The information obtained by “Al-Nahar” from a prominent Lebanese political figure, currently living abroad away from the spotlight, sheds light on the beginning of relations between President Rafik Hariri and the Syrian regime during the time of President Hafez al-Assad. This beginning was initiated by Abdel-Halim Khaddam, the deputy of President Hafez al-Assad. Here is a new chapter:
This political figure provides insights: After the Mountain War in the fall of 1983, which led to the victory of the Progressive Socialist Party and its allies led by Walid Jumblatt, and the defeat of the “Lebanese Forces,” followed by the diminishing influence of Amin Gemayel during the February 6, 1984 uprising, Rafik Hariri took on a “significant role” at the request of Damascus, according to a source cited in this article. The nature of this “significant role” is explained by stating that after the closure of the prospects for a settlement through Saudi-Syrian mediation, as evidenced by the failure of the Lausanne Conference for Lebanese-Lebanese dialogue, Syria turned to a settlement named “the tripartite agreement.” In this agreement, signed at the end of 1985, the doors were closed to an agreement with Amin Gemayel, and avenues were opened for an agreement between the “Lebanese Forces” represented by its leader Elie Hobeika, the Amal Movement represented by its leader Nabih Berri, and the Socialist Party led by Walid Jumblatt. Hobeika had already started a rebellious course in the eastern region of Beirut against the leader of the “Forces,” Fouad Abi Nader, before “the tripartite agreement” and during 1985. However, shortly after the conclusion of “the tripartite agreement” in early 1986, Dr. Samir Geagea succeeded in removing Hobeika from the leadership of the “Forces,” forcing Hobeika to leave the eastern region and establish the “Al-Waad” movement in areas of Syrian influence, especially in Zahle. But before these developments and at the request of Damascus, Hariri brought Hobeika from Paris in the first visit of the latter to the Syrian capital aboard Hariri’s private plane, and Hobeika had a meeting with Khaddam upon his arrival in Damascus. Thus, the visit of the leader of the “Lebanese Forces” marked the beginning of the “tripartite agreement.”
The political figure recalls that Hariri, at that time, had significantly strengthened his relations with the Syrian leadership, holding direct meetings with Assad, who honored him by inviting him to lunches or dinners. Hariri, on his part, offered Assad something unprecedented. He (Hariri) built, at his own expense, the massive Presidential Palace on Mount Qasioun overlooking Damascus. Hariri also built a huge conference palace on the main road leading from the Syrian capital to the airport. Additionally, Hariri added a third facility to the Presidential Palace and the Conference Palace, and the total value of these three palaces was approximately $60 million.
In parallel with Hariri’s new role in the Lebanese file, which reached its peak in the late 1980s with the signing of the Taif Agreement, jointly pursued by the Syrian Vice President and the Saudi Arabian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince Saud al-Faisal, Hariri’s regional role exceeded his Lebanese role. This was evident when he became a envoy for King Fahd to Damascus, conveying messages related to the developments of the first Gulf War between Iraq and Iran, which included most Gulf countries in the second half of the 1980s, including Saudi Arabia.
Hariri’s first visit to the Syrian capital in his capacity as an envoy from King Fahd was documented by Khaddam in his book “Syrian-Iranian Alliance and the Region,” published in 2010 by Dar Al-Shorouk in Egypt. Khaddam writes, “On March 27, 1986, Mr. Rafik Hariri, a envoy from King Fahd bin Abdulaziz, visited me and conveyed the following:
- There is information that an agreement has been made between Libyan President Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, Abu Nidal, and the Iranians to strike American facilities in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Of course, you have no connection to Abu Nidal, who may carry out these operations. It should be noted that there are no American facilities in Saudi Arabia; instead, there are Saudi facilities where Americans work. Any strike on them would be considered an attack on Saudi Arabia.
- The second matter, three days ago (March 24, 1986), Iranian President (Khomeini) called King Fahd, and this is the first time such a call has been made. The conversation was very good and excellent. (Khomeini) praised King Fahd, and King Fahd considers this Iranian initiative a result of the efforts of President Hafez al-Assad, thanking him for it. He considers this Iranian-Saudi development positive and emphasizes that Saudi Arabia is not a party to the Iran-Iraq problem…
- On the other hand, you know that President Assad said so once: we cannot accept Iran hitting any Arab country, especially the Gulf countries. President Assad also stated that any Iranian aggression against Arab countries is an aggression against Syria… This matter needs confirmation.”
Khaddam adds, “After the meeting with Mr. Hariri was presented to President Hafez on the same day… we agreed to inform Mr. Rafik Hariri that we are ready to send forces, in the size they want, and these forces will be under the command of King Fahd…”
Khaddam mentions that Hariri’s visits as an envoy for King Fahd were repeated in 1986. He also pointed out that he contacted Hariri to inform him of the results of his visit to Tehran on August 23 of that year, acting as an envoy from President Assad and conveying what he heard from President Khamenei to be transmitted to King Fahd.
The beautiful era of Hariri with Assad the father ended in 1998. The dark era with Assad the son ended with the assassination in 2005.