When I made the decision to write this book, I took it upon myself to maintain objectivity in presenting the facts and analyzing them without being influenced by emotions or biases. I posed a series of questions to myself and provided answers after careful consideration,” asserts former Syrian Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam in the opening chapter of his recently published book, “The Syrian-Iranian Alliance and the Region.” This book serves as his inaugural political memoir.
The “controversial” Syrian politician offers an account of various events he personally witnessed, participated in, or acquired knowledge about. He unveils how Damascus allowed Tehran to operate within its territory and aided in the establishment of regional alliances across volatile regions spanning from Pakistan and Afghanistan to Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine.
Before delving into the intricacies of Syrian-Iranian relations, Khaddam highlights the increased American interest in Iran following World War II and the onset of the Cold War with the Soviets. The United States extended substantial support to the Shah of Iran, deeming his country as the primary defense against Soviet expansion.
Subsequently, he illustrates how Washington utilizes the Iranian nuclear issue as a pretext to address major concerns and apprehensions in the Western world, primarily focusing on the nature of the Islamic regime.
According to Khaddam, the dispute between Washington and Tehran did not originate solely from the American hostage crisis at the US embassy in Iran but rather commenced when the Shah’s regime crumbled and Ayatollah Khomeini assumed power in Tehran. He describes America as “the Great Satan.”
According to Khaddam, the United States and Israel are perceived as impediments to Iran’s regional objectives. Nonetheless, he highlights the challenges faced by the American strategy of instigating internal turmoil in Iran, considering that external tensions would diminish the internal opposition’s effectiveness.
When examining the foundations of Syrian-Iranian relations, Abdel Halim Khaddam traces the early interactions between Damascus and the revolutionary leaders, shedding light on the significant role played by Mr. Musa Al-Sadr, the President of the Supreme Shiite Council in Lebanon. He further expounds on the author’s personal engagement with Iran, leading to Syria’s decision to establish a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union and form an alliance with the Islamic Republic.
Khaddam reveals Syria’s objectives in forming an alliance with Iran, prominently including the overthrow of the Iraqi regime, which resulted in Damascus engaging in a war against Iraq while simultaneously fighting Iran.
Khaddam asserts, “Despite the ideological contradiction between the secular regime in Syria and the Islamic regime in Iran, it only served to strengthen the alliance, as the primary issues were not subject to dispute.”
He acknowledges that “the nature of the regime in Damascus did not allow for a long-term strategy, but instead created a space for maneuvering, which led Syria to consider waging a war to reclaim the Golan Heights due to the inability to establish a state and develop its institutions.”
Within the memoirs, Khaddam delves into the dynamics of the late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad’s relationships with Lebanese politicians, expressing his trust in them and explaining why predominantly Christian and Sunni Muslim politicians felt insecure. He also references Iran’s extensive involvement in Lebanon during the Israeli invasion of 1982, detailing the growth of Iranian influence and the roles carried out by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard within Lebanese territory.
Khaddam narrates how President Hafez al-Assad showed no concern regarding Iranian influence and did not consider Iran’s expansionist ambitions. He also highlights Syria’s continued support for Hezbollah since its inception.
The memoir reveals the intricacies of the dispute between Damascus and the late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, illustrating how Iran exacerbated the conflict.
Khaddam recounts a conversation he had with the Iranian ambassador to his country, discussing the influence of “Hezbollah” and posing the question: Is it reasonable for “Hezbollah’s” weight in Iran to surpass that of Syria?
In a significant chapter of the memoir, Khaddam describes Hafez al-Assad’s endeavors to halt the Iran-Iraq war during its early stages due to Saddam Hussein’s obstinacy. Some Gulf nations anticipated a swift victory for Iraq, resulting in subsequent events that strained Syrian-Gulf relations and led to periods of tension.
The memoir also sheds light on Khaddam’s personal role in providing reassurances to the Gulf states concerning Iranian intentions towards them. It explores the content of his visits to Gulf leaders, the regional atmosphere, the nature of relations among the countries in the region, and how Iraqi-Iranian reconciliation proved to be comparatively easier than reconciliation between Damascus and Baghdad.
“Rai” publishes four chapters from Khaddam’s book. The fourth and final part, titled “We, the Gulf and Iran,” examines the significant implications for the regional situation and Syrian relations with Gulf Arab states.
Khaddam writes, “It was wise to work towards stopping the war before it escalated. President Hafez al-Assad made attempts in the early days through contacts with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Algeria. However, these attempts failed due to Iraq’s unyielding governance on one hand and the Gulf brothers’ expectations of a swift victory for Iraq in its war against Iran.”
Such disparities in vision and political actions have created an imbalance in Syrian-Gulf relations. The tension has reached a critical point with some of the Gulf nations.
