Arab governments, accusing them of defeatism and passivity while he remains steadfast and defiant. At the same time, he is unwilling to fire a single shot in the Golan. He, in the end, lifted the Arab cover from himself. I ask him: What have you done to allow yourself to accuse others? How can you claim to be resistant and steadfast while your people are oppressed and suffocated? Syria is a prison, and a prisoner does not defend his prison or his jailer.
The Syrian regime bears responsibility for the tension. The campaign that focused particularly on Saudi Arabia and Egypt involves a sort of ingratitude and an insult to Syria itself. The Syrian people cannot navigate the waters of Tehran’s strategy. Before Bashar al-Assad, there was serious cooperation between us and Iran. I was one of those who played a key role in shaping Syrian-Iranian policy. But it was cooperation within the framework of mutual interests. The cooperation was initially directed against Saddam Hussein. And there was one thing the Iranians knew: that the security of the Gulf Arab states is a red line for us.
When Iran targeted a Saudi oil tanker in 1985, King Fahd, may he rest in peace, sent a message to President Hafez al-Assad carried by the late Rafik Hariri, stating: We are capable of responding… but we do not want to expand the war, and we want Syria to play a role in stopping the tensions. Indeed, we discussed this with President Hafez al-Assad and agreed to send a message to King Fahd, which I dictated to Rafik Hariri, summarizing that Syria stands with Saudi Arabia and places its forces at the kingdom’s disposal. I personally went to Tehran the next day and met with then-President Ali Khamenei, who was understanding of the Syrian position. The issue was resolved, and things calmed down. After a while, tensions resurfaced, so we sent the foreign minister, and the Iranians understood and realized that the Gulf issue is fundamental and vital for us. Even during that period, there were disagreements with Tehran, such as on the stance towards Iraq. We and the Iranians agreed to resist any change in Iraq unless it resulted in a government that had good relations with Syria, Iran, and neighboring countries. We adhered to this. However, we were surprised when Iran’s allies from Iraqi parties and figures cooperated with the Americans. The London Conference in 2002 covered the war, and Iran’s allies became partners with Bremer in Iraq and entered the Governing Council and the Iraqi government.
We understand that Iran has a strategy in Iraq, but we cannot agree with it because we absolutely do not support Iraq being part of or under the dominance of any foreign or Arab country. Iraq has the right to be an independent country and part of the Arab system. It is true that every country gives up part of its sovereignty to this system. But for Iraq to become a link in Iran’s or anyone else’s strategy, this is something no one can tolerate. Hence, I believe that most Arab governments realized the gravity of the situation and tried to warn the Syrian leadership, but these attempts failed. In my opinion, communications between Cairo and Damascus continued until recently in an attempt to persuade Bashar al-Assad to adopt a rational approach. He now bears the consequences of the tension he caused.
- This leads us to the Arab axis between what is called the moderate Arabs and the hardliners according to the American classification?
- It is a misleading and incorrect term. There is a disagreement in the Arab world about our understanding of Arab interests. Some Arab countries believe that Arab interests lie in economic cooperation, political and security coordination, and so on. Others understand it through slogans and fiery speeches. But in the end, if we consider the Syrian regime to be hardline, and if we set aside the chants and speeches, let’s ask: What has this regime done regarding regional issues? Is it hardline against Israel? Is it hardline against the United States? Is it hardline against Europe? It is crawling to engage in dialogue with them. A hardliner does not seek dialogue.
A hardliner has a cause. So, what cause does Bashar al-Assad propose? Does he raise the issue of the Golan?
Not at all. He raises the issue of how to return to Lebanon, not how to return the Golan to Syria.
Where is the hardline stance? In Iraq? Did he take a hardline stance against the Americans in Iraq? He handed Saddam Hussein’s brother to the Americans. He expelled Saddam Hussein’s children, who were killed two weeks later. He expelled Saddam Hussein’s family from Syria. Hardline against the United States in Iraq? He sent his foreign minister to Baghdad. What did the latter do? He said: We support the political process, we are against terrorism, and so on. So where is the hardline stance? Is hardline stance just about empty slogans shouted here and there? There is no hardline stance, but rather submission.
- Where is the Syrian opposition now, and what is your role in uniting this opposition, especially in communicating with the Muslim Brotherhood?
- The Syrian opposition has made significant progress this year. A year ago, the opposition was suffocated in Syria, as the Syrian security regime left no room for people to express even a single word. Prisons were open, and anyone who wrote an article displeasing to the regime was immediately sent to prison, and so on. However, this year, a group of Syrian currents and figures managed to form the National Salvation Front, which includes nationalist currents, liberal currents, the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as our Kurdish brothers. We established a charter and a set of programs that we are implementing. We have moved to work internally and are working to form groups aimed at reaching a stage where the Syrian people can achieve change. We are confident and optimistic that this regime is on the verge of collapse.
- What do you rely on to bring down this regime? Do you rely on external forces, such as the United States? And does the outside world, meaning the United States and other countries that want to overthrow the Syrian regime, rely on you?
- We rely on the Syrian people and do not seek to effect change through external intervention, because external intervention carries significant risks. We are still seeing what is happening in Iraq. We strive and work to ensure that the change is national and Syrian. It is natural that we will use external pressures and always call on the international community to apply pressure on this regime, which leaves no opportunity for repression unused.
- Are you not worried about the US-Syrian rapprochement, especially after the Baker-Hamilton report on Iraq?
- If we analyze US policy deeply, we find that there are no factors driving rapprochement. The Baker report examined all the problems that do not lead to solving the Americans’ issue in Iraq. The purpose of the report is for the Americans to say that they have studied, analyzed, and advised, etc.
