In the ongoing pressure on Syria, Algeria, with the support of the Palestine Liberation Organization and Syria, requested an exceptional session of the Arab League. The council convened on May 22 in Tunisia, with Lebanon leading the delegation.
The Storm’s Passing
I arrived in Tunisia on the evening of May 21, just before the opening of the Arab League session. From the very beginning, I felt the severity of what Bashir Gemayel had caused through the war in Zahle: Arabs, even those most hostile to Syria, were showing solidarity because it was facing an Israeli threat. Late at night, in my hotel suite, Abdul-Halim Khaddam visited me, and we had a meeting that lasted an hour and a half. During the meeting, he briefed me on a draft resolution about the Arab League prepared by the Syrian Foreign Ministry. I had preliminary comments on it, especially regarding its declaration of the Arabs’ right to intervene in Lebanon and send their armies without referring to the official Lebanese position. I made amendments, and Khaddam accepted them without extensive debate.
The next morning, before the Arab League session’s opening, I met with the Secretary-General, Chadli Klibi, who conveyed to me that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were interested in playing a role in resolving the Lebanese crisis. Then I met with the session’s chairman, Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister, who didn’t even attempt to hide his hostility toward Syria. He confided in me that his country and Saudi Arabia were forced to support Lebanon and the Arab Deterrent Force, financially, while “waiting for the storm to pass.” They were concerned about the Israeli danger but wanted us to, over time, “restructure” it with non-Syrian forces and make some adjustments to its role. As for the Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud Al-Faisal, whom I met later, he maintained his characteristic reticence. He agreed with me that there was no escape from action but with Syrian consent. We agreed to reactivate the Follow-Up Committee but at the foreign ministers’ level. He tried to keep it at the level of ambassadors accredited to Beirut, but I did not accept.
The council’s proceedings began, and I delivered my speech, which received notable approval despite its somewhat harsh criticism of the Arabs for not taking serious initiatives.
Assassination Conspiracy
After my return to Lebanon, there was a particular focus on reviving the Arab Follow-Up Committee, but the deteriorating security situation led the Saudis to attempt holding meetings in Riyadh. President Sarkis firmly rejected that, insisting on holding it in Lebanon. The Saudis then revealed that they had received information indicating a conspiracy to assassinate Prince Saud al-Faisal. They emphasized steering clear of the meeting at Baabda Palace, which had previously been directly targeted.
At seven in the morning on June 7, I headed from Beit Ed-Dine, where I spent my nights, to oversee the final touches of the Follow-Up Committee meeting in Shtoora. I was accompanied by my counterparts from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Syria. The meeting took place at ten o’clock, and the discussions were simultaneously engaging and diverse. The ambassadors of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia told me that President Sarkis should raise any demands he wishes, and their countries were ready to respond positively to what he would propose. Consequently, the President raised all the issues, with the remaining impact falling on me. The debate intensified, particularly when discussing the gradual withdrawal or stay of the Arab Deterrent Force in Lebanon. We also delved into the necessity of “restructuring” it with non-Syrian units if it remained in Lebanon, Lebanese relations with Israel, and indiscriminate shelling, among other contentious topics between us and the Syrians.
Abdul-Halim Khaddam was extremely harsh towards Bashir Gemayel, the Kataeb party, and the Lebanese Forces. He stated, “Syria affirms the collaboration of a group of Lebanese, the Kataeb, with the Israeli enemy. They possess documents and minutes indicating horrendous plans to partition Lebanon. This was revealed through what Bashir Gemayel presented to Colonel Mohammed al-Khuli, who held several meetings with Bashir to negotiate and persuade him to sever ties with Israel.” He expressed his conviction “of Bashir Gemayel’s ill intentions in particular, and thus, the Kataeb party’s plans to detach this group from the Arab nation’s body and make it a conduit for Israeli malevolence and attacks.” At this point, Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah intervened, stating that cooperation between Kataeb and Israel should not persist “under any circumstances.” He wanted to hear from the presidency about the feasibility of achieving this demand because these people had become unattached to Lebanon, just as they were attached to others. He emphasized, “We want the Kataeb members to demonstrate a spirit of cooperation by announcing the severance of their ties with the enemy. This is a priority, and we do not object to meeting with Bashir and others, and we can find solutions for them.”
When Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal asked how to verify the Kataeb’s announcement of severing ties with Israel, the President replied, “When the principles of the National Accord were declared, there was a fundamental clause rejecting any dealings with Israel. All the factions, Sheikh Pierre, Bashir, Camille Chamoun, as well as the other Christian factions, signed these principles. What I want to say is that the Christian choice cannot be an Israeli one. There has been dealing with Israel by some individuals to secure weapons. Personally, I envision – just a personal vision – that if we give guarantees to this apprehensive group that started buying weapons from Israel to defend itself, the matter would end.”
The Syrian Tempo
Abdul-Halim Khaddam attempted to halt the work of the Arab Committee until the leader of the Lebanese Forces, Bashir Gemayel, presented a commitment to sever ties with Israel. It was decided that the committee would continue its mission while we engaged in consultations to reach this commitment. The committee entrusted the foreign ministers of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to contact all key Lebanese parties, including Bashir Gemayel. We agreed that the Follow-Up Committee would hold a preparatory meeting in Saudi Arabia on the 23rd of June, followed by a session on the 4th of July 1981, in the Presidential Palace in Baabda.