Despite the divergence in positions, we distinguished between the Iraqi regime and our relations with other Arab countries, particularly the Gulf states. We used to find justifications for these countries’ stances due to their concerns about the Islamic revolution in Iran.
He continues:
“We pursued two parallel approaches: firstly, to manage differences with the Gulf states through dialogue and provide reassurances and commitments that we would stand by them in any conflict they engaged in with Iran or others. Secondly, to focus on the Iranian leadership and reassure the Gulf states, refraining from any actions that would heighten their concerns.”
He further adds, “On January 10, 1982, at the request of President Hafez al-Assad, I traveled to Saudi Arabia, where I was received by the then Crown Prince Fahd bin Abdul Aziz. The purpose was to inform him about the outcomes of the Iranian minister’s visit to Damascus. He confirmed that the official opinions of the Iranian Islamic Revolution are exclusively expressed by Khomeini, the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, or the Minister of Foreign Affairs.”
“He also affirmed Iran’s willingness to send a goodwill mission to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, as well as receiving similar missions in Tehran. These missions aimed to urge an end to intervention in the war alongside Iraq. President Hafez al-Assad discussed this matter and assured him that he would inform the Kingdom about the discussions’ content.”
“In response, Prince Fahd expressed the Kingdom’s agreement with this approach to avoid clashes and tensions in the region. This is a commendable vision in light of the prevailing reality. I was content with the President’s message and efforts. We expressed our gratitude for his endeavors to alleviate tensions and wished him success and good health.”
“On the following day, I traveled to Kuwait on the same mission to report the discussions I had previously presented to Prince Fahd bin Abdulaziz. I had a meeting with the Emir of Kuwait, Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmed, in the presence of the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, His Highness Sheikh Sabah.”
Khaddam stated, “President Hafez agreed to the mediation and instructed me to travel to Tehran. Accompanied by the Foreign Minister, I visited Tehran and presented the situation to the Iranian president. I highlighted the risks of war expansion and the potential consequence of Gulf countries calling in American forces, which poses a significant threat to both Iran and Syria. The Iranian president expressed their desire to avoid further escalation of the war, but expressed their belief that Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states provide substantial assistance to Iraq. They provide financial resources, military facilities, and political support. The Iranians urged these countries to adopt a neutral stance since their assistance to Iraq only prolongs the war, which is not in their own interest or in the interest of the entire region. They expressed willingness to cooperate and requested us to exert pressure on the Gulf Arab countries to cease their support for Iraq.”
He continued, “Upon our return from Tehran, President Hafez instructed me to travel to Jeddah and inform King Fahd about the progress of the discussions with the Iranian leadership. On May 26, 1984, I went to Jeddah and met with King Fahd. I conveyed to him that President Hafez, after receiving his letter delivered by Sheikh Abdulaziz Al-Tuwaijri, requested my visit to Tehran, and that is where we were. However, upon our arrival, we were taken aback by a speech from Saddam Hussein and the bombing of two Iranian ships in the Gulf.”
meeting with King Fahd.
Khaddam continued, “I fulfilled my mission and informed King Fahd about the events. He asked me, ‘What did they say?’ I replied, ‘They (Iranians) expressed a genuine desire to improve their relations with the Gulf states. They are willing to do everything possible to enhance these relations. However, they firmly believe that Gulf countries are providing assistance to Saddam. Without this aid, he would not have been able to sustain his fight against them. They perceive Saddam’s attack on Kharg Island to be a result of coordination with the Gulf countries. They cited a statement by Mr. Ahmed Zaki Al-Yamani in a newspaper published in Brussels.'”
The king responded, “We inquired with Zaki Al-Yamani about this statement, and he denied making such a remark. We informed him that he should not lie about it.”
I replied, “I intended to provide you with their perspective. They also claimed that Zaki Al-Yamani stated in Kuwait that Iraqi pilots were unable to distinguish the nationality of the aircraft they targeted, using this as a justification for Iraq’s attack on a Saudi carrier.”
“They perceive these actions as support for Saddam: providing aid and targeting tankers,” I added. “They are also of the opinion that efforts should be made with other countries to discourage them from purchasing Iranian oil, as seen with the delegation sent to Japan for this purpose.”
“They believe that Saudi Arabia allows Iraqi planes to land and refuel there, enabling them to attack tankers. Furthermore, they claim that Saudi Arabia assists Iraq in gathering information through the use of AWACS aircraft,” I explained.
The king responded, “These claims are false.”
Prince Saud Al-Faisal, the Minister of Foreign Affairs (who was present), clarified, “AWACS aircraft are specifically designed for low-flying surveillance and do not detect carriers.”
I continued, “We present their viewpoint to provide you with a comprehensive understanding of the issue. It is also noteworthy that they do not believe there is a high probability of American and Western intervention. Even if such intervention were to occur, they are prepared to fight against the Americans in Iran.”
