Khaddam threatens Washington's ambassador with "immediate expulsion"... and exchange of Syrian-American bombing
President Ronald Reagan attempted to contain the crisis with President Hafez al-Assad following the bombing of the “Marines” and the shelling, sending his special envoy, Donald Rumsfeld, to Damascus on November 20, 1983. Rumsfeld, a former Secretary of Defense under President Gerald Ford, would later return to the same position under President George W. Bush and become one of the main planners of the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.
In Damascus, Rumsfeld first met with Foreign Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam, who opened the conversation by saying, “Every day, an American official makes a statement; we have become part of the American daily agenda.” Then, this dialogue ensued.
AFP …US Marines stand guard, at a military site near Beirut Airport, on October 23, 1983, after an attack on US Marine Corps headquarters in Beirut.
Rumsfeld: I certainly agree on keeping communication lines open between Damascus and Washington, and our relations could be better. I won’t exhaust myself explaining the American position, as it’s clear that the U.S. President wants to reach a solution regarding Lebanon. We want Lebanon to be sovereign and independent, with all foreign forces withdrawn from its territory.
Khaddam: The President (Assad) wanted to meet you, and without a doubt, he would be pleased to receive you in the future. His health conditions didn’t allow him to do so now. Regarding Israel’s need to withdraw from all Lebanese territories without gaining any benefits from its invasion of Lebanon, it’s essential, especially since the direct or indirect Israeli presence threatens Lebanon as well as our security and interests.
Rumsfeld: What more can Syria do to improve the security situation in Lebanon? There is still infiltration from the south, and terrorism continues in Beirut. There’s a sense in the region and in the United States that this terrorism isn’t happening without Syria’s permission or tolerance. Are there additional steps you can take to prevent these terrorist acts?
Khaddam: Let’s discuss this logically and realistically, away from the media campaign against Syria. What is Syria’s interest in terrorism? Syria has been one of the countries most affected by terrorism. The American ambassador in Damascus (Robert Paganelli) knows that a single car explosion killed 500 people (referring to acts of violence by the Muslim Brotherhood in the early 1980s). Hundreds of Syrians were killed in terrorist incidents in Syria. Why couldn’t Syria detect these acts before they happened? If we could have detected them, we would have stopped them. If terrorism was carried out in the capital, Damascus, how can Syria be held responsible for actions in areas where it has no presence? Why assume that Syria permits this and that these acts can only happen with its approval? What’s the logic? If the logic is to wage media campaigns against Syria, that’s something else. Infiltration can’t be fully controlled by anyone. We are a strong country with a solid security system, and yet thousands of weapons have infiltrated Syria and been used in sabotage.
In Hama, authorities seized tens of tons of explosives and weapons smuggled into Syria—over ten thousand pieces of various types of arms, infiltrated from Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan. Infiltration happened in a country with a strong security system; so, how could we not imagine infiltration in regions marked by division, chaos, and fighting? Syria acts responsibly, and while relations aren’t good between Syria and the U.S., we would never agree to something like what happened against the Marines. To be frank, we want you to leave Lebanon and for your ships to depart, and the only way for you to leave is through successful national dialogue in Lebanon. We are not children to act irresponsibly.
Rumsfeld: You mentioned the media campaign twice, and I read an editorial in the “Baath” newspaper (the mouthpiece of the ruling party) about the alleged aim of my tour in the Middle East. I’m not here to conduct a media campaign, and I think some of the reasons why your neighbors and the U.S. feel that you tolerate some acts of terrorism are your relations with Iran, Libya, and the Soviet Union. These countries are believed to be involved in these acts. I completely agree that no state can entirely eliminate terrorism; even in the U.S., two years ago, the President was shot at (referring to the attempted assassination of President Reagan on March 30, 1981). I don’t want to imply that I’m naive about terrorist operations… there is always someone irrational who takes action against others’ interests. I agree that what’s desirable is for us to continue working to create a successful atmosphere in Lebanon.
Khaddam: Our problem with the Americans is that despite our multiple communications with them, they still don’t understand Syria. The Syrian government is an independent state, and Syrians are among the most proud of their independence and preserving it. We have good relations with the Soviet Union, partly due to Israel’s military situation and the scale of aid you provide to Israel. When (Yitzhak) Shamir says that Israel’s borders are defined by the Torah and expands on the ground, isn’t it my duty to seek all possible means to defend my country and secure the necessary arms for that?
Rumsfeld: To avoid any misunderstanding, it’s clear that the United States recognizes Syria’s sovereignty, independence, and right to make its own decisions. My reference to the Soviet Union, Libya, and Iran is unrelated to this matter and came only within the narrow context of terrorism, not Syria’s broader relationships. Two weeks ago, I met with President Reagan and Secretary Shultz, and in the United States, they support the “May 17 Agreement.” The Lebanese government wants foreign forces to leave, and you have said the same. You have good information about what’s happening there, so could you give me an idea of what you define as your security interests in the north, east, or south?
