Our alliance with the Islamic Republic aimed to overthrow Saddam Hussein and holds the key to the secret of Syrian-Iranian relations. When I decided to write this book, I took it upon myself to present the facts objectively and analyze them away from emotions and their effects. In the first chapter of his first political memoir, The Syrian-Iranian Alliance and the Region, the controversial Syrian politician, former Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam, presents some of the events he witnessed, participated in, or learned about. He reveals how Damascus opened its territory to Tehran’s activity and assisted in establishing its regional alliances in inflamed areas from Pakistan and Afghanistan to Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine.
Before delving into the details of Syrian-Iranian relations, Khaddam points out the escalation of American interest in Iran since the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War with the Soviets. America provided significant assistance to the Shah of Iran, considering his country as the first line of defense against Soviet expansion. He then presents how Washington uses the Iranian nuclear file as a cover for major issues that cause concern and fear in the West, with the nature of the Islamic regime being the most important among them.
Khaddam believes that the dispute between Washington and Tehran did not start because of the taking of American hostages in its embassy in Iran but rather started at the moment the Shah’s regime collapsed, and Khomeini arrived in Tehran. He described America as the Great Satan. In his opinion, the United States and Israel are obstacles to Iran’s regional goals. However, he points out the difficulty of the American bet on blowing up the internal situation in Iran, considering that external tensions will weaken the ability of the internal opposition.
Abdel Halim Khaddam traces the early beginnings of Syrian-Iranian relations, how the President of the Supreme Shiite Council in Lebanon, Mr. Musa Al-Sadr, played the main role in it, and how the author’s relationship with Iran began until Syria settled on the signing of a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union and the establishment of an alliance with the Islamic Republic. He revealed the Syrian objectives of the alliance with Iran, the most prominent of which was the overthrow of the Iraqi regime, which put Damascus at war with it while it was fighting Iran.
Khaddam said that despite the ideological contradiction between the secular regime in Syria and the Islamic regime in Iran, this only led to the consolidation of the alliance, considering that the main issues were not disputed. He admits that the nature of the regime in Damascus did not allow Syria to have a long-term strategy but produced an arena in which the regime could maneuver, which led to Syria considering fighting a war to liberate the Golan because of the inability to build the state and its institutions.
In important areas of the memoirs, Khaddam tells about the nature of the relationship of the late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad with Lebanese politicians and his confidence in them. He also explains why mostly Christian and Sunni Muslim politicians were not safe.
The third part of Khaddam’s book sheds light on the effective Iranian entry into Lebanon during the Israeli invasion of its territory in 1982. It describes how Iran’s influence in Lebanon grew and the tasks carried out by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard in the country.
Despite this, President Hafez al-Assad was not worried about Iranian influence and did not consider Iran’s expansionist ambitions. He also details how Syria continued to support Hezbollah since its establishment, despite the dispute between Damascus and the late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, which Iran exacerbated.
In one chapter, Khaddam recounts a conversation between himself and the Iranian ambassador that included Ataba from Damascus to Tehran. He questioned the reasonability of Hezbollah’s weight to Iran being greater than that of Syria.
Another important chapter discusses Hafez al-Assad’s attempts to stop the Iran-Iraq war in its early days due to Saddam Hussein’s intransigence. Some in the Gulf anticipated Iraq’s quick victory, which, along with other events, led to an imbalance in Syrian-Gulf relations, reaching a point of tension in some periods.
Khaddam also reveals his personal role in providing assurances to the Gulf states regarding Iranian intentions towards them. He discusses the content of his visit to their leaders, the atmosphere in the region, the nature of relations between its countries, and how Iraqi-Iranian reconciliation was much easier than reconciliation between Damascus and Baghdad.
The book is published in four episodes, and this is the third part.
In this chapter, former Syrian Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam details the early beginnings of Syrian-Iranian relations. He explains that these relations started during the time of the Shah regime in Iran, and some factions of the Iranian opposition established good relations with Syria. Mr. Musa al-Sadr, the President of the Supreme Shiite Islamic Council in Lebanon, played a major role in these relations through the Party for the Liberation of Iran, whose most prominent leaders were Mehdi Bazargan, Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi, Sadegh Tabatabai, Sadiq Qutb Zadeh, and Mustafa Shamran. After the success of the revolution, Mehdi Bazargan became the Prime Minister of Iran, Sadegh Tabatabaei became the Deputy Prime Minister, and Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi became the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was succeeded after his resignation by Sadegh Qutb Zadeh. Mustafa Shamran took over the Ministry of Defense, according to Khaddam.