My belief was strengthened, after the Follow-Up Committee meeting in Baabda, that Syria did not want to withdraw its army from Lebanon until further notice. At times, it would cite the threat from Israel, and at other times, it would question the Lebanese army’s eligibility and its ability to assume security responsibilities. Meanwhile, the National Movement was keen on taking positions that criticized the army in a way that supported the Syrian perspective. Up to that point, President Wazir, despite his brave positions, was somewhat considerate of the National Movement in its attacks on the army.
Amid intermittent clashes and ongoing tensions, I prepared what was then known as the “Lebanese Working Paper” to be discussed in Saudi Arabia as part of the preparatory meeting for the Arab Follow-Up Committee.
At Jeddah Airport, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal was waiting for us, accompanied by Lebanon’s ambassador to the Kingdom, Zafir Al-Hasan. After a brief rest at Al-Hamra Palace, where we were hosted, I had lunch with my three counterparts: Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, Saud Al-Faisal, and Abdul-Halim Khaddam. At 5 p.m., the meetings began, with the participation of the four foreign ministers and the Secretary-General of the Arab League, Chadli Klibi, and his representative in Beirut, Mahmoud Al-Maamouri.
From the very beginning, the Syrian Foreign Minister tried to impose his tempo on the meeting, stating, “Syria will not make any concessions until the Kataeb party officially condemns dealing with Israel.” After some brief exchanges, my counterparts agreed to study the Lebanese working paper. However, they insisted that nothing from it would be implemented until the required Kataeb statement was issued.
Success of “Inoculation”
On June 24, we held two sessions, morning and evening, during which heated debates took place between Abdul-Halim Khaddam and me on most of the issues. We achieved two important matters: a timeline for the army’s restructuring and convincing Syria of the principle of “inoculating” the Deterrent Force with Arab units alongside the Syrian units. Additionally, we established a program for the deployment of the Arab Deterrent Force in Lebanon. The next day, we boarded the plane back to Beirut, and my assessment of my three counterparts, the foreign ministers of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and Syria, after the Jeddah meeting was as follows: “Sabah Al-Ahmad possesses an exceptional ability to maneuver, Saud Al-Faisal is a good and effective foreign minister, but I doubt his country’s ability to influence or deter Damascus. As for Abdul-Halim Khaddam, he is an ordinary lawyer exploiting his position to the fullest, accusing me of being the de facto ruler in Lebanon. While in reality, I make some fundamental decisions related to foreign and domestic policy in the state, given the trust of President Sarkis. But fundamentally, is there any real authority in Lebanon in the true sense?”
I returned to Beirut and participated in a series of consultations and communications with the authorities to calm the security situation in the Bekaa, lift the siege on the people of Zahle, and create a political atmosphere conducive to the success of reconciliation efforts. Finally, the Arab, international, and Lebanese efforts made to end the tragedy of Zahle bore fruit. We convinced the Syrians to accept the deployment of 350 members of the Internal Security Forces and the exit of Lebanese Forces fighters from the city with their light weapons on June 30, after nearly three months of battles and the siege. However, the missile crisis remained unchanged, although its intensity decreased after the parties involved showed an acceptable degree of restraint. On July 2, I visited the Syrian capital, where I met my counterparts Abdul-Halim Khaddam and President Hafez al-Assad to hold talks on the issues to be raised in the Arab Follow-Up Committee meeting in two days.
Angry Reactions
At 5 p.m. on July 4th, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal, Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, and Abdul-Halim Khaddam arrived at Baabda after passing through Ehden, where they visited President Suleiman Frangieh. President Sarkis and I arrived at 1 p.m. to oversee the final arrangements for the Quadrilateral Committee meeting, along with Prime Minister Shafik Wazzan. We still held hope that Johnny Abdo would succeed in convincing Bashir Gemayel to declare his condemnation of dealing with Israel. The Intelligence Director had been working towards this goal since my return from Saudi Arabia, holding a series of meetings with the leader of the Lebanese Forces to persuade him.
We convened the first session at 8 p.m. At the session’s opening, Abdul-Halim Khaddam inquired about the Kataeb paper. President Sarkis requested a delay until the next day, as communications were ongoing with Bashir Gemayel on this matter. Then the discussion turned to the Lebanese working paper, and Abdul-Halim Khaddam read the section related to the Lebanese army and the issue of assuming security responsibilities. He also mentioned the request for scheduling the withdrawal of Arab Deterrent Force from Beirut and its suburbs before August 1, 1982. He then looked at President Sarkis and said, “Mr. President, I wish you had drafted this paper in collaboration with the Prime Minister, not with brother Fouad.” I intervened and told Khaddam, “The President actively participated in drafting it.” He immediately directed the question to Prime Minister Wazzan, asking, “Are you involved in drafting this paper?” The Prime Minister replied in the affirmative. It became apparent to everyone present that Khaddam was extremely displeased with Prime Minister Wazzan’s stance. Later, I learned that the Syrian counterpart confronted the Prime Minister again on the matter after the session, and when the latter reaffirmed his commitment to the contents of the working paper, Khaddam, in great annoyance, said, “Let me see how you will implement it.”
In the political circles, after the incident between the Prime Minister and the Syrian Foreign Minister, there was an impression that Prime Minister Wazzan would pay the price for his stance, and his government would fall soon, to be succeeded by a government led by Rashid Karami.