American concern about "SAM-5" missiles... and Reagan's envoy on a secret visit to Damascus
On December 12, 1982, the United States expressed its concern over the imminent deployment of “SAM-5” missiles in Syrian air defenses, publicly reiterating its request for a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. Syria responded through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “You express concern over Syria’s acquisition of self-defense means, yet we would have wished the U.S. government had shown this concern when Israel acquired this immense power. If the United States had refrained from supplying Israel with such weapons in the first place, it would not have created the conditions that forced Syria to seek self-defense means.”
In the following months, Israeli-Lebanese meetings progressed under American sponsorship, and Syria could not persuade Amin Gemayel to withdraw from the negotiations, nor improve the terms. On May 7, 1983, ten days before the agreement was signed, George Shultz arrived in Damascus, bringing the following message:
- The ongoing negotiations to reach an agreement between Lebanon and Israel are the essential first step toward the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, and Ambassador Habib has brought them to a point where only a few specific issues remain.
- President Reagan is determined for these matters to be resolved as soon as possible so that an early withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian forces from Lebanon can be achieved.
After expressing reservations about peace with Israel, Khaddam requested to review the Israeli-Lebanese agreement. Shultz replied that it would be provided by the Lebanese side. Khaddam responded: “You ask for our opinion on an unknown matter. Habib loves ambiguity so the Israelis can interpret as they wish. Meetings have taken place between you and Israel, and I understand that the Israelis requested clarifications. For instance, what are these clarifications, and does the agreement have a set timeframe?”
Shultz replied that the agreement contains a clause stating it can be amended or canceled by mutual consent, leading to the following exchange:
Khaddam: “So, the agreement is permanent?”
Shultz: “Yes, but it can be changed if both parties agree.”
Khaddam: “Will this agreement end the state of war between Israel and Lebanon?”
Shultz: “Yes… There is a clause that stipulates that within a maximum of six months, there will be negotiations under the supervision of the joint liaison committee to make this agreement permanent.”
Khaddam: “Will there be an exchange of goods and people under this agreement?”
Shultz: “During this period, arrangements will be made for this purpose. There is an annex to the agreement that specifies which conventional weapons (will be permitted in southern Lebanon).”
US Secretary of State George Shultz and Syrian Foreign Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam in Syria in 1983
Khaddam: “What is the fate of Saad Haddad and his group (leader of a Lebanese faction allied with Israel)?”
Shultz: “He will not be a commander of the brigade or the area.”
Khaddam: “What will he be?”
Shultz: “The Lebanese are considering that matter.”
Farouk al-Sharaa (Syrian Minister of state for foreign affaires): “Can any Lebanese move freely to the farthest point in the south under this agreement?”
Shultz: “Lebanese citizens will have no restrictions, except for security measures in certain areas.”
Al-Sharaa: “Where does the security zone extend?”
Philip Habib: “From the international border to the Awali River, following its course, then along the terrain south of Barouk Peak, the slopes of Barouk, including the Anni pass, down to the Beqaa.”
Khaddam: “To where in the Beqaa?”
Shultz: “To the end of Lebanese territory… up to the Syrian border.”
Khaddam: “But the Syrian-Lebanese border is not fully delineated yet.”
Habib: “You could resolve that quickly with the Lebanese.”
Khaddam: “What does the agreement say about Syria?”
Shultz: “Not a word… the Lebanese do not want to negotiate on behalf of Syria.”
Khaddam: “One more question… I apologize for the many questions… Let’s suppose the Lebanese do not approve the agreement; what will its fate be?”
Shultz: “I believe, and this is just my guess, Israel will redeploy its forces in Lebanon and attempt to make its occupation of Lebanon permanent.”
Al-Sharaa: “Clearly, there are security arrangements in the south that benefit Israel. What, in return, are the security arrangements that benefit Lebanon?”
Shultz: “Lebanon is building its strength to be able to control its entire territory. We are helping Lebanon by training and equipping its military forces, and everything I have heard suggests that the Lebanese have achieved considerable progress in this regard. Therefore, the opportunity for Lebanon to fully restore its sovereignty enjoys wide support. As part of the general commitments in the agreement, each side commits to refrain from hostile actions against the other. So, there are assurances from Lebanon regarding actions it may take against Israel, and vice versa. Thus, there are broad mutual commitments within this agreement.”
Khaddam: “There has been a special relationship between Lebanon and Syria for several decades. Lebanon and Syria were once one country, and if we look back at Mr. Philip Habib’s records, we would find in the U.S. immigration administration that Mr. Philip Habib’s father was registered as coming from Syria.”
Habib: “My father wouldn’t agree… he says he’s from Turkey.”