Khaddam explains that Damascus received the success of the Islamic Revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini with great pleasure and deep optimism, at a time when the region was under the pressure of Arab divisions and Israeli attacks. Even the late President Hafez Al-Assad sent a warm congratulatory message to Ayatollah Khomeini in which he stressed Syria’s commitment to comprehensive cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran. He also expressed the satisfaction of the Syrian people for the success of the revolution.
He added, “In early August 1979, I received an invitation from Iran’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi. I arrived in Tehran on August 15, 1979, where I was received at the airport by Dr. Yazdi, Mr. Sadegh Tabtabaei, and several Iranian officials. In the early hours of the next morning, around 3 am, my companion came into my bedroom and woke me up, telling me that Sheikh Mohammed Montazeri and a group wanted to meet me. I was surprised by the unscheduled visit at that hour and asked my chaperone to take them to the reception room while I dressed.
He added, “At eleven o’clock, I met with Dr. Mehdi Bazargan, the Prime Minister, with Dr. Yazdi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Tabtabaei, the Deputy Prime Minister, present. Dr. Bazargan spoke about the goals of the revolution and the popular consensus to support it. He stressed that the Islamic Revolution in Iran aimed to build strong relations with brotherly Syria. I then congratulated them on the success of the revolution in the name of the Syrian leadership and expressed our hopes that it would move Iran from one stage to a new phase where Arab-Iranian cooperation is integrated. The former Vice President of Syria explained that we agreed to develop relations, continue consultation between the two countries, cooperate in all fields, and coordinate efforts and positions on all issues that concern us. On the second day, I participated in Friday prayers at Tehran University on the occasion of Jerusalem Day. The prayers and celebrations on the occasion were remarkable in terms of the large number of participants, which exceeded several hundred thousand, and the cheers for Jerusalem and death to Israel.”
Khaddam continues his story: After returning to Damascus, I was impressed by the organization and determination of all the leaders I met. They were united in one cause: achieving the goals of the revolution. Remarkably, the unity of goals did not prevent differences between leaders in the state over working methods from achieving their goals. This made me certain that Iran had entered a new phase that would have subsequent implications and roles in regional and international policies.
At that point, we had two main options that played a major role in determining the course of Syrian policy. First, signing a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union, and second, establishing an alliance with the Islamic Republic. Our options were limited: a war with Israel was not possible due to a change in key elements in the equation after Egypt’s exit and the dispute with Iraq, which led to a significant imbalance of power. Objectively, activating resistance to the occupation in Syria was not possible because of the nature of the regime and its inability to bear the consequences of the resistance. Resistance requires a popular situation ready to bear the burdens and a political system based on the people. This was not possible.
The option of signing a friendship treaty with the Soviets provided Soviet military and political support that would limit the possibility of Israel’s aggression against Syria due to the Soviet obligations under the treaty.
Khaddam said that Syria had set several goals for its alliance with Iran, namely:
- Supporting our position on the conflict with Israel. In particular, since the early days of the Islamic Revolution’s success, it has taken a firm stance in supporting the Palestinian people and calling for the liberation of Palestine.
- Overthrowing the Iraqi regime, with which we were at war at a time when it was fighting Iran.
- Avoiding the extension of the war to the Arab countries in the Gulf, as this would lead to the region being plunged into the scourge of war on the one hand and, on the other hand, would lead the Arab countries to seek refuge in the United States and break the link between them and the arena of conflict with Israel.
He added: We are convinced that despite the ideological contradiction between our secular system and the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran, we did not have any disagreement regarding the main issues.
He further added: When we made a decision to ally with Iran, we did not have in mind the formation of a regional force for the liberation of Palestine because the existing factors were not available at the time. However, the question of Palestine and the conflict with Israel were among the factors that brought us together with Iran. On the other hand, international and regional balances are against the intensity of the formation of this regional force.
Khaddam acknowledged that the nature of the regime did not allow Syria to have a long-term strategy. Instead, it created an arena in which the regime could maneuver. In addition, the regime itself did not provide the factors of its own strength because it was not concerned with maintaining its security. This was different for Iran.
