Khaddam’s memoirs…the Marine bombing before the Lebanese Geneva dialogue…and America accuses Iran of working “behind the lines” of Syria

Robert McFarlane, Deputy National Security Advisor in the United States, returned to Damascus on September 7, reiterating previous statements about the necessity of a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon to coincide with the Israeli withdrawal. On the 22nd of the same month, he returned to Syria and stated that the Reagan administration “understands and accepts” Syria’s interests in Lebanon, both historically and logistically, and that it “recognizes Syria’s legitimacy in Lebanon.”

The American administration requested that Syria, in coordination with Saudi Arabia, organize a Lebanese dialogue conference in Geneva, Switzerland, attended by Abdul Halim Khaddam and all Lebanese parties who had not sat together at the same table since the outbreak of the civil conflict in their country in 1975.

President Ronald Reagan’s administration wanted to involve Syria in the Lebanese political process, immersing it in the details and responsibilities, hoping that this would eventually persuade Syrian President Hafez al-Assad to withdraw militarily from Lebanon while maintaining political influence.

Riyadh introduced non-combatant figures to the dialogue table whom it trusted and believed held sound political positions, such as Saeb Salam, Raymond Edde, and Adel Osseiran. Meanwhile, Washington supported President Amin Gemayel, and Damascus remained committed to its traditional allies, Walid Jumblatt and Nabih Berri. Syria accepted Gemayel as the head of the national dialogue, acknowledging his position as president and his prominent Maronite family background, but refused to let him sit at the head of the table. Instead, the participants were seated face-to-face: one side representing the United States, and the other representing Syria and Saudi Arabia. When asked about this arrangement, Khaddam explained, “We do not like the round shape; it is not aesthetically pleasing. We prefer the rectangular shape.”

Nevertheless, Khaddam sought to win Gemayel over, hoping to persuade him of the dangers of the “May 17 Agreement.” The Syrians did not intend to defeat Amin Gemayel in Geneva; rather, they wanted to appease him as much as possible and draw him into the Syrian-Saudi camp, despite their lukewarm attitude towards him. In his private notes, Khaddam wrote, “When he used to come to my office (before he became president), he would stay for three hours, constantly asserting his candidacy. He is a president, but he is not above us.” Khaddam quoted President Assad, who felt “pity” for Gemayel, saying, “Amin Gemayel and his father evoked feelings of pity in us. I would say that our emotional response played a role in our entry into Lebanon, as we could not stand idly by, watching people slaughter each other, all of them our people.”

The Attack on the Marine Barracks on the Eve of Geneva Talks

A week before the Geneva conference, a bomb-laden truck crashed into the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, while another struck the French forces’ barracks, causing two massive explosions at 6 a.m. on October 23, 1983. The attack killed over 250 Americans and around 90 French soldiers. Armed groups with ties to Iran were immediately blamed, especially after the attack was claimed by an obscure faction called “Islamic Jihad.” The same faction had previously claimed responsibility for the April 18, 1983, suicide bombing on the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, which killed 17 Americans and 32 Lebanese citizens.

One connection between the 1982 and 2024 conflicts, separated by four decades, is that Hezbollah leaders Fouad Shakr and Ibrahim Aqil, recently assassinated by Israel, were involved in the 1983 attack on the Marines. At that time, Hezbollah had not been officially formed; groups like “Islamic Jihad” were growing in anticipation of the official announcement of the party.

Following the 1983 Marine barracks bombing, the United States stated that Iranian elements in Lebanon were operating “behind Syrian lines,” allied with Syria, which should bear responsibility for any Iranian actions in Lebanon, regardless of its knowledge of specific terrorist plans. Less than two hours after the bombing, U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger pointed fingers at Iran and Syria. Secretary of State George Shultz presented a statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committees, saying, “Our goal in Lebanon is a political, not military, solution. The presence of our Marines was a fundamental pillar of stability to make a political solution possible. The primary responsibility lies with the Lebanese Armed Forces, whom we have helped train and equip and who are more than a match for their Lebanese adversaries. Their challenges, however, stem from facing forces that are sheltered, armed, and supported by Syria. Israel is also a crucial factor in Lebanon, and we need its constructive efforts to support the Lebanese government and the reconciliation process. Israel has influence among certain sectarian groups, and we hope it uses that influence to encourage a political settlement.”

Marines evacuate American, European, and other foreign civilians who were transported by American military helicopters to ships off the coast of Beirut, 1984.

Syria and its proxies “hindered our efforts to remove foreign forces and expedite a political settlement,” according to Shultz. “While no one questions Syria’s legitimate security concerns regarding Lebanon, unlike Israel, Syria is unwilling to negotiate with Lebanon on aligning its security interests with Lebanon’s sovereign right to determine its future.”

Iran responded through its Chief Justice, saying, “The Islamic people of Lebanon have taught the United States and France a lesson about refraining from aggression against oppressed peoples.” While the Syrian government condemned the bombing, state newspapers welcomed it, writing about what they called the “Lebanese National Resistance.”

Amid escalating U.S. pressure, an increase in American forces off Lebanon’s coast, intensified Washington-Tel Aviv communications, and the Begin government’s call-up of reserves, the Syrian military leadership called its own reserves into service, preparing for potential military confrontation with the Americans in Lebanon. Syria’s ambassador in Washington was summoned and informed that the United States “does not intend any hostile action against Syria,” expressing surprise at Syria’s call to arms. A U.S. State Department spokesperson stated, “We urge restraint, and neither the United States nor Israel is planning any military action in Lebanon against Syria.”

On November 12, 1983, U.S. Ambassador Robert Paganelli met with Syrian Minister Khaddam in Damascus, stating that rocket launchers were deployed on the outskirts of Beirut and near Aley, aimed at American ships in the sea and Beirut Airport. Some of these weapons, he added, were in the hands of Syria’s Druze allies (Walid Jumblatt’s group). “We therefore officially request that you prevent such potential attacks in areas where Syrian forces are present. We attach great importance to this matter, and I don’t need to emphasize what President Reagan and Secretary Shultz have said—that there should be no doubt that we will not hesitate to protect our forces and take the necessary military measures, and we will use all available means to safeguard our interests in Lebanon.”

The Syrian side replied that their forces were not present in Beirut at the time of the attack on the Marine barracks, stating, “We do not want aggression against anyone, and we also want accusations not to be cast recklessly.” Ambassador Paganelli replied, “Most evidence suggests that the attack came from Iranians, and Syria is blamed because it allowed Iranians to pass through its territory. They receive support from you, so Syria is responsible for what happens, which is not in Syria’s interest. Syria’s interest is in controlling these actions.” Deputy Foreign Minister Issam al-Naib intervened, saying, “Regarding Syria being blamed for allowing Iranians to pass through, I would like to ask: Can we prevent Iranians, with whom we have good relations, from traveling through our land? Does an Iranian’s passage automatically mean they are going to commit an attack?”

U.S. Ambassador: Of course… If Iranians are traveling to join a group whose objectives create a problem for America, then Syria, as a sovereign government, should take action to prevent it. The attack on the Marines was a malicious act of terrorism aimed at destabilizing the situation and forcing foreign forces out of Lebanon. If that was the aim, it has failed. The American people support President Reagan in keeping forces in Lebanon to restore stability, and there is broad consensus that if the forces were withdrawn, the situation would deteriorate dramatically.