Mubarak’s message to Saddam before the invasion was clear: “The blow will come to you… A change in the regime is what is needed.”
In the late 1990s, tensions between the United States of America and Iraq escalated, posing a threat of an American invasion.
Documents published in five installments by the London newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat revealed Egyptian-Syrian coordination aimed at averting the American invasion of Iraq.
Former President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad shared a unified conviction to openly convey to Saddam Hussein that the strike would specifically target him, the regime, and the country. They believed that regime change was necessary and that it could only be achieved through a direct hit. This conversation took place in early 1998, five years before the American invasion.
In response to the crisis, Assad reached out to Mubarak, and they agreed that Khaddam and Foreign Minister Farouq al-Shara would visit Cairo to assess the situation and determine the appropriate course of action that would weaken Iraq.
On February 17, 1998, Khaddam and Shara held a meeting in Cairo with Kamal Al-Ganzouri, the Egyptian Prime Minister, Amr Moussa, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Osama El-Baz, Advisor to the President of the Republic for Political Affairs, before meeting with Mubarak.
According to the meeting minutes, President Mubarak and Khaddam began with words of courtesy. President Mubarak then inquired about the prevailing atmosphere, the Iraq issue, the involvement of the United Nations and America, and the validity of the news regarding the Americans’ intention to strike Iraq and the Israeli presence in the matter.
Khaddam responded, “Certainly, Israel exists. Mr. President, considering the ongoing events, is this intense campaign solely focused on searching for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, including the presidential palaces? Or is there something else at play that affects us as Arabs and the region? The emphasis on the issue of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction seems to be mere arguments, neither more nor less. Furthermore, Saddam states that there is nothing there, that the weapons have been destroyed, and that the eight presidential palaces are open for inspection by the United States and the United Nations.”
President Mubarak commented, “They only mention inspections and weapons of mass destruction, but the true objectives of this operation will become apparent later.”
Khaddam continued, “Then the true objectives will become clear, although they already seem apparent to us. Merely asserting that this campaign, mobilization, and display of strength are not aimed at war or military strikes, but rather serve the necessities and requirements of international security, is illogical and therefore unreasonable.”
At this point, President Mubarak inquired about the steps to be taken in addressing this issue.
Khaddam replied, “Exactly, that is the question that has already been raised. We agree that action must be taken to address the situation and prevent an escalation.”
President Mubarak expressed the need for action to address the ongoing situation.
Khaddam responded, “Indeed, there is a widespread belief among Arab citizens and on the Arab street that the events unfolding are part of a planned effort by the Americans and Israelis. On one hand, it aims to support Israel, and on the other hand, to establish dominance and control over this region, aligning with the historical trajectory of Israeli ambitions.”
President Mubarak acknowledged, “I appreciate President Hafez for conveying the message. It is crucial for us to adhere to the content of the Security Council and United Nations resolutions regarding the inspection and elimination of weapons of mass destruction and other armaments. We should cooperate with the inspection mission and avoid opposing American inspectors. All of this is to prevent a military strike, as they claim, based on our past experiences with the previous strike on Iraq.”
Khaddam replied, “Yes, and that is precisely what needs to be emphasized. I am absolutely certain that no Iraqi delegate would dare to convey such words directly to Saddam personally.”
Mubarak responded, “That is exactly what happened during his invasion of Kuwait. We provided him with advice, but he rejected it, resulting in the consequences we witness today.”
Khaddam commented, “Exactly. Going back to our previous analysis of this issue, which is the focal point of discussion, if the objective is to redraw the map of the region, I believe it will lead to a bleak and dark future for the Arab world, and no one will forgive us for allowing that to happen.”
Mubarak affirmed, “Precisely. This is an important and serious matter.”
Khaddam responded, “In light of the imminent danger posed to the region through the Iraqi gateway, we must take action to halt this project. Additionally, we need to earnestly consider implementing a project to counter it within the Arab region. The first crucial step is to prevent the strike from targeting Iraq. If the strike were to occur, the situation would become highly dangerous and unfavorable.”
Osama Al-Baz interjected, “Indeed, it would lead to confusion among governments. Presently, the average citizen, regardless of age or location, sympathizes with Iraq. This sentiment is prevalent among the people. If a strike were to take place, as witnessed during the Kuwait war, we would witness the negative consequences of this conflict on the Arab situation. We must consider our current stance. Moreover, we observe Israel conducting strikes, occupying territories, and disregarding United Nations resolutions without any significant reaction.”
Khaddam conveyed to President Mubarak the importance of openly informing Saddam Hussein that the strike would specifically target him and his regime. He emphasized that regime change is necessary and can only be achieved through such a strike. President Mubarak agreed with this approach.
“I propose sending representatives from Egypt and Syria to meet with Saddam Hussein in Baghdad. They can advise him and caution him against subjecting Iraq to the strike. What are your thoughts on this?” Khaddam asked.
Discussions ensued regarding the selection of individuals for the task. Prime Minister Kamal Al-Janzouri suggested involving the foreign ministers of both countries, a suggestion that President Mubarak agreed with. Khaddam assured them that he would consult with President Hafez for his opinion. He added, “We must also inform our brothers in Saudi Arabia about the situation.” President Mubarak concurred.
Khaddam contacted President Al-Assad via phone and proposed the idea of sending a delegation to Baghdad. President Al-Assad welcomed the idea and emphasized that the delegation should comprise the foreign ministers of both countries. He also emphasized the importance of delivering a clear message.
According to a document by Khaddam, “During the meeting with President Mubarak, we reached an agreement to clearly communicate (with Saddam Hussein) and for the delegation to inform him that Syria and Egypt have thoroughly analyzed the alarming situation. All available information indicates the seriousness of the American involvement, but there is still an opportunity to avoid a military strike. The suggested course of action is to engage with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.”
The document further states, as reported by Asharq Al-Awsat, “In conclusion, the leaders of Egypt and Syria shared the same perspective on the gravity of the situation. They agreed to thoroughly analyze the causes and objectives of the crisis. Consequently, it is imperative to work towards resolving it and spare Iraq from a military strike.”
Days after the trip to Cairo, Kofi Annan, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, arrived in Baghdad and engaged in talks with the Iraqi leadership. These discussions resulted in the signing of an agreement in which the Iraqi leadership accepted the terms set by the Security Council for supervision and inspection.
Consequently, the storm has temporarily subsided. However, the question remains: How long will this last? Will the objectives of the United States change, or will they alter their methods?
During this intense crisis between Iraq and the United States, the American administration made several attempts to establish contact with us. Their goal was to neutralize the Syrian position and evoke memories of the alliance formed in 1990 during the Kuwaiti occupation.