“We emphasized to them that the problem lies between them and Iraq. The Gulf states have no involvement in this war except for providing aid,” I concluded.
The king responded, “Yes, aid is well known.”
Continuing the discussion, I proposed, “They (the Iranians) suggested that we agree to cease all actions related to oil tankers. This implies that the security of oil ships should be a shared responsibility, and the Gulf countries should exert pressure on Saddam to halt his attacks on tankers in the Gulf. We explained to them that they claim Saddam is irrational, powerful, and stubborn. If he does not respond to pressure, what is the solution?” The king replied, “He truly did not respond to the pressure.”
I added, “In this context, we considered the conversation between Mr. President and Sheikh Al-Tuwaijri, where the Kingdom expressed readiness to cease providing aid. We informed them that if Saddam does not respond to pressure to stop attacking tankers, then aid can be cut off from him. The Kingdom would issue a statement condemning the strikes on ships in the Gulf.”
“There was a misconception propagated by Iraq that Iran intended to occupy Iraq first and then the Arab Gulf states,” Khaddam continued.
Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz interjected, “We had the intention to shoot down the Iranian plane, but His Majesty the King prevented it.”
The king affirmed, “Yes, the operation was halted, and we denied pursuing the Iranian planes. Our actions were solely focused on rescuing passengers from the damaged ship. An Iranian pilot sought refuge in the Kingdom with his plane. We handled the situation discreetly. We requested Iran to accept the return of the aircraft.”
“We refrain from attacking Iran in our radio stations or newspapers. We hold Kuwait responsible for such actions. While we have the capability to intercept Iranian planes, we prefer not to create a problem. A few days ago, an Iranian plane loaded with missiles entered our airspace. Saudi aircraft flew over it and issued a warning for the plane to turn back within two minutes, and it complied. We did not want to escalate the situation, although we could have taken action. We reported this incident to the Iranian charge d’affaires, and his response was that the pilot had made a mistake,” the king explained.
I questioned, “How can such a mistake occur while flying over long distances in our airspace? We possess missiles that can accurately hit targets up to 100 kilometers away from the plane, but we choose not to employ these weapons against Iran. We reserve them for your defense.”
The king also expressed, “This matter needs thorough examination and scrutiny. Iraq claims that Iran has destroyed all my oil facilities in the Gulf. I am left with no choice but to either perish or drag Iran down with me. We cannot prevent Iran from striking Iraq or Iraq from striking Iran. However, is there any hope for a resolution? Or does Iran persist in its intention to occupy Iraq and capture Saddam, as Iraq will not surrender to the Iranians? They are bolstering Saddam’s position.”
Continuing, the king stated, “The president could inform the Iranians that the Gulf states are desperate to prevent the involvement of foreign powers in the Gulf. Why target their tankers and put pressure on them? Strike Iraq as you wish, but refrain from pressuring the Gulf states. Let the oil flow to Europe and Japan to avoid providing them with a justification to occupy the Gulf.”
I inquired with the king, “Regarding the discussion brought up by Sheikh Abdul Aziz about aid?” The king responded, “We have not provided them with aid for some time, but if we witness Iraq sacrificing itself, we will extend assistance. This is preferable to involving the Americans. We have the ability to act discreetly and through special means. If the war ceases, we are prepared to support Iran without hesitation. However, things need to calm down before we can take action.”
Khaddam shared the text of a letter from Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kuwait at that time, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Syria on 10/2/1986. The letter stated, “Undoubtedly, Your Excellency has been following the news of the severe escalation on the Iraqi-Iranian front alongside us. This escalation has led to rapid developments that have greatly concerned us. It may result in the invasion of Arab territory in Iraq. Your Excellency, considering the real dangers this poses to a fellow Arab country and the potential risks that such a threat may pose to the security and stability of our Arab nation, I draw your attention to the national stance expressed by sister Syria, represented by your commitment to the sanctity of Arab territory wherever it may be and your opposition to any Iranian encroachment on Arab lands.”
“I appeal to Your Excellency, in light of our national responsibility, to take action and make your utmost efforts to halt this perilous escalation,” the letter concluded.
Khaddam elaborated in his book, “Regarding Iraq, they are unwilling to see Iraq defeated due to the concerns we have mentioned. However, they also do not desire Saddam’s victory as it would imply alignment with America. Therefore, you can observe that the Soviets are assisting and sustaining Saddam to prevent his downfall. Simultaneously, they extend support to the Iranians, albeit indirectly through socialist countries without providing them with direct weapons.”