Khaddam: “The Lebanese government was not free to negotiate… that’s what the Lebanese Foreign Minister told us. He spoke at length about Israeli pressures, Israeli arrogance, and Israeli threats. On one occasion, he told us, Tamir, a member of the Israeli delegation, requested a specific issue, and the Lebanese side rejected it. Tamir told the Lebanese, ‘If you don’t agree tonight, 300 Druze could be killed, and tomorrow, 10,000 Christians might die.’ This was told to us by the Lebanese Foreign Minister and Brigadier Abbas Hamdan, a member of the negotiating delegation. We didn’t make this up… we heard it from Dr. Elie Salem, and you can ask him. Even President Amin Gemayel was threatened. Sharon visited Sheikh Pierre Gemayel, the father of the president, and told him, ‘You had two sons, now you have one… either you agree, or your son will no longer be president.’ This was also relayed to us by members of the Kataeb Party’s political bureau. What could President Amin Gemayel do, and did he dare to act otherwise? Absolutely not. Is Saad Haddad considered a gain for the Lebanese?”
Shultz: “One of the Israelis’ demands was for Saad Haddad to be either the commander of southern Lebanon or the security zone, or to lead the brigade.”
Khaddam: “We agree to a tripartite withdrawal—Syrian, Palestinian, and Israeli—from Lebanon without conditions, and for this agreement to be put to a public referendum in Lebanon. In that case, we will accept what the Lebanese people decide. But for now, the situation in Lebanon is different; now there is terror being carried out by the Kataeb forces. Killings and destruction happen every day.”
Khaddam spoke about Shultz’s statement regarding the Syrian leadership needing to inform the U.S. military leadership if it wished to fly its planes in Lebanese or Syrian airspace near the border area. The Syrian minister said, “According to international law, in my own country and over my own land, I cannot fly without notifying another country?” Philip replied that this was merely a practical measure to avoid incidents, nothing more. Khaddam concluded the discussion by saying, “We’ve said that once Israel withdraws, we will withdraw from Lebanon, but in our opinion, Israel, under this agreement, will not withdraw.”
After the “May 17 Agreement” was officially announced, Shultz returned to Damascus on July 6, 1983, and met with Khaddam again. Khaddam unleashed his anger on the agreement, saying it was rejected by a large segment of Lebanese Christians, including the head of the National Bloc, Raymond Edde, and former president Suleiman Frangieh, as well as outright rejection from Walid Jumblatt and Nabih Berri. “If we set aside the Kataeb militias, we find that these two leaders (Jumblatt and Berri) are larger and more powerful (than the Kataeb). All the parties in Lebanon, except the Kataeb, are against the agreement, and if the United States wants to protect the agreement, it needs to send 200,000 Marines instead of 200. The entire population is against the agreement.”
Secret American Visits to Syria
The “May 17 Agreement” deprived Lebanon of having an air defense system for three years, which Khaddam described as a “treaty of submission and surrender.” Shultz met with Assad, who affirmed his minister’s stance: “We confirm Syria’s rejection of the agreement and any discussion or consideration based on this agreement or that recognizes it as legitimate.”
Following the mediation of an Arab leader with President Assad, Robert McFarlane, the Deputy National Security Advisor of the United States, made a secret visit to Damascus on July 17, 1983. He met with Assad, inviting the Syrian president to look beyond the agreement to establish “close relations” with America on both political and economic fronts. He stated that President Reagan believed that before improving relations in this way, he had to address the Arab-Israeli conflict at its roots, calling for cooperation on the matter.
The Americans often promised a comprehensive peace conference for the region and had organized one under President Richard Nixon, which Syria did not attend. Assad showed no interest in the new American proposal, viewing it as a political bribe to ensure Syria’s silence on the “May 17 Agreement,” paving the way for its complete withdrawal from Lebanon.
On August 6, 1983, McFarlane arrived in Damascus for a public visit this time, after being appointed special envoy to President Reagan for the Middle East, with a particular focus on Lebanon. Khaddam asked him, “What would be the position of the United States and Israel if the Lebanese government announced the cancellation of this agreement?” This conversation ensued:
McFarlane: “I don’t expect the Lebanese government will do that.”
Khaddam: “We accept whatever the Lebanese people decide, and then you will see that the Lebanese president will not be able to gain even 5 percent of the Lebanese people’s votes, and you will also see that this treaty will not get 5 percent of their support.”
The next day, the Syrian president met with McFarlane and told him that Syrian forces were deep inside Lebanon, less than 45 kilometers from the border, and that they were prepared to advance if a peace agreement with Israel was imposed. The American envoy responded, “Yesterday, the Israelis reiterated their readiness to withdraw from Lebanon within eight to twelve weeks, provided all foreign forces leave Lebanon.” Khaddam replied, “We agree, provided the agreement is canceled.”
The Syrian stance was interpreted as a dual threat to both the Americans and the Israelis. On August 23, U.S. Ambassador Robert Paganelli in Damascus protested comments attributed to Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass, stating that he would bomb Beirut and the airport if the agreement continued. Khaddam denied that such a statement had been made by the Syrian defense minister. On the 28th of the same month, Khaddam met with the American envoy Fairbanks, who came to express concerns after heavy gunfire targeted American forces in Lebanon by militias aligned with the Syrian army in the south, and artillery shells landed near the American ambassador’s residence. Fairbanks said, “We want Syria to know that the United States intends to defend its personnel against attacks from any side and certainly will not stand by or be passive when our personnel or facilities come under fire.”