Two Months After the Ceasefire: Saddam’s Focus on Assad
About two months after the ceasefire that marked the end of the Iran-Iraq War, specifically in November 1988, and according to a meeting record found in the official Syrian archives, Saddam Hussein received a delegation of Arab lawyers. During the meeting, he ignored Iran and instead focused his campaign against Hafez al-Assad, stating that “the regime in Syria stood with the enemy and the invading occupier (referring to Iran).” In a tone of reproach, he questioned the delegation about their closeness to Syria, saying: “You are not establishing relations with the people or the geography, but rather forming a political relationship with the ruling regime itself. Have the people who govern Syria changed their thinking? This was a stance that lasted eight years (Syria’s support for Iran), not just a week, for us to say it was a mistake or a moment of weakness, isn’t that right?”
“Al-Majalla” also reported that after the war with Iran, Saddam focused on tightening his grip domestically, attempting to form a four-party alliance that he wanted to include Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen, increasing pressure on his Ba’athist rival Hafez al-Assad, and making reconciliatory maneuvers in the Gulf.
Notably, Saddam also spoke about “non-interference in internal affairs,” calling on Arabs to “mobilize their armies to fight Iraq if it attacks another Arab country or interferes in its affairs.” This statement was made nearly two years before Iraq’s invasion of neighboring Kuwait in 1990.
Assad’s Caution
Syria’s fears about the “four-party alliance” were justified. According to a document analyzing this bloc—obtained by Al-Majalla from the archives of Syrian Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam, which he took with him to Paris in 2005—Damascus predicted that “this council would generate a series of crises in the Arab region, as three of its members have ambitions toward Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.” Additionally, the members had no geographical ties, and there were ongoing border disputes between some of the countries and their neighbors.
The document also quoted a Gulf leader who expressed surprise at the situation:
“We were actually quite surprised. (The late King of Jordan) Hussein visited us—as he often does, sometimes several times a month. We were aware of this alliance, and I expected him to bring it up, but he didn’t say a single word about it. I found that odd and wondered why he hadn’t discussed it with us. They said it was purely an economic alliance, and we said, ‘Alright, fine.'”
However, Assad’s envoy responded, “There are neither economic nor geographical factors at play here—only political objectives.”
King Hussein’s Stance
Al-Majalla reported that Assad questioned King Hussein about the Gulf states’ stance. The king responded:
“I visited some Gulf countries and deliberately traveled alone so that my visits wouldn’t put anyone in an awkward position. In Kuwait, Emir Jaber reproached us because we live at a certain standard, while they believe that development and major projects are unnecessary.”
King Hussein then continued his efforts to reassure the Gulf states, which had started expressing concerns about Iraq. According to the meeting record between Assad and Hussein, the Jordanian king tried to convince them that “Iraq is a strength for these states.”
Despite all the reassurances Hussein offered, Assad remained convinced that the king’s narrative was “not true, because it does not align with our understanding of the background that led to the creation of this council.” From the outset, Assad believed that “this alliance would be a problem for the Gulf states, which, as it seems, expressed their concerns while King Hussein attempted to reassure them.”
Furthermore, King Hussein had previously told the Syrian Prime Minister in Amman:
“Something must be done. If we could unify our efforts in this region, they (the Gulf states) wouldn’t be able to corner us and manipulate us. We must act and rely on ourselves. If the relationship between Jordan and Syria was the same as between Syria and Iraq, they wouldn’t dare do what they’re doing now. I spoke to President Hafez about the economic alliance, and Syria’s place in it is secured and leading. We must be cautious at first and present it as an economic bloc. These countries represent a strategic depth for us. We have raw materials and human resources, and Syria’s place is significant and important.”
Sowing Doubt Between Saudi Arabia and Syria
The document also reveals a conversation between King Hussein and Assad regarding the Islamic Summit Conference held in Kuwait. Saddam Hussein did not attend, but his deputy did. At the end of the conference, King Hussein took Iraqi Vice President Izzat al-Douri aside and asked why Saddam Hussein had not attended. Al-Douri replied:
“Personally, I wasn’t planning on attending either.”
When pressed for a reason, Al-Douri said they had received a telegram from Saudi Arabia requesting that Iraq not participate because President Assad would be attending.
King Hussein commented that “they do not want a meeting between any two Arab countries.”
The Syrian leadership analyzed King Hussein’s remarks, questioning Saudi Arabia’s motives. After all, Saudi Arabia had previously worked to reconcile Syria and Iraq. The conclusion drawn from a Syrian document was that “the objective was to create doubt between Syria and Saudi Arabia and to give Iraq an excuse for Saddam Hussein’s absence from Kuwait—because he was planning a different kind of visit, which materialized on August 2, 1990,” referring to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.
