The former vice president of the Syrian regime, Abdel Halim Khaddam, unveiled in his memoirs, which were published by the Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper, five reasons that led to the catastrophe in 1967. The most prominent among these reasons was the decision to shift the army’s allegiance from loyalty to the homeland to loyalty to the regime.
According to Khaddam, the Arab countries have yet to take adequate measures to analyze the causes of the “Nakbah” and the factors contributing to the weakness of the Arab position. The decision made was to sign the “Joint Arab Defense Agreement,” which, although beneficial in its provisions, remained stagnant due to the lack of establishment of its institutions and tools, similar to the subsequent developments in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Western countries and the Warsaw Pact in Eastern European countries.
Secondly, divisions within the Arab arena and the formation of two political blocs exacerbated the situation. The first bloc included Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria, while the second comprised Iraq and Jordan. Tensions heightened further with Iraq’s participation in the “Central Alliance,” formed by Iran, Turkey, and Iraq, with the support and involvement of Britain. The objective of establishing the “Central Alliance” was to prevent Soviet infiltration into the Middle Eastern countries.
Thirdly, the bloc consisting of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria failed to establish a defense structure.
Fourthly, while the United States and Western countries embraced Israel and provided it with financial and military assistance, the Arab countries found themselves lacking any ally to support them with military aid that would enable them to safeguard their territories and defend themselves.
The invitation extended by the Soviet Union to President Shukri al-Quwatli to visit Moscow in 1955 resulted in an arms deal with Syria, similar to what happened with Egypt. However, both countries failed to make a definitive decision regarding the nature of their relations with the Soviets. Consequently, they were unable to obtain military support equivalent to that received by Israel. The two countries remained on the fringes of friendship without venturing into an alliance due to the pressure exerted by certain Arab nations and the West. This situation is unjustifiable, as if both countries had made such a decision and engaged in negotiations with the Soviet Union, they could have secured the necessary support.
Furthermore, another significant reason was the decision to shift the army’s allegiance from loyalty to the homeland to loyalty to the regime. This choice resulted in the dismissal of numerous officers in both Syria and Egypt. In Syria, the Baathists made a grave error by transforming the Baath Party into a totalitarian party that held sole power and decision-making authority. As a consequence, Nasserite officers were dismissed, despite the signing of the tripartite agreement between Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, which included a union between the three countries.
The military committee that assumed control of the armed forces also dismissed General Ziad Hariri and his associates from the Syrian army, along with a significant number of non-Baathist officers, accusing them of being “reactionary.” Consequently, the army was depleted of competent officers while conscripted officers in reserve, deemed reliable solely due to their Baathist affiliation, were called upon for military service. Moreover, the party leadership adopted a stringent approach both domestically and in foreign relations, particularly with other Arab countries, leading to its isolation. It was under these circumstances that the Israeli aggression against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan occurred on 5 June 1967.