He continued, “It should be recognized that Iran operated under a clearly defined strategy and prepared its people to implement its policies. In other words, the Iranian leadership had great ambitions and acted accordingly.”
Khaddam added, “On the other hand, the situation in Syria was different. The regime’s leadership had no major ambitions, nor did it have the intention to fight a war to liberate the Golan. War was the last thing the regime’s leadership thought about after Egypt signed its peace treaty with Israel, and after the collapse of relations between us and Iraq. In addition, another factor was the inability to build the state and its institutions. When the state becomes unstable, it becomes without protective walls, and when the people lose their role, the state becomes devoid of all the reasons for protection.”
He believes that Iran has succeeded in using its relationship with Syria to achieve a set of goals defined by Syria’s contribution to preventing the war between Iran and Iraq from turning into an Iranian-Arab war. Iran has also succeeded in building a base in Lebanon through the establishment of Hezbollah, which has served Syrian and Iranian policies in draining Israel and removing it from Lebanon. Under the Syrian-Iranian umbrella, Hezbollah has formed a force that serves Iranian strategic goals in the region and has helped it spread in the Palestinian arena.
Iraq-Iran war
Khaddam said, “When Iraq entered the war with Iran, Hafez al-Assad began working on a ceasefire when a clash occurred between Iraqi and Iranian forces, and Iraqi forces entered Iranian territory. We did not have in mind to take a stand against Iraq or Iran. President Hafez al-Assad made contacts with some Arab presidents to work towards stopping the fighting.”
The Iraqi regime had put Syria in a situation where the only solution was to stand against the war it launched against Iran. This contributed to the growth of direct and serious relations between Syria and Iran, which happened through several stages. The most crucial stage was the shared hostility towards Saddam Hussein, which was the common denominator between Damascus and Tehran.
As the situation evolved, both on the battlefield and in the region, relations shifted from the shared point with Saddam’s regime to an alliance between the two countries. This alliance included the conflicts with Iraq, the conflict with Israel, the situation in Lebanon, and Syrian-Iranian relations with the Gulf states.
Despite the intellectual and ideological contradiction between the ruling regimes in Syria and the Islamic revolution in Iran, an alliance strengthened by common interests and shared concerns has grown. Relations have expanded to include a range of fundamental issues for both countries, including economic interests between them.
He added: Political cooperation was extensive in all fields. Syria used to defend Iranian policy in all Arab and international conferences, meetings, and forums. It provided the Islamic Revolution with all kinds of assistance and political support. Syria suffered significant damage due to the suspension of aid by the Gulf countries to Syria. The Iranian leadership has tried to compensate for this by providing assistance of one million barrels of oil per year to Syria, in addition to a set of economic agreements.
According to Khaddam, in the military field, the Syrian government helped Iran by convincing the Soviet Union to order Eastern European countries to sell heavy weapons to Iran, which was actually done through Syria. Contracts were signed in the name of Syria, and Iran was paying the value of weapons supplied to Latakia port and from there by aircraft to Tehran. The countries that contracted the weapons were Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, in particular.
We did not intend to annex Lebanon
We did not intend to annex Lebanon, nor did we question the legitimacy of the Lebanese state. Rather, we aimed to maintain influence in Lebanon, direct its foreign policies, and prevent Israel and its opponents from exploiting Lebanon.
Despite the fact that the Syrian military intervention was requested by the leadership of the Lebanese Front and President Suleiman Franjieh, Hafez al-Assad did not trust Christian leaders. This was due to severe military pressure on Christian areas by the National Movement and Palestinian organizations. President Suleiman Franjieh was the only Christian leader he trusted. Assad’s attitude towards other political leaders was flexible, sometimes treating them as allies and other times as enemies.
Assad did not trust the political leaders of Sunni Muslims because he believed they were connected to Saudi Arabia and thus not trustworthy. Unfortunately, President Saeb Salam became a victim of this situation when he was removed from office despite Khaddam’s efforts to prevent his removal. Salam’s father was also one of the main leaders in Lebanon who sympathized with Syria at that time.
He added, “Assad considered the Shiite community to be the closest to the regime in Syria and the most responsive to the regime. He did not trust the traditional political leaders of this community. He had deep confidence in Mr. Musa Al-Sadr. After his absence, trust was transferred to Mr. Nabih Berri (Speaker of Parliament). Mr. Nabih Berri became trusted, despite the fact that some leaders, such as Mr. Hussein Al-Husseini, were carrying the banner of Syrian politics in Lebanon.