Khaddam: The United States supports the “May 17 Agreement,” and we reject it because it conflicts with U.S. commitments to Lebanon and with our own interests. I told Mr. Shultz and Mr. McFarlane that we can define our commitments toward Lebanon, both you and us. Are we in agreement on the unity, sovereignty, and independence of Lebanon? If we agree, let’s put the agreement before us and remove everything that contradicts that. The security issue that concerns us is the Israeli presence in Lebanon.
Rumsfeld: The assumption is that the Israelis would leave?
Khaddam: Yes, entirely.
The late elected Lebanese President Bashir Gemayel, in the late 1970s
Rumsfeld: What I am interested in is whether Syria will allow the Lebanese government to choose and act as it wishes. It seems to me that one of the undesirable things is for foreign forces to stay longer. If there is a broken arm that isn’t set, all the muscles and veins grow incorrectly, and this defect remains permanently. It seems that the sure way for Lebanon to keep its “broken arms” is to delay the withdrawal of foreign forces.
Khaddam: Does anyone imagine that we would withdraw and leave Israel just 23 kilometers from our capital? We agree to say that the primary priority is Lebanon’s security interests and whatever the Lebanese state decides. But for Lebanon to be commandeered and handed over to Israel—no.
Rumsfeld: No one is saying that.
Khaddam: The “May 17 Agreement” says that… I suggest you read the agreement thoroughly to understand Syria’s concerns and those of many Lebanese.
Rumsfeld: I am going back to President Reagan, and my assessment is that two countries are occupying parts of Lebanon. Both say they should leave, and one of them agrees to withdraw. The Lebanese government wants both to leave together, but the longer they stay, the less likely they will leave.
Khaddam: I don’t agree with calling our presence in Lebanon an occupation.
Rumsfeld: It is a presence.
Khaddam: But it is not an occupation.
Rumsfeld’s visit came after President Hafez al-Assad suffered a heart-related health issue that required him to be hospitalized and unable to perform his duties.
Khaddam recalls that U.S. Ambassador Robert Paganelli came to meet him, saying, “He informed me that President Reagan wanted to send his envoy to Syria and Lebanon, Mr. Donald Rumsfeld. Given President Hafez’s illness, he would meet with me and Colonel Rifaat,” the Syrian President’s brother.
Khaddam replied immediately and with emotion, “In Syria, there is a state and institutions. The Foreign Minister represents Syria, and if you insist on meeting with Colonel Rifaat, we will refuse to receive Mr. Rumsfeld and will not grant him a visa to enter Syrian territory. If you arrange to meet with me and then meet with Colonel Rifaat after Mr. Rumsfeld’s arrival, we will put you and Mr. Rumsfeld in a car and drive you both into Lebanon.”
Khaddam comments, “The ambassador’s (Robert Paganelli) face turned pale and he replied, ‘I will inform my government.’” The next day, Paganelli requested another meeting with Khaddam, informing him that Washington had decided Rumsfeld would meet only with him, and Khaddam then welcomed Rumsfeld’s visit.
Amid these tensions between Damascus and Washington, events escalated significantly when American planes bombed Syrian positions in Mount Lebanon on the morning of December 4, 1983, in response to the Marine attack.
After the bombing, Khaddam says he met with General Hikmat (Shihabi, Chief of Staff) and Brigadier Ali Duba (Director of Military Intelligence), and they discussed the situation, concluding that a lack of response would widen the aggression and weaken the morale of their forces. They decided to respond, and General Hikmat instructed their forces to use available air defense weapons against any aircraft flying over their positions.
The Syrian ground defenses responded, shooting down an American plane and capturing its pilot. The United States considered Syria’s response to the American air activity an “act of aggression,” while it viewed its own flights over Syrian positions and bombings as “self-defense.”
The American operation was a test of Syria’s position and response during the Syrian President’s illness. Khaddam says, “The direct response was firm and decisive. It’s worth noting that the Americans had heavily bet on the President’s illness and the potential for a fundamental shift in Syria’s policy should he be absent from leading the country.”
AFP
The late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad with his younger brother Rifaat al-Assad at a military ceremony in Damascus, in 1984
When Hafez fell ill in November 1983, Rifaat acted as though he had been awaiting this moment, presenting himself as the “legitimate heir.” He saw himself as the sole successor and began rallying the support of his generals, which greatly displeased the president. This overlap between events in Lebanon and the power struggle in Damascus was striking.
The older brother, Hafez, resolved the conflict and decided to exile his younger brother. On May 28, 1984, a plane filled with officers, including Rifaat, departed for Moscow. He returned temporarily on two occasions: the first in 1992, at the request of his mother, who passed away that year, and the second in 1994, to offer condolences to his brother Hafez following the death of his son, Basil. In October 2021, Rifaat returned permanently, by decision of President Bashar al-Assad.