- What are these errors, for example?
- Among its major mistakes are what has happened and is happening in Lebanon: extending Lahoud’s term (the Lebanese president), the assassination of Hariri (Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri), and using Hezbollah and Syrian intelligence agents to inflame the situation in Lebanon and bring it to the brink of explosion in hopes of disrupting the international investigation. The second major sin committed by the Syrian regime is the alliance with Iran and putting Syria at the service of Iran’s regional strategy. The natural result of this is a targeted campaign against Arab governments and accusations. All of this is intentional, aimed at severing Syria’s ties with the Arab world. Bashar al-Assad signed a mutual defense treaty with Iran and established close security relations between Iranian and Syrian security agencies. There is an Iranian Revolutionary Guard office in Syria, and there is daily coordination on issues related to Lebanon and Iraq. Thus, he (Bashar al-Assad) has led the regime to a state of estrangement from the Arab world. This has raised significant concern among the Syrian public, especially as the campaign targeted Saudi Arabia. Historically, the Syrian people hold Saudi Arabia in high regard for its support of Syria under all circumstances, both politically and economically.
Saudi Arabia even supported Bashar al-Assad himself. For a while, Saudi Arabia covered for him under the pretext that changes in Syria might cause disturbances in the country. The aid provided by Saudi Arabia to Syria as a country and to the Syrian regime was substantial. This campaign comes within a regional context linking Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, separate from the Arab situation. Therefore, Farouk al-Sharaa’s claim that the problem is personal indicates stupidity. He wants to downplay the severity of the crisis with Saudi Arabia and pretends that it is a simple personal issue that will be resolved tomorrow or the day after. But the truth is that the problem exists due to the major mistakes made by the Syrian regime.
- But he suggested dialogue with Iran and Syria.
- Firstly, Mr. Baker did not bother to study Iran’s strategy and policy in the region. Iran’s strategy in the region is a regional strategy extending from the Mediterranean Sea to Central Asia. It has goals in Iraq and is working to achieve them. It has used the Americans to achieve these goals. I once heard a popular Iranian saying: If you see a snake, do not kill it; have your enemy kill it.
- You were closely involved with the Lebanese file throughout the Syrian presence in Lebanon, until after the death of President Hafez al-Assad, when the file was transferred to others. In your opinion, would the developments that occurred have happened if the file had remained in your hands?
- I left the Lebanese file in 1998 after Emile Lahoud was elected president. I was opposed to supporting him.
Since 1998, Bashar al-Assad took over the Lebanese file, and he had no political experience or understanding of public affairs. He lived in his father’s house, the decision-maker, and moved from being a doctor to a security official. Additionally, the domestic upbringing under President Hafez al-Assad made his children feel they were above everyone else. Basel before his death, then Bashar after him. Bashar was surrounded by a group of Lebanese who injected him against President Hariri and President Nabih Berri. When he came to power, he acted as if he owned two farms: the Syrian farm and the Lebanese farm. The farm, managed by his cousin Rami Makhlouf, was tasked with collecting its revenues, and the farm, managed by his brother Maher, was tasked with collecting it in Lebanon. When money, corruption, and security enter, the state ends.
- Was there a link between Hariri’s assassination and your removal from any role in Lebanon?
- No. Because I left Lebanon in 1998 and Hariri was assassinated in 2005. But of course, President Hariri was my friend. He served Syria a lot, more than the Syrian foreign minister himself. A large part of the foreign communications was handled by Hariri. He would come to Damascus, meet with me or with President Hafez al-Assad, then go to France or America or Saudi Arabia or Britain or Germany, etc. This, in addition to his constructive role in Britain or Germany, etc. His major problem was that he loved Syria more than its rulers.
- Do you think you would have been outside Damascus if things had gone as they used to?
- No. There were, in fact, disagreements between me and President Hafez al-Assad about domestic policy.
The situation in Syria was deteriorating: the economy was collapsing, the state was being consumed by corruption, poverty was increasing, unemployment was spreading, the standard of living was falling, freedoms were being repressed, etc. I tried many times to convince him to implement political, economic, and educational reforms, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union. We had a long discussion.
I told him that we could not continue the policy we were following during the Soviet era. We had a wall to lean on, but the wall fell, so we need to change our domestic, Arab, and international policies. We need to focus on the internal situation, as the Syrian people see the changes happening in the world and we can no longer withhold information from them in the age of satellite TV and information technology. Change and openness are necessary, and the people must participate and there must be economic openness. He listened many times but to no avail. My basic opinion was that restricting people drives them to despair and extremism, while openness and political participation strengthen the system and enhance the state.
- How do you view the latest Brammertz report in its Lebanese and Syrian aspects?
- The report is professional and its reading is professional. It points to the killer and that the crime was committed by the Syrian regime. It could have provided more information, but before the formation of the International Court, any additional information would have led to the obstruction of the investigation. If it had named names and provided the many facts it has, there would have been a campaign against the report and its follow-up, and the International Court might not have been established.
The issue is not who carried out the operation but who decided, arranged, and organized the execution. The problem with the Mitsubishi car is a minor one. Who brought the Mitsubishi? Who planted the explosives in the Mitsubishi? The report gave clear indications on this matter.
- Will your stay abroad be prolonged, and when do you plan to return to Damascus?
- God willing, the stay abroad will not be long. I am confident that this regime is in its final stages.
There is no reason for its continuation. The internal situation is tense, there is poverty and hunger that Syrians have not experienced even during World War I. There is repression that has not been known in any era for hundreds of years. Corruption in the Ottoman era was not known. Therefore, it is natural that this creates a fertile environment for change, and we are working to use this environment to achieve victory.