He further remarked, “The ongoing discussion between Prince Saud and me proved futile because Syria’s demands from Iraq were met with rejection from Baghdad, and likewise, Iraq’s expectations from Syria faced rejection from Damascus. The level of conflict between the two governments was substantial, with accumulated negative incidents over the course of 18 years. During this period, we nearly witnessed war breaking out on two occasions, in addition to Iraq’s support for acts of violence in Syria and Syria’s backing of its opponents in Lebanon.”
Khaddam also noted, “Reconciliation between Iraq and Iran was comparatively easier than achieving it between us and the Iraqi government. Consequently, Arab mediation proved ineffective due to our differing understanding of the nature and dangers posed by the Iraqi regime.”
Hariri’s meeting.
The former Syrian Vice President continued, “On March 27, 1986, Mr. Rafic Hariri received a delegation from King Fahd bin Abdulaziz. He relayed the following information to me: there are indications of an agreement between Gaddafi, Abu Nidal, and the Iranians to target American facilities in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Of course, you have no association with Abu Nidal and may carry out operations.”
“In Saudi Arabia,” he explained, “there are no American facilities per se. Instead, there are Saudi facilities where Americans operate. Any attack on them would be considered a strike against Saudi Arabia. Additionally, three days ago, Iranian President Ali Khamenei (the current leader of the Islamic Republic) called King Fahd. This was the first contact of its kind, and the conversation was filled with praise and admiration. Khamenei commended Saudi Arabia’s positions and praised the king.”
“King Fahd views this Iranian initiative as a positive outcome resulting from President Hafez Al-Assad’s efforts. He expressed gratitude for it and considers Saudi Arabia not to be a party to the Iran-Iraq issue. However, it should be noted that the President, on a previous occasion, stated that Iran striking any Arab country, especially the Gulf states, is not acceptable.”
“The President emphasized that any Iranian attack on Arab countries is considered an attack on Syria,” he continued. “The King has no doubt about this statement and firmly believes that Syria will defend Saudi Arabia in the event of an attack by Iran or any other party. They perceive any aggression by Iran against any country in the region as a threat to all. In other words, they will not allow Iran to pick them off one by one.”
He then mentioned another meeting on December 8, 1986, saying, “I met with Mr. Rafic Hariri and shared with him the developments following Farooq al-Shara’s visit to Tehran, as I had previously mentioned. These are the key points discussed.”:
Regarding Sri Island, the Kingdom has no involvement whatsoever, whether near or far. The Kingdom categorically denies any such act. The Iranian claim that the Kingdom assisted Iraq in attacking Sri Island is false and lacks any basis in truth or logic. If the Kingdom had been supporting Iraq in the manner alleged by the Iranians, numerous significant changes would have occurred in the course of the war.
Concerning the Iraqi pipeline passing through Saudi territory, it is an established and unquestionable matter. Several years have passed, and raising this issue now serves no purpose other than causing confusion. Financial aid to Iraq has been suspended for a considerable time, and we have consistently called for an end to this devastating war between the two Islamic countries.
Regarding the matter of the bags and explosives, the situation is clear. They were discovered by Saudi customs officers. The investigation into the individuals who brought them is ongoing, and we are yet to determine who planted them.
However, if Iran truly had no connection to the bags carried by Iranian pilgrims traveling from Isfahan to Jeddah, how can we explain the occurrence of ship attacks both before and after the Sri Island operation?
In our previous joint analysis, the following findings were made:
- Saddam Hussein’s objective is to expand the war in the region to involve other countries, thereby strengthening his front by engaging a larger number of Arab nations. This would garner broad support for him and entangle the Iranian revolution in a series of wars and minor skirmishes.
- Global imperialism, particularly American imperialism, has a vested interest in expanding the conflict to include other Arab countries. This would increase the dependence of these nations on fully protecting and assisting American decisions, allowing them to encircle, besiege, drain, and strike the Islamic revolution in Iran while impeding progressive Arab forces.
- The ongoing bombings of Saudi ships and vessels entering or leaving Saudi Arabia may prompt Saudi reactions, leading to responses and strikes against Iranian aircraft. Consequently, this would result in the expansion of the war.
Khaddam concludes that there have been continuous contacts between Syria and all Gulf countries, primarily focused on Iran. Any actions taken by Iran have raised concerns among these countries, who believe that such Iranian actions should not occur despite their full support for Iraq. Syria was the party engaged in discussions due to our relations with Tehran.
He further states that during that period, there were significant tensions between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait on one side and Iran on the other. These tensions were fueled by issues concerning oil tankers, war deployments with Iraq, and the incidents during the Hajj pilgrimage over two consecutive years. Ultimately, clashes between pilgrims and Saudi security forces resulted in the loss of hundreds of lives.
In all these circumstances, Syria played a role in extinguishing the fire and calming the situation to prevent its escalation, recognizing the extreme danger it posed.
