“The United States fully supports the International Commission of Inquiry’s request to meet with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and will closely monitor this development. If Assad refuses the committee’s request, he will find himself in a highly challenging situation,” stated a senior US official. A senior French official added, “The Syrian regime is now cornered and trapped from all sides. The only viable option remaining is complete cooperation with the Commission of Inquiry, which includes accepting accountability for President Assad and relinquishing his ambitions in Lebanon.”
Did the Syrian regime anticipate the situation with the International Commission of Inquiry would escalate to such a critical stage?
That does not appear to be the case.
He has already committed a second “strategic sin” following his initial misstep in 2003 when he gambled on the belief that embroiling Americans in the Iraqi quagmire would force them to seek a resolution with him, offering Lebanon’s head as a scapegoat, as they did in 1989.
Wrong understanding .
Initially, Security Council Resolution 1559 was dismissed as “not deserving the attention it received.” Foreign Minister Farouq al-Shara stated this in late 2004, seemingly influenced by this misconception. Despite the regime’s awareness of a significant American-French agreement behind the scenes, following the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, the International Commission of Inquiry was regarded as insignificant compared to the international resolution that established it. Assad’s team treated it as a mere legal maneuver, attempting to undermine it through intelligence tools such as Hussam Hussam and Zuhair Al-Siddiq to discredit all its statements.
Upon the issuance of Security Council Resolution 1644, the regime believed its legal maneuver had succeeded, assuming that the mission of the Commission of Inquiry had been aborted. Once again, it failed to recognize that this was the first instance in the history of the United Nations where it directly addressed a political assassination, devoting sessions, committees, and resolutions to it. Moreover, it disregarded the most significant aspect: its own suspicions that the commission of inquiry was indeed politicized, backed by influential regional and international powers seeking to punish the Syrian regime for transgressing several red lines and engaging in dangerous roles that surpassed the capacity of its strategic situation in Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine.
It’s Khaddam’s turn now,
as the consequences of his second sin come due and the moment of truth arrives to pay the steep prices.
This is a moment that vividly reveals itself following the sudden emergence of Abdel Halim Khaddam, the former vice president and key figure in Hafez al-Assad’s regime in Lebanon, appearing seemingly out of nowhere (from Damascus’s perspective) to undermine the entire framework of Syria’s engagement with the Commission of Inquiry.
Khadam will probably have what he wants
It is highly unlikely that a seasoned politician like Khaddam would present himself on the “Number One Report” radio station in Paris, speaking against the very regime he played a significant role in building, without being supported by regional, international, and local “reports” that substantiate his extensive historical coup.
Furthermore, Khaddam’s statement effectively terminates the work of the International Commission of Inquiry on the Rafiq Hariri assassination. With a witness of such high caliber, the Commission no longer requires additional evidence and data. Khaddam’s testimony alone will be sufficient to prompt the international body to transition from investigation to criminalization, from suspicion to charges.
This was evident from the committee’s quickness in directly seeking testimonies from Assad’s palace and the Ministry of Sharia, a mere three days after Khaddam delivered his televised testimony. These developments will become even clearer in the coming days when the Commission is expected to demand the arrest of the five Syrian security leaders it investigated in Vienna, as well as summoning Maher al-Assad and Asif Shawkat for questioning.
What does all of this signify?
The meaning is evident: regional and international actors are utilizing the Commission of Inquiry to tighten the grip not only around the ruling apparatus in Damascus but also around the military-security elite, who will soon find themselves at a crossroads. They will have to choose between loyalty to the ruling regime or aligning with the interests of their homeland, much like Khaddam did, or at least according to his stated reasons for taking such action.
Khaddam has disrupted the long-standing unity of this elite, which has endured for over three decades. Its members must now swiftly “assess” who will emerge victorious in the “struggle for control over Syria” before deciding which side to join.
Interestingly enough, it is highly likely that the prevailing party will align with the same influential regional and international powers that Mr. Khaddam is relying on!
Three possibilities lie ahead. However, how will political screening be conducted in Damascus following Khaddam’s coup?
There are three potential scenarios:
- Internal Developments: Conflicts or disputes within the ruling team.
- System-wide Developments: Conflicts or disputes within the entire political system.
- External Actions: Attempts from outside the system to overthrow the regime.
Flint Leverett, the former director of Middle East affairs at the US National Security Council between 2002 and 2003, wrote on October 30, 2005, regarding the first possibility: “Bashar Al-Assad lacks the authority his father had. Consequently, he will need to share power with others to a much greater extent than his father did, particularly with his brother Maher, the commander of the well-equipped Syrian unit known as the Republican Guard, as well as Asif Shawkat, the director of military intelligence, and his wife, Bushra, who holds significant behind-the-scenes influence.”
According to the Commission of Inquiry, Asif and Maher are implicated in the assassination of Hariri. Their names were mentioned in the initial report by Detlef Meles, which was solely published online for reasons that remain unclear. If the Commission of Inquiry and Western countries insist on Syria handing over these two individuals to an international judicial commission, Bashar will face a critical moment of truth, as Shawkat and Maher Akkaz are both his rivals. Conversely, as long as they remain loyal to him, it will be challenging for anyone within the Syrian power structure to successfully launch a coup, thereby making them valuable allies for the president.
However, the question remains: How long can this situation persist, especially if Asif and Maher decide to sink Bashar along with the entire Syrian regime?
Unless Bashar addresses this question by sacrificing these two individuals to save himself, the regime as a whole will be forced to make a decision, potentially at the president’s expense. This would result in a split within the regime, separating the security establishment controlled by the ruling staff (at least for now) from the military establishment, namely the army. The military establishment may then determine that sacrificing the ruling staff is necessary to ensure its own survival.
We are discussing the possibility of a military coup, which is not entirely unlikely. Credible sources confirm that such an attempted coup took place two weeks ago but was thwarted shortly before execution. Neutral Lebanese political circles also affirm that the United States and a significant influential Arab country (Saudi Arabia) maintain political and financial relationships with several Syrian generals.
However, if both of these options fail, the third option remains: creating a state of instability in Syria by weakening and “humiliating” the regime through the Commission of Inquiry, followed by triggering various time bombs targeting the regime, including the Kurds, the Muslim Brotherhood, figures like Khaddam and Rifat Al-Assad (reportedly based in northern Iraq), and other opposition forces abroad.
Is there a fourth alternative that involves changing the policies of the current ruling Syrian staff rather than replacing the staff itself?
It does not appear that this is currently feasible.
Not after khaddam bomb!
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