Berri became the most prominent politician in his sect and received full political and military support. The Amal movement (led by Berri) became the armed militia most closely associated with the regime in Syria. We helped it in its conflicts with Al-Murabitoun movement, the Progressive Socialist Party, the Palestinians, and then with Hezbollah.
Khaddam tells the story of the wider and effective Iranian entry into Lebanon during the Israeli invasion of Lebanese territory in early June 1982. He says, “The Iranian leadership made a decision at that time to send a brigade of the Revolutionary Guard to Syria, in agreement with us. Indeed, the IRGC brigade arrived within a few days of the start of the fighting. Most of them went to Lebanon, specifically to the Baalbek Hermel area. Thus, the process of Iranian influence in Lebanon began. One of the tasks of the Revolutionary Guard was to form Hezbollah, organize, support, and train the Islamic resistance operation. The Iranian approach was to ensure that the party did not slip into Lebanese political life but focused on the resistance, expanded it, and increased its effectiveness.
Regarding the Syrian position, he says that in practice, he sympathizes with Amal movement. Only President Hafez al-Assad was sympathetic to Hezbollah and gave instructions to the army command and security services to help him. He based his position on the fact that the party had become the main resistance force after the decline of Amal movement and the national parties. Therefore, it should be relied upon to resist and exhaust Israel.
Most Syrian officers in Lebanon were sympathetic to the Amal movement and were not inclined to support Hezbollah, as it is an Islamic party. They, the Syrian officers, are still under the weight of the bloody incidents that took place in Syria between the state and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Concern about Iranian influence
Khaddam continues: President Hafez al-Assad was not concerned about Iranian influence, nor did he have in mind that Iran was building a military and political base in Lebanon aimed at serving its strategy. He did not think that Iran had an ambition to expand regionally. It was an alliance with which we cooperated in confronting the Iraqi regime.
Regarding his interview with the Iranian ambassador, Khaddam says that he told the ambassador, “The propaganda that seeks to separate Syria and Hezbollah is nothing but a conspiracy and propaganda for their own benefit. Syria is a strong supporter of Hezbollah. Of course, you know that officials in Iran are subject to some kind of popular pressure because the popular masses in Iran, based on their love, inclination, and longing for the Syrian leadership, cannot believe it.”
He added, “It is unfortunate that some figures in Iran put Syria on one side and Hezbollah on the other side. We appreciate that there is a mobilization hostile to Syria, but we expect that the leadership in Iran will translate it, as we do any anti-Iranian mobilization in Syria. If a citizen speaks one word against Iran, we will put him in prison. If a group of people criticize Iran, we will deal with it strongly. This is how we understand the concern for relations between the two countries, stressing that responsibility in Lebanese affairs lies with Syria because Lebanon has special relations with Syria. We are one people. In addition, what is happening directly reflects on Syria’s security and policy in the region. This policy should be supported by our friends in the Islamic Republic of Iran because its basic lines are consistent with its anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist policies.”
But remember, as Khaddam addressed the Iranian ambassador to his country, we were warned several times of breaches within Hezbollah by three parties: Yasser Arafat, the Iraq group, and the second Lebanese office. We were concerned about the dangers of these breaches, as we feared that the groups that infiltrated Hezbollah would carry out actions that would harm its role in Lebanon and its relations with Syria. Unfortunately, these warnings were not given the necessary importance by the leadership of Hezbollah. However, we used to distinguish between the party as a building and a trend and between groups planted here and there doing negative actions. We still value this distinction and do not want this party to disappear, because we do not want any Lebanese who raises the slogan of fighting Israel to disappear.
Regarding the clash between Hezbollah and the Syrian forces in Lebanon at some stage, the former Syrian Vice President said, “Is it reasonable that Hezbollah’s weight in Iran is greater than that of Syria? If that is the case, the situation is painful. We believe that the relationship with Iran is more important than a hundred organizations. We consider the relationship with Iran to be based on a common vision of our joint tasks against imperialism and Zionism. This is the picture. We hope that before it comes out to the media, please contact us and ask for clarification: ‘O those who believed, if a punk comes to you with a report, find out that you will hurt people with ignorance and become sorry for what you have done.’ All channels are open between you and us at any time.”
This marks the end of the adab talk between the former Vice President of Syria and the Iranian ambassador in Damascus.
